Why do elites in authoritarian regimes choose to pursue democratic transitions? In a CDDRL research seminar series talk, James Fearon, Professor of Political Science and Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), offers a theory to explain the methods and motivations behind elite-led democratization. Fearon probes how authoritarian elites safeguard their power through autocratic constitutions, focusing on Myanmar, one of the longest-lived military regimes in the post-WWII era.

The Tatmadaw — Myanmar’s armed forces — held exclusive power after General Ne Win took control in a 1962 coup d’état until the early 2010s when they pursued a power-sharing arrangement with a civilian opposition. In 2008, the military junta that ruled from 1988 to 2011 ratified a new constitution they had drafted in a dubious referendum. While the 2008 Constitution appeared to take steps toward democracy, it featured serious limitations. It handed the military full control over several key ministries, secured “rent” streams for the officers, and reserved a quarter of parliamentary seats for military-appointed representatives. It further required that any changes to the constitution be passed by 75% of the legislature, thus giving them an effective veto.

In the November 2015 General Election, the opposition scored an overwhelming victory. The National League for Democracy Party (NLD) won close to three-fourths of the seats, giving them a large parliamentary majority and a strong ability to pass laws even if they were formally constrained on changing the constitution. The trajectory of these events raises the question, why did the military choose to pursue a democratic transition? Relatedly, why did military leaders believe that the 2008 Constitution would sufficiently protect them? Fearon observes that one of the NLD’s first actions was to create a new head-of-state position outside the constitution for Aung San Suu Kyi, the NLD’s leader.

Fearon argues that the military was protected not by the formal constitution, which is just a piece of paper, but rather by maintaining direct control of important streams of income and policy influence in the form of staffing of the bureaucracy and control of natural resource and drug incomes in militarily contested parts of the country. Control of these “rent streams” meant that the new NLD government could not shift them away from the military simply passing laws in parliament — even though the NLD did have considerable control and influence on many other dimensions of policy. In effect, this was a power (and rent) sharing division of the state.

Authoritarian rulers face international and domestic pressures, such as economic and political sanctions and costly revolutionary threats. Continued authoritarian rule would preserve elites’ control of the country’s existing resources. Movement toward democratization, on the other hand, generates both opportunities and costs. It comes with the promise of lifting international sanctions and increasing the flow of foreign aid, thus increasing the total economic “pie” available. However, the military could only take full advantage of that economic opening if they maintained a significant degree of economic and political control that the newly elected government could not revise without provoking a costly conflict (such as a coup attempt to reverse democratization). More general, Fearon argues that autocratic elites will be more inclined to try democratization when they can share rent streams and their military ability to retake power if this is challenged does not decline too rapidly after the transition.

Elite-led democratic transitions hold unique implications. On the one hand, top-down transitions are more efficient than bottom-up democratic revolutions because they reduce the costs and risks of violence. On the other hand, transitions led by undemocratic leaders are likely to result in only partial democratization because they tend to perpetuate preexisting power dynamics by reinforcing the influence of ruling elites and maintaining their access to rents.

Fearon proposes that as newly democratized societies begin to institutionalize, the relative power of the old elites may gradually diminish, leading to “endogenous consolidation.” Yet, if the military sees its power fading faster than expected, it may — as in the aftermath of Myanmar’s 2020 elections — intervene militarily to restore the status quo ante.