Stanford e-Oita is an online course for high school students in Oita Prefecture in the southwestern island of Kyushu, Japan, that is sponsored by the Oita Prefectural Government. Launched in fall 2019, it is offered by the Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education (SPICE) in collaboration with the Oita Prefectural Board of Education.

On January 8, 2021, Stanford e-Oita students were treated to a lecture by Sumire Hirotsuru, a professional violinist who was born and raised in Oita Prefecture. After graduating from Oita Uenogaoka High School, Hirotsuru attended and graduated from Harvard University and The Julliard School. She has performed with Yo-Yo Ma and the Silkroad Ensemble, and as a soloist at major venues in the United States and Japan, including Carnegie Hall, John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, and Suntory Hall, and at the Beppu Argerich Music Festival in Oita. After graduation from The Julliard School, Hirotsuru started her own company in New York City where she manages her own music promotional business. She is currently living in Japan.

Hirotsuru’s talk was titled “Sumire’s Journey in the U.S. and Japan.” While sharing thoughts on her upbringing in Oita, she had invaluable advice to the students like encouraging them to think about their strengths and the importance of balancing academics and extracurricular activities, in her case, practicing the violin. While introducing a typical day at Harvard, she emphasized the importance of building community in formal settings (e.g., through classes and musical practices and performances) as well as informal settings (e.g., having meals in her dorm with friends with diverse interests).

Since completing college, she has published several books. While sharing one of her publications, she underscored the critical importance of time management and setting benchmarks to reach one’s goals. She engaged students in thinking about a 2021 new year’s resolution and considering what needs to be achieved by June 2021, and even thinking about what needs to be done daily to meet their resolution.

Setting benchmarks resonated with Stanford e-Oita Instructor and fellow Harvard alumna, Kasumi Yamashita. Yamashita commented, “My e-Oita students were inspired by Sumire, who shared her personal journey from her hometown of Oita to the world stage. There’s a tendency to look outward and far away for new experiences but Sumire showed them how change can start in their own backyard. She talked about a cross-cultural program that she co-founded called ‘Summer in JAPAN,’ where Harvard undergraduates are invited to Oita to teach workshops and engage with Japanese students from many countries in English. It was one way that she brings her global experiences back to Oita, which is something I encourage my students to do.” Hirotsuru noted that she was inspired to begin Summer in JAPAN in Oita because she didn’t have any resource like that when she was growing up in Oita. “That was definitely one of my motivations to start a program like this.”

The emphasis on goal setting inspired a student to ask Hirotsuru about her current goal as a violinist. Hirotsuru replied that she aspires “to reach more people through music because right now, I feel like… classical music is often considered the music of people who have money… and access to concert halls. But I would like to bring my music to many people who are not only rich… I think music is something really important when you’re growing up.”

Hirotsuru’s talk also prompted one of the student musicians—a flutist of her high school brass band—to ask how Hirotsuru managed to balance both academics and violin practice. Hirotsuru responded by sharing, “You have a capacity of more than 100 percent… I think that you can put your effort completely on academics and flute at the same time by managing your time very efficiently.” Yamashita hopes that this lesson will be one that students will embrace far into their futures.

Reflecting on her experience with the students in Oita, Hirotsuru noted the following, “I was impressed by the students’ active participation in class—even through Zoom, I was able to see how their eyes were filled with excitement and passion for the future. I truly believe that there will be more opportunities for the students to expand their perspectives from Oita and beyond, as long as they keep their minds open.”

SPICE is grateful to Oita Governor Katsusada Hirose whose vision made this course possible. SPICE is also appreciative of Teacher Consultants Keisuke Toyoda and Hironori Sano for their unwavering support of Stanford e-Oita.

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Soft Power and U.S.-China Competition

One thing the Trump administration has identified correctly and managed to get consensus on, says Chinese military and security expert Oriana Skylar Mastro, is that the United States is in a great-power competition with China. Biden now accepts this framework, and Mastro expects him to maintain the basic principles of U.S. Asia policy, such as strategic ambiguity and ensuring Taiwan’s defense through arms sales. The difference will be in Biden’s approach, which is based on “multilateralism, strengthening partnerships, and not trying to provoke Beijing for the sake of provoking Beijing.” This approach, believes Mastro, is going to improve the U.S. position in terms of competition.

A core component of the U.S.-China great-power competition, however, is soft power — the ability of countries to get what they want through persuasion or attraction in the form of culture, values, and policies. Soft power, argues Mastro, is an area that is very hard for a president to have control over and rebuild, and American soft power has taken a tremendous hit with the breach of the U.S. Capitol on January 6. Demonstrating the decline of American democracy, the scenes from the pro-Trump mob attack have been a win for China and are hardly encouraging for U.S. partners and allies.

Biden can do a lot to tackle U.S. domestic problems and improve the political image of America abroad. But soft power, concludes Mastro, is organic. “I fear that President-elect Biden is going to learn that soft power, once lost, is very difficult to regain.”

The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Security in the Asia-Pacific

In shifting to relations between the United States and Japan, Kiyoteru Tsutsui focuses on how the traditional aspects of the Japan-U.S. alliance are playing out in the current geopolitical theater. In Tsutsui’s view, Japan’s early brushes with Chinese might in the 2010s has left the country particularly keen on ensuring that a strong counterbalance exists to China’s strategic advantage.

To that end, Japan has proactively partnered with other nations on trade deals such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The fact that both of these major free trade agreements were concluded without U.S. involvement is significant, and whether President Biden makes any response will be “one the more closely watched issues among foreign policy experts in the coming years,” by Tsutsui’s measure.

The reemergence of ‘the Quad,’ and even discussions of a ‘Quad+’ that includes nations such as South Korea, is of particular interest to Tsutsui. Such groups provide additional avenues for further developing the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ strategy originally envisioned by Prime Minister Abe. But Tsutsui is also not opposed to the idea of engaging China directly in multilateral efforts as long as China understands the U.S. and Japan’s resolve in countering Chinese aggression and non-peaceful ambitions.

The Korean Peninsula in the Spotlight

When it comes to engagement on the Korean peninsula, Gi-Wook Shin hopes the new administration will avoid a reactionary response and backsliding into old habits. The temptation to respond with an “anything but Trump’s” approach to handling relations with North Korea may be strong, particularly given the president’s unusually forward relationship with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, but Shin counsels to not set aside everything Trump did in regards to the DPRK.

“Bringing North Korea and Kim Jong Un more into the international community was an important step that no other president has made,” he says. Shin strongly cautions against a return to the strategic patience typical of the Obama era. With Kim’s consolidated control and North Korea’s wielding far more advanced nuclear capabilities and significantly strengthened ties to China than it did eight years ago, a return to previous patterns of diplomacy would fail to address the present circumstances on the Korean peninsula. Shin urges the Biden administration to reemphasize human rights and deepening dialogues with its diplomatic counterparts in Seoul. He foresees an improvement in U.S.-ROK relations but warns that North Korea can be a source of tension between the two allies.

Opportunities for Allies in Southeast Asia

Donald Emmerson also recommends strengthening diplomatic ties to the nations of Southeast Asia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). By his assessment, “ASEAN needs creativity. It needs new ideas rather than simply following the path of least resistance.” Emmerson envisions this well-spring of creativity coming in part from robust new efforts by the United States to engage with the region diplomatically and academically.

Existing forums such as the Bali Democracy Forum can provide a ready-made platform for engagement, while active participation in gatherings such as the Global Town Hall organized earlier this year by the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI) provide easy opportunities for the United States to meaningfully engage with Southeast Asia.

An Outlook on the Broader Asia-Pacific

Closing out the panel’s remarks, Thomas Fingar offers measured optimism for the future. “I think the incoming U.S. approach to the countries in Asia, China included, is going to be pragmatic and instrumental, not transactional. Every nation who thinks they can contribute, does contribute, and is willing to play by a rules-based order can be part of the solution.”

Fingar expects the Biden administration’s foreign policy to be “focused on problems, not places” — to be driven less by particular animosity or affection for certain countries and more by addressing global issues that promote American interests, such as climate change, the impediments in the international system to advancing American economy, and preserving security.

By consensus, the incoming Biden administration’s most immediate concerns are overwhelmingly domestic. But as Mastro articulated, the effects of the United States’ domestic policies directly impact its perception, standing, and sphere of influence around the globe.

Effective relationships between the United States and the Asia-Pacific cannot be sustained in the long term with an ongoing ‘America first’ agenda or by pursuing zero-sum goals. Rather, the Biden administration must focus on finding solutions to multilateral needs by working side-by-side with Asian nations as co-sponsors and co-leaders.

On December 10, 2020, 44 educators from across the United States joined a webinar titled “Global Human Rights and Minority Social Movements in Japan.” The webinar was offered on Human Rights Day, 72 years after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted. The featured speaker was Dr. Kiyoteru Tsutsui, who is the Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Professor and Senior Fellow in Japanese Studies at the Shorenstein APARC at Stanford University. He is also Director of the Japan Program, a Senior Fellow of FSI, and a Professor of Sociology.

The webinar can be viewed below:

Tsutsui has written extensively about human rights, including his latest book Rights Make Might: Global Human Rights and Minority Social Movements in Japan. In his talk, Tsutsui introduced the three most salient minority groups in Japan—the Ainu, an indigenous people in the northern part of Japan whose numbers range from 25,000 to 30,000; resident Koreans (Zainichi), a colonial legacy whose numbers have hovered around a half million; and the Burakumin, a former outcaste group whose numbers are approximately three million.

Tsutsui set the context for his talk by providing an overview of the global expansion of human rights dating from the UDHR in 1948 to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights—both adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966 and came into force from 1976. Human rights are now established as one of the key principles in the international community. He noted that despite the wide recognition of human rights as an important international norm, whether the institutionalization of human rights in international society has done what it was intended to do still remains debatable.

Concerning the era of global human rights in Japan, Japan ratified the two International Covenants noted above in 1979 and has been a member of the UN Commission on Human Rights since 1982 and the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights since 1984. These as well as participation in other forums have impacted ethnic minorities in Japan.

Tsutsui shared the historical backgrounds and key issues concerning the Ainu and resident Koreans. Concerning the Ainu, he underscored their lack of ethnic/indigenous pride—much less political activism—prior to the 1970s. This was largely because of their dependence on government welfare and strong pressure for assimilation. He then highlighted how Ainus’ self-perception changed after the 1970s as a result of their exposure to the Global Indigenous Rights Movement, which led to a reawakening of indigenous pride and the rise of Ainu activism.

Concerning resident Koreans, Tsutsui introduced their history prior to the 1970s as Japanese colonial era immigrants and their descendants who came to Japan or were brought to Japan by increasingly forceful means towards the end of World War II. He discussed issues concerning their loss of Japanese citizenship after World War II, resulting practices such as the fingerprinting of resident Koreans, and hurdles to mobilize for civil and human rights due to their non-citizen status and divided identities. Like the Ainu, things began to change from the 1970s with the beginning of the human rights era in Japan. For example, from the 1980s, encouraged by universal human rights principles, some resident Koreans refused to be fingerprinted, a practice they had previously resented but reluctantly complied with, and by 1985, over 10,000 resident Koreans joined in refusal. Resident Koreans made appeals to the UN Commission on Human Rights and other international forums to pressure the Japanese government. Amid mounting pressure domestically and internationally, the government terminated the fingerprinting practice for permanent residents in Japan (largely resident Koreans) in 1993, and for all alien residents by 2000.

Tsutsui summarized his talk by noting that global human rights galvanized minority social movements in Japan in four ways: (1) they empowered local actors with a new understanding about rights; (2) they provided political opportunities at the global level; (3) they increased international flows of mobilization resources; and (4) they provided vocabulary to frame their causes effectively. He closed his talk with a question, “Should we have hope or despair in terms of the future of human rights in the world?” and noted that the empowering capacity of global human rights is often overlooked, that reform takes time, that it is important to identify conditions conducive to improvement, and that contemporary backlash poses serious challenges.

In reflecting on the webinar with the educators, Tsutsui noted, “I was honored to present my work to the educators who can teach students in their formative years how important it is to continuously work to support human rights and how these efforts in the local context can change human rights practices not just locally but globally. This is a particularly important moment in the United States and in the world to reinforce the importance of human rights and democracy, as fundamental principles of democratic governance are challenged and protection of basic rights is in jeopardy. In these challenging times, I’d like to emphasize the importance of continuing grassroots-level work to support the principles of human rights and democracy. Ideas matter, and education shapes the future of our world.”

Teachers might consider some of the following as essential questions to raise with their students after viewing the lecture by Professor Tsutsui:

• How does the Ainu experience compare to the experience of Native Americans?
• How do textbooks in Japan cover ethnic minorities, and how is this similar and different to how ethnic minorities in the United States are covered in textbooks?
• How was ethnic minority participation in the Japanese military during World War II similar and different to ethnic minority participation in the U.S. military during World War II?
• What role can museums that focus on ethnic minorities play in educating the public, e.g., National Ainu Museum, National Museum of African American History and Culture?
• How is the backlash against ethnic minorities in Japan, e.g., being perceived as receiving special benefits, similar or different to that of ethnic minorities in the United States?
• Why is it important for young students to understand the significance of universal human rights?

The webinar was made possible through the support of the Freeman Foundation’s National Consortium for Teaching about Asia initiative. The webinar was a joint collaboration between SPICE and Stanford’s Center for East Asian Studies, and the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. Special thanks to Dr. Dafna Zur, CEAS Director, and John Groschwitz, CEAS Associate Director, for their support; to Dr. Gi-Wook Shin, APARC Director, and Dr. Karen Eggleston, APARC Deputy Director, for their support; and to SPICE’s Naomi Funahashi for facilitating the webinar and Sabrina Ishimatsu for planning the webinar.

This op-ed by Kiyoteru Tsutsui and Charles Crabtree was originally published in The Hill.

Any power transition produces policy casualties. In the United States, this might be particularly true as an incoming administration often differentiates itself from the incumbent by quickly announcing new policies and the abandonment of old ones. This is easier to do regarding domestic policy than foreign policy, where some continuity must be secured, even if serious disagreements exist between the incoming and outgoing administrations. Despite the tendency for administrations to make smaller changes in the realm of foreign policy, it seems that one casualty of the Biden administration will be the concept of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” The administration should learn more about the genealogy of this policy and reassert its commitment to the “free and open” part of the idea.

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The phrase “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) originates from the administration of Japan’s former prime minister, Shinzo Abe. In response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a global infrastructure development strategy that reflects China’s expansionist ambitions, Abe and his government weaved together some ideas from prior Liberal Democratic Party governments and labeled them the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy in 2016.

With an emphasis on coalition-building to check and balance China’s influence, this strategy had strong security undertones, which made Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries nervous. Fully aware of the need to get ASEAN countries on board, the Abe government softened the edges of the strategy by renaming it a “vision,” shifting away from the emphasis on security components and offering a more friendly tone to the Belt and Road Initiative. Backed up by Japan’s supportive engagement with Belt and Road activities, this softer version became a hit in Southeast Asia, with various countries claiming authorship for it — and even China did not register a strong objection to it.

The 2018 FOIP vision has three pillars: promotion of rule of law, freedom of navigation, and free trade; economic prosperity, and peace and stability. The first pillar is particularly important, as it distinguishes FOIP from China’s competing strategy.

Abe promoted FOIP not only in Asia but also in the U.S. Leveraging the warm personal relationship with his American counterpart, Abe tried to sell the strategy to the Trump administration as an effective way to moderate if not fully counter Belt and Road. Trump’s foreign policy team adopted this concept, using it to slow China’s expansion in the Pacific, Asia  and even East Africa. Eventually, the U.S. government began using the FOIP language frequently and placed it at the center of its anti-China foreign policy.

As the Biden administration takes over, it is understandable that its experienced foreign policy team, with a focus on returning to multilateral engagements and moderating anti-China rhetoric, would hesitate to quickly adopt FOIP, which may have acquired strong anti-China connotations in American foreign policy circles. In line with this, President-elect Biden so far has preferred the phrase “a secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific region” instead. This has deepened existing concerns in Asia, particularly in Japan, that Biden will be soft on China.

Correspondingly, Japan’s Suga administration, which came to power in mid-September, has faced criticism that it is softer on China than the Abe administration. This concern came to the fore in November, as the Suga administration routinely started using the language “secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific.” Another precipitating event was a recent press conference in which Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi did not immediately counter Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s prickly comments about the Senkaku islands.

Foreign policy experts, led by Yuichi Hosoya at Keio University, have argued vigorously that this language change signals a weaker commitment to the core principles of FOIP. If “free and open” is replaced by “secure and prosperous,” they contend, the whole vision becomes meaningless — and this shift will be remembered as a moment when Japan abandoned its commitment to the international order, undergirded by democracy and freedom, in favor of China’s vision of a “secure and prosperous” region that prioritizes development and stability.

Realizing the potential impact of this shift, the Suga administration quickly backtracked and resumed using “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” FOIP is back in Japan, which signals Japan’s continuing resolve to promote the international liberal order.

The Biden administration also should consider readopting “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” It’s understandable that Biden would want to move away from a strategic frame used by the Trump administration. There are certainly many of President Trump’s phrases that the Biden administration should drop, such as “America First” and “China virus.” But FOIP was not a vision created by anyone in the Trump administration. It was launched by Japan’s Abe administration and, after some modification, accepted by many Asian countries, arguably even by China.

Biden’s foreign policy likely will place greater emphasis on human rights and democracy than did Trump’s. Vis-à-vis China, this would mean that the U.S. will more vocally criticize human rights violations in Hong Kong, Xinjiang and elsewhere, and that trade negotiations will proceed with more civility. Given this, it would be inconsistent for the Biden administration to replace “free and open” with “secure and prosperous” in talking about the Indo-Pacific region. 

While there is some ambiguity about the concrete policies that accompany the admittedly underspecified FOIP vision, the Biden foreign policy team would be wise to readopt FOIP, bearing in mind an important fact: It was not Trump’s idea. If the next U.S. administration drops “free and open,” it will send the wrong message to the world, placing undue weight on Japan’s shoulders as the only major torch-bearer for liberal values in the region, and potentially straining the U.S.-Japan security relationship that must be in lockstep to moderate China’s ambitions.

This article by Kiyoteru Tsutsui was originally published by Nikkei Asia.

This was supposed to be the year that Japan would show the world that it is back.

The last few decades have seen Japan lose its prominence on the world stage, losing the lion's share of international attention to China. With the 2020 Summer Olympics as the focal point, however, Japan had planned on showcasing its technological advances, cultural assets, economic affluence, and social stability and efficiency, to dispel the notion that it has faded as an international power.

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COVID-19 changed everything. The outbreak in the Diamond Princess cruise ship in early February alerted the Japanese public to the power of the virus, and then the death of the famous comedian Ken Shimura in late March brought home its lethal impact. The early COVID domino saw K-12 schools closing on Feb. 27 and the Olympics postponed on Mar. 24. Quickly, tourism declined and the economy slumped as supply chains and production lines were disrupted and consumers mostly stayed home following emergency declarations.

Somewhat surprisingly, the number of cases did not grow exponentially in Japan as it did in the U.S. and Europe. Initially, a conspiracy theory was floated that the government was manipulating the numbers to leave open the possibility for the Olympics to take place, and soon the dominant narrative was that long-standing hygiene practices in Japan of wearing face masks and washing hands were the main reasons for the low number of cases. Despite the recent surge, the number of new cases in Japan has remained two digits below that in the U.S., and the country has avoided the worst of the virus's impact.

Yet, the public gave the government little credit for Japan's relative success. While the legislative measures and guidelines likely helped contain the spread of the virus, some missteps in the distribution of face masks and the economic stimulus package -- confounded by public relations miscalculations -- shaped the public perception that the government does not get what needs to be done.

This, combined with political scandals involving infractions of rules around political funds and elections, put then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on shaky ground by the summer. But it was the recurrence of the same health concern that ended the first Abe administration that forced him to step down again.

After Abe announced his resignation on Aug. 28, jockeying for his successor ensued, and quickly Yoshihide Suga, Abe's right-hand man as Chief Cabinet Secretary, emerged as a near consensus candidate, earning the support of most of the Liberal Democratic Party's major factions. On Sept. 16, Suga succeeded Abe.

Seen as a scrappy, self-made man belonging to no faction and who cares about regular folk, Suga started off with one of the highest approval ratings for any new prime minister. The air was filled with talk of a snap election, with the LDP poised to win big. In the face of continuing corona concerns, Suga decided against it, giving up his best chance of securing his position beyond next fall when he will face an LDP presidential ballot and a parliamentary Lower House election.

In the few months since, Suga has faced some criticisms: his rejection of the appointment of six scholars to the Science Council of Japan -- seen as retaliation for their earlier criticisms of the Abe administration -- drew the ire of the intellectual community, mostly on the left ideologically, and his foreign policy team appeared soft on China, raising concerns among the right-leaning public. Suga's popularity took a major hit in December when, in response to a surge in COVID cases, he was too slow to cancel his signature Go To Travel campaign that was intended to stimulate the economy by encouraging tourism. His approval ratings collapsed, and all of a sudden Suga finds himself fighting for survival.

While these have been the major events that the Japanese public will remember about 2020, what are the three most consequential events that will have a lasting impact on Japan in 2021 and beyond?

First, the end of the Abe era. Becoming the longest-serving prime minister in Japanese history is a major accomplishment in itself, but Abe was a transformative leader beyond his longevity. In foreign affairs, Abe strengthened the U.S.-Japan alliance, passing significant laws that enabled Japan to play a greater role and managing his relationship with U.S. President Donald Trump better than any major political leaders.

Furthermore, Abe formulated the concept of the free and open Indo-Pacific and developed the Quad, a quadrilateral grouping involving Japan, the U.S., Australia, and India, in the security realm, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership trade agreements, all as a way to counter China's expansionist ambitions.

Seen at first as an anti-China hawk, Abe soon mended fences politically and established good economic relationships with Beijing, working to develop multilateral frameworks to manage China's peaceful rise. These efforts constituted the first time in its post-World War II history that Japan led the world with a vision to build a world order governed by the rule of law, freedom, and democracy, an important legacy that should live on in the post-Abe era.

In domestic politics, Abe completed the process started by the government formed by the Democratic Party of Japan from 2009 to 2012 to strengthen cabinet's power to execute policies. The era of bureaucrats shaping much of Japan's future has ended, and politicians now pursue their own policies with electoral successes as their mandate. The personnel decision-making capacity was the critical component, and Suga, who was the main architect of the new system, will likely entrench politician-led policymaking.

The recent investigations into Abe-era political scandals, for which Abe himself had to respond to prosecutors, demonstrate the downside of concentration of power in the Prime Minister's office. Yet, his legacies will live on in the institutional frameworks his administration developed.

The second consequential event was COVID, not just for the obvious health and economic impact, but also for the unexpected ways in which it expedited a much needed social transformation in Japan. With the stay-at-home order, many Japanese workers experienced for the first time an extended period of telework and realized that it can be even more effective to work remotely from home.

Most employers also realized that telework is a viable option, especially in utilizing the hidden talents, particularly among women and the elderly, who cannot work regular hours but have much to contribute to the economy. Given the widespread concerns about Japan's work-life balance prompted by major instances of death by overwork, this offers an opportunity for the nation to achieve what the government's work-style reform policies had sought to accomplish.

The changes that COVID-19 has forced on Japan will likely expedite Japan's digital transformation too. Suga's administration has promoted digital transformation to cut meaningless red tape -- symbolized by the requirement for hanko, a personal seal, for official documents -- and to bring a more productive and efficient social system that can handle Japan's inevitable population decline.

This new system will offer customized support for citizens, depending on their personal situations, not just on their standardized demographic backgrounds. For example, elderly citizens can now receive different kinds of care and work opportunities depending on their health and career backgrounds, while children's school records can be used to identify areas of concern such as bullying or domestic abuse. With fifth-generation, or 5G, wireless networks becoming accessible to many, Japan is poised to achieve these social transformations and offer a model to the world.

Third-most consequential, but still underrated, was the decision to postpone the Olympics by a year. Until it was announced on Mar. 20, various possibilities surfaced from simple cancellation to postponement for two years. Considering that there was no precedent for postponement, this was uncharted territory.

In the end, the 12-month postponement may have been the best-case scenario. It was a gamble, however, since there were serious concerns about the possibility of the world not being ready by the summer of 2021. Now that COVID vaccines have begun to be distributed, things are looking quite promising for the Olympics to take place next year in Tokyo.

Beyond the actual staging of the games and all that will bring to Japan, the Olympics are important for their long term economic and social impact. Recent studies about the impact of the Olympics on a host country document positive economic impacts that can last as long as 20 years after the actual event, especially in tourism.

Japan had already started betting on international tourism as a major national economic focus and succeeded in increasing tourists dramatically until COVID struck. The infrastructure development required for increased tourism has largely been accomplished and had the Olympics been canceled, much of that investment would have been for naught. The economic impact would have been devastating. With the Olympics likely to be held next summer, Japan can still hope to show the world that it is back after all, just as it hoped to do in 2020.

This op-ed by Kiyoteru Tsutsui and Charles Crabtree was originally published in The Hill.

This year posed particular problems for democratic governments. While autocracies could limit human activities and rights with relative ease, virtually all democracies struggled to strike a delicate balance between the health imperatives posed by COVID-19 and economics and rights concerns, with a few exceptions such as Taiwan and Australia. Japan was no exception. Despite the fact that the country has fewer COVID-19 cases than many of its Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) peers, the Japanese government under first Shinzo Abe and now Yoshihide Suga has faced many criticisms from a jittery public for its slow, inconsistent, or overly onerous measures aimed at slowing the virus’s spread.

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As Japan prepares to ring in the new year, Prime Minister Suga faces major challenges. First and foremost is the late fall surge in COVID-19 cases. All the public criticisms against the government notwithstanding, Japan had managed the spread of the virus reasonably well until recent weeks. While the number of daily new cases is still two digits lower than in the United States, daily records have been set many times in the past few weeks and the virus now threatens to push Japan’s public health infrastructure toward the breaking point. The first few months of 2021 likely will be extremely tenuous for many Japanese, as they withstand the winter months spent mostly indoors and not necessarily with family members, waiting for the vaccine to arrive in the spring (at the earliest).

On the economic side of the pandemic, the Suga administration had to suspend the popular Go to Travel campaign, which was designed to stimulate consumption via domestic tourism. Suga was slow to suspend the campaign, since this would make it more difficult for small- and medium-sized businesses to survive, but his delay was roundly criticized in the media and among the public. In the coming months, he will have the daunting task of threading the needle between containing the pandemic and avoiding economic catastrophe. One thing seems sure: If the recent surge in COVID-19 cases is not contained, the economic damage will be devastating.

The political scandals of Suga’s predecessor are further limiting the prime minister’s ability to enact meaningful policy change. Prosecutorial focus on the prior administration has reached a boiling point in recent weeks, leading to separate investigations focusing on Abe, his first secretary, and his former agriculture minister. These cases allege corruption involving supporters of the administration and quid pro quo favors. Since Suga was Abe’s chief cabinet secretary, his potential knowledge of and involvement in these events are under the microscope as well, distracting him from governing and reducing his political capital — although he has not been accused of wrongdoing.

These two domestic issues — the pandemic and scandals — have combined to hit the Suga administration hard in the past few weeks, and his approval rating, which was very high when he took office is now down to 40 percent. Public support is not so low that it would end his administration right away, but if he can’t stop the slide with some effective measures, Suga might not last until the important elections next fall (LDP presidential and Lower House elections). 

If Suga can survive into the summer, new opportunities could open up for him. Presiding over a successful Tokyo Olympics could do wonders for his domestic and international image, even if he is not closely involved in the actual operation of the games. Showcasing to the world its technological advances, logistical mastery, cultural assets, tourist attractions and economic resilience, Japan could unite around the summer events, and Suga could benefit from an increased sense of national pride.

In addition, his signature domestic policy priorities likely would have produced some tangible outcomes by then, whether in the reduction of mobile phone bills, subsidies for infertility treatment, or any number of digital transformation initiatives that would reduce red tape in government operations. The COVID-19 pandemic created a tailwind for some of these policy reforms, and the Japanese public likely will value the reduced burden and added convenience that they bring, boosting Suga’s reputation as a “man of the people.”

In foreign affairs, Suga will have a chance to develop rapport with his American counterpart, President-elect Biden, once he has settled into the White House. He can use this as a springboard to restore a more professional handling of U.S.-Japan relations, rooted in mutual trust and support for multilateral frameworks. Led by career diplomats and experienced policymakers, the Biden administration should be able to soften the U.S. government’s anti-China rhetoric and establish more pragmatic relations with the Eastern power. While there is some concern that the Biden foreign policy team is oriented more toward the Middle East than East Asia, Biden cannot avoid China as his main diplomatic focus, and Japan is his best partner in dealing with China. The Suga administration has some key players such as Toshihiro Nikai, the former minister of economy, trade and industry and the current secretary general of the Liberal Democratic Party, who have strong pipes to China, and should be able to fulfill the role that Japan is expected to serve in coming years — the mediator between two superpowers.

In serving this role, the trust that Japan has cultivated among other players in the region will be valuable. Member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are the key swing votes in the competition for hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, and Japan is seen consistently as the most trusted partner in Southeast Asia. The Quad, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and other multilateral frameworks that Japan has been instrumental in developing are widely recognized as the best bet in containing China in both security and trade.

One missing piece in this equation is South Korea, a developed democracy and a natural partner for Japan. Because of historical disputes, the relationship has soured and the important alliance among the U.S., Japan and South Korea has not functioned well. Here, the Biden administration can be the mediator, convincing the parties to find the middle ground, to ensure that South Korea does not fall into China’s orbit.

Recent signals from South Korea indicate that it is prepared to work things out. For his part, Suga would have to strike a more conciliatory tone toward South Korea, despite the political risk of such an approach domestically. To be able to do that, it is crucially important that Suga secure domestic support, which will come only if he can get out of the two key challenges he’ll face in early 2021 — COVID-19 and his predecessor’s political scandals.

Charles Crabtree is an assistant professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College and a nonresident senior fellow at the Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research.

Kiyoteru Tsutsui is Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Professor and senior fellow in Japanese Studies at the Shorenstein APARC at Stanford University, where he is also director of the Japan Program, a senior fellow of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and a professor of sociology.

This op-ed originally appeared in Nikkei Asia 

If his recent diplomatic contacts are any indication, Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga is off to an auspicious start in managing Japan's two most important relationships: the U.S. and China.

Last month, Suga got a pleasant surprise when he spoke to Joe Biden, with the President-elect explicitly stating that the Senkaku Islands, which China claims as the Diaoyu, fall under the protection of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. A few weeks later, Suga received China's foreign minister Wang Yi, who was there largely to consolidate the warm economic relationships between the two countries -- except for a prickly comment about the Senkakus at the end. Clearly, the U.S. and China both see Japan as a critically important player in their competition for Asia-Pacific hegemony.

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This is a far cry from the precarious position Japan found itself in at the beginning of Shinzo Abe's first and second terms. In 2007, the young Prime Minister Abe elevated a spontaneous joint response by the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami into a quadrilateral working-level group involving regular meetings and maritime exercises. Dubbed the Quad, Abe sought to make the group a counter to China's increasingly expansionist threats in the Indo-Pacific region.

When Abe's first term was cut short, he was succeeded by the more China-friendly Yasuo Fukuda, who prioritized relations with China and stepped back from the Quad. Combined with a leadership change in Australia that saw the pro-China Kevin Rudd become Prime Minister, the Quad fizzled out.

After Abe returned to the prime ministership in 2012, lingering suspicion over his hawkish nationalism and anti-China sentiment was exacerbated by his 2013 visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine. That provoked rebuke not only from Japan's East Asian neighbors but from then U.S. Vice President Biden.

With U.S. policymakers still hoping that China's surging middle-class wealth would transform the country into a peace-loving democracy, the Quad seemed like a misguided attempt by Japan's China-hawks best left forgotten. Some in Tokyo were even starting to worry about a "grand bargain" between the U.S. and China that would relegate Japan to a small supporting role in the Asia-Pacific.

How times have changed. Few in Washington believe China will ever metamorphose into a moderate democracy, while in 2017, Abe harnessed Donald Trump's anti-China agenda to revive the Quad, as all four countries realized the need for a viable strategy to contain China. The new Quad has quickly gathered momentum, with India allowing Australia to join the Malabar naval exercises in November for the first time in 13 years so that all Quad members could participate.

As the Quad's main architect, Abe played a central role in bringing the group to this point, pairing it with the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision, another influential framework for the region for which he can claim authorship. By Abe's side throughout these developments, and now in charge of Japan's foreign policy, how will Suga handle the Quad, and what are its pros and cons?

The highest aspiration for the Quad is that it becomes an Asian version of NATO that can contain China. The combined military capabilities of the four countries are formidable, with the U.S. obviously leading the way and India possibly needing some catching up. The geostrategic impact of a formal alliance to pressure China would be tremendous.

Such an alliance would be even more effective if it included other countries in the region. Some, such as South Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam, have begun to participate in multilateral forums headlined by the Quad, possibly foreshadowing the development of a Quad Plus grouping that could exert significant pressure on China to moderate its expansionist approaches.

While Suga will likely tread carefully in expanding the Quad's activities to avoid damaging important economic relations with China, he has a clear understanding that China will only respond to power, and the game-changing power of the Quad alliance would surely appeal to him.

For all its potential, the Quad is not there yet. Fundamentally, it remains a coalition of like-minded countries discussing their concerns about China. At their most recent meeting in Tokyo in October, the four countries could not even muster a joint statement -- instead releasing separate readouts in each country's capital. Becoming an alliance with reciprocal obligations is clearly much further down the line.

Unless greater institutionalization becomes reality, China's divide and conquer approach will remain a threat, as it will try to target one or another country to break the Quad. China has already successfully done so before, pushing Australia to break from the Quad in 2008.

Today, the Quad's greatest utility for Suga is the threat it poses to China. The potential for this loose coalition to coalesce into a formidable alliance would increase if China continues to engage in provocative actions and further alienate the four countries. This threat could be effective in deterring China's aggressive behavior in the Indo-Pacific.

At this point, Suga will likely use the Quad as a card, gradually deepening its engagements but also preparing to develop it into a stronger alliance if China keeps poking at the Senkakus. The fact that Suga has that leverage today speaks to Japan's improved position relative to the early days of the first Abe administration.

This op-ed by Kiyoteru Tsutsui and Charles Crabtree
was originally published in The Hill.

President-elect Joe Biden had a pleasant surprise for Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga during their first phone conversation after the U.S. presidential election. In what was expected to be a cordial congratulatory call without policy discussion, Biden explicitly stated America’s commitment to protect the Senkaku Islands, citing Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

At the time, Americans were preoccupied with the political aftermath of the still-contested election, but Japanese observers paid close attention to the first contact between the two new leaders, especially since the first encounter between their predecessors shaped U.S.-Japan relations for the past several years.

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Four years ago, Prime Minister Shinzō Abe became the first foreign leader to meet with President Trump, soon after his election victory in November 2016. This fact was never lost on Trump; throughout his presidential administration, the relationship between the two men was strong, which benefited the alliance as the two countries worked to create a united front against China’s increasing international aggression.

In 2016, policymakers on the Japanese side were concerned about the U.S. conceding much of its interest in the Pacific to China, as part of “a grand bargain” that would diminish U.S. commitment to Japan and other allies in the region. Trump’s successful campaign made this scenario less likely, but the Japanese understood that their country relies more on American support in constraining China’s expansive regional ambitions than vice versa. 

Fast-forward to 2020, and we see a new political reality in the bilateral relationship — the U.S. needs Japan as much as Japan needs the U.S. in facing the challenges of China’s rise to a global superpower. The fact that Biden mentioned his commitment to Senkakus — largely unsolicited, although the Japanese side allegedly dropped some hints — suggests an American desire to shore up support from Japan.

With China now viewed as a shared rival — if not outright enemy — how will the two leaders shape regional dynamics in coming years? On security, tensions around the Senkakus almost certainly will rise, and a credible threat of U.S. military action is likely the most effective deterrent of China’s provocations that could escalate the conflict over territorial claims there. Biden surely will work hard to rebuild the trust of other allies in the region, with the hope of containing China through multilateral alliances. South Korea is a particularly important partner in this effort, and Suga would be wise to rehabilitate Japan-ROK relations that have been marred by complicated historical issues. The U.S. can help mediate the process.

Similarly, on economy and trade, multilateral frameworks such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) will become more important, and Japan will continue to encourage the U.S. to participate in these agreements. However, this might not be realistic given the domestic political environment in the U.S. The best-case scenario in the short term is probably the U.S. valuing the World Trade Organization (WTO) again. In this vein, the U.S. regaining the trust and respect of Europe is important, because China continues to lure European countries with its attractive economic and trade packages. 

On environmentalism, both Suga and Biden have declared that their countries will work toward zero emissions by 2050. On this issue, China’s cooperation is critical. While China also has committed to working toward zero -emissions by 2060, it likely will use this issue to gain other concessions from the U.S. Biden may face a difficult political decision at some point on whether to a) compromise on environmentalism and incur the wrath of the left wing of the Democratic party or b) sacrifice U.S. national interest in other areas for an agreement on environmentalism and risk losing support from independents and moderate Republicans. Japan would worry about the latter scenario.

Finally, Biden is expected to be more involved than Trump regarding China’s human rights issues. He’s likely to call out situations in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, among others. Japan will join the chorus, and mix in the North Korean abduction issue, which largely has been silenced internationally as a consequence of Trump’s bromance with Kim Jong Un. China will counter these criticisms by pointing to racism in the U.S. as evidence of American hypocrisy. This might embarrass the U.S. but can be a net positive, if China’s naming and shaming leads to more efforts by the U.S. government to address racism. This dynamic is reminiscent of the Cold War era, when the Soviet Union countered America’s criticisms of civil and political rights violations by pointing to racism in the U.S., facilitating advancements during the civil rights movement.

Overall, on hard issues such as security and trade, a drastic change is unlikely; rehabilitating relations with allies, and revaluing multilateral frameworks, will be the most likely changes under a Biden administration. On more values-oriented issues such as environmentalism and human rights, domestic politics in the U.S. plays a significant role in shaping Biden foreign policy. Assuming that Democrats don’t win both of the Senate seats in Georgia’s runoff elections, Biden will face a Republican Senate that can block appointments for key cabinet positions and some of his foreign policy priorities.

For Japan, Biden’s remark about the Senkaku Islands was an excellent start. With such a commitment secured, Suga can play the diplomatic game from a position of strength and mediate between the U.S. and China. This is a role that Japan can thrive in, as its shrewd management of relationships with both the U.S. and China in the past few years indicates. Japan’s success in playing this role could define international relations in the Asia-Pacific for the next decade or two.