Security

FSI scholars produce research aimed at creating a safer world and examing the consequences of security policies on institutions and society. They look at longstanding issues including nuclear nonproliferation and the conflicts between countries like North and South Korea. But their research also examines new and emerging areas that transcend traditional borders – the drug war in Mexico and expanding terrorism networks. FSI researchers look at the changing methods of warfare with a focus on biosecurity and nuclear risk. They tackle cybersecurity with an eye toward privacy concerns and explore the implications of new actors like hackers.

Along with the changing face of conflict, terrorism and crime, FSI researchers study food security. They tackle the global problems of hunger, poverty and environmental degradation by generating knowledge and policy-relevant solutions. 

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Traditionally, definitions of security emphasized military defenses and alliances against potential adversaries. Over the last few decades, of course, everything from financial flows and technology transfer, water and energy supplies, trade relationships, to information security and social media disinformation have demanded increasing attention, alongside or instead of hard power. Nowhere have notions of security been more multidimensional, and less militaristic, than in Europe.

Has Russia's fullscale war in Ukraine forced an enduring correction back to traditional notions? Or are some changes predating the war destined to persist? Can geopolitics return if it never went away? What is the future of the fiscal-military state? Is the modern state fit for purpose any more? What is technology actually doing to governance, if anything? How might security depend on new or reinvented institutions? Is China an even bigger game-changer than Russia for European security? Is there, could there be, a pivot to Asia, or is that a nonsense? So many questions -- how do we begin to sift them, and order them, to establish a workable framework with which to build notions of security that could last?

Anna Grzymała-Busse

Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall
Stanford,  CA  94305-6055

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Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Kleinheinz Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution
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Stephen Kotkin is a senior fellow at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and the Kleinheinz Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. Within FSI, Kotkin is based at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) and is affiliated with the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) and The Europe Center. He is also the Birkelund Professor in History and International Affairs emeritus at the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs (formerly the Woodrow Wilson School), where he taught for 33 years. He earned his PhD at the University of California, Berkeley and has been conducting research in the Hoover Library & Archives for more than three decades.

Kotkin’s research encompasses geopolitics and authoritarian regimes in history and in the present. His publications include Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929–1941 (Penguin, 2017) and Stalin: Paradoxes of Power, 1878–1928 (Penguin, 2014), two parts of a planned three-volume history of Russian power in the world and of Stalin’s power in Russia. He has also written a history of the Stalin system’s rise from a street-level perspective, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (University of California 1995); and a trilogy analyzing Communism’s demise, of which two volumes have appeared thus far: Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse 1970–2000 (Oxford, 2001; rev. ed. 2008) and Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment, with a contribution by Jan T. Gross (Modern Library, 2009). The third volume will be on the Soviet Union in the third world and Afghanistan. Kotkin’s publications and public lectures also often focus on Communist China.

Kotkin has participated in numerous events of the National Intelligence Council, among other government bodies, and is a consultant in geopolitical risk to Conexus Financial and Mizuho Americas. He served as the lead book reviewer for the New York Times Sunday Business Section for a number of years and continues to write reviews and essays for Foreign Affairsthe Times Literary Supplement, and the Wall Street Journal, among other venues. He has been an American Council of Learned Societies Fellow, a National Endowment for the Humanities Fellow, and a Guggenheim Fellow.

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Postdoctoral Fellow, 2022-23
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Kyuri Park joined the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) as a postdoctoral fellow during the 2022-2023 academic year. Kyuri was also a non-resident fellow of the US-Korea NextGen Scholars Program (2022-2024), an initiative by CSIS Korea Chair and USC Korean Studies Institute. 

Her research lies primarily in international security and cooperation, with a regional focus on the Asia-Pacific. Kyuri is particularly interested in examining the variations in the pattern of security cooperation between great powers and secondary states in the Asia-Pacific (1970-present) and drawing out the implications for regional order, stability, and the US grand strategy. By shedding light on joint military exercises in the region, during her time at Shorenstein APARC, Kyuri worked on her book project which explores how East Asian secondary states are responding to the rise of China, and why they are responding the way they are.  

Kyuri’s work on South Korea’s middle power diplomacy has appeared in International Politics. Previously, Kyuri was a US-Asia Grand Strategy predoctoral fellow at the USC Korean Studies Institute. She also served as a co-contributing author of ‘Korea-Japan relations’ in Comparative Connections published by Pacific Forum.  

Kyuri received her Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations at the University of Southern California (USC), M.A. in Asian Studies at Georgetown University, and B.A. in International Studies at Ewha Womans University. 

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Visiting Scholar at APARC, 2022-23
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Lieutenant Colonel Faith Posey joined the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) as Visiting Scholar for the 2022-2023 academic year. Lt. Col. Posey currently serves in the United States Air Force. While at APARC, she conducted research regarding security and international relations issues in the Asia-Pacific.

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Ben Rosenthal

Ben Rosenthal is a Research Assistant at the Cyber Policy Center. A recent graduate of Harvard College and Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Ben received his A.B. in Linguistics and Statistics and concurrent M.A. in Linguistics. His thesis explored associations between phonological features and predicted emotions in text-based data. While at Harvard, he was also active as a student leader in myriad organizations including as manager for the NCAA Division I water polo team and as producer for several on-campus arts companies, including the Harvard-Radcliffe Dramatic Club and the Lowell House Opera Society. During the 2020 presidential election, Ben worked as a voter protection associate for Biden’s Florida campaign, ensuring equitable access for voters and developing real-time improvements to campaign infrastructure. He is originally from Miami, FL.

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Visiting Scholar
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Or (Ori) Rabinowitz, (PhD), a Chevening scholar, is an associate professor at the International Relations Department of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. During the academic year of 2022-2023 she will hold the post of visiting associate professor at Stanford’s CISAC. Her research interests include nuclear proliferation, intelligence studies, and Israeli American relations. Her book, Bargaining on Nuclear Tests was published in April 2014 by Oxford University Press. Her studies were published leading academic journals, including International Security, Journal of Strategic Studies, and International History Review, as well as op-eds and blog posts in the Washington Post, Foreign Policy and Ha’aretz. She holds a PhD degree awarded by the War Studies Department of King’s College London, an MA degree in Security Studies and an LLB degree in Law, both from Tel-Aviv University. She was awarded numerous awards and grants, including two personal research grants by the Israeli Science Foundation and in 2020 was a member of the Young Academic forum of the Israeli Academy for Sciences and Humanities.  

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Pallabi Mitra Chakrabarti serves as the Chief Strategy & Innovation Officer at CMCI, a Women-Owned Small Business headquartered in Fairfax, Virginia. In this role, she delivers the highest quality solutions related to science, technology, and policy. 

Prior to joining CMCI, Pallabi held positions at multiple Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories and federal government contracting organizations since 2016. She began her career supporting the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), DOE’s semi-autonomous agency tasked with enhancing national security. During this time, she led the exploration of ionizing radiation technologies and spearheaded the development of innovative alternative technologies to radiological materials. 

Most recently, Pallabi served as a subject matter expert at Sandia National Laboratories. She led activities related to the security of radioactive materials across a diverse set of partners, including international and domestic government agencies, other U.S. government laboratories, NGOs, industry, and academia. She also played an instrumental role in developing and designing research studies that identified and analyzed information on radiation technologies used in the treatment of cancer. 

In parallel with her professional endeavors, Pallabi has pursued scholarly work at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, where she continues to research how to bridge the gap between global health and radiological security. Pallabi received a Master of Science degree from the London School of Economics and Political Science in 2014, and she earned a Bachelor of Science degree from Cornell University in 2013.

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Noa Ronkin
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The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is pleased to invite applications for a suite of fellowships in contemporary Asia studies to begin fall quarter 2023.

The Center offers postdoctoral fellowships that promote multidisciplinary research on contemporary Japan and contemporary Asia broadly defined, inaugural postdoctoral fellowships and visiting scholar positions as part of the newly launched Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab, and a fellowship for experts on Southeast Asia. Learn more about each opportunity and its eligibility and specific application requirements:

Postdoctoral Fellowship on Contemporary Japan

Hosted by the Japan Program at APARC, the fellowship supports research on contemporary Japan in a broad range of disciplines including political science, economics, sociology, law, policy studies, and international relations. Appointments are for one year beginning in fall quarter 2023. The application deadline is December 1, 2022.
 

Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellowship on Contemporary Asia

APARC offers two postdoctoral fellowship positions to junior scholars for research and writing on contemporary Asia. The primary research areas focus on political, economic, or social change in the Asia-Pacific region (including Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia), or international relations and international political economy in the region. Appointments are for one year beginning in fall quarter 2023. The application deadline is December 1, 2022.
 

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The Center offers a suite of fellowships for Asia researchers to begin fall quarter 2023. These include postdoctoral fellowships on contemporary Japan and the Asia-Pacific region, inaugural postdoctoral fellowships and visiting scholar positions with the newly launched Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab, and fellowships for experts on Southeast Asia.

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Cover of the book 'The China Questions 2'
The belief that China presents a challenge, if not an outright threat, to U.S. national security is increasingly prevalent in elite and public discourse. The main points of contention lie in the degree to which China threatens U.S. national security, how exactly China may challenge U.S. national security, and uncertainty about how the answers to these questions may change over time (which is fundamentally a debate about the drivers of Chinese strategy).

In this chapter, included in the volume The China Questions 2: Critical Insights into US-China Relations​ Harvard University Press, 2022), Oriana Sklayar Mastro focuses on the direct and indirect ways the People's Republic of China poses a threat to U.S. national security today.

Two caveats are in order. First, this focused discussion on challenges and threats may distort the degree to which China threatens the United States. On aggregate, the discussion presents a malign influence from the Perspective of U.S. national security. But it could be much worse. China has resolved many of its territorial disputes peacefully. Beijing has relied mainly on economic and political tools to blunt U.S. influence beyond its immediate region. China is an active member of the vast majority of international institutions. Even though faced with a conventionally superior U.S. military, China has yet to change its minimal no-first-use nuclear doctrine.

Second, while Mastro presents information on trends and trajectories, her focus is on today's challenges. These are likely to expand in scope and increase in intensity over the next five to ten years.

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A chapter in The China Questions 2: Critical Insights into US-China Relations, edited by Maria Adele Carrai, Jennifer Rudolph, and Michael Szonyi.

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Oriana Skylar Mastro
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This commentary originally appeared in The Economist.


In the afternoon of August 4th, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) kicked off the largest and most sophisticated military exercises it has ever conducted. Over the course of a week, the Chinese launched dozens of missiles and conducted drills near Taiwan with 100 aircraft, ten destroyers and support vessels. Submarines and aircraft carriers also played a role. The display has made the third Taiwan Strait crisis, which occurred between 1995-96, when China conducted four rounds of tests over the course of several months, with barrages of no more than six missiles, look like child’s play.

Part of the rationale for the latest exercise was to signal Beijing’s anger over Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. Ms Pelosi, the speaker of the House of Representatives, was the highest-ranking American government official to visit the island since 1997. Back then Newt Gingrich, who was also the House speaker, made the trip. China warned that if Ms Pelosi added Taipei to her itinerary, there would be hell to pay.

The exercise is also a bit of a “coming-out party” for Beijing. In 1996 the third crisis ended when America sent two aircraft-carrier strike groups within 200 miles (322km) of Taiwan. America saw this as a great strategic success, and Chinese leaders were unhappy with its interference in what China considers a domestic affair. The resentment helped to drive China to build the PLA into one of the greatest armed forces in the world.


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Compared with 1996, China’s forces today are barely recognizable. Back then it had a large army, with roughly 4m people, but that was a sign of its backwardness more than anything else. With obsolete equipment and poor training, China barely had what could be considered an air force and a navy. Its pilots could not fly over water, at night or in rough weather. In 1999 less than 2% of its fighters were fourth generation, just 4% of its attack submarines were classed as modern (nuclear powered, for example) and none of its surface ships was. Its navy was a glorified coastguard with ships that, lacking air-defense systems, had to hug the coastline on any patrol. Its nuclear weapons, solid-fuelled and housed mainly in fixed silos, could have been taken out in one fell swoop by America.

Now China’s armed forces are comparable to America’s in quality and quantity. Most of its platforms are modern (of the latest technology for the relevant domain) and it boasts the largest navy in the world. In some areas, Chinese military capabilities already surpass America’s—in shipbuilding, land-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles, and integrated air-defense systems. China possesses the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal in the world, one that is currently undergoing major modernization.

Chinese leaders knew the PLA had to conduct a series of large, realistic exercises to identify issues and hone their capabilities. If China had done so out of the blue, instead of using Ms Pelosi’s visit as a pretext, international opprobrium would have been stronger.

But even with all these improvements, it is unclear whether China could take Taiwan by force. China has not fought a war since 1979, when it made heavy weather of a “punitive” invasion of Vietnam. An amphibious attack, and to a lesser degree a blockade of the type the exercises off Taiwan were simulating, would demand complex joint operations (involving army, air force and navy), which in turn require impeccable logistics and command and control. Xi Jinping, China’s leader, launched a massive organizational reform to improve in these areas, and the PLA undoubtedly has. But the war in Ukraine may have given him heightened anxiety, given that the Russians struggled precisely with logistics and command.

For this reason, we should see the massive exercises off Taiwan less as a signal, and more as a rehearsal for combat. Mr Xi wants progress on the Taiwan issue, and domestically talk in the press is shifting from peaceful reunification to armed reunification. Chinese leaders knew the PLA had to conduct a series of large, realistic exercises to identify issues and hone their capabilities. If China had done so out of the blue, instead of using Ms Pelosi’s visit as a pretext, international opprobrium would have been stronger.

China will seize the opportunity to practice as much as possible. It has announced already that this round of exercises will continue and that another round in the Bohai Gulf/Yellow Sea is next. And it won’t just be large-scale exercises. It is unlikely that Beijing will return to its previous level of operations. Instead, China might attempt to normalize greater Chinese activity around Taiwan. That makes war more probable. Through a series of exercises the PLA, and the party leadership, might gain confidence that China’s forces are ready to take Taiwan sooner than they would otherwise have thought.

Of course, this all depends on how the exercises and operations go. From the outside, this is hard to assess. The missiles landed where they should have in recent days, and there were no accidents. But we don’t know how much and how well different groups are communicating with each other. To prepare for joint operations, air-force units need to operate in close proximity and coordinate with ground troops and amphibious elements. The PLA needs to practice providing supplies, such as prepositioned fuel stocks, and bringing munitions and medical supplies to forward locations such as Fujian, the province directly across the Taiwan Strait.

This is where the real trouble lies. If activities in the vicinity of Taiwan become more routine, not only does this heighten anxiety in Taipei (and probably other regional capitals as well) but it helps to disguise any preparations for a real military campaign. China needs an element of surprise to be able to take Taiwan before America has time to mobilize adequate forces in the region to defend the island. If China’s forces are simulating formations, blockades, attacks, and amphibious landings, it will be harder to decipher when they are preparing for the real thing. Ms Pelosi’s visit has allowed Beijing to move to a new level of military activity unchallenged, which will make it harder for America to defend Taiwan. No signal of America’s commitment to the island can fix that.

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The Taiwan Temptation

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Nancy Pelosi’s visit was more pretext than provocation.

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The Institute recently received new information and feedback, warranting a major revision to our report, “Abadeh is Marivan,” first published on August 28, 2020. The Abadeh site is the Amad Plan’s Marivan site, an important test site responsible for conducting large-scale high explosive tests for developing nuclear weapons under the Amad Plan, Iran’s effort during the early 2000s to build five nuclear weapons, subsequently reoriented to a smaller, better camouflaged nuclear weapons effort. The new information allowed the Institute to locate with high certainty Marivan’s outdoor test site, located about 1.5 kilometers northeast from the support site (see Figure 1). Although the logistical support site was razed in July 2019, the outdoor test site appears to have remained largely intact. Recent satellite imagery acquired and analyzed by the Institute shows that the outdoor site features two bunkers and a test ramp.he Institute recently received new information and feedback, warranting a major revision to our report, “Abadeh is Marivan,” first published on August 28, 2020. The Abadeh site is the Amad Plan’s Marivan site, an important test site responsible for conducting large-scale high explosive tests for developing nuclear weapons under the Amad Plan, Iran’s effort during the early 2000s to build five nuclear weapons, subsequently reoriented to a smaller, better camouflaged nuclear weapons effort. The new information allowed the Institute to locate with high certainty Marivan’s outdoor test site, located about 1.5 kilometers northeast from the support site (see Figure 1). Although the logistical support site was razed in July 2019, the outdoor test site appears to have remained largely intact. Recent satellite imagery acquired and analyzed by the Institute shows that the outdoor site features two bunkers and a test ramp.

Read more at The Institute for Science and International Security.

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Frank Pabian
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