Guam, the small island territory in the Pacific Ocean, plays a unique strategic role in the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy. In a new article, part of a Hudson Institute collection of essays on the challenges and motivations of defending Guam, Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro analyzes the island’s strategic importance to the United States, China’s threats to U.S. forces on the island, and the pathways to deterrence against Chinese encroachment in the region. 

Mastro enumerates a number of reasons behind Guam’s strategic importance. First, “the Chinese missile threat to U.S. regional bases, especially those located in the first island chain, enhances the operational role of those bases sufficiently distant from China to partially mitigate the threat it poses, yet also close enough to be operationally impactful.” Guam’s geostrategic potential is rooted in its proximity to China, and represents “the westernmost location from which the U.S. can project power, manage logistics, and establish command and control.” 

In a Taiwan contingency, Mastro argues that Guam would play an important role as a logistics hub and jumping-off point for combat forces headed toward the Taiwan Strait, with the caveat that U.S. forces could maintain roughly half the sortie rate from Guam as that from Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Japan. Another reason behind Guam’s strategic utility comes from reliable base access, which is more reliable than in other Asian host countries.

Despite the U.S. force posture and the island’s protective distance from China, Guam remains vulnerable to Chinese intermediate-range ballistic missile attack. According to Mastro, the U.S. has systems on the island to protect against missile threats, such as a THAAD battery, but “U.S. military commanders want much more of a guarantee that the U.S. would be able to continue operations out of Guam even under Chinese missile attack.”

Given China’s ability to threaten U.S. bases on the island, Mastro proposes an “unappreciated and underutilized” pathway to deterrence: deterrence by resiliency. Similar to deterrence by punishment, which seeks to prevent adversary attacks by employing the threat of severe penalties should the adversary do so, deterrence by resiliency is based primarily on shaping adversaries’ perceptions of one’s own capabilities. “However, unlike deterrence by punishment, the goal is not to create fear of retaliation but rather to encourage the perception that disruptive events would have little effect on an adversary.” Mastro uses the term resiliency to refer to a state’s ability to both absorb and deflect costs at a given level of violence.

Mastro argues that resilience is about signaling to China that “the benefits it would derive from a particular action would actually be less than it believes them to be. Improving defenses can enhance deterrence through this mechanism, but, given its limitations, other avenues—in particular, pursuing viable alternatives and creating redundancy—should also be pursued to ensure that an attack on Guam would not cripple a U.S. war effort.”

Guam, frequently cited as the U.S.’s viable alternative to bases within the first island chain, represents a critical strategic waypoint, but as long as the U.S. is reliant on the island to fight and win a war, “China will ensure that it can effectively target the island, thus making messaging associated with Guam’s defense key.” Mastro proposes that the language about defending Guam must expand to accomodate resilience contingencies for the island’s planned defenses, which, “once in place and even under attack […] would ensure that the US could continue operations there to the degree necessary to, for example, maintain air superiority over the Taiwan Strait.” 

Whether China would accept deterrence by resilience remains to be seen, but policymakers must employ new thinking about Guam’s defense to meet the new security challenges posed by China.

The Pacific islands are known for their tropical climate, lush landscape, and rich cultures, but as coterminal student Ma’ili Yee has learned, they also form a backdrop to multiple geostrategic agendas in the Pacific Ocean region. In her recent research, Yee focuses on the vital economic, military, and geopolitical roles the Pacific island nations play at a time when the U.S.-China great power competition is generating renewed interest in the region.

Yee received her BA in International Relations in 2020 and is completing her MA in East Asian Studies this summer. She has been interested in Sino-U.S. relations in the South Pacific and noticed the scarcity of materials that incorporate Pacific Islander perspectives on the geopolitical developments in the region and how the island nations are affected by and responding to the tensions in the U.S.-China relation. She set out to study these issues.

Yee’s research over the past year has been supported by the Shorenstein APARC Diversity Grant. As part of its commitment to promoting inclusion and racial justice at Stanford, APARC established the grant in summer 2020 to support students from underrepresented minorities interested in studying contemporary Asia. Yee is the grant’s inaugural recipient.

Yee originally intended to use the grant to conduct field research in Fiji and Tonga but had to adjust her plans due to restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic. She ended up studying primary source materials shared online by country members of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), an inter-governmental organization that aims to enhance cooperation between countries and territories of the Pacific Ocean region, including the formation of a trade bloc and regional peacekeeping operations.

Multiple Islands, One “Blue Continent”

Yee’s research reveals that Pacific island nations do not share the same strategic and diplomatic agendas of traditional powers. Rather, in recent years, they have developed a more assertive diplomatic posture, becoming highly involved in promoting blueprints that are vital to their objectives and creating their own framework for defining strategic priorities in the Pacific region. Most importantly, as Yee explained in a recent presentation to the APARC community, Pacific island nations reject being viewed as pawns in a power game by larger states, particularly amidst the intensifying U.S.-China competition.

Against the framework of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, island nations have endorsed a collective framework they call the Blue Pacific. The Free and Open Indo-Pacific, which was introduced by Japan and later formalized by the United States, is a strategic vision that often privileges the Indian Ocean over the Pacific Ocean and prioritizes U.S.-led maritime concerns.

By contrast, the Blue Pacific vision is grounded in Pacific island nations’ perspectives. It emphasizes the opportunity to leverage their collective oceanic presence and focuses on their concerns, foremost of which are climate change and sustainable development. The Blue Pacific advocates for a long-term foreign policy commitment to act as one “Blue Continent” while also calling for greater international coordination. PIF member countries are currently developing these priorities in their vision for the future, the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. “The uncertainty of COVID-19,” write PIF Members, “only reinforces the need for a long-term strategy for how we work together as one Blue Pacific.”

By consolidating their interests as a unified political bloc, Yee concludes, Pacific Island nations now exercise significant agency in determining the trajectory of their region and using their voices to shape multilateral initiatives such as the Paris Agreement. External powers who seek to exercise influence in the Pacific Ocean region would do well to develop reciprocal relationships with island nations and consider their goals, she says.

Yee's research also examines the opportunities for fintech to promote sustainable development in the Pacific Ocean region and as an area for potential collaboration and competition amongst world powers as U.S.-China tensions continue to unfold.

“I am grateful to APARC for this Diversity Grant and for allowing me to do this kind of work,” says Yee. “It really would not be possible without such support, so it was cool to see this resource come out last summer.”

This blog post was first published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute's The Strategist analysis and commentary site.

The Quad is stronger than ever. The informal ‘minilateral’ grouping of Australia, India, Japan and the United States has in the past year held its first stand-alone ministerial meeting and its first leaders’ summit, and launched an ambitious project to deliver Covid-19 vaccines. This ‘golden age’ of the Quad is a product of newfound Indian enthusiasm for the grouping, in turn, spurred by the military crisis in Ladakh, where India faces ongoing Chinese troop incursions across the two countries’ disputed border.

But the Quad is not bulletproof. Some experts have suggested that the economic and diplomatic effects of the devastating second wave of the pandemic in India will preoccupy the Indian government, sapping the Quad of capacity for any new initiatives. Others counter that India remains committed to competition with China—which is what really matters for the Quad—although its partners always expected ‘two steps forward, one step back’ from India.

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Related: On the Conversation Six podcast, Tarapore discusses the policy paper on which this blog post is based with Jawaharlal Nehru University Professor of International Politics Rajesh Rajagopalan. Listen:

The pandemic may well prove to be a hiccup in the Quad’s evolution, but a potentially much larger disruption may come from the ongoing Ladakh crisis itself. As I argue in a new ASPI Strategic Insights paper, the crisis has greatly increased the risk of a border war between India and China, which would present a defining test of the Quad. A possible war could either strengthen or enervate the Quad—depending on how India and its partners, including Australia, act now to shape the strategic environment.

Risk is a function of likelihood and consequence. The likelihood of war on the India–China border is still low—both countries would prefer to avoid it—but has risen since the crisis began. Both countries have greatly expanded their military deployments on the border and backed them with new permanent infrastructure to resupply and reinforce them. China has proved its revisionist intent with large and costly military incursions, although its specific objectives and plans remain unknown. And the interaction of both countries’ military strategies and doctrines would, on the threshold of conflict, promote escalation.

The consequences of a possible conflict would be dire for both belligerents and for the region. China — assuming it is the provocateur of conflict—would likely face some political rebuke from states that consider themselves its competitors, but it will work strenuously to reduce those costs, and would likely have priced them in to its calculations of whether to fight. India will suffer high tactical costs on the border, and may also suffer wider harm if China uses coercive cyberattacks against strategic or dual-use targets.

In a costly war, the repercussions may spill over to damage India’s recently developing strategic partnerships, especially with the United States and Australia. Despite generally favorable views of the US, the Indian strategic elite still harbors some latent suspicions. This was highlighted in two episodes in April 2021, when the US Navy conducted a freedom of navigation patrol through the Indian exclusive economic zone, and when the US was slow in delivering Covid-19 vaccine raw materials and other relief. Both instances quickly receded from the Indian public imagination—thanks to quick correctives from Washington—but they did reveal that, under some conditions, Indian perceptions of its new partnerships can be quickly colored by distrust.

A China–India border war may create exactly those conditions. There is a chance that conflict may result in a redoubled Indian commitment to the Quad, if New Delhi judges that it has no option but to seek more external assistance. Conversely, unless a conflict is managed well by India and its partners, it is more likely to result in Indian disaffection with the Quad. India deepened Quad cooperation during the Ladakh crisis partly as a deterrent signal to China, and partly because the Quad is still full of promise. However, after a conflict—when China hasn’t been deterred and has probably imposed significant costs on India—the Quad’s utility would have been tested, and probably not ameliorated India’s wartime disadvantage.

The task before Quad governments is to be sensitized to this risk and implement mitigation strategies before a possible conflict, to buttress the coalition in advance. As I outline in the ASPI paper, they could do this at three levels. First, they could offer operational support—such as intelligence or resupply of key equipment, as the US already has done in the Ladakh crisis—although Quad partners’ role here would be limited. Second, they could provide support in other theatres or domains—with a naval show of force, for example, although cyber operations would probably be more meaningful in deterring conflict or dampening its costs. Third, they could provide political and diplomatic support — signaling to Beijing that a conflict would harm its regional political standing.

For Quad members, the main goal would be to deter conflict in the first place, and, failing that, to preserve the long-term strategic partnership with India for the sake of maintaining as powerful and energetic a coalition as possible to counterbalance China in the long term.

While U.S. policymakers and military planners have been heavily focused on China’s maritime expansion in the western rim of the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea, Beijing has been steadily growing its capacity in the Indian Ocean region. The United States and its partners should take realistic and effective steps that address the strategic risks they face in the region and realize their vision of a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” writes APARC’s South Asia Research Scholar Arzan Tarapore in the latest issue of The Washington Quarterly.

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The United States’ strategic competition with China now extends to the Indian Ocean region, albeit it takes a different form compared with the heavily militarized territorial disputes of the western rim of the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) fleet is increasingly designed for oceanic deployments beyond China’s near seas and is rapidly expanding its amphibious capability. The PLAN conducts frequent oceanographic survey and submarine deployments, maintaining a constant presence of at least seven or eight navy ships in the Indian Ocean at any time. Having established its first-ever overseas military base on the western edge of the ocean, in Djibouti in 2017, China continues to develop other ports from Tanzania to Indonesia under the banner of the Belt and Road Initiative. It is also expanding security cooperation with regional states.

“This military expansion poses strategic risks for the United States and its allies and partners,” argues Tarapore. “It gives China rapidly increasing capacity to use military coercion in the Indian Ocean region, both directly, through military intervention, and indirectly, by compelling changes in regional states’ security policies.” It also gives China advantages in case of a potential war in the region.

The United States and its partners have proclaimed their commitment to the “free and open Indo-Pacific” vision. However, the four powers with the greatest interest and capacity to push back on China’s inroads —namely, the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, which banded together as the “Quad” — have failed to mitigate Beijing’s challenge. Their haphazard response “does little to curtail China’s capacity to coerce small states or posture for war,” says Tarapore.

He then offers a strategic assessment and a conceptual framework by which the United States and its partners can more effectively mitigate the risks of Chinese military expansion. Their most urgent task, he claims, is to build “strategic leverage,” that is, develop their political relationships and military capabilities in ways that consolidate their advantages. By doing so, they would ideally convince Beijing that coercive policies are unworkable or prohibitively costly, which would then impede China’s capacity to coerce regional states or posture for wartime. Tarapore is convinced that India has a key role to play within this framework if the latter also accounts for India’s particular resource and policy constraints.

When U.S. Vice President Michael Pence recently met with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in Tokyo ahead of the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, he declared that “The United States-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of peace, prosperity, and freedom in the Indo-Pacific.” Examining U.S.-Japan security relations is a priority of Stanford’s U.S.-Asia Security Initiative (USASI) at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. Just days prior to the Vice President’s remarks, USASI and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF) co-hosted the 2018 the U.S.-Japan Security and Defense Dialogue Series, where a key theme was coordination and cooperation in the long-standing U.S.-Japan security relationship.

Held in Tokyo from January 31 through February 2, this workshop convened senior Japanese and American policymakers, military leaders, scholars, and regional experts to discuss Japan's security strategy and the alliance between Japan and the United States. It is part of a dialogue series that deepens a discourse on contemporary Asia-Pacific security issues, while building bridges between American and Asian academics, government and military officials, and other defense and security policy specialists. Over the course of three days, core participants held frank discussions with scholars, government officials, and military leaders from both countries about the status of the U.S.-Japan security alliance given the present array of challenges in the region; met in private with key members of the Japanese government and the United States Embassy; and also engaged in candid conversations with military leaders that analyzed Japanese and American combined military planning and operations.

“This year’s workshop was the second meeting of the US-Japan Security and Defense Dialogue Series,” said USASI Director, Ambassador Karl Eikenberry. “It continues to be an excellent venue for the exchange of views between government and military officials, academics, and those with policy experience on U.S.-Japan security relations.”

Workshop Co-Host, Lieutenant General Noboru Yamaguchi, Japanese Ground Self Defense Force (Retired) and Special Advisor to the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, commented: "The issues we discussed were timely and important as the security environment surrounding the alliance is serious and cooperation among Japan, the United States, the Republic of Korea, and other partners, while improving, has a long way to go."

Solidifying the U.S. Alliance with Japan

(From left to right: General Vincent Brooks, Commander, UNC/CFC/USFK; Ambassador David Shear; Ambassador Michael Armacost; and Workshop Co-Hosts Ambassador Karl Eikenberry and Lieutenant General, (Retired) Noboru Yamaguchi)

(From left to right: General Vincent Brooks, Commander, UNC/CFC/USFK; Ambassador David Shear; Ambassador Michael Armacost; and Workshop Co-Hosts Ambassador Karl Eikenberry and Lieutenant General, (Retired) Noboru Yamaguchi)

Day One of the dialogue saw participants engage in a series of frank discussions on many of the challenges facing the U.S.-Japan security alliance, including American and Japanese assessments of security trends in East Asia; training, operations, and strategic planning between the U.S. and Japan armed forces; and security cooperation and instability on the Korean Peninsula.

“The Workshop is an unique opportunity for participants to share their views on political, economic, and security developments in the Indo-Pacific area,” reflected Ambassador Eikenberry. “It provides a way for the United States and Japan to explore ways to achieve the shared goal of maintaining peace and prosperity in the region.”

Visits with U.S. Mission and Japan Foreign Minister

Highlights for Day Two included a meeting between core dialogue participants and key officials at the U.S. Embassy in Japan, including Ambassador William Hagerty. The day ended with a consultation with Japan Foreign Minister Taro Kono. APARC faculty and affiliates at that meeting included Ambassador Eikenberry, Ambassador Michael Armacost, USASI Associate Director Dr. Belinda Yeomans, and visiting scholar Dan Sneider.

“The diversity of the participants made the dialogue especially interesting,” said Ambassador Armacost. “The presentations and comments were both thoughtful and practical.” The frank and open dialogue about the operation of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, noted Sneider, covered topics ranging “from the broad strategic level to the nitty gritty issues of alliance coordination and cooperation. Both Japanese and American participants have found this to be refreshing and revealing.”

Fleet Activities Yokosuka

(Meeting with Commander of the Japanese Self-Defense Fleet, Vice Admiral Kazuki Yamashita)

(Meeting with Commander of the Japanese Self-Defense Fleet, Vice Admiral Kazuki Yamashita)

The 2018 U.S.-Japan Security and Defense Dialogue Series closed with a group of the U.S. and Japanese participants visiting United States Fleet Activities Yokosuka. There, they met with the Commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet, Vice Admiral Phil Sawyer, and had a working lunch aboard USS Chancellorsville. They subsequently toured the Memorial Ship Mikasa (famous for serving as Admiral Togo’s flagship during the Russo-Japanese War) and met with the Commander of the Self-Defense Fleet, Vice Admiral Suzuki Yamashita at his headquarters. The conversations throughout the day focused on the importance of the alliance and the challenges of conducting combined U.S.-Japanese naval and joint operations.

Chatham House Rule applied to the dialogue, but a workshop report with no direct attribution or remarks will soon be made available to the public.

June 2018 Update: the 2018 workshop report is now published. Read it now.

A Japanese version of the workshop report is also available.

The report from the inaugural U.S.-Japan Security workshop of May 2016 is also available. 

The U.S.-Asia Security Initiative is part of Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC). Led by former U.S. Ambassador and Lieutenant General (Retired) Karl Eikenberry, USASI seeks to further research, education, and policy relevant dialogues at Stanford University on contemporary Asia-Pacific security issues.

"As authoritarian states like China double down on strategic investments and project their “sharp power” abroad, the United States may finally be reaching a new Sputnik moment," writes Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies in his latest for The American Interest. Read here.