Stanford University

Democracy

The Role of Public Diplomacy in Democracy Promotion

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The Role of Public Diplomacy in Democracy Promotion

In partnership with the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy is pleased to host a moderated panel discussion on the role of public diplomacy in democracy promotion at Stanford University.

A distinguished panel of experts, including Larry Diamond, Michael McFaul, and Kathryn Stoner, will discuss how USG public diplomacy programs can most effectively promote and defend democratic values in an increasingly authoritarian and illiberal global context.  The panel will also consider whether the U.S. is still a credible force in championing democracy around the globe. Finally, we hope this panel will yield insights into how public diplomacy programs can better shape the way foreign publics perceive and act upon their citizen rights and responsibilities.

Intended for an audience of public diplomacy practitioners, policymakers, scholars, and Stanford professors and students, this panel will also be of interest to think tanks, NGOs, and academic institutions and centers devoted to the study of the diplomacy/democracy nexus. Participants can join in person or online.

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In-Person:
Philippines Conference Room
Encina Hall, Third Floor, Central, C330
616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305

Online: Via Zoom

Panel Discussions

Why Ukraine Must Win

Authors
Elbegdorj Tsakhia
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As a former president who was democratically elected, I have a firm conviction in the cause of freedom, and in the power of the people, united as one, to defend it when under attack. This cause, and this faith, are now being tested on the blood-stained soil of Ukraine in a way we have not seen in many decades.

As the war in Ukraine grinds into its second year, the world’s democracies must rally with even greater resolve to declare that freedom is non-negotiable, and to give Ukraine the weapons it needs to win.

Freedom is an opportunity for all. By contrast, despots offer solutions and opportunities that only comfort themselves. They claim they bring justice. But their justice is selective. They dictate their chosen way of life to others. Their obsession is their own survival and longevity in power, not the prosperity of their people. Sooner or later, dictators become desperate, servicing their corrupted web of crooks and pleasing the vultures that are flying around them.

I know Putin does not tolerate freedom. I have sat with him on many occasions. He despises differences and competition. He fears a free Ukraine. As a deep narcissist, he could not afford to see more successful and prosperous neighbors. He envisioned that a free, democratic Ukraine could represent a grave danger for his regime. The Russian aggression against Ukraine did not happen out of the blue. It was a pinnacle of long-fought rivalries between ideas of freedom and fists of repression.

President Elbegdorj Tsakhia walks with President Xi Jinping of China and President Vladimir Putin of Russia President Elbegdorj Tsakhia walks with President Xi Jinping of China and President Vladimir Putin of Russia. Elbegdorj Tsakhia

The frontline of this war runs well beyond Ukraine’s devastated battlefields. It runs through Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. It is raging between humanity’s best and worst instincts. Between the free world and the suppressed. It is an all-encompassing war between autocracy and democracy.

Many ask why, compared to Europe, most Asian countries tend to have a neutral position on Ukraine. The answer is simple. All they can do is watch with a heavy heart. They closely follow each breaking news bulletin to learn who has the upper hand at that moment. Sadly, the continent of Asia is also full of self-proclaimed rulers. In most cases, their governments lack legitimate representation.

Ukrainians are fighting for that very principle—not only for their country, but for our right to be free. Their fight is global. As a result, our support should be global and completely unconditional. Ukraine’s victory will give encouragement to all freedom-loving people on this planet. Autocrats everywhere will be knocked on the defensive. If Russia prevails, dictators will march in full swing.

The Kremlin propaganda machine is in full steam, blaming the other side as the ones committed to eliminating Russians. But, to my knowledge, no one wants to see Russians killed. No one is depriving Russia but the Kremlin. No one is depleting Russia’s resources and potential but the Kremlin. No one is crippling the Russian armed forces but the Kremlin. No one started a full-out invasion of Ukraine but the Kremlin. No one forced the free world to take drastic actions but the Kremlin. Finally, no one is calling for the inevitable demise of the Kremlin but—by its actions—the Kremlin.

In starting this war of aggression and then purposely brutalizing innocent civilians, the Kremlin leadership is guilty of serious international crimes. It has had no shame in bringing devastation and suffering to the most vulnerable. To the innocent children, elders, and families. And this horror is not solely present in war-torn territories. It is also present in Russia itself.

Ukrainians are suffering, shedding blood, and sacrificing everything precious to them, not just to defend their sovereignty and democracy but to restore the damaged world order.
Elbegdorj Tsakhia

Putin's so-called "partial" mobilization has brought fear and tears to Russia’s most vulnerable, its ethnic minorities who have been disproportionately drafted and thrown to the frontline. The Buryats, Kalmycks, Tuvans, and other marginalized minorities have been used as cannon fodder. In the remote regions where these ethnic minorities live, communities have almost run out of military-age men. By local accounts, the Kremlin is committing textbook ethnic cleansing under the umbrella of a “special operation.”

Under Putin's long-lasting shadow, Russia’s development has been hurled back a generation, and its politics has been frozen to the core. Yet, even in this deep freeze, there are some palpable cracks. The war in Ukraine is no longer just one man's conflict. It is inflicting pain to the countless lives his dark shadow touches. Everyone’s heart breaks when innocent families dig graves for their loved ones.

The outspoken and brightest in Russia are mostly silenced. In any nation, free-minded people are fundamental to offering different views and better solutions. But, unfortunately, this very part of society in Russia has fled in large numbers. The remaining brave people in Russia are still fighting against corruption and the deeply intimidating war while facing torture and jail. Therefore, the world is not against the Russian people but against the Kremlin's kleptocracy and atrocities.

For many, it is no surprise that the regime in Kremlin has long since relied on brainwashing and the use of criminal agents. Even their incarcerated recruits lack simple screening. The more ruthless and vicious against Ukrainians they are, the more they are welcomed. They are escapees of long-term sentences. They have been mostly rejected by their loved ones. Their mission is to kill.

Ukrainian soldiers who are fighting at the frontline describe the Wagner mercenaries as "zombie waves." The Russian supply of such waves seems unlimited. To defeat these horrendous Kremlin tactics, Ukraine desperately needs more advanced weaponry.

The Wagner Group is becoming trapped by their continued crimes for the Russian regime. The Wagner crack is widening. More countries have now deemed them an international criminal organization, a terrorist group. Justice-seeking communities worldwide scream for accountability for what they have done and continue doing against Ukrainians.

President Biden and Chancellor Scholz might have time to wait. But a wounded Ukraine has no time. The killers, rapists, and looters are not wasting their time. The Wagner Group is not waiting. Putin is not waiting.
Elbegdorj Tsakhia

There are some in Russia disappointed with other countries, including Mongolia's stance on the war against Ukraine. Due to its geography, squeezed between China and Russia, the Government of Mongolia is forced to perform a balancing act. However, public opinion in Mongolia resolutely condemns the brutal attack against this sovereign nation.

In this regard, I would like to bring a historical record to your attention. When Adolf Hitler attacked the Soviet Union, the people of Mongolia united against this fascist invader. They showed solidarity with the Soviet people and spared nothing. If nomadic herders had over 100 horses, they sent more than half of their livestock to the Soviet Union. A quarter of all the horses on the Soviet frontline during World War II came from Mongolia.

In the days following the war's end, it was not rare to see a skinny but sturdy Mongol horse standing together with victorious allied forces in the ruins of Berlin. Horses were logistical lifelines, moving heavy equipment and weaponry through mud and rough terrain, including mined ones. In challenging circumstances, Mongolian horses were the only means of a ride and sometimes a much-needed source of nourishment. The number of horse supplies from Mongolian herders to the Soviets reached more than half a million.

Also, in late 1941, the Soviets began a counter-offensive against German forces on the outskirts of Moscow. During those unusually harsh winter months, most of the Red Army soldiers and officers wore warm winter uniforms made from cattle stocks in Mongolia. In addition, with financial support from Mongolia, the Soviets produced columns of tanks and fleets of fighter aircraft. The Government of Mongolia donated its gold and hard currency reserves to the Soviet Union for four years in a row. And Mongolian lamb and meat donations to the front line outperformed those provided by the Lend-Lease Act.

When Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union, Mongols stood with their northern neighbor as best as we could. When Putin's Russia attacked Ukraine, from day one, the people of Mongolia stood against the brutal invasion. My point here is: The West should do what the Mongols did, and act like the Mongols acted. In support of Ukraine’s right to exist, the democracies should show solidarity and spare no form of assistance.

President Elbegdorj Tsakhia of Mongolia on horseback on the Mongolian steppe. President Elbegdorj Tsakhia on horseback on the Mongolian steppe. Elbegdorj Tsakhia

I have wondered why most of the decisions by the West to offer support to Ukraine are always one step behind Russian aggression. President Zelensky, from the first days of the war, asked "not for a ride" but for "more weapons." War-torn Ukraine is still begging for fighter jets and longer-range missiles.

Ukrainians are paying the ultimate price for our freedom. They are suffering, shedding blood, and sacrificing everything precious to them, not just to defend their sovereignty and democracy but to restore the damaged world order.

President Biden and Chancellor Scholz might have time to wait. But a wounded Ukraine has no time to wait at all. Those who snatched Ukrainian territories, cities, and villages are not waiting. The killers, rapists, and looters are not wasting their time. The Wagner Group is not waiting. Finally, Putin is not waiting.

No country facing aggression and destruction on this scale can be asked to wait. Ukraine needs WINGS and missiles to delete, deplete, and defeat Russia’s death squads. Putin will only stop fighting when he exhausts all his murderous arsenals. The only path to peace is through Ukraine's victory.

Victory means more than expelling Russian aggression, more even than liberating all occupied Ukrainian territory. Victory requires the rebuilding of Ukraine after conflict, and total recovery from Putin's war. If Ukraine fails to achieve that, freedom and the free world will face continuous intimidation and aggression from dictatorships.

Ukraine is not just fighting for its freedom, but for freedom everywhere.

Slava Heroyam!

Elbegdorj Tsakhia

Elbegdorj Tsakhia

Bernard and Susan Liautaud Visiting Fellow at Stanford University and former Prime Minister and President of Mongolia
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As the first anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine approaches, former President of Mongolia Elbegdorj Tsakhia urges the democratic world to rally with even greater resolve to declare that freedom is non-negotiable, and to give Ukraine the weapons it needs to win.

Department of Defense Delegation Joins FSI Scholars for Panel on Current Security Challenges

Authors
Melissa Morgan
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

On Thursday, February 9, the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies was pleased to welcome a delegation of chief information officers from the Department of Defense for a panel session with security and foreign policy experts. The CIOs were hosted by the Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation, an interdisciplinary, cross-campus effort at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) aimed at solving pressing national security problems at the locus of diplomacy, information, the military, the economy, and technology.

The delegation was led by David McKeown, the Acting Principal Deputy Chief Information Officer, and represented each of the branches of the military as well as various DoD task forces focused on cybersecurity, digital modernization, and integrated defense strategies.

As the officers responsible for cybersecurity, communications, information systems, and other information enterprises at the Department of Defense, the war in Ukraine and the lessons it teaches about how technology functions in a modern conflict were top of mind for the visiting officials. To provide insight into what can be learned from Ukraine, FSI Director Michael McFaul and senior fellows Scott Sagan and Amy Zegart presented their perspectives on Putin, nuclear security, and the evolving intelligence ecosystem.

 

Counting Assets and Creating Confidence
 

For former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul, one of the biggest takeaways from the war so far in Ukraine is how poorly conventional wisdom served both Putin and Western alliances in estimating how Ukraine would respond to an invasion. By the numbers — tanks, missiles, personnel, ammunitions — Russia’s military capability is formidable. Yet it has vastly underperformed against traditionally-held expectations, a fact McFaul admitted has required him to revise his own research and thinking.

“Clearly tanks, aircraft, missiles, and soldiers are not the whole war effort,” he told the delegation. “That tells me we need to figure out better ways to measure capabilities than just counting things.”

[Left to Right] Amy Zegaty, Michael McFaul, and Soctt sagan at pajlwn secittek

His concerns over military enterprise were not limited to Russia. Turning a critical eye towards home, McFaul also stressed the importance of fixing acquisition and development challenges in the United States’ industrial base. Reliable, scalable access to military resources is not only crucial to the defense of America and its allies, McFaul reminded the panel, but it has direct impacts on how effective deterrence strategies will be elsewhere. Without such guarantees, the United States will lack credibility, whether in Ukraine and the active conflict there or in Taiwan and the challenges it faces from China.

For McFaul, the odds-defying performance of the Ukrainian military thus far also highlights the complimentary need to quantify the human side of defense and the impact it can have on strategic outcomes.

“How do you measure will to fight? We need to understand that better if we want to be better at our assessments in the future,” he urged.
 

Keeping a Clear Eye on Nuclear Threats
 

Early in the war, Putin and other Kremlin spokespeople made headlines with less-than-veiled allusions to the possibility of using nuclear weapons in their campaign against Ukraine. While that nuclear sabre-rattling has cooled in recent months, Scott Sagan says the United States and its allies need to remain very clear-eyed to the dangers posed by raising even the specter of nuclear use.

“I don’t think it’s out of the question yet,” said Sagan. He went on to explain, “I don’t think Vladimir Putin has decided yet whether he would use nuclear weapons or not. Part of these threats are about trying to deter us from intervening and to scare and divide the West. But it’s also about Putin getting a gauge of what we’re thinking and how we might respond if he did.”

Sagan, an internationally recognized expert on nuclear security and nuclear policy, said that even with the assurances that high-level U.S. officials such as Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin have communicated to their Russian counterparts, the unacceptable nature of any kind of nuclear use in war needs to be emphasized. 

What’s at stake here is not just the future of Ukraine, or the future of democracy, or the future of American credibility. It’s also about the future of what kind of nuclear world we live in.
Scott Sagan
FSI Senior Fellow at CISAC

“We need to underline the illegality of this. We need to remind them that we have a long history of going after war criminals. We need to make it clear that if they think they will not suffer catastrophic personal consequences, they should think again,” said Sagan.

Beyond individual actors, the threat of nuclear weapons directly challenges the regime of non-proliferation currently in place around the world. By Sagan’s assessment, the endurance of non-proliferation rests on how the West would respond to the use of a nuclear weapon in Ukraine. In the scenario where nuclear use leads to the Russian military intervening against Putin, or the West escalating to bring about a definite Russian defeat, Sagan believes non-proliferation would continue largely intact.

If, however, nuclear use leads to the collapse of the Ukrainian government and causes the West to back away, the domino effect could topple the commitment to non-proliferation the world over. Sagan points to the recent uptick in dialogue about nuclear programs in South Korea, Japan, and Iran as early indicators of what a more devastating event could trigger.

“What’s at stake here is not just the future of Ukraine and the future of democracy, and the future of American credibility; it’s also, potentially, the future of what kind of nuclear world we live in,” he cautioned.

Amy Zegart discusses the changing landscape of intelligence gathering at a panel with Department of Department CIOs. Amy Zegart discusses the changing landscape of intelligence gathering at a panel with Department of Department CIOs. Melissa Morgan

Grappling with a Deluge of Data
 

Amy Zegart offered similar cautions when asked about cyber capabilities and intelligence. Analysts have been quick to comment on the seemingly underwhelming cyber front in the war against Ukraine, particularly when compared with Russia’s estimated cyber capabilities and prior campaigns into cyber interference. Zegart flipped the scenario to pose a different perspective.

“The lesson may not be that Putin is not ten feet tall. I think the right question to ask is, ‘Could he have been?’” she told the CIOs.

Rather than view the events in Ukraine as a win for Western cyber defense, Zegart believes it will be much more constructive to unpack how the current war was almost a near miss.

“What are the factors that tilted in our favor? What if those aren’t there next time? Is a near miss a signal that things are working well? Or is the near miss a sign that things are prone to catastrophic failure?” she posed to the delegates.

Zegart has studied and written extensively about how emerging technologies are rapidly and dramatically changing the landscapes of cyber and intelligence gathering, an analysis she summarizes as the “Five Mores”: more threats, more speed, more data, more customers, and more competitors. While not exclusive to the events unfolding in Ukraine, each of these areas has been highlighted and accelerated by the conflict, says Zegart. In a world where information is coming faster and from more directions than ever before, understanding those points of potential failure and building resiliency and protocols into the process becomes absolutely crucial for security and defense, whether in Russia and Ukraine or with adversarial relationships elsewhere.

How can autocrats prevent self-deception? How can we help our adversaries stop deceiving themselves?
Amy Zegart
FSI Senior Fellow at CISAC

Understanding Parallels Between Moscow and Beijing
 

While the current conflict in Ukraine was the immediate topic of the panel, the implications of what is happening now in Eastern Europe have clear correlations to how events unfold between China and Taiwan in coming years. Beyond Ukraine, the question many of the officers had was: What is Xi Jinping learning from all of this?

As both Scott Sagan and Michael McFaul were quick to point out, Xi, like Putin, is a very difficult target to read, and making any assessment of his thinking is exceptionally difficult.

Echoing the sentiment, Amy Zegart explained, “When I go down the list, I can make an argument for polar opposite learnings on every dimension. That’s what concerns me the most. I don't know which of those Xi Jinping is learning.”

Turning the question around, Zegart offered an alternative. “Maybe the question we need to be asking is, ‘How can autocrats prevent self-deception? How can we help our adversaries stop deceiving themselves?” As Scott Sagan noted, autocratic systems built around an authoritarian leader like Putin are highly incentivized towards yes-man politics rather than criticism and constructive critiques about how to identify problems and achieve results. Putin’s miscalculations in Ukraine and the apparent gaps in his intelligence briefings are evidence of this.

In regimes prone to self-deception, the answer to Zegart’s question may lie in data and analysis. If autocratic leaders are unable to rely on information from within their own system, outside actors should work to fill in those gaps and communicate an accurate cost-benefit analysis, she suggests.

Looking toward China, Michael McFaul agrees that this type of communication and analysis needs to be a key part of the U.S. deterrence strategy.

“I think it would be a very worthy enterprise for a government organization or a think tank to spell out in detail the economic consequences of an attempted invasion of Taiwan. We want Xi Jinping to know that,” he advised.

[Left to right] Joe Felter, David McKeown, Michael McFaul
Scott Sagan speaks about nuclear security and nonproliferation to a delegation of visiting CIOs from the Department of Defense.
Joe Felter, the director of the Gordian Knot Center, sits with visiting CIOs from the Department of Defense as they listen to a panel with FSI experts.
David McKeown from the Department of Defense listens to a panel of FSI experts.
A delegation of chief security officers from the Department of Defense visit scholars at the Freeman Spogli Institute.

Learning from Today and Planning for Tomorrow
 

Whether in Ukraine, China, or in other challenging policy areas, McFaul also emphasized the need for longevity and commitment.  “This is year one of the war,” he reminded the delegation. ”We can feel really good about what we’ve done today, but if in Year 4 we’ve lost the war, nobody is going to remember that.”

McFaul highlighted not only the urgency of the current situation, but also the importance of dialogue and partnerships between academia and policymakers. While political appointments and assignments in government may shift from term to term or from one administration to another, experts at academic organizations like the Freeman Spogli Institute and the Gordian Knot Center can provide the continuity and deep bench of expertise needed to make, adapt, and sustain challenging policy decisions in the long-term.

In his concluding remarks, McFaul reminded the visiting delegates of one of the institute’s foundational principles. “Our mission statement here at FSI is to translate research into policy outcomes. We want people based in D.C. to understand how many resources and people we have for them to call on,” he said.

Wrapping up the discussion, Joe Felter, the director of the Gordian Knot Center, likewise emphasized the importance of this connection. Speaking to the CIOs he said, ”This panel clearly shows that academia does more than just admire problems. Stanford is in this fight, and we’re putting our best forward to provide solutions.”

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Chief Information Officers representing specialties across the Department of Defense met with Michael McFaul, Scott Sagan, and Amy Zegart to discuss the war in Ukraine and how it’s changing the discussion around cyber defense, nuclear policy, and deterrence.

The Future of Women, Life, and Freedom in Iran

Authors
Melissa Morgan
News Type
Commentary
Date
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"Women, Life, and Freedom" has become the rallying cry of tens of thousands of Iranians around the world. What began as protests over the death of Mahsa Amini, a young Kurdish woman detained by Iran's morality police, has become a groundswell in Iran's society unlike anything since the Iranian Revolution in 1979.

"Those three words [are] even more progressive than 'Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness,' because women are central to it. It has life. It has joy," says Dr. Abbas Milani, the director of Iranian Studies at Stanford University. He joined Michael McFaul on the World Class Podcast to discuss what Dr. Milani calls the "seething volcano" of anger, disappointment, and frustration many in Iran feel towards the corruption, cronyism, and economic mismanagement the regime of Iran has perpetrated against its citizens.

Could Mahsa Amini be the spark that sets off a democratic explosion? Milani and McFaul discuss what the latest calls for change might mean for the country, and how a democratic Iran could rewrite the calculus of the global geopolitical stage.

Listen to the episode below, or wherever you listen to podcasts.

 

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Like what you hear? Catch up on all of the episodes of World Class and subscribe for updates and alerts on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify, and wherever you get your podcasts.

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Rebuild, Reimagine, and Accelerate: Ukraine

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Rebuild, Reimagine, and Accelerate: Ukraine

Rebuilding Ukraine will not be easy. Rebuilding Ukraine into a modern market economy, an effective state, and a thriving democracy that can fulfill the requirements of EU membership will be a challenge. Rebuilding Ukraine into a model for sustainable development and sustainable societies in the 21st century for the world to follow will be an uphill battle.

It is a necessary battle.

Guided by past experiences of successes and failures in post-war reconstruction, our goal is to generate innovative, practical ideas for the rebuilding effort. We aim to provide a framework for reconstruction that empowers government policymakers, private sector actors, and non-government leaders to be ambitious and accountable.

This workshop brings together a broad set of experts to define the problem, outline the cornerstones of an effective framework, and lay the foundations for future action. We hope that the conversations we start together at Stanford will serve as a springboard for productive collaborations in the months and years ahead.

Organized by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, and Economists for Ukraine.

7:30 - 8:10 am — Arrival and breakfast

8:10 - 8:15 am — Welcoming remarks

Kathryn Stoner (Stanford)
Dmytro Kushneruk (Consulate of Ukraine in San Francisco)

8:15 - 8:30 am — Opening remarks

Anastassia Fedyk (UC Berkeley)
Michael McFaul (Stanford)

8:30 - 9:00 am — Keynote Address

Mustafa Nayyem (State Agency for Restoration and Infrastructure Development of Ukraine), via Zoom

9:00 - 9:45 am — Taking stock: The Scale of Destruction and Scope of Reconstruction so far

Tymofiy Mylovanov (Kyiv School of Economics), via Zoom  
Nataliia Shapoval (Kyiv School of Economics), via Zoom

9:45 - 10:00 am — Coffee break

10:00 - 11:30 am — Getting the Economics Right. The Policies and Sequence of Reform and Reconstruction

Chair: Anastassia Fedyk (UC Berkeley)

Panelists:  
Torbjorn Becker (Stockholm School of Economics)  
Barry Eichengreen (UC Berkeley)  
James Hodson (AI for Good Foundation)  
Marianna Kudlyak (Federal Reserve Bank San Francisco)  
Denis Gutenko (former Head of State Fiscal Service)

11:30 - 11:45 am — Coffee break

11:45 am -1:15 pm — Getting Governance Right. Strengthening Democratic Accountability and Expanding Civic Engagement

Chair: Anna Grzymala-Busse (Stanford)

Panelists:  
Francis Fukuyama (Stanford)  
Luis Garicano (University of Chicago), via Zoom  
Ilona Sologoub (Vox Ukraine; Economists for Ukraine)  
Eva Busza (National Democratic Institute)  
Olexandr Starodubtsev (National Agency on Corruption Prevention), via Zoom

1:15 - 2:00 pm — Lunch

2:00 - 4:00 pm — Getting International Financing Right. The Structure, Sources, and Types of International Assistance

Chair: Erik Jensen (Stanford)

General Principles and Problems 
Panelists: Yuriy Gorodnichenko (UC Berkeley); Roger Myerson (University of Chicago)

The View from the U.S. Administration  
Panelists: Erin McKee (Bureau for Europe and Eurasia (E&E), USAID), via Zoom
Dafna Rand (Office of Foreign Assistance (F), Department of State), via Zoom

The View from International Financial Institutions 
Panelists: Vladyslav Rashkovan (IMF), via Zoom; Michael Strauss (EBRD)

4:00 - 4:15 pm — Coffee Break

4:15 - 6:00 pm — Sectoral and Regional Rebuilding. Ukrainian Reconstruction as a New Model for Sustainable Development

Chair: Kathryn Stoner (Stanford)

Panelists:  
Tatyana Deryugina (UIUC; Economists for Ukraine)  
Yulia Bezvershenko (Stanford)  
Andrii Parkhomenko (USC)  
Iryna Dronova (UC Berkeley)  
Eric Hontz (Center for International Private Enterprise) 
Roman Zinchenko (Greencubator), via Zoom

6:00 - 6:30 pm — Takeaways and Next Steps

Moderators: Anastassia Fedyk and Michael McFaul

6:30 - 7:00 pm — Reception

7:00 pm — Working Dinner: Takeaways and Next Steps


By invitation only. Not open to the public.

Workshops

Japan Must Do More, and Faster, to Avert War Over Taiwan

Authors
Oriana Skylar Mastro
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Commentary
Date
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This opinion article first appeared in the Washington Post.

 

Most world leaders, including President Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, agree that the defense of Taiwan is crucial for regional security. But most options for improving deterrence will take too long. Building Taiwan’s self-defense, developing more U.S. firepower in the region, creating the economic resilience to make severe sanctions feasible: None of these will come to fruition before 2030.

Japan could change the game now. Allied forces, responding immediately and en masse, have a chance of thwarting a Chinese invasion, according to a recent report from the Center for Strategic & International Studies. But, in meetings with high-level officials in Tokyo last month, I sensed a mismatch between talk and walk. Japan must broaden its vision of self-defense to encompass priorities and declaratory policies that will avert calamity in the region. Tokyo cannot wait until war breaks out to start the tougher conversations.

Here’s why.

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First, without Japan, the United States could be outgunned in a fight to defend Taiwan, notwithstanding Washington’s new basing agreement with the Philippines. A combined U.S.-Japan fleet, on the other hand, would boast more than three times as many aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyers as the People’s Liberation Army Navy. The quality of many Japanese ships approaches that of its U.S. counterparts. Eight of Japan’s destroyers field a state-of-the-art Aegis weapons system used by some of the more advanced ships in the U.S. Navy.

Tokyo could contribute significantly to a military effort to deny China the ability to take Taiwan by force. To do so [... it] must be willing to go after the amphibious invasion force and targets on mainland China — a very controversial proposition indeed.

Second, Japan’s involvement could mitigate some of the geographic vulnerabilities of the United States. Adding Japanese bases more than doubles the locations from which the two countries together could conduct operations. Japan’s southwestern islands are closer to Taiwan than mainland China. Take Yonaguni Island, just about 70 miles from Taiwan’s east coast. On it are intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, as well as anti-ship and anti-aircraft capabilities. Operating from these bases in the defense of Taiwan, allied forces would have more opportunities to quickly target an invading force. That would make attacks on U.S. bases in Japan, such as Kadena, at the southernmost tip of the archipelago, less attractive to the Chinese. Such strikes would no longer completely cripple an air effort.

Third, Japan has military strengths that would make a fait accompli almost impossible for China. Though Japanese diesel submarines are slower than U.S. counterparts, they could reach the Taiwan Strait in just two days. U.S. submarines departing from Hawaii would take at least a week; from San Diego even longer. This makes Japan the first line of defense for Taiwan. Japanese boats could also monitor key choke points through which Chinese navy submarines would be attempting to exit the First Island Chain in the western Pacific. This would free up the quieter submarines of the U.S. Navy to wreak havoc on amphibious vessels and escort ships.

In short, Tokyo could contribute significantly to a military effort to deny China the ability to take Taiwan by force. To do so, Japan must increase its stockpile of torpedoes and long-range strike weapons, as planned. Tokyo must be willing to go after the amphibious invasion force and targets on mainland China — a very controversial proposition indeed.

On the surface, it looks as if Japan is moving in the right direction. The government took the groundbreaking historic step of increasing defense spending to 2 percent of Japan’s gross domestic product over the next five years. This meant a whopping 26.3 percent increase in 2023 alone. The greatest increase in the past was in 1986, by nearly 50 percent.

Last year, former prime minister Shinzo Abe stated that the security of Japan is connected to Taiwan. He said a Chinese use of force against a U.S. vessel defending Taiwan could legally trigger the deployment of Japan’s military (known as the Self-Defense Force).

Indeed, a 2015 law allows Japan to engage in collective defense when presented with an existential threat. This provides plenty of flexibility for Japan to fight alongside the United States without the need for a constitutional amendment. The officials I spoke with in Tokyo were firm that Japan would respond if China attacked U.S. bases such as Kadena.

Crudely, Japan seems to be prepared to push back against only Chinese assets that are clearly poised to attack its sovereign territory. Those heading toward Taiwan? Not so much.

But all these initiatives concern self-defense. Japan does worry that military activity around Taiwan could extend to the security of its southwestern islands. Or that if China takes Taiwan, it would be emboldened to take the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which Tokyo administers but which China also claims. There are even concerns that Okinawa, a group of 160-plus islands that is home to 1.4 million people (and dozens of U.S. bases), could then prove enticing to Beijing.

Crudely, Japan seems to be prepared to push back against only Chinese assets that are clearly poised to attack its sovereign territory. Those heading toward Taiwan? Not so much.

While a degree of strategic ambiguity makes sense, too much could backfire. If Japan is clearly unwilling to defend Taiwan, then improvements in Japanese military capabilities will do little to deter conflict across the strait. Japanese officials don’t need to say they would attack any Chinese invading forces, but they need to let their counterparts know it is a real possibility. The officials I met were unwilling to send such strong messages; some insisted reassuring Beijing was more important.

Tokyo must make clear at home and abroad that defending Taiwan is no longer off the table. The prospect of Japan engaging in offensive operations in the defense of Taiwan would stay Chinese President Xi Jinping’s hand. Only then would recent monumental changes in Japanese politics fulfill their potential in contributing to peace and security in Asia. If Ukraine has taught us anything, it is that deterrence is costly, but war is worse.

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Michael McFaul, Oriana Skylar Mastro, Ken Jimbo, Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Larry Diamond, and Francis Fukuyama speaking at the Yomiuri Conference, Tokyo.
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Stanford Experts Explore the Roles of Taiwan and Ukraine in Countering Autocratic Challenges to Democracy

At the Yomiuri International Conference, Freeman Spogli Institute scholars Larry Diamond, Francis Fukuyama, Oriana Skylar Mastro, Michael McFaul, and Kiyoteru Tsutsui examined lessons from the war in Ukraine, the risks of a crisis over Taiwan, and the impacts of both geopolitical flashpoints for defending democracy and for a coordinated approach to deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.
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Gi-Wook Shin and Francis Fukuyama at Encina Hall, Stanford, in conversation.
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A Resurgence of Democracy?

A Conversation with Francis Fukuyama on the Challenges of a Changing Global Order
A Resurgence of Democracy?
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Tokyo must make clear at home and abroad that defending Taiwan is no longer off the table.

Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law in Southeast Asia

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Workshop on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law in Southeast Asia

This workshop brings together scholars from Asia and the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University to discuss the state of democracy, development, and the rule of law in Southeast Asia. Through these broad lenses, the participants will present research and reflections on various topics and cases from the region, including the monarchy in politics, peace-making in the Philippines, Chinese infrastructure investments in Myanmar, illiberalism in the Philippines, and Islamic law in Indonesia.

Event Co-Chairs:

Marisa Kellam
Associate Professor, Waseda University and Visiting Scholar at CDDRL

Donald K. Emmerson
Director, Southeast Asia Program of Shorenstein APARC

9:30 – 10:00 AM — Coffee and Introductions

10:00 – 10:45 AM — Political and Social Risks of the BRI: China’s overseas infrastructure investment projects in Myanmar
Presenter: Ruosui Zhang, Ph.D. Candidate, Waseda University
Discussant: Mike Bennon, Research Scholar, Global Infrastructure Policy Research Initiative at CDDRL, Stanford University

Developing countries are not passive takers of China’s loans and investments, an oft-overlooked aspect in the political economy of China’s foreign investment. Tracing the changing fate of the Myitsone dam in Myanmar, this presentation will argue that an increase in accountability from military dictatorship to semi-democracy explains the suspension of the project by the Myanmar government in 2011. It will also argue that the change in the leadership’s ideology from the quasi-civilian to a civilian government explains why the project did not encounter further setbacks even though the accountability level increases in Myanmar in 2016. 

10:45 – 11:30 AM — Roundtable discussion on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law in Indonesia
Reza Idria, Assistant Professor, Ar-Raniry State Islamic University
Gita Wirjawan, Chairman, Ancora Group

This roundtable discussion will offer the perspectives of renowned Indonesia scholars on democracy, development and the rule of law in their country. In particular, Reza Idria will discuss the social and political responses to Sharia in Aech, and its broader implications for the rule of law in Indonesia. Gita Wira will speak about prospects and challenges for Indonesian democracy and development, including his expectations for the outcome and impact of elections next year.

11:30 AM – 12:30 PM — Lunch and Informal Discussion 

12:30 – 1:15 PM — Monarchy and Autocratization: Cases in Southeast Asia
Presenter: Kana Inata, Associate Professor, Tokyo Metropolitan University
Discussant: Francis Fukuyama, Professor and Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at CDDRL, Stanford University

Focusing on Southeast Asian monarchies, this presentation will highlight monarchs’ involvement in processes of autocratization in the region. The talk will contend that the monarchy intervenes directly as an autocratizer in Malaysia and Brunei, whereas the monarchy is used indirectly to justify autocratization by government actors in Thailand and Cambodia. In making these claims, the talk will clarify the boundaries between monarch’s de jure and de facto interventions in politics and will consider monarchical accountability. 

1:15 – 2:30 PM — Roundtable discussion on Democracy and the Rule of Law in the Philippines
Aya Watanabe (Researcher, Institute of Developing Economies-JETRO)
Lisandro Claudio (Associate Professor, UC Berkeley)
Yuko Kasuya (Professor, Keio University)

This discussion will consider the nature of democracy and its impact on the rule of law in the Philippines. Aya Watanabe will argue that the electoral prospects of politicians have complicated peace-making in the Mindanao conflict given that the negotiated settlements must be approved and implemented within the democratic political system. Both Lisandro Claudio and Yuko Kasuya will offer reflections on the May 2022 Philippine presidential election, and the pervasiveness of illiberalism, corruption, and violence in Philippine democracy more generally.

2:30 – 3:00 PM — Reflections 
Co-chairs and participants
 

Philippines Conference Room
Encina Hall, Third Floor, Central, C330
616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305

This event is open to Stanford affiliates and invited guests only.

Workshops

CDDRL Joins Call for Global Solidarity in Supporting the Iranian Struggle for Freedom

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Nora Sulots
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The Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University is proud to join Freedom House and a coalition of nearly 500 experts, organizations, dignitaries, and heads of state calling on the international community to strengthen its support for Iranian pro-democracy protesters.

A joint statement on the Freedom House website reads as follows:

Iranians have taken to the streets in rebellion.  The vanguard are young women, but they have been joined by men and people of all ages.  With breathtaking courage and unarmed, they have kept coming, even as the regime has shot, hanged, tortured, blinded, raped, beaten, and arrested many thousands. 

The spark was mandatory hijab, but the target of the uprising is the whole theocratic system.  Their slogan is Woman, Life, Freedom.  The goal they chant is “Azadi, Azadi, A-za-di,” meaning “Freedom, Freedom, Freedom.” 

Their victory would mean deliverance from a regime that denies free elections, free speech, due process of law, and personal autonomy in matters as simple as the choice of clothing. 

Victory would mean even more than that.  The end of the Islamic Republic’s system of misogyny would constitute a global landmark in the long march toward a world in which women are treated equally. 

The triumph of freedom in Iran could renew the global tide of democratization that was so strong in the latter twentieth century but has ebbed in the face of authoritarian counterattack. 

The Azadi movement addresses no demands to the regime, which it regards as fundamentally illegitimate and beyond reform.  The protestors chant “down with” it.  They want theocracy and dictatorship replaced by freedom and democracy.  They proclaim a “revolution.” 

They deserve unstinting support from freedom-loving people around the world: 

  • Governments, civic associations, and individuals should speak loudly and often in support of the protestors and in condemnation of the regime’s repressive actions.  Legislators and others should “adopt” individual arrestees, especially those facing execution, and spotlight their plight. 
  • Governments should take diplomatic, economic, and symbolic measures to punish the regime and bolster the protestors. All officials involved in the repressions, from Supreme Leader Khamenei down to local Basij commanders, should be sanctioned. The Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) should be added to terrorism lists. 
  • High level officials of democratic governments should receive leaders of the opposition, in publicly-announced meetings. 
  • Accurate, reliable, fact-based reporting via international radio, television, and social media reaching Iran should be enhanced, as should assistance to private Iranian exile broadcasting. 
  • Technical assistance, including equipment, should be given to help the demonstrators counteract censorship and surveillance and to communicate despite the regime’s disruption of Internet service and blocking of websites. 
  •  Labor unions, governments, and others in the international community should express solidarity with Iranian workers, should share the experiences of other labor struggles for worker rights and democracy, and should also seek ways to provide practical assistance, such as VPNs, other means of communication, and contributions to strike funds if safe and effective channels can be found.


We pledge to do all in our power to support the Iranian struggle for Azadi and call upon all people of good will everywhere to join us.


Additional signatories as of publishing this article include CDDRL faculty (Kathryn Stoner, Abbas Milani, Michael McFaul, Francis Fukuyama, and Larry Diamond), visitors (Sheri Berman), and practitioner program alumni (Laura Alonso, Nino Evgenidze, Nino Zambakhidze, Agon Maliqi, Andrea Ngombet, Oleksandra Medviichuk, and Saeid Golkar), among the hundreds of others.

We encourage you to read the full statement and sign the petition for yourself.

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The Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University is proud to join a coalition of nearly 500 experts, organizations, dignitaries, and heads of state calling on the international community to strengthen its support for Iranian pro-democracy protesters.

Stanford Experts Explore the Roles of Taiwan and Ukraine in Countering Autocratic Challenges to Democracy

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Noa Ronkin
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Despite their many differences, Taiwan and Ukraine have been portrayed as two fronts in a global struggle between democracy and authoritarianism. The interrelations between the two geopolitical flashpoints took center stage at the recent Yomiuri International Conference, Taiwan and Ukraine: Challenging Authoritarianism. Cohosted by APARC’s Japan Program, the Yomiuri Shimbun, and the Asia Pacific Initiative, the conference was held on January 16, 2023 at the International House of Japan (IHJ) in Tokyo. It examined paths to addressing autocratic challenges to democracy and offered recommendations for coordinated deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region by the United States and its allies.

The forum included two sessions with Freeman Spogli Institute (FSI) experts. The first session, moderated by Ken Jimbo, IHJ managing director and API president, featured panelists Oriana Skylar Mastro, FSI center fellow at APARC, and Michael McFaul, the director of FSI. They examined the fallout of the war in Ukraine, the risks of a Taiwan crisis, and their implications for security in East Asia, including Japan. The second session, moderated by Kiyoteru Tsutsui, the deputy director of APARC and director of the Japan Program, featured panelists Larry Diamond, Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at FSI, and Francis Fukuyama, Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at FSI. They considered the war in Ukraine and the tensions over Taiwan against the struggle to bolster the liberal international order.

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Military Miscalculations, Economic Dislocations

McFaul opened the first session by reviewing some of the lessons from the war in Ukraine. The international community underestimated the Ukrainian military, he said. Putin, however, miscalculated the response of the United States and NATO, on the military side, and the scope of the sanctions the global community of democratic states, including Japan, would be willing to impose on Russia, on the economic side. 

It turned out, noted McFaul, that it was possible to reduce drastically Russian oil and gas coming into Europe, and Russia today has significantly fewer resources to fight Ukraine than it had anticipated. “I think it is very important to look at just how much economic dislocation happened with Russia, a country that was not integrated into the global economic world in the same way that China is,” McFaul said. He pointed out that the international community might also be underestimating the political pressure and dislocation that will erupt if, unprovoked, China invades Taiwan. “It will have very deep economic consequences for the Chinese economy,” said McFaul.

It is important to remember that the international community did not make credible commitments to deterring Russia before 2022, McFaul noted. In the case of China, he emphasized the imperative of considering concrete ways to enhance deterrence against a Chinese invasion of Taiwan before military action begins. 

Rethinking Defense and Deterrence

China, however, is not easily deterrable, as Mastro explained in her following remarks. President Xi has been clear from early on that enhancing China’s role on the international stage would be a key part of the Chinese Communist Party’s agenda. Taiwan is a top priority issue in the Chinese Communist Party’s long-term thinking, said Mastro. She reminded the audience that at the recent CCP Congress, President Xi reaffirmed that China will not rule out using force to bring Taiwan under its control. He also elevated Party members with extensive expertise in the joint operational domain and with Taiwan contingencies to the Central Military Commission, the Chinese top decision-making body for military affairs.

I am convinced that if Japan were to commit to fighting with the United States in this contingency, that would be enough to deter China.
Oriana Skylar Mastro

How, then should the United States and its allies approach the question of deterring China? Mastro emphasized three conditions that U.S and Japanese defense policy must meet.

First, whatever the United States and Japan do in the defense realm must have an operational impact. For example, U.S. carriers will do nothing to prevent China from taking Taiwan in a wartime scenario, Mastro argued. “And along those lines, from the Japanese point of view, enhancing defense of the Senkaku Islands does nothing to deter China from taking Taiwan unless Japanese operations are going to be involved directly in stopping a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.”

The second condition is that China has to know about any defense changes the U.S. and its allies are making. For instance, if, in peacetime, there is no indication that the Japanese military is engaging in Taiwan Strait transits with the United States and the Chinese do not know about such activities, then they do not enhance deterrence.

Third, deterrence must happen before a war starts. It may seem an obvious point, but if the prevalent view is that, for example, the Japanese public will support the United States once a conflict over Taiwan erupts, then this approach does not deter China. “We have to let the Chinese know now that there is such support,” Mastro stated.

One issue China is concerned about, Mastro noted, is widening a Taiwan contingency. “China only wins Taiwan if the war is short, geographically limited to Taiwan, and only involves the United States, potentially in Taiwan,” she explained. “So I am convinced that if Japan were to commit to fighting with the United States in this contingency, that would be enough to deter China.”

Ultimately, the question before the United States and its allies is: “Do we want a happy China that is undeterred or an unhappy China that's deterred,” Mastro concluded. “Those are our only two options.” Deterrence is expensive and requires tradeoffs, but one thing that is costlier than deterrence is a major war, she emphasized.

“Let’s start thinking about how to actually change the environment with the sense of urgency that we need, because my biggest fear is that we're going to find ourselves in a major war with massive cost,” she urged the audience. There will be sacrifices to make, but the alternative, in Mastro's view, is worse.

Opportunities and Perils for Democracy

In the second session of the conference, panelists Larry Diamond and Francis Fukuyama examined the war in Ukraine and the tensions over Taiwan from the lens of democratic decline and its implications for the liberal international order.

Democracy has been in a global recession for most of the last two decades, yet the picture is not as bleak for democracies as it was just two or three years ago, said Diamond. In the United States, reforms at the state level have occurred, election deniers took control of Congress seats by a much smaller margin than predicted before the 2022 midterms, and extreme election deniers in crucial swing states were virtually defeated. Meanwhile, on the international stage, 2022 spotlighted autocrats’ inevitable shortcomings. In Russia, Putin has catastrophically miscalculated the war in Ukraine. In China, Xi has massively mismanaged the COVID pandemic, and the country’s economic growth is severely impaired.

It's going to be very important that the people of Taiwan see that they're not alone, that the democracies of the world — not just the United States and Japan but Australia and Europe — are with them; it will increase their will to fight.
Larry Diamond

Fukuyama said he was encouraged by the democratic solidarity shown in response to the war in Ukraine, especially in Europe, within NATO, and in Japan. Germany’s and Japan’s decisions to increase their defense budgets have been remarkably reassuring signals of strength among democracies, he noted.

But we sometimes forget that many countries in the Global South and elsewhere do not buy into this narrative, cautioned Fukuyama. Among the big disappointments in this regard is India, he stated, which raises the question of whether the issue at stake is indeed a battle between democracy and authoritarianism.

Indeed, democracies still face intractable challenges, Diamond explained. These include the corrupting influence of dirty money around the world, the trends of de-industrialization and hollowing out of the working class in advanced democracies, and social media, which Diamond sees as the single biggest driver of democratic decline. “I cannot tell you how much damage social media has done to destroy the social fabric of Truth and credibility and polarize society into tribal camps who don't have the same facts,” he said. “We have not found a way to temper that impact and win the battle For Truth.”

Taiwan and Deterrence

When it comes to the question of Taiwan, Diamond says he is worried. “There is going to be a PRC military invasion of Taiwan, probably in this decade, unless it is deterred,” he said. The three most crucial actors in deterring China are Taiwan, the United States, and Japan, he explained. Successful deterrence must involve coordination among all three in multiple arenas — from military cooperation to increased defense capacity and preparedness to impose such heavy costs in response to a Chinese invading force that will change Xi’s calculus.

Diamond observed that democracy is about uncertainty, of which there is now plenty in Taiwan as it looks ahead to a January 2024 contentious presidential election. Diamond’s prediction is that "China will intervene however it thinks it can” in Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election, as Xi would certainly prefer to pick up the island peacefully than by force, he said. “I think it's going to be very important that the people of Taiwan see that they're not alone, that the democracies of the world — not just the United States and Japan but Australia and Europe — are with them; it will increase their will to fight.”

Media Coverage

The Yomiuri Shimbun

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Gi-Wook Shin and Francis Fukuyama at Encina Hall, Stanford, in conversation.
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A Conversation with Francis Fukuyama on the Challenges of a Changing Global Order
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Elbegdorj Tsakhia
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Elbegdorj Tsakhia Appointed the Bernard and Susan Liautaud Visiting Fellow

While at Stanford, Elbegdorj, formerly the president of Mongolia, will focus on examining strategies to support Mongolian democracy in an increasingly polarized geopolitical landscape.
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India’s Strategic Balancing Act: The Quad as a Vehicle for Zone Balancing

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India’s Strategic Balancing Act: The Quad as a Vehicle for Zone Balancing
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At the Yomiuri International Conference, Freeman Spogli Institute scholars Larry Diamond, Francis Fukuyama, Oriana Skylar Mastro, Michael McFaul, and Kiyoteru Tsutsui examined lessons from the war in Ukraine, the risks of a crisis over Taiwan, and the impacts of both geopolitical flashpoints for defending democracy and for a coordinated approach to deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.

Between Electoral Cooptation and Violence: Managing Competitive Authoritarian Elections

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Autocratic elections are often marred with systematic intimidation and violence toward voters and candidates. When do authoritarian regimes resort to violent electoral strategies? I argue that electoral violence acts as a risk-management strategy in competitive authoritarian elections where: (a) the regime’s capacity for coopting competitors, local elites, and voters is low, and (b) the expected political cost of electoral violence is low. I test these propositions by explaining the subnational distribution of electoral violence during the most violent election in Mubarak’s Egypt (1981-2011): the 2005 Parliamentary Election. The results indicate that electoral violence is higher in districts where: the regime’s capacity for coopting local elites and competitors is low, clientelistic strategies are costlier and less effective, and citizens’ capacity for non-electoral mobilization is low. The conclusions provide lessons for efforts to contain electoral violence in less democratic contexts.

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Autocratic elections are often marred with systematic intimidation and violence toward voters and candidates. When do authoritarian regimes resort to violent electoral strategies?

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CDDRL Working Papers
Authors
Ahmed Ezzeldin Mohamed
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