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It is August again, and my wife and I are back on our farm. We have a medium-sized operation in east-central Iowa that produces soybeans, alfalfa, and corn, and that also supports an Angus cow-calf herd. These summers are supposed to be quiet, relaxing times away from the bustle of Stanford University. However, the days here seem anything but tranquil.  Two years ago my almanac report dealt with one of the worst droughts in Iowa’s history; last year the focus was on flooding and the wettest planting season on record.  I suppose it is only fair that wind should be the main topic this year. For our rural neighborhood, only problems, not answers, seemed to have been blowin’ in it.

Two evenings after our arrival from California, we were sent scurrying to our doubly reinforced “safe” room in the basement. Warning sirens blared, all television stations went on emergency broadcasting, and the spontaneous neighborhood phone line magically got activated.  Everything was for real, and all hell broke loose.  Eighty-five m.p.h. flat-line winds, grape-sized hail, and buckets of rain.  The power went out, and our safe-room conversation centered on whether or not to start our small generator—not for lights, but to assure that the sump pump continued working!

For a swath three miles wide and 15 miles long the tornado danced—jumping here and skipping there. Some farms were spared; others were pretty much demolished.  We were moderately lucky.  We lost an infinite number of branches and our largest oak tree—a four-foot diameter, 70-foot tall specimen. Entire trees were twisted off like toothpicks. Shingles from roofs went missing, as did white fencing. But we were among the lucky ones—no major buildings were lost and no people or animals were injured.

Two farms over, the five-bin corn storage unit took a direct hit. Two 120-foot tall elevators that lift grain to the top (called legs, although the anatomy analogy makes no sense) lay in a crumpled mess.  These bins hold some 240,000 bushels of corn and there are massive amounts of steel involved. The broken legs looked, at 120X scale, like an angry third-grader had deliberately slammed his Lego creations onto the ground. The difference is that the repairs, labor costs, and replacement parts for the bins and legs total $750,000. Farmers soon began re-reading their insurance policies about acts of God, depreciation allowances, and the rules for full versus partial replacement.

The morning following the storm, an eerie calm was soon replaced by a different form of energy.  Other work seemed to stop in a region larger than the storm-hit area.  No one arranged it, but neighbors suddenly appeared at each other’s farmsteads with tractors, loaders, pickups, and chainsaws. Small mountains of brush, trees, and building parts began to emerge, to be burned at a later date—no doubt with generous burn permits being granted by the county.

At the time of the storm, corn was about waist high. Like the trees, it took a serious beating throughout the storm’s path.  The corn stalks were tightly packed in narrow rows as a consequence of the changed density of planting—from 20,000 kernels per acre 20 years ago to 35,000 currently.  (Bags of seed corn containing 80,000 kernels now typically sell in excess of $300, putting seed costs per acre about on a par with the cost of nitrogen fertilizer.) This tightly woven carpet of corn was now leaning at 45 degrees—or worse.  The question was whether the stalks would straighten up. And the answer turns out to be “sort of.”  Many of them are “goose-necked,” a much used word now in farmer conversations. The concern is, IF large ears develop, will the stalks be sturdy enough to support them? Or, will a large amount of “ear droppage” seriously reduce yields and profits? We continue to be optimistic, and are still hoping for corn yields of 190 bushels per acre, not far from our best year of 220 bushels.

Morning coffee conversations at the old limestone café have been fairly somber affairs this summer. (The general store has changed hands, but unfortunately, the watery coffee and the stale cookies have not improved.)  Farmer faces were grim even before the storm, mainly because of what has happened to corn prices.  In August 2012, local farmers were being offered $7.65/bushel [56 pounds] of corn; in August 2013, the price was $6.20/bushel, and on August 20, 2014, the price was $3.60/bushel.  Suddenly the rush to buy new pick-ups and large harvesting equipment slowed drastically.  John Deere, the major farm-equipment manufacturer, has already laid off hundreds of workers at various Iowa sites.

Orders have not stopped entirely, however, largely because of crop insurance.  Virtually all farmers have either 75% or 85% revenue protection. If a combination of yield and/or price declines cause revenue to be less than 75% (85%) of normal, farmers are reimbursed by private insurance companies. The premiums for this revenue-protection insurance are heavily subsidized by the federal farm program. Taxpayers underwrite more than 60% of the total insurance premiums, which last year resulted in subsidies to farmers of about $9 billion. Historic yields are used in the insurance contract, and this year the early insurance lock-in price was $4.62/bushel. That price looked low in the spring, but now looks extremely favorable.  Unfortunately, many of my neighbors chose the “wrong” insurance option. They were able to purchase 75% revenue protection for about $4.50/acre, whereas the 85% protection cost about $19/acre. For a farmer with 1500 acres of corn, the difference in insurance premiums was more than $20,000.  But given declining corn prices, the cheaper insurance option for 2014 will surely turn out to be the most costly choice at the end of the season.  Farm decision making these days is mostly about risk management, and that is why crop insurance was such a big element in the new farm program.

Perhaps the hottest topic of conversation at morning coffee centered again on wind, but not of the tornado variety.  It turns out that “the wind comes sweeping down the plain” in Iowa as well as in Oklahoma. Iowa is the third-largest producer of wind energy, and wind power supplies a hefty 27 percent of Iowa’s total energy use. So why are my neighbors upset?  It is something called the Rock Island Clean Line (RICL), and a bit of history is in order.
 

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The old Rock Island Line was a rail company—made more famous than it really deserved to be by Johnny Cash. The line ran five miles south of our farm, and yes, it was a “mighty fine line” that did carry cows, sheep, pigs, and mules. But it went bankrupt in 1975. The Rock Island Clean Line originally planned to use some of the old right-of- way for quite a different purpose—transporting wind-generated power from northwest Iowa on huge towers, with cables carrying direct-current electricity into the Illinois market to the east. It turned out, however, that too much of the old right of way went through urban areas and was unsuitable, so RICL will purchase some 500 linear miles of farmland right-of-way for the towers.

Farmers are rationally and irrationally furious. (The line was originally scheduled to go across the full length of our farm, so we have been directly involved in the discussions.) It has been extremely difficult to get straight answers about the line, with the company and the Iowa Utilities Board doing a dance in which neither wants to lead. There is no doubt that these140-foot towers create an ugly line of sight; they complicate farming with large machinery; and they seriously impact adjoining fields during the construction phase.  The company believes that it is offering generous one-time compensation—the equivalent of $10,000 to $15,000 per acre in most cases—but it then retains easement rights to this land forever, including the authority to sell the rights. Farmers are livid—they basically do not want the line from which they will receive no benefits—but they are being faced with potential eminent domain proceedings if they do not agree to sell. All sorts of NIMBY arguments are being brought forward, from the “government can’t tell us what to do,” to “the lines will emit electrical forces that will cause health effects,” to “they are not paying enough,” to “why should we use good Iowa soil to transport electricity rather than to produce food for the hungry?” The last of these comments is the one I have heard most often. When I inquired as to whether the coffee group was also against ethanol—since 40% of Iowa corn is going into gas tanks rather than hungry mouths—I was NOT regarded as a helpful contributor to the conversation!

In the end, I suspect that the Rock Island Clean Line will prevail, and that farmers and their families will learn to accommodate the power towers. Many farmers will grumble publically, but smile privately en route to their banks with rather large checks. However, both the process and outcome have stirred up deep passions about who controls the land.

Not all farmers are sad this summer, and the winds of good fortune have blown in the direction of cattle feeders.  The structure of cattle feeding in Iowa has changed enormously in recent times. I am the son of a mid-sized feeder, and spent a good deal of my youth working with cattle and driving cattle trucks.  Most east Iowa farms these days are strictly grain farms, in large part to free farmers from the 24/7 burden of animal care. My neighbor talks about his corn-Texas crop rotation—growing corn in the summer and going to Texas for the winter.
 

Two black angus calves.


There are only two large cattle feeding operations left in Linn County where I live, and both are within four miles of our farm.  I was invited by one of the owners to attend a cattle auction with him, and to see for myself just how much things had changed.  He owns his own 18-wheeler, and almost every week takes a load (36 head) of prime beef to the auction.  Cattle are taken to the auction pens the night before the sale and are taken off of feed and water. These steers weigh between 1400 and 1500 pounds, and buyers want assurance that the animals have not gorged on feed and water just before crossing the scales. The cattle are weighed early the morning of the sale, and weights are then flashed on a scoreboard as the animals enter the sale ring.

There is still an amazing amount of ritual at a cattle auction—I had forgotten just how much! Prime steers are typically sold in lots of 12 animals. They enter the ring from one side, and are moved about by a “ring man” so that buyers can get a good view of them. Part of the ritual is where various people sit.  A small group of farmers/sellers sits in one section, typically bantering about whom has the best cattle and whose will “top the sale.” The buyers sit near the top of the bleachers, in the same spot each week, but separated from each other.  (They would not want a casual conversation between them to be construed as collusion!) There is also the auctioneer with his chatter, mile-a-minute delivery, and selling antics. The sale itself happens very rapidly. There are typically two to four bidders for a particular lot of animals, and the bids go back and forth among them at lightning speed. The bidding cues are highly personalized—one buyer uses the flip of his tally sheet, another raises his index finger, and one simply arches his eyebrow.  In less than 45 seconds, the winning buyer has spent $27,000! And then the next lot appears.  Cattle from this sale went to packing plants in Wisconsin, Iowa, Nebraska, and Illinois.

On the 25-mile ride home, my neighbor talked about how pleased he was with what had happened. His steers had gained well and had topped the market in terms of price at $1.57 per pound. He said that corn was very cheap, as was distiller’s grain—the high protein by-product from making corn-based ethanol—which is now an important part of cattle feeding rations. There would be a healthy profit from this load of steers that had grossed about $80,000. 

But then he turned somber.  What should he do about next year? The price of 600-pound calves that he would put into the feedlot for feeding and sale next year are selling at the astronomical price of $2.50 per pound and even higher.  Perhaps next year, he said, was the year to stay out of the ring and go to Texas or Arizona for the winter. Risk had reared its ugly head once again. But my neighbor is first and foremost a cattle feeder, with a cattle feeder’s mindset toward risk. My conjecture is that he will somehow find a rationale for purchasing replacement calves, and that he will do everything all over again next year.                                                 

“The answer my friend, is blowin’ in the wind,

The answer is blowin’ in the wind.”

(Bob Dylan, 1962)

 

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Stanford-Sasakawa Peace Foundation New Channels Dialogue 2014

Energy Challenge and Opportunities for the United States and Japan

 

February 13, 2014

Bechtel Conference Center, Encina Hall, Stanford University

Sponsored and Organized by Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF) and Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (S-APARC) in Association with U.S.-Japan Council

 

Japan Studies Program at Shorenstein APARC, Stanford University has launched a three-year project from 2013 to create new channels of dialogue between experts and leaders of younger generations from the United States, mostly from the West Coast, and Japan under a name of "New Channels: Reinvigorating U.S.-Japan Relations," with the goal of reinvigorating the bilateral relationship through the dialogue on 21st century challenges faced by both nations, with a grant received from the Sasakawa Peace Foundation.

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About the Speaker: Paul N. Stockton is a managing director of Sonecon, LLC and the co-founder and president of Cloud Peak Analytics, the Sonecon division that provides analysis to help businesses understand and manage the full range of risks to their operations and investment strategies.  Before joining Sonecon, Dr. Stockton served as the assistant secretary of defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs from June 2009 until January 2013.  In that position, he was responsible for DoD efforts to strengthen security in the Western Hemisphere, and helped nations across the region deal with threats to energy infrastructure and other emerging challenges.  As assistant secretary, he also guided the Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection program, served as DoD’s Domestic Crisis Manager, and led the Department’s response to Hurricane Sandy and other natural disasters.  For his service, Dr. Stockton was twice awarded the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, DoD’s highest civilian award. 

Prior to his tenure as assistant secretary, Dr. Stockton served as a senior research scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. He was also associate provost of the Naval Postgraduate School and legislative assistant for national security affairs to Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan.  He holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University and a BA summa cum laude from Dartmouth College.

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Paul Stockton Managing Director, Sonecon, LLC; Co-Founder and President, Cloud Peak Analytics, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs Speaker
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Abstract:  

Haber and Menaldo (2011) claim there is little evidence that oil is harmful to democracy, and that previous studies to the contrary were corrupted by omitted variable bias. Michael Ross professor of political science at UCLA will present findings from a paper co-authored with Jørgen Juel Andersen to show there is little evidence of the bias they allege, and point out that they decline to test the most credible version of the resource curse hypothesis.  The versions that they do test, moreover, are based on two implausible assumptions: that oil will effect a country’s regime type immediately, rather than over a period of several years; and that the relationship between oil wealth and political power did not change over the 200 year period covered by their data.  We argue that oil only had strong anti-democratic effects after the 1970s, when most oil-producing autocracies nationalized their industries; and show their main results are overturned when we add to their models a dummy variable for the post-1979 period, and allow the effects of oil to take place over a period of three, five, or seven years, instead of just one year.  

Speaker Bio: 

Michael L. Ross is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), and Director of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies. 

He has published widely on the political and economic problems of resource-rich countries, civil war, democratization, and gender rights; his articles have appeared in the American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, Annual Review of Political Science, British Journal of Political Science, International Organization, Journal of Confiict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, Politics and Gender, and World Politics.  In 2009, he received the Heinz Eulau Award from the American Political Science Association for the best article published in the American Political Science Review. 

His work has also appeard in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Harper's, The Los Angeles Times, and been featured in The Washington Post, Newsweek, and many other publications. 

Ross currently serves on the advisory boards of the Review Watch Institute, the Natural Resource Charter, and Clean Trade, and was previously a member of the Advisory Group for the World Bank's Extractive Industries Review.  He is also a member of the Political Instability Task Force and the APSA Task Force on Democracy Audits and Governmental Indicators.

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Michael Ross Professor, Political Science Speaker UCLA
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Trevor L Davis is a Social Science Research Scholar in the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development and the Department of Economics at Stanford University. His research interests include studying the influence of market design on electricity market outcomes. Before coming to Stanford he worked in a macroeconomic forecasting section at the Federal Reserve Board of Governors and earned a BA in economics and statistics from the University of Chicago and a MS in statistics from George Washington University.

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Nigeria’s national oil company NNPC is at the center of a profoundly dysfunctional oil sector in a country that some argue embodies the “resource curse.” In a new study, PESD Associate Director Mark C. Thurber and PESD affiliated researchers Ifeyinwa Emelife and Patrick Heller find that NNPC’s persistent underperformance stems from its role as the linchpin of a sophisticated and durable system of patronage.

Abstract

Nigeria depends heavily on oil and gas, with hydrocarbon activities providing around 65 percent of total government revenue and 95 percent of export revenues.  While Nigeria supplies some LNG to world markets and is starting to export a small amount of gas to Ghana via pipeline, the great majority of the country's hydrocarbon earnings come from oil.  In 2008, Nigeria was the 5th largest oil exporter and 10th largest holder of proved oil reserves in the world according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.  The country's national oil company NNPC (Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation) sits at the nexus between the many interests in Nigeria that seek a stake in the country's oil riches, the government, and the private companies that actually operate the vast majority of oil and gas projects.

Through its many divisions and subsidiaries, NNPC serves as an oil sector regulator, a buyer and seller of oil and petroleum products, a technical operator of hydrocarbon activities on a limited basis, and a service provider to the Nigerian oil sector.  With isolated exceptions, NNPC is not very effective at performing its various oil sector jobs.  It is neither a competent oil company nor an efficient regulator for the sector.   Managers of NNPC's constituent units, lacking the ability to reliably fund themselves, are robbed of business autonomy and the chance to develop capability.  There are few incentives for NNPC employees to be entrepreneurial for the company's benefit and many incentives for private action and corruption.  It is no accident that NNPC operations are disproportionately concentrated on oil marketing and downstream functions, which offer the best opportunities for private benefit.  The few parts of NNPC that actually add value, like engineering design subsidiary NETCO, tend to be removed from large financial flows and the patronage opportunities they bring. 

Although NNPC performs poorly as an instrument for maximizing long-term oil revenue for the state, it actually functions well as an instrument of patronage, which helps to explain its durability.  Each additional transaction generated by its profuse bureaucracy provides an opportunity for well-connected individuals to profit by being the gatekeepers whose approval must be secured, especially in contracting processes.  NNPC's role as distributor of licenses for export of crude oil and import of refined products also helps make it a locus for patronage activities.  Corruption, bureaucracy, and non-market pricing regimes for oil sales all reinforce each other in a dysfunctional equilibrium that has proved difficult to dislodge despite repeated efforts at oil sector reform.

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Norway is lauded as the rare example of a major oil and gas exporting country that has managed to avoid the "resource curse." A new study by PESD Associate Director Mark C. Thurber and Consulting Research Associate Benedicte Tangen Istad looks more closely at the Norwegian petroleum experience and the role of national oil company Statoil in it. The reality is messy and political but nonetheless an impressive story of how Norway built a vibrant domestic oil and gas industry on the back of national champion Statoil and a robust system of governance that could curb Statoil's excesses as needed at a few key junctures.
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Executive summary:

Statoil was founded in 1972 as the national oil company (NOC) of Norway.  Along with Brazil's Petrobras, Statoil today is a leader in several technological areas including operations in deep water.  With its arm's length relationship to the Norwegian government and partially-private ownership, it is generally considered to be among the state-controlled oil companies most similar to an international oil company in governance, business strategy, and performance.

Statoil's development and performance have been intimately connected to its relationship with the Norwegian government over the years.  The "Norwegian Model" of distinguishing Statoil's commercial responsibilities in hydrocarbons from regulatory and policy functions granted to other government bodies has inspired admiration and imitation as the canonical model of good bureaucratic design for a hydrocarbons sector. 

However, the reality is that Norway's comparative success in hydrocarbons development, and that of Statoil, has been about much more than a formula for bureaucratic organization.  Belying the notion of a pristine "Norwegian Model" that unfolded inexorably from a well-designed template, the actual development of Norway's petroleum sector at times was, and often still is, a messy affair rife with conflict and uncertainty.  But Norway had the advantage of entering its oil era with a mature, open democracy as well as bureaucratic institutions with experience regulating other natural resource industries.  Thus far, the diverse political and regulatory institutions governing the petroleum sector-and governing the NOC-have collectively proven robust enough to handle the strains of petroleum development and correct the worst imbalances that have arisen. 

Mark Thurber and Benedicte Tangen Istad make the following six principal observations from their research.

First, Norway's policy orientation from the start was focused on maintaining control over the oil sector, as opposed to simply maximizing revenue.  As a result, the country was more concerned with understanding and mitigating the possible negative ramifications of oil wealth than with any special advantage that could be gained from it. 

Second, the principal means through which Norway was able to exert control over domestic petroleum activities was a skillful bureaucracy operating within a mature and open political system.  Civil servants gained knowledge of petroleum to regulate the sector through systematic efforts to build up their own independent competence, enabling them to productively steer the political discourse on petroleum management after the first commercial oil discovery was made.  Robust contestation between socialist and conservative political parties also helped contribute to a system of oil administration that supported competition (including between multiple Norwegian oil companies as well as international operators) and was able to evolve new checks and balances as needed.

Third, Statoil did play an important role in contributing to the development of Norwegian industry and technological capability, in large part because it had the freedom to take a long-term approach to technology development.  With a strong engineering orientation and few consequences for failure as a fully state-backed company, Statoil developed a culture valuing innovation over development of a lean, commercially-oriented organization.  These priorities may not have always contributed to maximization of government revenues in the short run-costs came to be perceived as high in Norway (for various reasons not all related to Statoil) and Statoil was on occasion responsible for significant overruns.  However, the focus on innovation contributed to significant technological breakthroughs and helped spur the development of a high-value-added domestic industry in oil services.

Fourth, the formal relationship between Statoil and the government has become more arm's-length as Norway's resources and oil expertise have matured.  Under its first CEO, experienced Labour politician Arve Johnsen, Statoil aggressively flexed its political muscles to gain special advantages in licensing and access to acreage.  As domestic resources began to mature, Statoil's leadership (starting with Harald Norvik in 1988, and continuing through the tenures of subsequent CEOs Olav Fjell and Helge Lund) focused more on forging an independent corporate identity and governance structure that would allow the company to compete effectively abroad. 

Fifth, notwithstanding changes in their formal relationship, it has remained impossible to sever the close ties between the Norwegian state and a company with the domestic significance of Statoil.  These residual ties can manifest in various ways, including: 1) the effect on policy decisions of direct personal connections between Statoil leaders and politicians; 2) persistent "Norway-centric" influences on Statoil's strategy even in the larger context of efforts to internationalize; and 3) public pressure from politicians who continue to see themselves as Statoil's masters.  Such pressures can affect large strategic companies, public or private, in any country, but their effect is magnified by Norway's small size and Statoil's importance within it as the largest petroleum developer.

Sixth, Statoil's experience thus far casts doubt upon the conventional wisdom that NOC-NOC connections provide material benefit in opening resource access around the world.  To the extent that such linkages are important, Statoil would seem to be among the best-positioned to benefit from them as both a highly competent producer and a company that might be sympathetic to the needs of resource-rich countries.  However, there are few instances so far where Statoil's status as an NOC has been an obviously decisive factor in unlocking resources that would otherwise be off-limits.

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Profile
Leif Wenar is Chair of Ethics at King's College London.

After earning his Bachelor’s degree in Philosophy from Stanford, he went to Harvard to study with John Rawls, and wrote his dissertation on property rights with Robert Nozick and T.M. Scanlon.

Leif Wenar works in moral, political and legal theory. His most abstract theoretical work concerns the nature and justification of rights. Most of his scholarly writings have focused on the work of John Rawls. Much of his current research focuses on international issues such as war, human rights, severe poverty, development aid, and inequalities among nations.  He has recently written on the global trade in natural resources such as oil and diamonds, and how to stop the damaging effects of the "resource curse." Most of his published work is available online at  wenar.info.

He has been a Visiting Professor and a Fellow at the Princeton University Center for Human Values, a Fellow of the Center for Ethics and Public Affairs at The Murphy Institute of Political Economy, and a Fellow of the Program on Justice and the World Economy at The Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs.

Research
Leif Wenar works in moral, political and legal theory. Much of his current research focuses on international issues such as war, human rights, severe poverty, development aid, and inequalities among nations. His most abstract theoretical work concerns the nature and justification of rights. Most of his scholarly writings have focused on the work of John Rawls, and he co-edited the autobiographical volume Hayek on Hayek.

He has recently written on the global trade in natural resources such as oil and diamonds, and how to stop the damaging effects this trade has on low-income countries. His work on this topic can be found at www.cleantrade.org.

Attached is the paper for the seminar. Of course there's no expectation that you'll want to read the whole thing, so here's a short guide to what might be most interesting for our time together:
  • The main policy proposals in the project can be gotten from sections 1-14, skipping the 'Question' sections. (These sections cover the material in "Property Rights and the Resource Curse"; if you've read that article you'll not miss too much by skipping these sections.)
  • The final section, A14, tries to build on Seema's excellent work on loan sanctions;
  • Sections 7, 8, 9, and A13 touch on the issues of the standards for
    disqualifying regimes from selling resources/accessing credit, and the
    agencies that could rule on whether these standards have been met.

The rest of the material is just there in case it interests you.

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Leif Wenar Professor of Ethics Speaker Kings College London
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Abstract
An accurate estimate of the ultimate production of oil, gas, and coal would be helpful for the ongoing policy discussion on alternatives to fossil fuels and climate change. By ultimate production, we mean total production, past and future. It takes a long time to develop energy infrastructure, and this means it matters whether we have burned 20% of our oil, gas, and coal, or 40%. In modeling climate change, the carbon dioxide from burning fossil fuels is the most important factor. The time frame for the climate response is much longer than the time frame for burning fossil fuels, and this means that the total amount burned is more important than the burn rate. Oil, gas, and coal ultimates are traditionally estimated by government geological surveys from measurements of oil and gas reservoirs and coal seams, together with an allowance for future discoveries of oil and gas. We will see that where these estimates can be tested, they tend to be too high, and that more accurate estimates can be made by curve fits to the production history.

Bio
Professor Rutledge is the Tomiyasu Professor of Electrical Engineering at Caltech, and a former Chair of the Division of Engineering and Applied Science there.  He is the author of the textbook Electronics of Radio, published by Cambridge University Press, and the popular microwave computer-aided-design software package Puff.  He is a Fellow of the IEEE, a winner of the IEEE Microwave Prize, and a winner of the Teaching Award of the Associated Students at Caltech.  He served as the editor for the Transactions on Microwave Theory and Techniques, and is a founder of the Wavestream Corporation, a manufacturer of high-power transmitters for satellite uplinks.

This talk is part of the PESD Energy Working Group series.

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Dave Rutledge Professor of Electrical Engineering Speaker Caltech
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