Erin Baggot Carter and Brett Carter describe how Beijing’s repression reaches all the way to American classrooms.
Ali Çarkoğlu, a political scientist specializing in elections, voting behavior, and Turkish politics, presented an analysis of Turkey's electoral dynamics from 1990 to 2023 at a CDDRL research seminar. His study focused on the interplay between social cleavages, democratic backsliding, and their impact on political competition and voter behavior. Using data from the World Values Survey and Turkish Election Studies, Çarkoğlu explored the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the enduring influence of cultural divides on Turkey’s political landscape.
Central to his analysis was the "alla Turca kulturkampf," a concept describing the deep-rooted center-periphery divide in Turkish politics. This cleavage reflects a cultural conflict between two contrasting societal visions: the Kemalist ideal of secularism, gender equality, and scientific rationalism versus the pro-Islamist focus on tradition, religion, and family values. Despite the AKP’s success in bringing peripheral groups into the state’s institutional core, these cultural divides persist as a primary source of polarization. Çarkoğlu argued that this polarization has entrenched partisan loyalty and overshadowed other factors in shaping voter behavior.
A key theme of the presentation was Turkey's democratic backsliding, characterized by the erosion of democratic institutions, curtailment of civil liberties, and electoral manipulation. Çarkoğlu noted that Turkey ranks 148th on the liberal democracy index, illustrating its significant democratic decline. He linked these trends to heightened polarization, which weakens opposition forces and reduces the influence of traditional electoral cleavages. Instead of fostering competitive elections, the political landscape is increasingly dominated by entrenched party loyalties and identity-driven politics.
The presentation also highlighted the significant social and economic changes Turkey has undergone since 1990. Urbanization surged from 61% in 1992 to 78% in 2024, while agriculture’s share of employment dropped from 45% to 17%. Economic growth has raised per capita income from $2,000 to $10,000, but inequality remains pervasive, and safety nets are inadequate. Women’s labor force participation remains low at 35%, and educational disparities persist. Household sizes have decreased, and the dependency ratio has dropped from 65 to 47 over 30 years. However, these societal shifts have had limited political consequences, as electoral dynamics remain anchored in longstanding cultural cleavages.
Çarkoğlu’s findings indicated that Turkey’s party system has remained "frozen" for the past three decades. While socio-demographic factors play a declining role in explaining voter behavior, attitudinal variables such as group identity and cultural values have gained prominence. This shift reflects how polarization has solidified, with partisan loyalty reinforcing competitive authoritarianism.
Çarkoğlu emphasized that the weakening of electoral cleavages has facilitated democratic backsliding by reducing opposition effectiveness and enabling strategic manipulation. Despite rapid social change, entrenched cultural divides and polarization have prevented political transformation. His research underscores the importance of addressing institutional decline, polarization, and social inequality to combat democratic erosion. Turkey’s experience offers critical lessons for other unconsolidated democracies facing similar challenges.
Using data from the World Values Survey and Turkish Election Studies, CDDRL Visiting Scholar Ali Çarkoğlu explores the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the enduring influence of cultural divides on Turkey’s political landscape.
This "Meet Our Researchers" series showcases the incredible scholars at Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). Through engaging interviews conducted by our undergraduate research assistants, we explore the journeys, passions, and insights of CDDRL’s faculty and researchers.
Dr. Didi Kuo is a Center Fellow at Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), manager of the Program on American Democracy in Comparative Perspective at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), and co-director of CDDRL's Fisher Family Honors Program. Her research focuses on democratization, political reform, corruption, and the evolution of political parties. She is the author of Clientelism, Capitalism, and Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2018) and the forthcoming The Great Retreat: How Political Parties Should Behave and Why They Don’t (Oxford University Press, 2025). Dr. Kuo has been an Eric and Wendy Schmidt Fellow at New America and is a non-resident fellow with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She received a PhD in political science from Harvard University, an MSc in Economic and Social History from Oxford University, where she studied as a Marshall Scholar, and a BA from Emory University.
I first became interested in politics growing up in the American South during the early stages of today’s polarized era. Living in a deeply conservative area during the rise of partisan media and in Newt Gingrich’s congressional district sparked my curiosity about politics and its broader implications.
In college, my interest expanded beyond American democracy. Post-Cold War debates on democratization and the U.S.’s role in promoting democracy, particularly during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan after 9/11, shaped my desire to explore democracy, governance, and international policy—questions that remain critical today.
I majored in political science, pursued graduate studies in the UK, and worked at think tanks where I saw PhDs bridging research and policy. This inspired me to pursue a doctorate. After earning my PhD, I was fortunate to join CDDRL as a postdoctoral fellow, where I’ve found the ideal environment to explore these issues and contribute to broader discussions on democracy and development.
I don’t tend to think of my findings as particularly “exciting” in the traditional sense, as they often reaffirm long-standing conventional wisdom. However, one key insight that my research reinforces is that stable and thriving democratic societies require not just strong democratic institutions but also robust intermediary organizations.
My new book focuses on political parties, which are a prime example of these intermediary organizations. Much of my research highlights the importance of understanding not just what governments and institutions look like, but how they link to society. How do they connect with citizens? How do they convince citizens that government actions are meaningful and worthwhile? These are critical questions for democracy.
I believe you cannot fully grasp concepts like governance, democracy, or even state capacity without understanding the role of these intermediaries. They play a vital role in bridging the gap between institutions and the public, ensuring that democracy is not just about structures but about meaningful engagement with citizens. This finding matters because, without these linkages, even the strongest institutions risk losing public trust and legitimacy.
When I arrived at Stanford 10 years ago, I noticed a disconnect: while political science views strong political parties as essential for democratic success, public opinion often sees them as a problem. At CDDRL, I observed how many outside academia dislike or even distrust parties, despite their historical link to stability and democratic consolidation.
My book was inspired by this gap. It defends political parties, arguing that many of democracy’s challenges over the past 50 years stem from weaker parties—not stronger ones. My goal is to challenge the narrative that parties are the problem and show how strengthening them is key to addressing today’s democratic challenges.
That's a critical question. Angelo Panebianco’s 1988 concept of the "electoral-professional party" highlights how professionalized parties prioritize winning elections over grassroots connections—a trend that has only intensified with today’s competitive elections and internal party factions.
Despite electoral success through strategies like PR and micro-targeting, parties struggle to meaningfully connect with voters, leading to dissatisfaction, distrust, and rising disillusionment. This indicates that a purely electoral focus is unsustainable.
Parties are unlikely to shift strategies without electoral losses. For instance, Democrats must rebuild trust and align policies with popular interests, while Republicans face the challenge of reconciling their traditional structure with the influence of the MAGA faction.
Both parties need to balance professionalization with public engagement by fostering grassroots connections and building sustainable support. Without recalibration, they risk further alienating voters and undermining trust in democratic institutions.
That’s a great question, and we’re already seeing a partisan realignment. Historically, Democrats and left-leaning parties represented the working class, but now they increasingly draw support from highly educated urban professionals. Meanwhile, right-leaning parties, traditionally backed by elites, are gaining support from the working class.
This shift, driven by education and economic divides, challenges both parties. Democrats must balance appealing to urban professionals and working-class voters, while Republicans struggle to reconcile small-government policies with the needs of a working-class base.
State and local parties may offer insights by experimenting with coalition-building strategies, such as Democrats succeeding in rural areas or centrist Republicans challenging MAGA influence. These cleavages create both opportunities and uncertainty, and how parties manage these divisions will shape the future of U.S. partisanship.
As parties have become more professionalized, their community engagement has become episodic, focused mainly around elections. This has left advocacy and organizing to NGOs, civic groups, and social movements, many of which operate independently or are even anti-party.
To reclaim their social role, parties need to maintain a consistent presence in communities year-round, addressing local issues and collaborating with civic groups. NGOs and social movements, in turn, should see parties as potential partners rather than adversaries, working together to institutionalize their causes and foster democratic engagement.
This relationship should be a two-way street—parties investing in communities and NGOs collaborating within the party system. Together, they can rebuild connections and create a more integrated approach to representation and problem-solving.
I recommend Making Democracy Work by Robert Putnam. While Putnam is better known for Bowling Alone, this book initially captured my interest in political science. It compares governance in northern and southern Italy, introducing the concept of social capital as critical to local institutions' success. Putnam demonstrates how formal institutions and society are deeply interconnected, linking contemporary outcomes to historical legacies of conquest and political development.
Reading it in college while traveling through Italy was transformative—it brought the book to life and showed how political science connects institutions, societies, history, and economics. It’s a great introduction to the field, encouraging young researchers to tackle complex questions and piece together relationships to understand political challenges like democratic backsliding. Each piece of research adds to a larger puzzle, making this work so rewarding.
Examining democratization, political reform, and the role of political parties with Dr. Didi Kuo.
The Chinese government is revolutionizing digital surveillance at home and exporting these technologies abroad. Do these technology transfers help recipient governments expand digital surveillance, impose internet shutdowns, filter the internet, and target repression for online content? We focus on Huawei, the world’s largest telecommunications provider, which is partly state-owned and increasingly regarded as an instrument of its foreign policy. Using a global sample and an identification strategy based on generalized synthetic controls, we show that the effect of Huawei transfers depends on preexisting political institutions in recipient countries. In the world’s autocracies, Huawei technology facilitates digital repression. We find no effect in the world’s democracies, which are more likely to have laws that regulate digital privacy, institutions that punish government violations, and vibrant civil societies that step in when institutions come under strain. Most broadly, this article advances a large literature about the geopolitical implications of China’s rise.
This piece first appeared on the Stanford University Press Blog.
The declaration of martial law on December 3, 2024, in South Korea (hereafter Korea) stunned the world. People are still wondering how such an undemocratic measure could happen in an advanced nation like Korea, long viewed as a beacon of Asian democracy. Simply put, the declaration was President Yoon’s political suicide, based on miscalculations and poor judgment, and he is primarily to blame. His days as Korea’s top leader are numbered, and he may face criminal charges for violating the Constitution and even attempting insurrection.
Still, to understand what has happened and learn any lesson for the future of Korean democracy, we need to consider the larger historical and sociopolitical contexts. As I warned in a 2020 essay, Korea’s democracy had been gradually crumbling in a manner captured by the Korean expression “to become soaked by a light drizzle without noticing.” As I argued in that essay and elsewhere, “the subtle subversion of democratic norms across multiple spheres could one day hit Korea's young democracy with unbearable costs.” This is what we are witnessing today.
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Korea’s struggle for democracy has been a long and arduous journey, marked by many challenges and sacrifices. It began in April 1960 with a student movement, the country’s first large-scale, grassroots expression of the desire for democratic change. That student-led movement toppled the authoritarian Syngman Rhee regime but, in the following year, faced a military coup led by Park Chung Hee. Park ruled until his assassination by his intelligence chief in 1979, which was soon followed by another military coup led by Chun Doon Whan. Chun brutally suppressed civilian protests in the city of Kwangju in May 1980. Many Koreans, including myself, still hold painful memories of the martial laws imposed in 1979 and 1980.
Korea finally transitioned to democracy in 1987 after nationwide protests and has been considered an exemplary case of the “third wave” of democratization. Even after the transition, however, the young Korean democracy faced many challenges, including corruption charges against presidential families and even the suicide of a former president.
The real test for Korean democracy came in 2017, when then-President Park Geun Hye was impeached — a first in the nation’s history — after months of “candlelight” protests that drew tens of millions into the streets. I observed these protests firsthand. Some experts saw them as a sign that Korea’s young democracy had succumbed to populist forces and that its institutions had weakened, but I disagreed. Instead, I argued that these protests represented a movement to redress the violation of democratic institutions by the country’s political elite. Far from signaling a crisis of democracy, I further argued, Park’s impeachment was a step forward.
I had high hopes for the Moon Jae In administration that came into power through the following snap elections. President Moon, a former human rights lawyer, promised to create a new nation where “the opportunities are equal, the process is fair, and the result is just.” The public applauded his efforts: his approval ratings soared above 80 percent during his first year in office.
Yet, warning signs did not take long to appear in various corners of Korean society. The Moon administration showed no qualms about embracing populist tactics, presenting itself as the champion of ordinary citizens in a battle against the establishment elite. In particular, this approach included a brutal campaign of political retribution to “eradicate deep-rooted evils,” which shed bad blood among conservatives. Many intellectuals in and outside Korea, including myself, grew increasingly concerned by illiberal and populist trends in Korea’s politics. This diagnosis formed the basis for my co-edited book, South Korea’s Democracy in Crisis (2022), which identifies illiberalism, populism, and polarization as key threats to the country’s hard-won democracy.
Yoon Suk-Yeol came into power in this toxic political environment, where democratic norms such as mutual toleration, coexistence, and compromise have become increasingly rare. Much like the 2020 U.S. presidential election, which was a pitched battle between pro- and anti-Trump forces, Korea’s 2022 presidential election was characterized by extreme confrontation between pro- and anti-regime forces. In both cases, a coalition of opposition groups won a narrow victory after a bruising election campaign. Yoon’s razor-thin margin of victory over his opponent Lee Jae-Myung—a mere 0.73 percentage points—is a sobering illustration of just how polarized Korea has become.
Like Joe Biden, Yoon won the conservative party’s nomination not necessarily because he provided a new vision or possessed appealing leadership qualities, but rather because he was regarded as the candidate best positioned to achieve a transfer of power. As a career prosecutor with little political preparation or experience, Yoon entered politics building on his reputation as a strong, corruption-fighting figure unyielding to political pressures. From the outset, however, his political ascendancy raised concerns. As I wrote in a 2022 column shortly after he was elected president, I felt “more apprehension than hope for the future.”
Korean politics, which is defined by a winner-take-all electoral system and a powerful presidency, further intensified tensions between the executive and legislative branches, especially as the opposition controls the National Assembly (with 192 of 300 seats). The Yoon administration was pressuring the opposition with prosecutorial investigations, and opposition leader Lee is now facing trial on multiple criminal charges, including bribery and corruption. In response, the opposition kept passing bills that the president then vetoed, such as the appointment of a special, independent counsel to investigate allegations surrounding First Lady Kim Keon-Hee.
In this highly contentious, polarized political landscape, Yoon’s declaration of martial law can be understood as a desperate attempt to assert control. Reportedly, Yoon said he made the declaration to send a strong warning to the opposition.
Now that both Yoon’s attempt to govern the country through martial law and the opposition’s motion to impeach him failed, Korea will suffer from political turmoil and uncertainties for the foreseeable future. The opposition will continue to press for Yoon’s impeachment, vowing to bring the motion to the floor every week until it is passed, while public anger and protests will only increase. There is no realistic path for Yoon to complete his term, which still has more than two years remaining, but it is uncertain how his presidency will end.
While preparing for a new political leadership, Koreans can reflect on their conflict-ridden journey to democracy and turn this crisis into an opportunity for political reforms. There is broad agreement in Korea that the institutions created by the 1987 democratic Constitution, referred to as the “1987 regime,” have outlived their historical purpose. The 1987 Constitution created an extremely powerful presidency with a single-term limit, giving rise to a host of negative repercussions. All but 47 of the 300 seats in the National Assembly are filled through winner-take-all elections in single-member districts. Constitutional reform is required to address the former, and electoral reform is needed to fix the latter. Political calculations, however, have continued to stymie efforts to overhaul these reforms.
Korea’s political culture must also change. Demonizing opponents, divisive identity politics, and insular political fandoms and populism have no place in a healthy democracy. A pluralistic, democratic society naturally encompasses a wide variety of views.
The turmoil in Korea clearly attests to the urgency of shifting toward a healthier political culture and enacting institutional reform. Without such changes, the country risks facing similar crises in the future.
The historical and sociopolitical contexts of President Yoon’s declaration of martial law and its aftermath
A first-year studying political science and international relations, Soraya is interested in the intersection of democratic promotion and great power politics, studying the causes of democratic recession and development. She has also done research on domestic gender equity and child wellbeing policy. As a Hoover Institution NSAF mentee, she is exploring national security policy.
The faculty and staff of Stanford's Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), as well as the undersigned alumni of the Fisher Family Summer Fellows Program (FFSF, formerly known as the Draper Hills Summer Fellows Program, DHSF), demand the immediate and safe release of our friend and colleague, Jesús Armas, who has been kidnapped by agents of the Venezuelan government.
Jesús has bravely worked with the opposition to promote fair elections and uphold democracy in Venezuela. His abduction is a blatant act of repression aimed at silencing his vital work for freedom and justice.
We call on the Venezuelan government to release Jesús immediately and urge the international community to condemn this attack on democracy and human rights. Jesús inspires us all, and we stand united in solidarity with him and his fight for a brighter future for Venezuela.
Signed,
Tatevik Matinyan, Armenia (DHSF 2022)
Daria Minsky, Belarus (DHSF 2022)
Mariana Mello, Brazil (DHSF 2022)
Tainah Pereira, Brazil (DHSF 2022)
Assefa Getaneh, Ethiopia (DHSF 2022)
Zurab Sanikidze, Georgia (DHSF 2022)
Gabriel Reyes Silva, Guatemala (DHSF 2022)
Ritu Sain, India (DHSF 2022)
Aida Aidarkulova, Kazakhstan (DHSF 2022)
Carol Kiangura, Kenya (DHSF 2022)
Jacqueline Akinyi Okeyo Manani, Kenya (DHSF 2022)
Ainura Usupbekova, Kyrgyz Republic (DHSF 2022)
Alaa Al Sayegh, Lebanon (DHSF 2022)
Jad Maalouf, Lebanon (DHSF 2022)
Natasha E. Feghali, Lebanon (DHSF 2022)
Mariela Saldivar Villalobos, Mexico (DHSF 2022)
Bulgantuya Khurelbaatar, Mongolia (DHSF 2022)
Sarita Pariyar, Nepal (DHSF 2022)
Dr. Babatunde Omilola, Nigeria (DHSF 2022)
Daniel Alfaro, Peru (DHSF 2022)
Andréa Ngombet, Republic of Congo (DHSF 2022)
Jamus Lim, Singapore (DHSF 2022)
Anchal Baniparsadh, South Africa (DHSF 2022)
Geline Alfred Fuko, Tanzania (DHSF 2022)
Ornella Moderan, Togo (DHSF 2022)
Denis Gutenko, Ukraine (DHSF 2022)
Nariman Ustaiev, Ukraine (DHSF 2022)
Yulia Bezvershenko, Ukraine (DHSF 2022)
Rayhan Asat, Uyghur human rights lawyer / USA (DHSF 2022)
Tien Trung Nguyen, Vietnam (DHSF 2022)
Brett Carter, Assistant Professor, University of Southern California; Hoover Fellow, Stanford University; Affiliate, CDDRL, Stanford University, USA
Biljana Spasovska, Executive Director, BCSDN, North Macedonia (FFSF 2024)
Sunny Cheung, Hong Kong (FFSF 2023)
Hector Fuentes, Visiting Scholar at CDDRL, Venezuela (FFSF 2024)
Erik Jensen, Affiliated Faculty, CDDRL, USA
Khatia, Former member of the Parliament, Georgia (FFSF 2024)
Mykhailo Pavliuk, Chernivtsi Oblast Legislature, Ukraine (FFSF 2023)
Alice Siu, Deliberative Democracy Lab, USA
María Ignacia Curiel, Researcher at Poverty, Violence and Governance Lab, CDDRL, Stanford, USA
Thao Dinh, Coordinator of Civil Society Forum, Vietnam (FFSF 2024)
Tem Fuh, Project Manager, Institute for Security Studies, Kenya (FFSF 2023)
Dagva, Open Society Forum, Mongolia (FFSF 2024)
Margaret Levi, Senior Fellow, CDDRL, USA
Halyna Yanchenko, Member of Parliament of Ukraine, Ukraine (FFSF 2023)
Iaroslav Liubchenko, Head of the Department on Building Integrity in The Defence and Security Sector at the National Agency on Corruption Prevention, Ukraine (FFSF 2023)
Nora Sulots, Communications Manager, CDDRL, USA
Cristofer Correia, Voluntad Popular, Venezuela (FFSF 2023)
Stephen Stedman, Senior Fellow, CDDRL, Stanford, USA
Sally Abi Khalll, Oxfam, Lebanon (FFSF 2023)
Ivetta Sergeeva, Postdoctoral Fellow, CDDRL, Russia
Valentin Bolotnyy, Kleinheinz Fellow, Hoover Institution, USA
Gulsanna Mamediieva, Georgetown University, USA (FFSF 2023)
Tamar Khulordava, Former MP, founder of Egeria Solutions, Georgia (FFSF 2023)
Francis Fukuyama, Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and Director, Ford Dorsey Masters in International Policy, Stanford, USA
Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian, Director of Social Inclusion at the Organization of American States, USA (DHSF 2021)
Sophie Richardson, Visiting Scholar, CDDRL, Stanford University, USA
Diego Zambrano, Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, USA/Venezuela
Beatriz Magaloni, Graham H. Stuart Professor, Political Science and Senior Fellow, FSI, Stanford University, USA and Mexico
Didi Kuo, Center Fellow, CDDRL, USA
Dinsha Mistree, Affiliated Researcher, CDDRL; Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, USA
Evan Mawarire, Senior Fellow, USA (DHSF 2018)
Raihana Maqbool, Independent Journalist, India (DHSF 2021)
Alon Tal, Visiting Professor, USA/Israel
Nikita Makarenko, Independent Journalist, Uzbekistan (DHSF 2021)
Ghina Bou Chakra, Amnesty International, Lebanon (FFSF 2023)
Alberto Díaz Cayeros, Senior Fellow, CDDRL, Stanford University, USA / Mexico
Aisha Yesufu, Citizens Hub, Nigeria (DHSF 2021)
Gillian Slee, Gerhard Casper Fellow in Rule of Law, CDDRL, USA
Victor Spinu, Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, Republic of Moldova (FFSF 2024)
Denis Gutenko, AirLittoral Cofounder, Ukraine (DHSF 2022)
Ali Carkoglu, Political Scientist, CDDRL Visiting Scholar, USA
Jamie O'Connell, Lecturer in Residence, Stanford Law School and Affiliated Scholar, CDDRL, USA
Ruben Mascarenhas, National Joint Secretary, Aam Aadmi Party, India (FFSF 2023)
Kumi Naidoo, Payne Distinguished Lecturer, 2023-25, USA / South Africa
Mary-Therese Heintzkill, Program Manager, CDDRL, USA
James Fearon, Professor, Stanford University, USA
Kim Juárez Jensen, Poverty, Violence, and Governance Lab, USA
Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow, Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford University, USA
Manasi Subramaniam, India (FFSF 2023)
We are concerned and outraged to learn of the state-sponsored abduction of 2022 Fisher Family Summer Fellow Jesús Armas by agents of the Maduro regime in Venezuela. We urge the regime to release him from detention immediately.
The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), Stanford University’s hub for the interdisciplinary study of contemporary Asia, invites nominations for the 2025 Shorenstein Journalism Award. The award recognizes outstanding journalists and journalism organizations for their significant contributions to reporting on the complexities of the Asia-Pacific region. The 2025 award will honor an Asian news media outlet or a journalist whose work has primarily appeared in Asian news media. Award nomination entries are due by Saturday, February 15, 2025.
Sponsored by APARC, the award carries a cash prize of US $10,000. It alternates between recipients who have primarily contributed to Asian news media and those whose work has mainly appeared in Western news media. In the 2025 cycle, the award will recognize a recipient from the former category. The Award Selection Committee invites nominations from news editors, publishers, scholars, teachers, journalists, news media outlets, journalism associations, and entities focused on researching and interpreting the Asia-Pacific region. Self-nominations are not accepted.
The award defines the Asia-Pacific region as encompassing Northeast, Southeast, South, and Central Asia, as well as Australasia. Both individual journalists with a substantial body of work and journalism organizations are eligible for the award. Nominees’ work may be in print or broadcast journalism or in emerging forms of multimedia journalism. The Award Selection Committee, comprised of journalism and Asia experts, judges nomination entries and selects the honorees.
An annual tradition since 2002, the award honors the legacy of APARC benefactor, Mr. Walter H. Shorenstein, and his twin passions for promoting excellence in journalism and understanding of Asia. Throughout its history, the award has recognized world-class journalists who push the boundaries of reporting on Asia. Recent honorees include The New York Times' Chief China Correspondent Chris Buckley; India's long-form narrative journalism magazine The Caravan; Burmese journalist and human rights defender Swe Win; and Maria Ressa, CEO of the Philippine news platform Rappler and 2021 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate.
Award nominations are accepted electronically via our online entry form through Saturday, February 15, 2025, at 11:59 PM PST. For information about the nomination rules and to submit an entry please visit the award nomination entry page. APARC will announce the winner by April 2025 and present the award at a public ceremony at Stanford in autumn quarter 2025.
Please direct all inquiries to aparc-communications@stanford.edu.
Sponsored by Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, the annual Shoresntein Award promotes excellence in journalism on the Asia-Pacific region and carries a cash prize of US $10,000. The 2025 award will honor an Asian news media outlet or a journalist whose work has primarily appeared in Asian news media. Nomination entries are due by February 15, 2025.
![[Left to right]: Michael McFaul, Marshall Burke, Steven Pifer, Oriana Skylar Mastro, Didi Kuo, and Amichai Magen on stage.](https://fsi9-prod.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/styles/375x211_x2/public/2024-10/fsi_reunion_2024_panel_hero.png?h=c4d9845d&itok=tBJruaUE)
