Why do elites in authoritarian regimes choose to pursue democratic transitions? In a CDDRL research seminar series talk, James Fearon, Professor of Political Science and Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), offers a theory to explain the methods and motivations behind elite-led democratization. Fearon probes how authoritarian elites safeguard their power through autocratic constitutions, focusing on Myanmar, one of the longest-lived military regimes in the post-WWII era.

The Tatmadaw — Myanmar’s armed forces — held exclusive power after General Ne Win took control in a 1962 coup d’état until the early 2010s when they pursued a power-sharing arrangement with a civilian opposition. In 2008, the military junta that ruled from 1988 to 2011 ratified a new constitution they had drafted in a dubious referendum. While the 2008 Constitution appeared to take steps toward democracy, it featured serious limitations. It handed the military full control over several key ministries, secured “rent” streams for the officers, and reserved a quarter of parliamentary seats for military-appointed representatives. It further required that any changes to the constitution be passed by 75% of the legislature, thus giving them an effective veto.

In the November 2015 General Election, the opposition scored an overwhelming victory. The National League for Democracy Party (NLD) won close to three-fourths of the seats, giving them a large parliamentary majority and a strong ability to pass laws even if they were formally constrained on changing the constitution. The trajectory of these events raises the question, why did the military choose to pursue a democratic transition? Relatedly, why did military leaders believe that the 2008 Constitution would sufficiently protect them? Fearon observes that one of the NLD’s first actions was to create a new head-of-state position outside the constitution for Aung San Suu Kyi, the NLD’s leader.

Fearon argues that the military was protected not by the formal constitution, which is just a piece of paper, but rather by maintaining direct control of important streams of income and policy influence in the form of staffing of the bureaucracy and control of natural resource and drug incomes in militarily contested parts of the country. Control of these “rent streams” meant that the new NLD government could not shift them away from the military simply passing laws in parliament — even though the NLD did have considerable control and influence on many other dimensions of policy. In effect, this was a power (and rent) sharing division of the state.

Authoritarian rulers face international and domestic pressures, such as economic and political sanctions and costly revolutionary threats. Continued authoritarian rule would preserve elites’ control of the country’s existing resources. Movement toward democratization, on the other hand, generates both opportunities and costs. It comes with the promise of lifting international sanctions and increasing the flow of foreign aid, thus increasing the total economic “pie” available. However, the military could only take full advantage of that economic opening if they maintained a significant degree of economic and political control that the newly elected government could not revise without provoking a costly conflict (such as a coup attempt to reverse democratization). More general, Fearon argues that autocratic elites will be more inclined to try democratization when they can share rent streams and their military ability to retake power if this is challenged does not decline too rapidly after the transition.

Elite-led democratic transitions hold unique implications. On the one hand, top-down transitions are more efficient than bottom-up democratic revolutions because they reduce the costs and risks of violence. On the other hand, transitions led by undemocratic leaders are likely to result in only partial democratization because they tend to perpetuate preexisting power dynamics by reinforcing the influence of ruling elites and maintaining their access to rents.

Fearon proposes that as newly democratized societies begin to institutionalize, the relative power of the old elites may gradually diminish, leading to “endogenous consolidation.” Yet, if the military sees its power fading faster than expected, it may — as in the aftermath of Myanmar’s 2020 elections — intervene militarily to restore the status quo ante.

The first of four panels of the “America Votes 2024: Stanford Scholars on the Election’s Most Critical Questions” series examined the changing political and global landscape shaping the upcoming U.S. presidential and congressional elections. The panelists shed light on the challenges of election administration, shifts in campaign strategies due to polarization, and the global context animating the election. Moderated by Kathryn Stoner, Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) and Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), the panel featured Stanford scholars Shanto Iyengar, Beatriz Magaloni, and Nathaniel Persily. The “America Votes 2024” series is co-organized by CDDRL, the Hoover Institution’s Center for Revitalizing American Institutions, and the Institute for Research in the Social Sciences.

Evolving Election Administration and Oversight

The 2024 election will differ significantly from previous cycles, said Nathaniel Persily, the James B. McClatchy Professor of Law at Stanford Law School and a Senior Fellow at FSI. That is due to changes in the legal landscape, a shift in the social media environment, and ongoing threats to election officials.

Persily noted that many election officials have resigned due to rising threats. Changes like the Electoral Count Reform Act have impacted the certification process, and the decline of the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC) has affected voter registration accuracy. Persily raised concerns about how social media platforms have restricted access to election monitoring tools, like CrowdTangle, further complicating election oversight.

While new Artificial Intelligence tools are playing a growing role in content moderation on social media, they have limited reach, especially on popular platforms like TikTok. Persily pointed out that misinformation is a continuing concern, with conspiracy theories around mail-in ballots, poll watcher interference, and vote-counting delays potentially undermining public trust. However, he expressed some optimism, indicating that early voting could help election officials proactively address issues before Election Day and that the use of paper ballots in most states will add a layer of security.

Yesterday, the National Academy of Public Administration — an independent nonprofit organization established in 1967 to assist government leaders in building more effective, efficient, accountable, and transparent organizations — announced that Francis Fukuyama, Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, was among the leaders selected for the 2024 Class of Academy Fellows. This prestigious honor places Dr. Fukuyama among an elite group of leaders in the field of public administration who collectively provide expert insights on governance and policy challenges.

In a press release, Terry Gerton, President and CEO of the Academy, shared, “The 2024 class of Academy Fellows reflects a wide range of professional experience, including dedicated civil servants and accomplished academics. These 42 leaders will be an enormous asset to the Academy in the years ahead, and we look forward to working with all of them to help create a bright future for our country.”

The 2024 Class of Academy Fellows consists of 42 distinguished individuals, including public administrators, scholars, business leaders, and former government officials. The rigorous selection process involves nominations by current Fellows, followed by a comprehensive review of each nominee’s professional achievements and contributions to public administration. Dr. Fukuyama and his fellow inductees will be officially welcomed during the Academy’s annual Fall Meeting, which will be held November 13-15, 2024, in Washington, D.C.

Dr. Fukuyama is a political scientist internationally known for his influential work on the development of political order and the concept of liberal democracy. His selection as a Fellow reflects not only his scholarly achievements but also his ongoing efforts to address some of the most pressing governance challenges facing democracies around the world.

In a statement to the Academy, he shared, “I am very interested in civil service reform, and the question dealt with by the Academy concerning agility in government. Regardless of the outcome of the upcoming election, this is an issue that needs to be addressed; it is particularly critical given the changing technological environment within which the government works.”

One of Dr. Fukuyama’s current projects is a working group to protect and reform the U.S. civil service, formed in response to plans elaborated in the Heritage Foundation's Project 2025 to strip civil service protections from all federal workers and replace them with political loyalists in a future administration. “I believe that the revival of Schedule F proposed in the Heritage Foundation's Project 2025 constitutes a severe threat to the future of a merit-based public service and needs to be engaged directly by the Academy and other bodies concerned with good governance.”

The Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law is pleased to invite applications from pre-doctoral students at the write-up stage and from post-doctoral scholars working in any of the four program areas of democracy, development, evaluating the efficacy of democracy promotion, and rule of law. The application cycle for the 2025-2026 academic year will be open from Monday, September 23, 2024, through Sunday, December 1, 2024.

Our goal is to provide an intellectually dynamic environment that fosters lively exchange among Center members and helps everyone to do excellent scholarship. Fellows will spend the academic year at Stanford University focusing on research and data analysis as they work to finalize and publish their dissertation research while connecting with resident faculty and research staff at CDDRL.

Pre-doctoral fellows must be enrolled currently in a doctoral program or equivalent through the time of intended residency at Stanford and must be at the dissertation write-up (post course work) phase of their doctoral program. Post-doctoral fellows must have earned their Ph.D. within 3 years of the start of the fellowship, or plan to have successfully defended their Ph.D. dissertations by July 31, 2025.

In addition to our regular call for applications, CDDRL invites applications for the Gerhard Casper Fellow in Rule of Law for 2025-26. We welcome research on any aspect of rule of law, including judicial politics, criminal justice, and the politicization of judicial institutions. We are an interdisciplinary center; candidates from any relevant field (i.e. the social sciences, law) are welcome to apply. The Gerhard Casper Fellow will be part of CDDRL’s larger cohort of pre- and postdoctoral fellows. Please apply through the CDDRL fellowship application process and indicate that you would like to be considered for the Gerhard Casper Rule of Law Fellowship.