This blog post was first published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute's The Strategist analysis and commentary site.

The Quad is stronger than ever. The informal ‘minilateral’ grouping of Australia, India, Japan and the United States has in the past year held its first stand-alone ministerial meeting and its first leaders’ summit, and launched an ambitious project to deliver Covid-19 vaccines. This ‘golden age’ of the Quad is a product of newfound Indian enthusiasm for the grouping, in turn, spurred by the military crisis in Ladakh, where India faces ongoing Chinese troop incursions across the two countries’ disputed border.

But the Quad is not bulletproof. Some experts have suggested that the economic and diplomatic effects of the devastating second wave of the pandemic in India will preoccupy the Indian government, sapping the Quad of capacity for any new initiatives. Others counter that India remains committed to competition with China—which is what really matters for the Quad—although its partners always expected ‘two steps forward, one step back’ from India.

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Related: On the Conversation Six podcast, Tarapore discusses the policy paper on which this blog post is based with Jawaharlal Nehru University Professor of International Politics Rajesh Rajagopalan. Listen:

The pandemic may well prove to be a hiccup in the Quad’s evolution, but a potentially much larger disruption may come from the ongoing Ladakh crisis itself. As I argue in a new ASPI Strategic Insights paper, the crisis has greatly increased the risk of a border war between India and China, which would present a defining test of the Quad. A possible war could either strengthen or enervate the Quad—depending on how India and its partners, including Australia, act now to shape the strategic environment.

Risk is a function of likelihood and consequence. The likelihood of war on the India–China border is still low—both countries would prefer to avoid it—but has risen since the crisis began. Both countries have greatly expanded their military deployments on the border and backed them with new permanent infrastructure to resupply and reinforce them. China has proved its revisionist intent with large and costly military incursions, although its specific objectives and plans remain unknown. And the interaction of both countries’ military strategies and doctrines would, on the threshold of conflict, promote escalation.

The consequences of a possible conflict would be dire for both belligerents and for the region. China — assuming it is the provocateur of conflict—would likely face some political rebuke from states that consider themselves its competitors, but it will work strenuously to reduce those costs, and would likely have priced them in to its calculations of whether to fight. India will suffer high tactical costs on the border, and may also suffer wider harm if China uses coercive cyberattacks against strategic or dual-use targets.

In a costly war, the repercussions may spill over to damage India’s recently developing strategic partnerships, especially with the United States and Australia. Despite generally favorable views of the US, the Indian strategic elite still harbors some latent suspicions. This was highlighted in two episodes in April 2021, when the US Navy conducted a freedom of navigation patrol through the Indian exclusive economic zone, and when the US was slow in delivering Covid-19 vaccine raw materials and other relief. Both instances quickly receded from the Indian public imagination—thanks to quick correctives from Washington—but they did reveal that, under some conditions, Indian perceptions of its new partnerships can be quickly colored by distrust.

A China–India border war may create exactly those conditions. There is a chance that conflict may result in a redoubled Indian commitment to the Quad, if New Delhi judges that it has no option but to seek more external assistance. Conversely, unless a conflict is managed well by India and its partners, it is more likely to result in Indian disaffection with the Quad. India deepened Quad cooperation during the Ladakh crisis partly as a deterrent signal to China, and partly because the Quad is still full of promise. However, after a conflict—when China hasn’t been deterred and has probably imposed significant costs on India—the Quad’s utility would have been tested, and probably not ameliorated India’s wartime disadvantage.

The task before Quad governments is to be sensitized to this risk and implement mitigation strategies before a possible conflict, to buttress the coalition in advance. As I outline in the ASPI paper, they could do this at three levels. First, they could offer operational support—such as intelligence or resupply of key equipment, as the US already has done in the Ladakh crisis—although Quad partners’ role here would be limited. Second, they could provide support in other theatres or domains—with a naval show of force, for example, although cyber operations would probably be more meaningful in deterring conflict or dampening its costs. Third, they could provide political and diplomatic support — signaling to Beijing that a conflict would harm its regional political standing.

For Quad members, the main goal would be to deter conflict in the first place, and, failing that, to preserve the long-term strategic partnership with India for the sake of maintaining as powerful and energetic a coalition as possible to counterbalance China in the long term.

The California Department of Education adopted the Ethnic Studies Model Curriculum last March. Chapter 3 of the Model Curriculum includes a section on “Native American Studies.”

On June 18, 2021, SPICE will host a panel of three Native and Indigenous scholars to reflect on California’s new model curriculum and the state of ethnic studies in their respective regions. The panel will include Navajo, Native Hawaiian, and Ainu educators who will provide a range of educational perspectives on Native and Indigenous studies in the United States and Japan.

• Dr. Harold Begay, Superintendent of Schools, Navajo Nation
• Dr. Sachi Edwards, Faculty Member at Soka University in Tokyo, Japan
• Dr. Ronda Māpuana Shizuko Hayashi-Simpliciano, Vice Principal, Ke Kula Kaiapuni ʻo Ānuenue, Honolulu, Hawaiʻi

The webinar, titled “Indigenous Voices: Educational Perspectives from Navajo, Native Hawaiian, and Ainu Scholars in the Diaspora,” will address several additional topics, such as the various academic field names of the study of Native and Indigenous people, the complexity and diversity of Native and Indigenous people’s experiences, and recommended resources for K–12 educators.

These topics are not only relevant to teachers in California but to educators in other states as well. K–12 educators and administrators are encouraged to attend. Register in advance at https://bit.ly/3z4kxtc.

This webinar is a joint collaboration with the National Consortium for Teaching about Asia (NCTA) and the Center for East Asian Studies at Stanford University.

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Stanford e-Entrepreneurship Japan is an online course offered to high school students in Japan. It is offered annually in fall and spring by SPICE and the Japanese NPO e-Entrepreneurship, led by Yusuke Matsuda. The instructors are Irene Bryant (fall) and Maiko Tamagawa Bacha (spring). The goal of the course is to foster creative thinking and problem-solving skills in students with a focus on innovation to address social issues.

Because of my experiences with social issues in Brazil, Argentina, the United States, Japan, and Mexico, my decision to apply to Stanford e-Entrepreneurship Japan—a course for those with a passion in social issues and innovation—was immediate. However, when I started taking the course, I had little idea of the connection between business and social issues. Soon after classes began, I saw real-life examples of how unique innovations can improve the world. Every two weeks, a different professional gave us a lecture. Getting to hear stories of their first-hand experiences as entrepreneurs was an opportunity I never received at school, and I embraced it fully by asking question after question.

My favorite lecture was one given by David “Mas” Masumoto, who runs a sustainable peach farm in California. Through his lesson on growing organic peaches and passing down the farm to his children, I was able to make connections to a larger social issue in Japan: the lack of young people in agriculture. His lecture provided insights on specific ways professionals were practicing social entrepreneurship.

The course was certainly demanding. After the lectures, we had to work on group projects to come up with our own solutions, which enabled me to further understand and practice aspects of social entrepreneurship. It took hours of preparation and as I was one of the only students who lived abroad, I sometimes had to work with peers at ungodly hours. Nonetheless, all the hard work was absolutely worth it. The diversity provided by the unique regional backgrounds of other students located all around Japan exposed me to important perspectives on social issues.

For the final project, which included an individual research report on a social issue and a group business pitch, we had full control of what we wanted to do. The individual paper was refreshing for me because at school there is never this much flexibility, and it was a perfect chance for me to explore my interest in addressing social issues like environmental sustainability through entrepreneurship. For the group project, we created a business plan for a sustainable toothpaste. I have never worked with such motivated, diverse, and brilliant students willing to put in so many hours of work. Through the project, not only did I get to put skills that I learned during the program into practice, but I also made lifelong friends who shared the same passions as me.

Finally, Stanford e-Entrepreneurship Japan has grown my interest in how social issues can be resolved through entrepreneurship, and has motivated me to pursue not only the exploration of social issues, but business in college. It is a course like no other, with wonderful peers, invaluable lessons, and a supportive teaching staff. I encourage people who are curious about social issues or business in general to take advantage of the program.

This commentary by Kiyoteru Tsutsui and Charles Crabtree was originally published in The Hill.

The recent White House summit meeting between President Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga signaled to the world, and especially to China, that the U.S.-Japan alliance is strong and ready for intensifying competition in Asia.

For the first time in more than 50 years, the Japanese and American leaders mentioned Taiwan in their joint statement. China immediately responded with strong words, as expected, but since has moderated its tone. Furthermore, Chinese leader Xi Jinping participated in the U.S.-organized Leaders Summit on Climate the week after the Biden-Suga meeting and took a collaborative stance, a hopeful sign that competition will not eliminate the possibility of some collaboration and that climate change is an area where Beijing, Tokyo and Washington can work together.

But the U.S. and Japan still have at least three concerns about China: Beijing’s continued posturing on Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands; its significant leverage in economic relations; and its repression of human rights in Xinjiang, Hong Kong and beyond. How should the alliance handle these important issues? 

On the security front, America’s return to multilateralism under Biden is a welcome development for Japan and other like-minded states in the region. The U.S.-Japan alliance is obviously central in the coalition of democratic nations concerned about China’s ambitions. The primary goal of these countries ought to be walking the thin line between demonstrating their resolve to counter any aggressive behavior by China with force and avoiding any unnecessary provocation against China. 

Toward that end, the most promising framework is the Quad that includes India and Australia in addition to Japan and the U.S. The first-ever leader-level meeting in March elevated the Quad’s status significantly. While it still is a long way from becoming a NATO-like security apparatus — and it’s not even clear if that’s the consensus goal — it could help stabilize the region by creating a credible counterweight to check China’s territorial ambitions.

Beyond the Quad, the inclusion of other like-minded stakeholders such as South Korea and ASEAN countries on security matters is important. With South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s visit to Washington planned in late May, a good first step for the Biden administration would be to invest some diplomatic capital in mending fences between Japan and South Korea. A full-scale reconciliation between the two regional powers is unlikely this year; Suga faces elections in the fall, for which he needs to consolidate the conservative base, and Moon is a lame duck with limited political power. But some reconciliation would be welcome for the U.S. as it seeks to resurrect the trilateral alliance with Japan and South Korea to complement the Quad in deterring China’s ambitions and addressing the threat posed by North Korea. 

In the economic domain, China is arguably even more difficult to contain, being the largest trade partner for virtually all the countries in the region. Decoupling from China was a key theme at the Biden-Suga summit, but this is a task that has proven much easier said than done. From semiconductors to rare earth minerals, the battle for key materials for the 21st century economy will only intensify, and China’s grand scheme in the Belt and Road Initiative needs to be countered by a similarly grand long-term strategy that would flesh out the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision.

In this regard, the U.S.-Japan Competitiveness and Resilience Partnership can be quite consequential. In addition to pledging cooperation on “sensitive supply-chain” issues, it outlines the agenda for technological innovation that cuts across security and economic domains, making it a critical tool in the competition with China. This is because whoever develops an edge in transformational technologies — such as artificial intelligence, 5G infrastructure, and outer space development — will enjoy diplomatic and military advantages as well as economic profits. The combined $4.5 billion investment in the partnership is a good first step to ensuring that the U.S. and Japan retain an innovation advantage. Additional expenditures likely will be necessary, though, considering China’s commitment in these areas.

On human rights, Japan and America take different approaches. While the U.S. has called the situation in Xinjiang a genocide and imposed sanctions there, as well as in Myanmar following the military coup, Japan has taken a more subdued stance. This is a standard approach for Tokyo, which prefers to emphasize engagement with violating governments.

The Biden administration seems to accept Suga’s strategy of engagement, and perhaps the diplomatic channel that this approach provides can be useful in negotiating some kind of settlement. However, the strategy of engagement that has produced some benefits in countries such as Thailand and possibly Myanmar is unlikely to be as effective with China. Furthermore, several Western corporations are facing boycotts in China for taking a stand against forced labor in Xinjiang. If Japanese corporations avoid paying the price and continue business as usual, Tokyo might face greater pressure to take some action. Given the central importance of the Chinese market for Japanese businesses, this could give rise to significant tension between Tokyo and Washington. 

On all these dimensions, for Japan and the U.S. to be effective in countering China, both Biden and Suga would have to consolidate domestic support. Biden’s first 100 days generally were seen as successful, with COVID-19 vaccine distribution going smoothly and Congress passing ambitious spending bills. Besides, Biden has at least until the midterm elections in November 2022 to move things forward.

The timetable is less friendly for Suga, who needs to win the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) presidential election in September and hold a House of Representatives election by October. His fate will be shaped in large measure by his government’s pandemic response and how that influences economic fortunes, and to a lesser extent the success of the Tokyo Olympics. Most Tokyo insiders predict that he will remain in office past October, citing weak opposition both in and outside of the ruling LDP. If, however, COVID-19 vaccine distribution does not move forward by the fall, as projected by the government, and the economy continues to slide, that could still trip him up.

Only with domestic political stability and economic prosperity can Tokyo and Washington take the next steps in projecting strength vis-à-vis China, and that is the best deterrent against China’s expansionist ambitions and toward ensuring peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific area.

SPICE currently runs four regional programs for high school students in Japan: Stanford e-Hiroshima, Stanford e-Kawasaki, Stanford e-Oita, and Stanford e-Tottori. These online courses are coordinated in collaboration with school and government officials at the city and prefectural levels, with the goal of presenting creative and innovative approaches to teaching Japanese high school students about U.S. society and culture and global themes.

All four courses recently finished their 2020–21 term. This summer, two top students from each course will be honored through a virtual event hosted by SPICE, Stanford University. Congratulations to the eight honorees below on their academic excellence!

Stanford e-Hiroshima (Instructor Rylan Sekiguchi)

Student Honoree: Sara Arakawa
School: Hiroshima Prefectural Hiroshima Kokutaiji Senior High School
Project Title: Silicon Valley: Secrets Behind Success

Student Honoree: Chika Isone
School: Hiroshima Prefectural Hiroshima Senior High School
Project Title: Making Innovation by Design Thinking in Silicon Valley

Stanford e-Kawasaki (Instructor Maiko Tamagawa Bacha)

Student Honoree: Eric Silang
School: Kawasaki High School
Project Title: Humor and America

Student Honoree: Shunya Tani
School: Kawasaki High School
Project Title: Possible Ways to Promote Renewable Energy in Japan and the U.S.

Stanford e-Oita (Instructor Kasumi Yamashita)

Student Honoree: Hana Burkart
School: Hofu High School
Project Title: Social Discrimination Against Foreigners in Japan

Student Honoree: Yayano Okuda
School: Usa High School
Project Title: Environmental Education

Stanford e-Tottori (Instructor Jonas Edman)

Student Honoree: Eri Tamura
School: Tottori Nishi High School
Project Title: Teachers’ Treatment in the U.S.

Student Honoree: Hinata Yonemura
School: Yonago Higashi High School
Project Title: Veganism: How Japanese Society Can Promote It

The SPICE staff is looking forward to honoring these eight students in a virtual ceremony on August 23, 2021 (August 24 in Japan). Each student will be given the opportunity to make a formal presentation to members of the Stanford community and the Japanese community in the San Francisco Bay Area.

SPICE also offers online courses to U.S. high school students on Japan (Reischauer Scholars Program), China (China Scholars Program), and Korea (Sejong Korea Scholars Program), and online courses to Chinese high school students on the United States (Stanford e-China) and to Japanese high school students on the United States and U.S.–Japan relations (Stanford e-Japan).

To stay informed of SPICE news, join our email list and follow us on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.

The Instructor of the Reischauer Scholars Program (RSP) is Naomi Funahashi.

When Tai Young Whang, an ambitious high school graduate from Pyongyang, stepped onto the dock in Tokyo in 1933 to attend Hitotsubashi University, he never could have imagined that his personal dream of building economic bridges between Korea and Japan would fuel his great-grandson’s desire to follow in his footsteps almost a century later.

***

At the end of my first year of middle school, I chose to study the Japanese language for the first time. What started out as a curiosity of the language and some of Japan’s popular cultural exports (such as Pokémon games) gradually blossomed into a deeper passion for Japan’s culture and history. During my eighth-grade world history class, I turned my focus to researching the intricate sankin kōtai system and skilled political maneuverings underlying the Tokugawa shogunate’s iron grip on power during the 17th century. I even found myself at Eiheiji Temple in Fukui Prefecture that May meditating towards a blank wooden wall at four in the morning. Yet, I was not satisfied. These brief historical vignettes, like still frames in the film reel of humanity, remained fragments of a larger narrative that I was increasingly eager to discover.

As my school did not offer courses in East Asian or Japanese history, I was excited to apply during my sophomore year to Stanford’s Reischauer Scholars Program (RSP), an online program on Japan offered to high school students across the United States. By providing its students with the ability to comprehensively explore Japanese history, economics, society, and more, the program presents a unique opportunity to delve into these topics alongside similarly motivated peers. While the course taught me a lot about Japan proper, I also gained a much deeper understanding of the U.S.–Japanese relationship.

During the course of the 20-week program, we spent the first 14 weeks on a series of in-depth readings and comprehensive seminars led by government officials, business leaders, and scholars. As actual practitioners of the fields we were studying, these visiting experts brought their worldviews and inspiring insights to life. During one of the virtual seminars, for example, we had the opportunity to meet Rachel Brunette-Chen, the then-Principal Officer for the U.S. Consulate General in Sapporo, and learn about both the U.S.–Japan Security Alliance and her own foreign service experience bolstering the ties that connect the two countries. Hearing from an actual foreign service officer provided a tangible sense of the dedication and importance of those who work to link American and Japanese interests on the ground.

Starting from week one, we unpacked what we had learned from our readings and virtual classrooms through weekly discussion boards. These online forums continued throughout the week, often filled with thought-provoking perspectives, respectful rebuttals, and witty banter. We debated the efficiency of Abenomics, the impact of textbook revisions on Japanese history education, and the societal strains of modernization on early 20th century Japan, among other topics. Each new post became another thread weaving our different ideas together into a tapestry of cross-cultural connections that we all grew to treasure. Even today, many of us remain connected both online and by our shared experience.

***

Brandon Cho’s great-grandparents, Tai Young Whang and Bong Soon Whang, Seoul; photo courtesy Brandon Cho

This op-ed by Kiyoteru Tsutsui originally appeared in Nikkei Asia.

In one of the few unscripted moments in the meticulously planned U.S.-Japan summit meeting last Friday, President Joe Biden referred to Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga as "vice president" before quickly correcting himself.

In a different era, this could have turned into a diplomatic incident, with right-leaning Japanese pundits calling it evidence of the U.S.'s patronizing approach to Japan. Fortunately for Biden, the current geopolitical environment is not conducive to such provocation, and no major media picked up on the slip.

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Much has been made of Suga being the first foreign leader to meet Biden in person. According to the U.S. State Department Office of the Historian, this is only the second time ever that a Japanese prime minister became the first foreign leader to meet a new president in the White House.

The other time was in 1989, when Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita visited President George H.W. Bush. Back then, Japan was a major threat to U.S. economic hegemony. Today, China is that threat, and not just in the economic domain. China is the first bona fide competitor to the U.S. since the Soviet Union, and its threat extends to every nook and cranny of the globe.

To counter China's ascension, the U.S. needs its allies, and Japan is the most important partner for that purpose. This is the context in which Suga visited the White House despite all the COVID-related restrictions.

Not surprisingly, the statements were carefully crafted to send strong signals to China. Building on the two-plus-two dialogue in March, the joint statement touched on the importance of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific, from the East and South China seas to even Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Taiwan.

Japan certainly wanted a reference to the Senkaku Islands, which Beijing claims and calls the Diaoyu, and the applicability there of Article V of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The Biden administration had made that commitment earlier, calming concerns among Japanese leaders that the new administration may be softer on China than the Trump administration.

Biden has, in fact, been quite tough on China and has given almost a perfect answer to what Japanese foreign policymakers wanted. In return, the U.S. wanted Japan to be squarely on Washington's side. The wording of the joint statement — negotiated until the last minute — saw Japan agree to include a reference to Taiwan for the first time in 52 years, but with Japan's preferred wording, encouraging "the peaceful resolution of the cross-Strait issues."

Predictably, China reacted quickly and strongly, accusing the two countries of interfering in its domestic affairs and warning Japan about siding with the U.S. We have yet to see what retaliatory actions China might take, but the reference to Taiwan signals the beginning of a new trilateral relationship between China, Japan and the U.S.

The summit covered other important issues, all with China in the background. One key issue is economic security. In particular, supply chain decoupling will become a battle cry for the U.S. and its allies as they seek to reduce dependence on materials from China. Semiconductors are especially critical, as they power all the major growth areas in the new economy. Taiwan's dominance in the semiconductor industry is the main reason why Taiwan is so important to both sides.

To remain in the driver's seat in the new economy, the joint statement announced a new U.S.-Japan Competitiveness and Resilience (CoRe) Partnership. The most concrete proposal was an initial commitment of $4.5 billion from the two governments toward fifth generation (5G) and 6G networks, reflecting concerns about China's dominance in the key digital infrastructure of the future.

Human rights is another thorny issue, with the joint statement specifying concerns over Xinjiang and Hong Kong. With some companies joining the boycott campaign on cotton from Xinjiang, and China countering by criticizing racial division in the U.S., the clash between China and the U.S. will intensify in this area as well. Japan has stepped out of its comfort zone and criticized China on human rights, following the American approach more explicitly than before. In this regard, it is notable that Suga also referred to rising violence against Asians in the U.S.

One area in which China might be more of a partner than a competitor is climate change, with all three countries committing to zero emissions by mid-21st century. Almost concurrently with the Biden-Suga meeting, American and Chinese climate envoys — John Kerry and Xie Zhenhua — met in China and issued a joint statement affirming their commitment to work together on global climate challenges.

All these initiatives and commitments are potentially meaningful and consequential developments that can reshape the Indo-Pacific, although more concrete ideas are needed before we can evaluate their impact. The biggest take-away ought to be the confirmation that the U.S.-Japan alliance is gearing up for a new era of competition with China.

Japan more than reaffirmed its commitment to the alliance with the U.S., risking its economic relations with China. The U.S. will be sure to ask for more concrete actions from Japan on the basis of the joint statement, and Japan can no longer evade questions about what it would do in a confrontation with China. Japan has to navigate a tough terrain of standing with the U.S. in the competition with China while preventing the escalation of tensions between Beijing and Washington, and at the same time protecting its own national interests.

A new phase of the trilateral relationship has just begun, and like it or not, other Asian nations might face the same decision that Japan faced, and sooner rather than later.