Security

FSI scholars produce research aimed at creating a safer world and examing the consequences of security policies on institutions and society. They look at longstanding issues including nuclear nonproliferation and the conflicts between countries like North and South Korea. But their research also examines new and emerging areas that transcend traditional borders – the drug war in Mexico and expanding terrorism networks. FSI researchers look at the changing methods of warfare with a focus on biosecurity and nuclear risk. They tackle cybersecurity with an eye toward privacy concerns and explore the implications of new actors like hackers.

Along with the changing face of conflict, terrorism and crime, FSI researchers study food security. They tackle the global problems of hunger, poverty and environmental degradation by generating knowledge and policy-relevant solutions. 

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The Institute of Science and International Security’s new book Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons chronicles the Islamic Republic of Iran’s efforts to build nuclear weapons. The book draws from original Iranian documents seized by Israel’s Mossad in 2018 in a dramatic overnight raid in Tehran. The “Nuclear Archive” allows deep insight into the country’s effort to secretly build nuclear weapons. The book relies on unprecedented access to archive documents, many translated by the Institute into English for the first time. Based on three years of intensive research and analysis of the Nuclear Archives, this new book from the Institute presents a compelling account of Iran’s secret plans to develop nuclear weapons. The Institute of Science and International Security’s new book Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons chronicles the Islamic Republic of Iran’s efforts to build nuclear weapons. The book draws from original Iranian documents seized by Israel’s Mossad in 2018 in a dramatic overnight raid in Tehran. The “Nuclear Archive” allows deep insight into the country’s effort to secretly build nuclear weapons. The book relies on unprecedented access to archive documents, many translated by the Institute into English for the first time.

Read more at the Institute for Science and International Security.

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Based on three years of intensive research and analysis of the Nuclear Archives, this new book from the Institute presents a compelling account of Iran’s secret plans to develop nuclear weapons. Frank was the Geospatial Contributing Analyst.

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Frank Pabian
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Ph.D

Dr. Neilsen is an Assistant Professor in International Security at Baruch College, City University of New York (CUNY). She was the Cyber Security Fellow at CISAC from 2022-2024. Her research focuses on new technologies in conflict (specifically cyber, social media, and AI), mass atrocities, dis/misinformation, and the ethics of war. Her published work has appeared in International Affairs, Terrorism & Political Violence, Ethics & International Affairs, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Genocide Studies & Prevention, Lawfare, Just Security, and War on the Rocks. 

Previously, Rhiannon was a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Australian National University, a Research Consultant for the Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict (ELAC) at the University of Oxford, and a Visiting Fellow at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence.

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Naomi Egel recently completed her PhD from the Government Department at Cornell University. Her research examines the politics of multilateral weapons governance. Using a mixed methods approach, she assess why states pursue multilateral agreements to govern various weapons, and how their motivations for doing so affect the process and outcome of negotiations. More broadly, her research analyzes how different actors shape and contest multilateral security negotiations, how they frame weapons in different ways, and how power is exercised and contested in such negotiations.

Previously, Naomi was a Hans J. Morgenthau (nonresident) fellow at the University of Notre Dame and the inaugural Janne Nolan nuclear security visiting fellow at the Truman Center for National Policy. She has also been a visiting fellow at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) in Geneva, Switzerland. Before starting my PhD, she was a research associate for International Institutions and Global Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations.

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Laura Courchesne is the Co-Director and the Co-Founder of the Centre for Artificial Intelligence, Data and Conflict. Her work focuses on the role of the online environment in shaping and augmenting conflict dynamics. Laura was previously a Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and a Research Fellow at the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project at Princeton University. She has also consulted for Google's Jigsaw and Schmidt Futures. She completed her Ph.D. in International Relations at the University of Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar.

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Miriam Barnum completed her Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Southern California (USC). Her research is focused on understanding the motivations and constraints that shape states’ arming choices. In her book project, she examines the role that internal security threats play in driving choices between nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons pursuit options. Other ongoing projects relate to arming choices more generally, international conflict, and nonproliferation and arms control, with a focus on applying computational measurement models to enhance our understanding of these substantive areas.

While pursuing her Ph.D., Miriam was a US-Asia Grand Strategy predoctoral fellow at USC's Korean Studies Institute, and Director of Data Science for the Security and Political Economy (SPEC) Lab. Before coming to USC, she worked as a research assistant in the National Security Office at Los Alamos National Laboratory.

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Ian’s research focuses on the intersection of technology, science, and international security. His dissertation addresses the history and cultural politics of integrating Artificial Intelligence into military decision-making processes in the United States. 

Ian is affiliated with the Internet Governance Lab and the Center for Security, Innovation & New Technology, both housed at American University. He was a pre-doctoral fellow at CISAC and the Institute for Human Centered AI from 2022-2023. Ian's work has appeared in publications such as War on the Rocks and The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

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Julie George studies the politics of emerging technologies and international security. She was a predoctoral fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (HAI) at Stanford University. Broadly, her doctoral research examines the proliferation of emerging technologies and their impact on the probability and nature of conflict and cooperation in the international system. This focus has led her to engage a broad selection of scholarship across science and technology studies, history, international organizations, and law. 

Prior to her doctoral studies at Cornell University, she worked at the Atlantic Council and completed a graduate fellowship at the Nonproliferation Education and Research Center (NEREC) housed at KAIST University in South Korea. Her previous work included research on nuclear and cyber security, military expenditures, and trade in East and South Asia. She has a B.A. and M.A. in Political Science from Boston University, where she received the Best Thesis Award and was inducted into Phi Beta Kappa. More information regarding Julie’s research can be found at www.juliexgeorge.com

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Steven Pifer
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With an ugly war of attrition in Ukraine threatening to drag on for months, some fear possible escalation and suggest Washington should start talking to Moscow about a cease-fire and ending the war, or offer proposals to foster diplomatic opportunities.

Ending the fighting may well require talks, but the decision to negotiate should lie with Kyiv.

The Russian army launched a large-scale invasion of Ukraine on three fronts on February 24. However, by the end of March, it had to abandon its goal of capturing the Ukrainian capital and withdrew from much of northern Ukraine. The Kremlin said its forces would then focus on Donbas, consisting of Ukraine’s easternmost oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk.

By mid-July, Russian soldiers had occupied most of Luhansk. That represented a symbolic victory, but in reality three months of grinding fighting gained little new territory. The Russian army, which has seen roughly 15,000 to 25,000 soldiers killed in action and lost much equipment, appears exhausted.

The Ukrainian military has also taken heavy losses but has been bolstered by flows of new arms from the West. Among other things, Russian war crimes have provoked sharp anger among Ukrainians and strengthened their resolve to resist.

Now hardly seems a propitious time for negotiations.

To begin with, Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Kremlin show no sign of readiness to talk seriously. Russian officials articulated their war aims for Ukraine early on: denazification (of a government headed by a Jewish president), demilitarization, neutrality, recognition of occupied Crimea as Russian territory, and recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent so-called “people’s republics.”

In early July, Russian National Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev restated basically the same goals. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on July 20 said that Russia had broadened its military aims and would seek to seize territory beyond Donbas. He later added that Moscow sought to end the “unacceptable regime” in Kyiv.

The Kremlin’s goals remain unchanged — Ukraine’s almost total capitulation — despite the fact that Russia’s performance on the battlefield has fallen well short of expectations and could deteriorate as the Ukrainians take military actions such as systematically destroying Russian ammunition dumps. Do those who urge talks see space for any compromise that would not leave Ukraine in a substantially worse position than before the most recent invasion began in February?

Even a cease-fire presents peril for the Ukrainian side. It would leave Russian troops occupying large parts of eastern and southern Ukraine, with no guarantee they would leave. The Ukrainians have learned from bitter experience. Cease-fires agreed in September 2014 and February 2015, supposedly to end the fighting in Donbas, left Russian and Russian proxy forces in control of territory that they never relinquished and did not fully stop the shooting. Moreover, the Russian military might use a cease-fire to regroup, rearm, and launch new attacks on Ukraine.

This is not to say that a cease-fire or negotiation should be ruled out. But, given the risks inherent in either course for Ukraine, the decision to engage in talks on a cease-fire or broader negotiations should be left to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his government.

If Ukraine’s leadership were now to conclude that it should seek a settlement, Moscow’s unyielding negotiating demands would require that Kyiv consider concessions. They would be painful for the Ukrainian side and would almost certainly encounter stiff public opposition: A July poll showed that 84% of Ukrainians opposed any territorial concessions. That included 77% in Ukraine’s east and 82% in the south, the two areas where most fighting now occurs.

Any negotiation thus would be fraught with risk for Zelenskyy and his team. Only they can decide when — or if — it is time to talk. Battlefield developments and future military realities may affect the calculation in Kyiv. If Ukraine’s leaders choose to begin negotiations, the West should not hinder them, but the West also should not press them to negotiate before they see a net benefit in doing so. Western officials should be leery of opening any channel to Moscow that the Russians would seek to turn into a negotiation over the heads of the Ukrainians.

To be clear, this war has an aggressor, and it has a victim. Those who advocate that Washington talk to Moscow fear that, if the war continues, Russia might consider launching attacks on targets in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states. One should not wholly exclude that possibility, but the Russian military has its hands full with Ukraine. It likely does not want to take on NATO directly as well.

The United States and NATO certainly have a major interest in avoiding direct military conflict with Russia. However, in order to minimize that risk, is it right to ask the Ukrainian government to make concessions to the aggressor, concessions that could reduce the size and economic viability of the Ukrainian state, that would provoke a sharp domestic backlash in the country, and that might not end the Russian threat to Ukraine?

One last point to weigh. If the West pressed Kyiv to accept such an outcome, what lesson would Putin draw should his stated desire to “return” Russia’s historic lands extend beyond Ukraine?

Published on Brookings.edu

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Ending the fighting may well require talks, but the decision to negotiate should lie with Kyiv.

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J. Luis Rodriguez
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The United Nations kicks off the 10th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on Monday, gathering 191 treaty members in New York. It’s an NPT review that typically takes place every five years, though the pandemic pushed the date back two years.

Read more at The Washington Post.

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Latin American countries will push again for nuclear disarmament at this month’s review conference

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Dr. Daniel Greene has been accepted as a 2022 Emerging Leaders in Biosecurity fellow from the Center for Health Security at John Hopkins University.

The Emerging Leaders in Biosecurity program supports talented career professionals in deepening their expertise, expanding their network, and building their leadership skills through a series of events coordinated by the center. The highly competitive program inspires and connects the next generation of leaders and innovators in the biosecurity community.

Dr. Daniel Greene received his Ph.D. in Education from Stanford University, and continues research focused on the societal risks and potential of the life sciences using a combination of data science, survey research, policy and analysis, and qualitative methods to help us understand our collective options for regulating life-science research. He has been a Postdoctoral Researcher in Biosecurity and Project Fellow for CISAC since 2019.

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Dr. Daniel Greene has been accepted as a 2022 Emerging Leaders in Biosecurity fellow from the Center for Health Security at John Hopkins University.

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