Is communication technology conducive to collective violence? Recent studies have provided conflicting answers to the same question. While some see the introduction of cellular communication as a contributing factor to civil conflict in Africa (Pierskalla and Hollenbach APSR 2013), others ascribe an opposite effect to mobile communications in Iraq (Shapiro and Weidmann IO forthcoming). During the talk, I will further explore the logic behind "Why the revolution will not be tweeted", and argue that the answer lies in contagion processes of collective action at the periphery, not the hierarchical schemes of central coordination as was argued before. To provide evidence, I will draw on historical accounts of social revolutions, a GIS study of the Syrian Civil War, a convenience survey sample from the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, as well as network experiments of collective risk-taking in a controlled setting.

Speaker Bio

Navid Hassanpour (Ph.D.s in Political Science from Yale'14, and Electrical Engineering from Stanford'06) studies political contestation, in its contentious and electoral forms. Following an inquiry into collective and relational dimensions of contentious politics, currently he is working on a project that examines the history, emergence, and the dynamics of representative democracy outside the Western World. This year he is a Niehaus postdoctoral fellow at Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of public and International Affairs. His work has appeared in Political Communication as well as IEEE Transactions on Information Theory. His book project, Leading from the Periphery, is under consideration at Cambridge University Press' Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences Series.

This event is part of the Liberation Technology Seminar Series. 

Abstract: While non-democratic states often restrict traditional civil liberties such as speech, media, and association, the degree of Internet freedom permitted varies dramatically across states.  This paper uses a mixed-method approach to analyze global patterns of Internet policy across hybrid and authoritarian regimes, and to offer a model of key causal factors and processes influencing policy choice – particularly the choice whether to adopt restrictive policies that limit Internet use and content or to permit the development of and access to a vibrant uncensored Internet.  Large-N analysis identifies global patterns of Internet restrictions and examines how these patterns appear to be changing as Internet penetration increases.  The paper also draws on research from the Russian Federation, tracing changes in domestic Internet policy choices and their relation to political instability and control, examining a critical period of policy change in a regime that had previously stood out for its relatively unrestricted Internet. 

About the Speaker: Jaclyn Kerr is a doctoral candidate in government at Georgetown University. Her research examines the Internet policies adopted by authoritarian and hybrid regimes in their attempts to adapt to the potentially destabilizing influence of growing Internet penetration.  She holds a BAS in Mathematics and Slavic Studies, and an MA in Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies from Stanford University.  In 2013-2014, Ms. Kerr was a research fellow at the Center for the Study of New Media and Society at the New Economic School in Moscow, while conducting field research for her dissertation.  She has worked as a research assistant at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard, has been an IREX EPS Fellow at the U.S. Embassy in Kazakhstan, a Research Fellow at Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar, an IREX YLF Fellow in Saint Petersburg, Russia, and has previous professional experience as a software engineer. She joins CISAC as a Cybersecurity Predoctoral Fellow for 2014-2015.