On October 6, 2021, the APARC China Program hosted the panel program, "Engaging China: Fifty Years of Sino-American Relations." In honor of her recently released book of the same title, Director of the Grassroots China Initiative Anne Thurston was joined by contributors Mary Bullock, President Emerita of Agnes Scott College; Thomas Fingar, Shorenstein APARC Fellow; and David M. Lampton, Professor Emeritus at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Thomas Fingar also moderated the panel.

Recent years have seen the U.S.-China relationship rapidly deteriorate. Engaging China brings together leading China specialists—ranging from academics to NGO leaders to former government officials—to analyze the past, present, and future of U.S.-China relations.

During their panel, Bullock, Fingar, Lampton, and Thurston reflected upon the complex and multifaceted nature of American engagement with China since the waning days of Mao’s rule. What initially motivated U.S.’ rapprochement with China? Until recent years, what logic and processes have underpinned the U.S. foreign policy posture towards China? What were the gains and the missteps made during five decades of America’s engagement policy toward China? What is the significance of our rapidly deteriorating bilateral relations today? Watch now: 

For more information about Engaging China or to purchase a copy, please click here.

On Veterans Day last week, I was reflective of my relatives and friends who are veterans of U.S. wars. My parents were migrant farmworkers and sharecroppers before and after World War II and several of my relatives are veterans of World War II. I also grew up as a farmworker, and most of my co-workers were migrant laborers from Mexico contracted through the Bracero Program. The Bracero Program was a 22-year initiative started in 1942 that allowed the United States to recruit temporary guest workers from Mexico. The laborers, called braceros, or individuals who work with their arms, were mostly concentrated in California. I attended school with many children of braceros.

Several of my classmates and family friends—including some children of my bracero co-workers—served in the Vietnam War, referred to by Vietnamese as the American War. A family friend, John Nishimura, died of wounds on April 4, 1968 sustained from hostile gunfire that left him as a quadriplegic on December 10, 1967 in the central highlands province of Kontum, Vietnam. Like other Asian Americans who served in Vietnam, he faced race-related challenges during his service. This topic is covered in the PBS series, Asian Americans, for which SPICE’s Waka Brown developed a teacher’s guide.

During my freshman year at U.C. Berkeley, 1972–73, I witnessed anti-Vietnam War protests and took a course in Chicano Studies (now Chicana/o and Latina/o Studies). Because of my childhood, I felt more Mexican than Japanese in many ways. In the Chicano Studies course, I recall a lecture on Chicano veterans of U.S. wars. The informal learning (observing the protests) and formal learning in Chicano Studies marked the first time in my life that I had been introduced to perspectives on the Vietnam War that were not included in my high school U.S. history textbook.

After graduating in 1976, I entered a teaching credential program at U.C. Berkeley’s Graduate School of Education that was called the Black-Asian-Chicano Urban Program or BAC-UP. One of the students was Charley Trujillo, a recent graduate of U.C Berkeley who majored in Chicano Studies. I felt a closeness to him because of my upbringing, and also recall how much I appreciated what we would now call “global perspectives” that he shared. We completed BAC-UP in 1977 and I went to teach in Japan and lost touch with him.

In 2014, while planning for a SPICE event that honored braceros with Dr. Ignacio Ornelas, the grandson of a bracero, Ornelas asked to introduce me to his friend, Charley Trujillo, and I immediately recalled Charley Trujillo from BAC-UP and wondered if he was the same person. I looked up his name online and was pleasantly surprised that he was the same person whom I had last seen 37 years prior. During our reunion, I learned from Trujillo that he had become a novelist, editor, publisher, and filmmaker. He is very well known for his book and documentary, Soldados: Chicanos in Viet Nam. While in BAC-UP, I didn’t know that he was a disabled Vietnam War veteran and that his father was a veteran of World War II. After hearing about his experiences in Vietnam, the global perspectives that he shared during BAC-UP became even more poignant. I also recalled how he sometimes challenged our professors—something that I could not do—on topics related to the “master narrative” of U.S. history.

Prior to my reunion with Trujillo, my former colleagues, Dr. Rennie Moon and Dr. Kenneth Koo, developed a SPICE curriculum unit, Legacies of the Vietnam War, which I encourage high school teachers to use as a supplement to the information about the Vietnam War in their U.S. history textbooks. The five lessons in the curriculum unit are described below. Someday, I would like to add Trujillo’s documentary as the foundation for a sixth lesson.

• Lesson One examines the political and economic aftermath of the Vietnam War. Students learn about the political situation following the war, Vietnamese emigrants known as the “boat people,” and post-war economic development.
• Lesson Two examines the impact of warfare on human health and the natural environment. Students learn about tools of warfare, including Agent Orange and landmines, and their harmful consequences on the ecosystem as well as on generations of civilians and veterans.
• Lesson Three combines a number of neglected and hidden themes in the Vietnamese war literature, including the experience of Vietnamese Amerasians and the involvement of non-U.S. soldiers who fought in Vietnam.
• Lesson Four gives voice to different categories of Vietnamese who have migrated abroad in the decades following the war: Vietnamese Americans, the Montagnards, and Vietnamese brides in Korea.
• Lesson Five investigates the idea of history as competing narratives. Students examine three representations of the Vietnam War—the war as depicted in American history textbooks, the war as exhibited at the War Remnants Museum in Ho Chi Minh City, and the war as represented in an effort to build a monument to the U.S.–South Vietnam alliance by the Vietnamese American community in Wichita, Kansas.

Trujillo and I are in periodic touch and he continues to expand my perspectives on the Vietnam War and its legacies by sharing his riveting and heartbreaking yet inspiring story. Most recently, we met at the San Jose Vietnam War Memorial. He is in the midst of producing a film based on his book, Dogs From Illusion, a Vietnam War novel on the Chicano war experience. Ornelas, a social studies (including ethnic studies) teacher at Willow Glen High School in San Jose, is currently enrolled in the Principal Leadership Institute at U.C. Berkeley’s Graduate School of Education. It’s very gratifying to know that Ornelas, Trujillo, and I share similar cultural histories that are not usually included in U.S. history textbooks at the high school level, and also share similar academic experiences that were only made possible by those who came before us. I am eternally grateful to Trujillo, Nishimura, and other veterans who sacrificed so much to make our lives better. I feel that it is essential for us as teachers to include their unique perspectives in the teaching of U.S. history.

This interview was first published by the Stanford News Service.

When President Joe Biden meets with his Chinese counterpart President Xi Jinping next week, they will both want to show the world that the two countries have common and compatible objectives and that cooperation is possible, says Stanford scholar Thomas Fingar.

While there are real differences between the two countries, global threats exist that require joint effort to address, such as nuclear proliferation and the danger of new arms races, said Fingar in an interview with Stanford News Service.

In anticipation of the upcoming summit scheduled for Monday, Fingar discusses what to expect when the two leaders meet and what goals Biden will want to work towards as it fits with his larger objectives for the U.S.

Fingar is a Shorenstein fellow at The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), which is part of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. He is leading a multi-year study, China and the World, that seeks to better understand China’s global engagement.

Fingar returned to Stanford in 2009 after having served as the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and, concurrently, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Fingar served previously as assistant secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (2000-01 and 2004-05), principal deputy assistant secretary (2001-03), deputy assistant secretary for analysis (1994-2000), director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1989-94) and chief of the China Division (1986-89). Between 1975 and 1986 he held several positions at Stanford University, including senior research associate in the Center for International Security and Arms Control.

Where does diplomacy between the U.S. and China now stand?

Friction between Beijing and Washington did not put an end to diplomatic exchanges, but having markedly different approaches has inhibited the two sides. Simply stated, the United States has sought to work on specific global and bilateral problems to achieve priority objectives such as limiting greenhouse gases and reducing the dangers of unconstrained nuclear, space and cyber competition. China has maintained that “building trust” and improvement of the overall bilateral relationship are prerequisites for progress on specific issues. Developments in the run-up to the summit, such as the joint climate statement in Glasgow, suggest that Beijing has relaxed its preconditions.

How does the summit symbolize a diplomatic reset?

Both symbolically and substantively, the summit will empower lower-level officials in both countries to work on issues within their purview. This is more significant in China, where clear signals from the top are necessary for subordinates to engage, but it will also help to mitigate paralysis on the U.S. side resulting from competing visions of how best to address China-related issues.

What issues will be top of mind for Biden and Xi?

Both will want to diminish exaggerated characterizations of bilateral friction as evidence that we have entered a new Cold War and may be on the verge of conflict, and that cooperation on any issue is impossible. We have very real disagreements, but we also have many common or compatible objectives. Helping domestic and external audiences to understand that things are not nearly as dire as many observers contend will be a priority objective. Beyond that, I think clarifying matters of greatest concern to the other side and establishing mechanisms to address them will be on the agenda.

What areas can they agree on and where can they make progress?

They are likely to find it easier to agree on issues requiring joint effort than on the best way to address issues like nuclear proliferation (Iran and North Korea), new weapons systems and the danger of new arms races (hypersonic glide vehicles, cyber and kinetic threats to nuclear surveillance and command and control systems) and transition to cleaner energy sources.

What areas will spark disagreement and will these issues come up?

I suspect that both leaders will feel compelled to raise all of the high salience concerns in their countries. For Biden, that list includes Xinjiang, Hong Kong, PRC [People’s Republic of China] actions near Taiwan and the rollback of opportunities for Americans in China. Xi will raise U.S. military operations around China’s periphery, arms sales and relations with Taiwan, restrictions on visas for Chinese citizens and Chinese investment in the U.S., among other issues.

What would signal that the meeting was productive?

The fact that it has occurred will be significant because it will open the door to other, hopefully, less contentious exchanges across a broad spectrum of issues. Easing of travel restrictions should be easy to achieve but of more than symbolic importance. I doubt that the meeting is designed to solve any of the difficult issues in our relationship.

What do you think about Biden’s approach to China?

I agree with the President’s focus on his largely domestic “Build Back Better” agenda. Spending the time, effort and political capital necessary to secure approval of measures to address infrastructure, energy, education, childcare, internet access and a host of social justice, pandemic and voter protection issues are, in my opinion, more important than trying to improve relations with China for the sake of improving the relationship. Where working with China is necessary and/or perceived to be possible for achieving other domestic and foreign policy goals, he should do so. I think the fact that this summit is taking place is a sign that he is attempting to do that, but I judge that he is unwilling to jeopardize his ability to achieve higher priority objectives by making concessions to Beijing merely to create the appearance of a better relationship.

Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro discussed America's strategic, military, and economic interests in Taiwan, as well as the potential for an outbreak of armed conflict on WBUR's "On Point" with Meghna Chakrabarti. 

Mastro first reflected on the escalation of Chinese miliary activity in the Taiwan Strait and the potential likelihood of conflict in the immediate future, stating that, "The increase in recent tensions does not tell us that there's a higher likelihood of war...we have this uptick in Chinese military activity in the vicinity of Taiwan...the number of air incursions in particular has increased exponentially."

The month of October, in particular, saw record high rates of Chinese aircraft with a record high on October 4 with 56 aircraft, and 159 aircraft total entering Taiwan's air defense identification zone.

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Mastro then suggested that the recent displays of military power are not indicative of a plan to invade Taiwan immediately. "I think this is mainly political signaling, Beijing is trying to tell Taiwan, you're on your own...as much as the United States can make statements, can make agreements like AUKUS with the Australians, when push comes to shove, they are not here," she said.

Mastro indicated that the situation with Taiwan is part of a larger great power competition in which China aims to exert global influence. "The bottom line is that China has a different vision of what it wants the world to be like. And it's not only that China wants to control what governments do, they want to control what corporations, universities, individuals can say and do," she said.

"China has demonstrated whenever it has economic power, diplomatic power, or military power, they are more than willing to use it to hurt others...if [U.S.] national security has been free from foreign dictation, being free from other countries telling the United States and the American people what to do, then it's absolutely critical that we stand up to China," said Mastro.

When asked about the prevention of armed conflict, Mastro argued that "War is very easy to prevent, you just give the other side everything they want. The difficulty is ensuring our own peace and security, stability and prosperity in the face of this challenge. And so for that reason, I think [Taiwan] is very important, and Taiwan is only the the biggest Flashpoint and the first step to ensuring that the United States maintains its position in Asia and therefore its position in the world."

Listen to the full conversation here.