The "Meet Our Researchers" series showcases the incredible scholars at Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). Through engaging interviews conducted by our undergraduate research assistants, we explore the journeys, passions, and insights of CDDRL’s faculty and researchers.

How has infrastructure development been used to gain influence in diplomacy? How has our understanding of that tool changed since BRI, and how successful has it been for China?

Infrastructure development has always been a problematic tool for amassing geopolitical influence; it builds friendships when loans are going out, then creates enemies once they’re issued. A recent example is the 1997 Asian financial crisis when Western countries had invested in power plants throughout the continent, only for many countries to default and expropriate. This has happened repeatedly throughout history.

While China’s done quite well at protecting its economic interests in infrastructure projects, it's a mixed bag due to the prevalence of moral hazard, public backlash, and the tarnishing of diplomatic ties. With the state being so heavily involved in BRI, China intervenes when countries want to default or expropriate, protecting its interests and those of state-owned enterprises effectively. However, this can lead to a moral hazard problem because these enterprises feel too protected by China and act without the appropriate caution while building risky projects.

Today, many countries that have received BRI lending have serious relational problems with China, if not at the government level, then among the public. People tend to push back and feel taken advantage of when a foreign country comes in and builds projects, especially with rumor mills churning out narratives about China’s 'debt-trap diplomacy.' These diplomatic challenges were true long before the BRI and persist today.

Why do countries, through BRI or other means, decide to take on infrastructure projects they obviously can’t afford?

Countries often don’t behave rationally — politics, corrupt officials, and conflicting interests all affect policymaking. Also, everyone builds infrastructure projects that may bankrupt them, partly due to an ingrained optimism bias in the infrastructure sector.

We’re in the worst developing country debt crisis in modern history, and countries are having a difficult time navigating a changing infrastructure lending landscape. China is now the largest bilateral lender, and its absence from international organizations like the Paris Club prevents the unified action needed to allow countries to emerge from debt crises. Even the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is struggling to help them, as it is cautious about issuing aid to countries with murky BRI loans to pay back.

Funding for infrastructure development can be used as an incentive for democratization through conditionality on loans. However, many countries are turning away from traditional Western lending institutions in favor of alternative lenders with fewer conditions. How can we balance the importance of conditionality and incentivizing democratization while preventing the decreased reliance on Western institutions?

Conditionality can be positive in promoting democratization, but there have to be limits to it, especially because it becomes less effective when alternative lenders like China exist. Conditionality began as limited to policies that promote democratization, development, and liberalization but has metastasized to the point where lenders are pushing a wide range of policies on borrower countries. Many of these conditions, such as environmental or social protections, are good policies but can be viewed as a manifestation of Western imperialism within these countries. These programs also become futile when countries become simply incentivized to seek Chinese loans instead, which have virtually no conditionality.

Is the turn away from Western lending institutions an inevitable shift, or can policy changes encourage its prodominance again, if that’s something that we want?

Western institutions are better for infrastructure development, as organizations like the World Bank are the best at protecting human rights and preventing environmental disasters. There are also strategic and security reasons for promoting Western institutions — for example, we don’t want Chinese technology companies building telecommunications grids in other countries.

The bigger question is, what would a return to a Western-dominated model of investment look like? Pre-BRI, there was an open, liberal system of direct investment from private companies. BRI represented a pivot to more state-driven investment. Should the US shift to a similar model, or return to private direct investment fueling infrastructure development? The Biden administration’s alternative to BRI for state-driven investment was the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII). Despite mutual investment in telecommunications and renewable energy, PGII focuses on developing very different sectors than BRI, building social impact projects like healthcare infrastructure.

What is the most exciting or impactful finding from your research, and why do you think it matters for democracy, development, or the rule of law?

I’m focusing on how liberal democracies can get building again, so I researched flaws in domestic infrastructure projects within the US. It revealed how the judicial system was an engine fueling how infrastructure projects are conducted; I realized the extent to which permitting regulation and environmental litigation had been driving my own incentives when I was a bureaucrat. Decisions are often made in response to case law and to ‘litigation-proof’ projects, which can incentivize inefficient and expensive project management. I believe democracies are perfectly capable of building infrastructure projects well, but problems in current building initiatives, from the California High-Speed Rail to our housing crisis, are rooted in the outsized effects of the threat of lawsuits.
 

How do you see your research influencing policy or contributing to real-world change?

I do research on practical public-private partnership policy in the United States, working with the Build America Center and the Department of Transportation to directly supply the government with research when needed.

There are policy changes that must occur to promote effective infrastructure development. The US will have to reform institutions that predated BRI to adapt to today’s post-BRI world. The three key institutions are the World Bank, the IMF, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). I hope that my ideas can influence their restructuring. For domestic development, I’m continuing my work with the Build America Center on how governments can more efficiently procure infrastructure projects and help public officials adopt best practices.

Lastly, what book would you recommend for students interested in a research career in your field?

The first book, which is extraordinarily boring but crucial to infrastructure development, is The Strategic Management of Large Engineering Projects: Shaping Institutions, Risks, and Governance. Written by Miller, Lessard, Michaud, and Floricel, it includes the perspectives of MIT engineers on infrastructure project case studies to understand why so many have failed. For some great history, the economist Raymond Vernon’s book Sovereignty at Bay develops the idea that relationships sour over international investment and that it’s not an effective diplomatic tool.

Three years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the joint declaration of a "friendship without limits" by Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, the two leaders reaffirmed their partnership during a phone call, pledging continued coordination on foreign policy, security, and trade. Meanwhile, President Donald Trump’s controversial Oval Office meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and his administration's vitriolic foreign policy rhetoric have raised concerns that Washington may no longer be the reliable partner it once was. Moreover, amid ongoing U.S.-imposed tariffs, India is bracing for the fallout from Trump’s trade war, despite Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s February visit to the White House, which did not yield the concessions and Trump support New Delhi had hoped for.

The 2025 Oksenberg Symposium, titled China’s Strategic Relationships, brought together experts to discuss these evolving strategic relationships between China, the United States, Russia, and India, and to consider their perspectives and strategic adjustments in response to shifting internal and external political, economic, and social dynamics. The discussion, moderated by APARC’s China Program Director Jean Oi, featured panelists Da Wei of Tsinghua University, Alex Gabuev of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Sumit Ganguly of the Huntington Program on Strengthening U.S.-India Relations at the Hoover Institution, and FSI Director Michael McFaul.

This convening followed Chatham House rules to encourage candor, so the following summary does not attribute comments to individual panelists.

A Partnership Without Limits

The panelists first focused on the increasingly complex relationships between Russia, China, and the United States. On the one hand, a growing China-Russia alignment across military, economic, and political domains has been well documented. On the other hand, Russia’s increasing dependence on China — especially after the war in Ukraine — has raised questions about the asymmetry of their partnership.

Even so, the relationship between the two nations remains strong, partly due to their shared distrust of the West. Although China has been cautious about fully endorsing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it has refrained from condemning the war, understanding the risks of destabilizing Russia or fostering a Western-aligned regime.

The View from New Delhi

India’s relationships with the United States and China are marked by a delicate balancing act. The U.S.-India partnership has strengthened over the years, driven by shared concerns about China’s growing assertiveness. Still, despite bipartisan support for this relationship, India’s historical experiences, particularly during the Cold War, have left a lingering distrust toward U.S. intentions. That wariness is now increasing under the uncertainties of the Trump administration.

India's relationship with China is complicated by military and economic disparities and by China’s strategic partnerships in South Asia, particularly with Pakistan. India's policy remains cautious, aiming to maintain a non-aligned stance while strengthening defense and trade ties with the United States and managing tensions with China, especially over border disputes.

Beijing’s Patience

U.S.-China relations took center stage at this year’s symposium. China’s rise as a global power has posed a complex challenge for U.S. foreign policy. Under the first Trump administration, China was portrayed as a revisionist power with expansionist ambitions. Trump’s rhetoric framed China as a strategic adversary, drawing comparisons to the Soviet Union under Stalin. This characterization contributed to the perception of a new Cold War and an accelerated decoupling of the two economies. In the second administration, tariffs and a looming trade war define the relationship.

From China’s perspective, the past decade has seen an overemphasis on its relationship with the United States., which at times strained its ties with Russia and India. China’s growing partnership with Russia, motivated by shared concerns over Western policies, has been key in countering perceived threats, particularly NATO’s expansion. However, China has remained cautious about fully endorsing Russia’s actions, such as the invasion of Ukraine, while acknowledging the risks of a collapsing Russian regime.

China’s relations with India have been challenged by border issues, as well as India’s shift away from non-alignment and its growing ties with the United States. These changes have complicated China’s strategic calculations in South Asia, though recent stabilization in Sino-Indian relations shows potential for improvement.

Challenges for Global Stability

The panelists noted that the increasing competition between the four countries is reshaping the international order, creating a more multipolar world where countries are single-handedly pursuing their national interests. This fragmentation of global power poses challenges for international cooperation but also provides China with opportunities to pursue more flexible diplomatic strategies, potentially easing tensions with Russia and India.

The U.S. response to these changes, particularly under Trump, was heavily scrutinized. In both Trump's first and second terms, the administration’s foreign policy marked a radical departure from past practices, blending radical isolationism, unilateralism, and realism. Panelists noted that the erosion of democratic ideals in U.S. foreign policy contrasts with its role in the Cold War era as a champion of democracy and human rights, particularly in opposition to Soviet authoritarianism. This shift has been especially evident in its approach to Taiwan, where there has been limited emphasis on supporting its democratic values amid growing pressure from China.

This new isolationist stance, driven largely by domestic concerns and a belief that the United States has been exploited in global trade, has led to a strategic pivot away from multilateralism. During Trump’s first term, the administration withdrew from key international agreements such as the Paris Climate Accords, the Iran nuclear deal, and the World Health Organization, favoring "America First" policies over collective global action. The continued shift toward isolationism and unilateralism marks a radical departure from previous administrations' commitment to liberal internationalism.

A Rough Road Ahead

Panelists expressed concern that this dramatic shift could leave Washington isolated, undermining its ability to address global challenges like climate change, international security, and the rise of authoritarian regimes. The erosion of key alliances could also diminish U.S. influence, making it harder to counter the growing power of China and Russia.

One panelist observed that while Trump initially framed China as a strategic adversary, his second term saw more conciliatory rhetoric, though his policies — especially the trade war — could ultimately harm U.S. interests. This approach could erode U.S. global influence by weakening international alliances and multilateral institutions that have long underpinned U.S. power. The panelists agreed that Trump’s foreign policy would fundamentally reshape U.S. relationships with key global players.

The symposium underscored the complexity of balancing strategic interests in a rapidly changing world, where traditional alliances are being tested and new dynamics continually emerge. The challenge for China, the United States., Russia, and India is to navigate these relationships in ways that secure their national interests while contributing to broader global stability.

The second installment discusses the administration’s efforts to cut off funding to democracy-promoting organizations like the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and USAID, despite congressional approval, which violates the law and undermines democracy. Fukuyama and Diamond highlight how, historically, authoritarian regimes erode the rule of law while claiming democratic legitimacy. They warn that the U.S. is heading toward a constitutional crisis, as Trump's disregard for judicial authority could set a dangerous precedent. Finally, they urge vigilance and legal challenges to uphold liberal democratic principles and institutional checks and balances.

In January, Fukuyama and Diamond also shared their annual review of democracy around the world. Part I focuses on global democracy after the “year of elections,” while Part II examines the state of democracy in the U.S. Both videos can be viewed below.

Today, state parties have played very weak roles in their national parties’ structures, Kuo said. “There’s also been much less reliance on the affiliated groups that once constituted the core of parties, such as labor unions, student groups, women's groups, and groups that really emerged in an era of the mass organization party.”

At the same time, she noted, while not a full convergence, an increasing similarity has arisen among the major parties regarding their economic approaches to governance and markets.

This holds two key implications, she said. First, this embrace of neoliberal orthodoxies has eroded the traditional distinctions between left and right that support the party systems. “Neither party really represents the working class through an economic agenda,” Kuo said.

She added, “There’s a lot of empirical evidence that these erosions of party differences in left and right generate more political instability. They produce more extremist candidates who can capitalize on the fact that voters aren't sure how to hold politicians to account when the policies are the same and also increases the level of anti-system messaging in political campaigns.”

The second implication is that these changes to party organization have resulted in more delegation to non-party groups – political strategists, consultants, and the private sector – that end up doing the work that parties historically did.

Meanwhile, the parties increasingly reflect an “educational cleavage” among voters that, along with increased outsourcing of governance to the private sector, has contributed to a rise of “plutocratic populism.”

In his remarks, Cain raised the issue of how campaign finance reform and other institutional changes, such as the introduction of primaries, contributed to the decline of strong political parties. Meanwhile, rapid changes in technology and global economics are playing roles in the political process.

“Globalization means we don't have stable neighborhoods anymore, that labor is going in and out, that we communicate in a completely different way than the way we used to, which makes it very hard to rely on the party machines,” he said.

Azari said parties are failing to live up to their central role in representing the citizenry and “empowering less powerful groups in society” that offer “a countervailing source of power to capital.” A turn to centrism or a “third way” by the Democratic Party in the 1990s reflected such a dynamic of disconnection.

“The political center is a nondescript place, a nonexistent voter, yet it looms large in the public imagination,” Azari added, quoting a line from Kuo's book.

Grumbach said that as a behaviorist, he seeks to understand the “neurology of the mass voter brain.” He cited a recent Quinnipiac survey that revealed how negatively Democratic voters now view Democratic members of Congress compared to poll results in October 2024. “It is a massive shift … the Democratic Party is ripe for a takeover.”
 

‘Democratic renewal’

Kuo, an Eric and Wendy Schmidt Fellow at the think tank New America, has written widely about democratization, capitalism, and political parties.

Kuo said, “I'll say that we are in a very bad place in American democracy that goes far beyond anything any one political party can do … I think that building stronger political parties very much needs to be part of democratic renewal.”

In a recent interview with CDDRL, Kuo noted, “Much of my research highlights the importance of understanding not just what governments and institutions look like, but how they link to society. How do they connect with citizens? How do they convince citizens that government actions are meaningful and worthwhile? These are critical questions for democracy.”

In the February 2025 issue of The Diplomat magazine, APARC and Korea Program Director Gi-Wook Shin, professor of sociology and the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea, discusses the political crisis in South Korea following President Yoon's ill-fated attempt to impose military rule and its implications for the country's future.

On January 26, 2025, the impeached and arrested Yoon was formally indicted on insurrection charges. Separately, the Constitutional Court has begun deliberations on whether to dismiss him as president or reinstate him. The national reaction to Yoon’s martial law declaration "underscores how South Koreans’ hard-won democracy is not taken for granted,” Shin, an expert on social movements and democracy in South Korea, says. "This episode highlights both the fragility and resilience of Korea’s young democracy."

In this interview with The Diplomat's Editor-in-Chief Shannon Tiezzi, Shin explains how sharp political polarization in Korea set the stage for the marital law episode of December 2024 and how the country can start bridging these gaps, how the prolonged political upheaval is impacting Korean economy and society, and what's ahead for the ruling People Power Party and the opposition Democratic Party.

How did South Korea’s history as a dictatorship – and past experiences of martial law – inform both Yoon’s decision to declare martial law and the public response?

South Korea’s painful history with dictatorship and martial law casts a long shadow over contemporary politics. I entered college in 1979, a year marked by the assassination of Park Chung Hee in late October and a period of intense political instability ensued under martial law. In fact, President Yoon Suk Yeol entered a college in the same year as me and it is hard to understand how he could forget these shared experiences and decided to declare martial law.

When Yoon declared martial law last December, it triggered an immediate and decisive public backlash, driven by a collective memory of decades of struggle against autocratic regimes. This reaction underscores how South Koreans’ hard-won democracy is not taken for granted. Civic groups, citizens, and lawmakers mobilized swiftly, reversing the martial law decision within six hours and passing the motion to impeach Yoon 10 days later. Despite recent backsliding, proactive civic engagement demonstrates that their experiences have informed strong commitment to safeguarding democratic principles.

Read the complete interview in The Diplomat magazine (subscription) >

Additional Media Commentary and Analysis

In recent weeks, Professor Shin has commented on and analyzed the evolving political situation in Korea via the following media outlets:

“For a United States that Remembers the Capitol Riots, Korea’s Turmoil Isn’t Someone Else’s Business”
Shindonga, January 8, 2025 (interview – Korean)

South Korea Needs to Move On from This Crisis
Bloomberg, January 8, 2025 (quoted)

It’s a Challenge for a Weakened Political Leadership in South Korea to Handle Trump Presidency
CNBC Squawk Box Asia, January 7, 2025 (interview)

South Koreans Adopt Trump's “Stop the Steal” Slogan for Impeached Yoon
AFP, January 6, 2025 (quoted)

South Korea: “The Crisis Risks Lasting Beyond the Next Presidential Election”
Les Echos, January 6, 2025 (interview)

South Korea Divided Over Yoon Standoff
BBC News - The Context, January 3,  2025 (interview)

Is South Korea a Beacon of Global Democracy?
The Korea Times, December 30, 2024 (author - Korean)