Poor air quality is thought to be an important mortality risk factor globally1,2,3, but there is little direct evidence from the developing world on how mortality risk varies with changing exposure to ambient particulate matter. Current global estimates apply exposure–response relationships that have been derived mostly from wealthy, mid-latitude countries to spatial population data4, and these estimates remain unvalidated across large portions of the globe. Here we combine household survey-based information on the location and timing of nearly 1 million births across sub-Saharan Africa with satellite-based estimates5 of exposure to ambient respirable particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter less than 2.5 μm (PM2.5) to estimate the impact of air quality on mortality rates among infants in Africa. We find that a 10 μg m−3 increase in PM2.5 concentration is associated with a 9% (95% confidence interval, 4–14%) rise in infant mortality across the dataset. This effect has not declined over the last 15 years and does not diminish with higher levels of household wealth. Our estimates suggest that PM2.5 concentrations above minimum exposure levels were responsible for 22% (95% confidence interval, 9–35%) of infant deaths in our 30 study countries and led to 449,000 (95% confidence interval, 194,000–709,000) additional deaths of infants in 2015, an estimate that is more than three times higher than existing estimates that attribute death of infants to poor air quality for these countries2,6. Upward revision of disease-burden estimates in the studied countries in Africa alone would result in a doubling of current estimates of global deaths of infants that are associated with air pollution, and modest reductions in African PM2.5 exposures are predicted to have health benefits to infants that are larger than most known health interventions.
Climate-induced shocks in grain production are a major contributor to global market volatility, which creates uncertainty for cereal farmers and agribusiness and reduces food access for poor consumers when production falls and prices spike. Our study, by combining empirical models of maize production with future warming scenarios, shows that in a warmer climate, maize yields will decrease and become more variable. Because just a few countries dominate global maize production and trade, simultaneous production shocks in these countries can have tremendous impacts on global markets. We show that such synchronous shocks are rare now but will become much more likely if the climate continues to warm. Our results underscore the need for continued investments in breeding for heat tolerance.
Kristin Chandler joined CDDRL in April 2018 and serves as the Associate Director for Operations. Before coming to Stanford, Kristin worked at the Ronald McDonald House Stanford as the Operations Manager leading the day-to-day operations and building a culture of service excellence with empathy. Kristin holds a bachelor's degree in Social Work from The University of New Hampshire. An advocate for social justice, Kristin spent 15 years working for grassroots non-profit organizations where she specialized in operations and program management. CDDRL’s mission resonates with her background and passion for global issues.
In a world complicated by terrorism, cyber threats and political instability, the private sector has to prepare for the unexpected. Amy Zegart, CISAC co-director, the Hoover Institution’s Davies Family Senior Fellow, and co-author (along with Condoleezza Rice) of Political Risk: How Businesses And Organizations Can Anticipate Global Insecurity, explains lessons learned in keeping cargo planes moving, hotel guests protected – and possibly coffee customers better served.
From New York Times bestselling author and former U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza Rice and Stanford University professor Amy B. Zegart comes an examination of the rapidly evolving state of political risk, and how to navigate it. The world is changing fast. Political risk-the probability that a political action could significantly impact a company's business-is affecting more businesses in more ways than ever before. A generation ago, political risk mostly involved a handful of industries dealing with governments in a few frontier markets. Today, political risk stems from a widening array of actors, including Twitter users, local officials, activists, terrorists, hackers, and more. The very institutions and laws that were supposed to reduce business uncertainty and risk are often having the opposite effect. In today's globalized world, there are no "safe" bets.
POLITICAL RISK investigates and analyzes this evolving landscape, what businesses can do to navigate it, and what all of us can learn about how to better understand and grapple with these rapidly changing global political dynamics. Drawing on lessons from the successes and failures of companies across multiple industries as well as examples from aircraft carrier operations, NASA missions, and other unusual places, POLITICAL RISK offers a first-of-its-kind framework that can be deployed in any organization, from startups to Fortune 500 companies.
Organizations that take a serious, systematic approach to political risk management are likely to be surprised less often and recover better. Companies that don't get these basics right are more likely to get blindsided.
International climate change agreements typically specify global warming thresholds as policy targets, but the relative economic benefits of achieving these temperature targets remain poorly understood. Uncertainties include the spatial pattern of temperature change, how global and regional economic output will respond to these changes in temperature, and the willingness of societies to trade present for future consumption. Here we combine historical evidence with national-level climate and socioeconomic projections to quantify the economic damages associated with the United Nations (UN) targets of 1.5 °C and 2 °C global warming, and those associated with current UN national-level mitigation commitments (which together approach 3 °C warming). We find that by the end of this century, there is a more than 75% chance that limiting warming to 1.5 °C would reduce economic damages relative to 2 °C, and a more than 60% chance that the accumulated global benefits will exceed US$20 trillion under a 3% discount rate (2010 US dollars). We also estimate that 71% of countries—representing 90% of the global population—have a more than 75% chance of experiencing reduced economic damages at 1.5 °C, with poorer countries benefiting most. Our results could understate the benefits of limiting warming to 1.5 °C if unprecedented extreme outcomes, such as large-scale sea level rise, occur for warming of 2 °C but not for warming of 1.5 °C. Inclusion of other unquantified sources of uncertainty, such as uncertainty in secular growth rates beyond that contained in existing socioeconomic scenarios, could also result in less precise impact estimates. We find considerably greater reductions in global economic output beyond 2 °C. Relative to a world that did not warm beyond 2000–2010 levels, we project 15%–25% reductions in per capita output by 2100 for the 2.5–3 °C of global warming implied by current national commitments, and reductions of more than 30% for 4 °C warming. Our results therefore suggest that achieving the 1.5 °C target is likely to reduce aggregate damages and lessen global inequality, and that failing to meet the 2 °C target is likely to increase economic damages substantially.
Stanford scientists found that the global economy is likely to benefit from ambitious global warming limits agreed to in the United Nations Paris Agreement.
Failing to meet climate mitigation goals laid out in the U.N. Paris Agreement could cost the global economy tens of trillions of dollars over the next century, according to new Stanford research. The study, published in Nature, is one of the first to quantify the economic benefits of limiting global warming to levels set in the accord.
The agreement commits 195 countries to the goal of holding this century’s average temperature to 2 degrees Celsius above levels in the pre-industrial era. It also includes an aspirational goal of pursuing an even more stringent target of limiting temperature rise to 1.5 degrees. To date, the economic benefits of achieving these temperature targets have not been well understood.
“Over the past century we have already experienced a 1-degree increase in global temperature, so achieving the ambitious targets laid out in the Paris Agreement will not be easy or cheap. We need a clear understanding of how much economic benefit we’re going to get from meeting these different targets,” said Marshall Burke, assistant professor of Earth system science in the School of Earth, Energy & Environmental Sciencesand lead author of the study.
To develop this understanding, a team of Stanford researchers studied how economic performance over the past half-century correlated with changes in temperature around the world. Then, using climate model projections of how temperatures could change in the future, they calculated how overall economic output is likely to change as temperatures warm to different levels.
The researchers found a large majority of countries – containing close to 90 percent of the world’s population – benefit economically from limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees instead of 2 degrees. This includes the United States, China and Japan – the three largest economies in the world. It is also true in some of the world’s poorest regions, where even small reductions in future warming generate a notable increase in per capita gross domestic product.
“The countries likely to benefit the most are already relatively hot today,” said Burke. “The historical record tells us that additional warming will be very harmful to these countries’ economies, and so even small reductions in future warming could have large benefits for most countries.”
The projected costs from higher temperatures come from factors such as increases in spending to deal with extreme events, lower agricultural productivity and worse health, the scientists said.
Previous research has shown that the actual climate commitments each country has made as part of the Paris Agreement add up to close to 3 degrees of global warming, instead of the 1.5–2 degrees warming goals.
Given this discrepancy, the researchers also calculated the economic consequences of countries meeting their individual Paris commitments, but failing to meet the overall global warming goals of 1.5–2 degrees. They found that failing to achieve the 1.5–2 degrees goals is likely to substantially reduce global economic growth.
Percentage gain in GDP per capita in 2100 from achieving 1.5 degrees Celsius global warming instead of 2 degrees. (Image credit: Marshall Burke)
“It is clear from our analysis that achieving the more ambitious Paris goals is highly likely to benefit most countries – and the global economy overall – by avoiding more severe economic damages,” said Noah Diffenbaugh, professor of Earth system science and paper co-author.
The authors note the study may underestimate the total costs of higher levels of global warming. That’s especially true if catastrophic changes such as rapid melting of the ice on Greenland or Antarctica come to pass, or if extreme weather events such as heatwaves and floods intensify well beyond the range seen in historical observations. A recent studyby Diffenbaugh and his colleagues showed that even with reduced levels of global warming, unprecedented extreme events are likely to become more prevalent.
The new research helps shed light on the overall economic value of the Paris Agreement, as well as on the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw the U.S. from the accord because of concerns that it is too costly to the U.S. economy. The researchers calculated that the overall global benefits of keeping future temperature increases to 1.5 degrees are likely in the tens of trillions of dollars, with substantial likely benefits in the U.S. as well. They note that these benefits are more than 30 times greater than the most recent estimates of what it will cost to achieve the more ambitious 1.5 degrees goal.
“For most countries in the world, including the U.S., we find strong evidence that the benefits of achieving the ambitious Paris targets are likely to vastly outweigh the costs,” said Burke.
Burke is also a fellow at the Center on Food Security and the Environment, the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environmentand the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Diffenbaugh is also the Kara J Foundation Professor, the Kimmelman Family Senior Fellow in the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment and an affiliate of the Precourt Institute for Energy. Additional co-authors include W. Matt Davis, a former researcher at the Center on Food Security and the Environment. The research was supported by the Erol Foundation.
Media Contacts
Marshall Burke, School of Earth, Energy & Environmental Sciences: mburke@stanford.edu, (650) 721-2203 Noah Diffenbaugh, School of Earth, Energy & Environmental Sciences: diffenbaugh@stanford.edu, (650) 223-9425 Michelle Horton, Center on Food Security and the Environment: mjhorton@stanford.edu, (650) 498-4129
On May 14 and 15, 2018, many of the CISAC fellows were lucky enough to visit the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) at Offutt Air Force Base near Omaha, Nebraska. USSTRATCOM oversees strategic deterrence on multiple fronts, including nuclear weapons, missile defense, and, until recently, cyber-attacks. This trip was only the latest iteration of a longstanding relationship between CISAC and USSTRATCOM to foster research and debate on deterrence, assurance, and nuclear security
Our visit involved several highlights. General John Hyten, Commander of USSTRATCOM, took time out of his schedule to speak with us during breakfast on the first day. We were briefed on the global mission and history of USSTRATCOM, strategic planning, laws of armed conflict, nuclear modernization, and cybersecurity. The fellows were also able to visit the Global Operations Center and Battle Deck, where many of USSTRATCOM’s most important day-to-day functions take place. Several CISAC fellows (including me) had the opportunity to brief both military and civilian members of USSTRATCOM on a range of issues spanning from nuclear terrorism to the proliferation of offensive cyber capabilities to the domestic politics of American citizens’ growing perception (now at a historic high) of national decline.
I walked away from the experience with three strong impressions.
First, USSTRATCOM is populated with thoughtful individuals who have deeply sober attitudes about the devastating impact of using nuclear weapons. Each person we met was committed to ensuring the nation’s security but emphasized how seriously they took the notion of nuclear conflict and how they all sought never to prevent conflicts from reaching that point.
Second, I was struck by how everyone at USSTRATCOM was open to discussing new or provocative ideas. During our breakfast, General Hyten called upon one of the fellows working on Russian nuclear doctrine. It was clear that he was aware of the fellow’s work and disputed its conclusion. The two conversed about their differing views for several minutes before agreeing to disagree. Another one of our fellow’s briefings focused on the origins of the recent United Nations treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. Her talk drew some skepticism, but also many questions and generated a very civil discussion. USSTRATCOM invited us to speak, took our arguments seriously, and sought to understand any viewpoint that they felt could be valuable.
Third, and lastly, there is enormous need and potential to continue building connections between the military (or government more broadly) and the academic community. Visiting USSTRATCOM highlighted how scholars who study security may not fully grasp the realities behind how to effect and maintain it. This might lead to academic work that tends to be unrealistic or too reductive. Conversely, both military and civilian members of USSTRATCOM may be so engrossed in addressing specific problems that they sometimes miss the forest for the trees or overlook fallacies in their strategic logic. This could result in policies that have unintended and, given USSTRATCOM’s purview, severe consequences. Collaboration between these two worlds is perhaps the best tool we have for solving both problems simultaneously. The potential ramifications are too important not to do so.
Eric Min is a Zukerman Postdoctoral Fellow in Social Sciences at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, where he also obtained his Ph.D. in Political Science. His research focuses on the application of text analysis, machine learning, and statistical methods to analyze the dynamics of conflict and diplomacy. Starting in the fall of 2018, he will be an Assistant Professor in Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles. He can also be found on Twitter.
Informal savings and borrowing institutions are a way to intermediate between savers and borrowers in the developing world. But if these associations attract mostly savers or mostly borrowers, or are concentrated in one occupation, they may not function as well as they should. This column uses survey results from Malawi to suggest that commitment savers and borrowers mix in such associations, but occupations have tended to stick together. This may make them vulnerable to shocks such as a bad harvest.