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Noa Ronkin
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The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is pleased to announce its new China Policy Fellowship, which will bring to Stanford mid-career to senior-level experts with extensive research experience on issues vital to U.S. China policy and influence in the policymaking process. With this new offering, APARC seeks to apply cutting-edge academic analysis to pressing challenges affecting U.S. policy toward China and to strengthen U.S.-China relations.

The fellowship will be awarded annually to one expert. While at Stanford, the China Policy Fellow will undertake original research in his/her area of expertise and will play a lead role in organizing a major conference on a topic central to the U.S.-China policy agenda. Each fellow’s work and annual conference will result in a publication that will help advance a deeper understanding of China and its aims.

The fellowship will be hosted by APARC’s China Program, whose mission is to facilitate multidisciplinary, social science-oriented research on contemporary China, with a dual emphasis on basic and policy-relevant research. The appointment of the inaugural 2021-22 China Policy Fellow will begin in the fall quarter of 2021. The new fellowship is made possible thanks to the generosity of an APARC supporter.

“The need to enhance understanding within the United States about China has never been more critical,” says China Program Director Jean Oi, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics. “In these times when divergent claims and bellicose propositions are regularly made by politicians and policymakers in the United States and in China, the China Policy Fellowship will help us promote dialogue between the two nations and empirically-driven research relevant to U.S. China relations. I am delighted that we are able to offer this new fellowship opportunity.”

The application deadline for the 2021-22 China Policy Fellowship is February 15, 2021.

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A missile display in the Military Museum in Beijing, China.
Commentary

The United States Must Avoid a Nuclear Arms Race with China

Oriana Skylar Mastro explains why U.S. nuclear policy needs to minimize the role of nuclear weapons in the U.S.-China great power competition and pave the way for arms control.
The United States Must Avoid a Nuclear Arms Race with China
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APARC Announces 2021-22 Postdoctoral Fellowships for Emerging Scholars in Contemporary Asia, Japan, and Korea Studies

The Center’s commitment to supporting young Asia scholars remains strong during the COVID-19 crisis.
APARC Announces 2021-22 Postdoctoral Fellowships for Emerging Scholars in Contemporary Asia, Japan, and Korea Studies
(Left) Yuen Yuen Ang; (Right) Congratulations Yuen Yuen Ang, Winner of the Theda Skocpol Prize from the American Political Science Association
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Dr. Yuen Yuen Ang Awarded Theda Skocpol Prize for Emerging Scholars

Former China Program postdoc and Stanford Ph.D alumna Yuen Yuen Ang has received the Theda Skocpol Prize for Emerging Scholars from the American Political Science Association for her scholarship on China’s transformation into a global superpower.
Dr. Yuen Yuen Ang Awarded Theda Skocpol Prize for Emerging Scholars
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Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Center invites applications for the inaugural 2021-22 China Policy Fellowship from experts with research experience on issues vital to the U.S. China policy agenda and influence in the policymaking process.

Encina Hall
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

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Research Scholar
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Michael Bennon is a Research Scholar at CDDRL for the Global Infrastructure Policy Research Initiative. Michael's research interests include infrastructure policy, project finance, public-private partnerships and institutional design in the infrastructure sector. Michael also teaches Global Project Finance to graduate students at Stanford. Prior to Stanford, Michael served as a Captain in the US Army and US Army Corps of Engineers for five years, leading Engineer units, managing projects, and planning for infrastructure development in the United States, Iraq, Afghanistan and Thailand. 

Program Manager, Global Infrastructure Policy Research Initiative
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Kiyoteru Tsutsui
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On August 28, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced that he will step down from the position, citing serious health concerns. What is his legacy and what lies ahead? Below, I list his three major accomplishments (hits) and disappointments (misses) and consider who is likely to succeed him.

Hit: Abe’s greatest accomplishment is that he kept winning elections and stayed in power, becoming the longest-serving prime minister in Japanese history. In a country where only one prime minister (Koizumi) lasted more than two years in the last three decades, this is a significant achievement. He started his (second) term in 2012 when Japan was still reeling from the triple disaster of 2011 and the mismanagement by the then-ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). He initially restored confidence in Japan, energized the economy with bold policies, and brought stability to Japanese politics. The weakening and eventual disintegration of the DPJ facilitated his streak of electoral victories, but he deserves credit for launching several policy initiatives to revitalize the stagnant and aging economic giant and for incorporating social welfare policies – many of which were proposed by opposition parties – to stave off dissatisfaction among voters. He raised the consumption tax rate twice and still won six straight elections, an amazing feat considering how past prime ministers faired after a tax hike.

Miss: Despite this long period as prime minister, it is not entirely clear that he accomplished major policy goals. Abenomics – Abe’s signature economic policy – reinvigorated the Japanese economy, shooting stocks up to great heights, but the economy as a whole did not grow any faster under his watch and per capita GDP shrank, exacerbating economic inequality. Revising the Constitution, widely seen as his ultimate goal as prime minister, did not come close to being a reality, even though he launched a number of trial balloons. Abe also proposed many new policy initiatives with catchy phrases – womanomics, work-life balance reform, reviving rural Japan, etc. – but was often criticized for producing only an impression that he is doing something (yatterukan) rather than actually getting things done.


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Hit: Foreign policy was Abe’s strong suit. Having outserved most G7 leaders, his stature at international meetings rose to a height few Japanese prime ministers reached before. Overcoming the initial perception as a hawkish nationalist ideologue, he demonstrated savvy pragmatism in foreign affairs, developing strong relationships with the United States, particularly with President Trump, and recovering from the rocky start with President Xi to forge a practical partnership with China. His administration also passed a series of legislation that advanced realist security policies and popularized a vision of Free and Open Indo-Pacific, which other countries including the United States bought into. Furthermore, despite the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Abe marched on and led the charge toward the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a rare example of Japan leading a multilateral agreement without support from the United States.

Miss: Yet, Abe failed to achieve some key foreign policy goals. The issue of abduction of Japanese by North Korea, which prompted him to national prominence when he was a young cabinet member under Prime Minister Koizumi, did not see any progress, nor did territorial negotiations with Russia – another foreign policy issue he expended a good deal of capital on. South Korea was another thorn on his side: the “comfort women” agreement could have been Abe’s major accomplishment, but domestic political turmoil in South Korea led to President Moon’s scuttling of the agreement, which sent the Japan-South Korea relations into a downward spiral. This development had more to do with South Korean politics than Abe, but he still could have tried to repair the damage. Instead, he threw in a towel on Moon and escalated tensions with South Korea, when the two countries should be close allies collaborating to cope with China’s assertiveness and the North Korean nuclear threat.

Hit: Abe’s cabinet accumulated enormous power over bureaucrats by holding authority on personnel decisions, which is critical in controlling them. This shift of power from bureaucrats to politicians was what the DPJ advocated when it became the ruling party. Abe nearly perfected this transfer of power and established a system under which the prime minister can take the initiative for new policies, going over opposition from career bureaucrats, and seek voters’ judgment about the merits of the policy in subsequent elections. This departs from decades of political practice in Japan, whereby bureaucrats set major policies, and most politicians merely parrot policy goals, which is unconducive to major policy changes needed to energize the stagnant economy and society. Abe leaves in place the cabinet apparatus that could empower the next prime minister to launch major policy initiatives.

Miss: The downside of the concentration of power is corruption. A series of scandals that revealed excessively cozy relationships between Abe and his supporters threatened Abe’s hold on power in the last few years. As is often the case, the coverup was worse than the initial infraction in the major financial scandals, and other transgressions challenged the public’s sense of fairness as Abe’s supporters – politicians, government officials, business leaders, journalists, or celebrities – allegedly received special treatment. The lack of accountability undermined Abe’s credibility toward the end, and the weakened administration struggled to handle the coronavirus crisis. Despite the relatively low numbers of coronavirus cases and victims in Japan, Abe received few applauses for his handling of the crisis. Even though his health was the main reason for his resignation, all these recent developments sapped the energy out of his cabinet, setting the stage for his resignation.

Who’s Next?

Abe’s abrupt departure prompted a number of party leaders to jockey for the successor position. As of this writing, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga has all but secured the position, having picked up support from key factions within the ruling LDP. Fumio Kishida and Shigeru Ishiba will remain on the ballot but other major candidates such as Defense Minister Taro Kono have decided not to run this time.

Suga has been the most important partner for Abe in the cabinet along with Deputy Prime Minister Aso, contributing to the consolidation of power in the cabinet and executing various policy initiatives and legislative successes. Suga would likely carry forward many of Abe’s key policies, and with his tactical savvy and the potent cabinet apparatus that he helped create, has the potential to become a powerful prime minister. On the other hand, he would only have a year before the next election for LDP presidency (because he would be filling Abe’s remaining term) and he would have to account for Abe’s negative legacies, in some of which he is seen as complicit. These factors lead many observers to predict a short stint for him, but Suga is a scrappy self-made man who rose from a modest background, and his political instincts and already strong hold on power are not to be underestimated.

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Shinzo Abe speaking from a lectern
Commentary

Reflections on the Assassination of Former Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe

Abe was one of the most transformative political leaders in modern Japanese history, and his passing will change Japanese politics in a number of ways, most immediately shaking up internal politics within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. To honor Abe’s legacy, we all need to reassert our resolve to protect our democracy in Japan, the United States, and all over the world.
Reflections on the Assassination of Former Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe
The Japanese delegation onboard the USS Missouri during the surrender ceremony on September 2, 1945.
Q&As

How WWII Continues to Shape Regional and International Relations in Asia

In an interview with Stanford News, Gi-Wook Shin, the director of APARC and the Korea Program, describes how divergent perspectives on the legacies of WWII continue to shape different understandings of history and impact inter-Asia and U.S.-Asia relations.
How WWII Continues to Shape Regional and International Relations in Asia
A young boy prays after releasing a floating lantern onto the Motoyasu River in front of the Atomic Bomb Dome in Hiroshima, Japan.
Commentary

Why the US-Japan Partnership Prospered Despite Hiroshima and Nagasaki

There has been little diplomatic conflict between the United States and Japan over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during WWII, but that stability could change in the future, writes Japan Program Director Kiyoteru Tsutsui in an op-ed for The Hill.
Why the US-Japan Partnership Prospered Despite Hiroshima and Nagasaki
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Despite this long period as prime minister, it is not entirely clear that Abe accomplished major policy goals.

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This event has been postponed. Please see below for details.

On the heels of Prime Minister Abe's resignation, a Cabinet meeting has been called for the morning of Wednesday, September 16 prior to the Diet vote for the new Prime Minister later that day. As much as he would like to join us that morning, Defense Minister Kono has to prioritize the cabinet meeting; the whole cabinet has to resign in order for the vote to take place. Therefore, we will be postponing our seminar "Turbulence in East Asia and Japan's Security," which was planned for September 15 at 4 PM (Pacific)/September 16 at 8 AM (Japan). 
 
We will advertise the new date for the event once it has been set. We hope you will be able to join us at that time. Thank you for your interest and understanding.
 
 
Starting with a landscape overview of Japan's security and defense as it regards the Asia-Pacific region and also the world, Japanese Minister of Defense Kono Taro will discuss recent changes in Japan's security environment, the challenges and opportunities these changes present, as well as their impacts on the country's security policy. Minister Kono will also examine the major issues for Japan's defense and Japan's approach to them. The webinar will end with a short audience Q&A moderated by APARC Japan Program Director Kiyoteru Tsutsui.
 
SPEAKER
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Portrait of Taro Kono, Japanese Minister of Defense
Kono Taro, 56, is an eight-term Member of the House of Representatives. He has been Minister of Defense in the Abe Government since September 11, 2019.
 
Among positions he has held are Foreign Minister; Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission, or Minister in charge of the National Police Organization; Minister for Administrative Reform; Minister for Civil Service Reform; Minister for Regulatory Reform; Minister in Charge of Consumer Affairs and Food Safety; and Minister in Charge of Disaster Management in the Abe Government, Parliamentary Secretary for Public Management and Senior Vice-Minister of Justice in the Koizumi Government, and Chairman of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
 
Kono is a graduate of the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. He was Chairman of the Japan Race Horse Association and Chairman of the Shonan Bellmare Football Club, the 1995 Asia Champion Soccer Club. He is married to Kaori and has a son, Ippei.
Kono Taro Minister of Defense, <br>Government of Japan</br>
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In a recent perspective published by the New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM), Stanford Law student Alexandra Daniels analyzed a growing body of federal litigation brought by prisoners with the hepatitis C virus (HCV) who are seeking access to treatment for their condition. With co-author and mentor, Law Professor David Studdert — also a professor of medicine at Stanford Health Policy — Daniels documented the dire public health problem of HCV in prisons.

“People incarcerated in prisons account for approximately one third of HCV cases in the United States” the authors wrote, and nearly one in five prisoners are infected, compared with 1 percent of the general population. 

HCV is a slow-moving disease, but left untreated it eventually leads to cirrhosis, cancer, liver failure, and death.  

A new wave of “miracle” drugs for treating HCV appeared in 2014. Direct-acting antivirals–or DAAs–are far more effective than anything previously known. The catch–they are extremely expensive, upwards of $50,000 for a course of treatment.  This creates a far higher price tag for universal treatment than most prison systems can afford. The result is that, even though prisons are the epicenter of the HCV epidemic, only a small minority of prisoners have gained access to DAAs.

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Owning Handgun Associated With Dramatically Higher Risk of Suicide

Men who own handguns are eight times more likely to die of suicide by handgun than men who don’t have one — and women who own handguns are 35 times more likely than women who don’t, according to startling new research led by SHP's David Studdert.
Owning Handgun Associated With Dramatically Higher Risk of Suicide
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Stanford Works With California Prisons to Test and Prevent COVID-19

A $1 million gift from the Horowitz Family Foundation allows Stanford researchers to work on reducing the spread of COVID-19 among the incarcerated and inform mitigation strategies in other high-density living situations.
Stanford Works With California Prisons to Test and Prevent COVID-19
A map of the United States.
Commentary

Partitioning the Curve — Interstate Travel Restrictions During the Covid-19 Pandemic

Many jurisdictions have responded to the unevenness of the COVID-19 pandemic by battening down their borders. SHP's David Studdert and Michelle Mello take a deep dive into the legalities of attempting to prevent people from crossing state lines in this New England Journal of Medicine perspective.
Partitioning the Curve — Interstate Travel Restrictions During the Covid-19 Pandemic
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The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the 8th Amendment of the Constitution, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, to guarantee prisoners a minimum basic level of health care. Yet even though prisons are the epicenter of the hepatitis C epidemic, only a small minority of prisoners have gained access to new "miracle" drugs to treat HCV.

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We provide an equilibrium analysis of the efficiency properties of simultaneous bilateral tariff negotiations in a three-country model of international trade. We consider the setting in which discriminatory tariffs are allowed, and we utilize the “Nash-in-Nash” solution concept of Horn and Wolinsky (1988). We allow for a general family of political-economic country welfare functions and assess efficiency relative to these welfare functions. We establish a sense in which the resulting tariffs are inefficient and too low, so that excessive liberalization occurs from the perspective of the three countries.

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Kyle Bagwell
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This chapter examines the World Trade Organization (WTO), its history and its relevancy today to our understanding of trade agreements. It examines the central norms of the system and compares trade liberalisation under the multilateral WTO with the more exclusive regional and/or preferential trade agreements. The chapter first addresses the political consequences of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/WTO membership, focusing both on the rules and norms of the regime and on the explanation for why they have become less functional over time. It then looks at its legislative success and compares that with agreements that have existed simultaneously, but have limited membership. The chapter also looks at the effectiveness of the WTO as a forum for dispute settlement. It further presents some general thoughts on the impact of a rise in populism and other stumbling blocks the WTO faces.

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Judy Goldstein
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This paper empirically examines recently declassified tariff bargaining data from the GATT/WTO. Focusing on the Torquay Round (1950–1951), we document stylized facts about these interconnected high-stakes international negotiations that suggest a lack of strategic behavior among the participating governments and an important multilateral element to the bilateral bargains. We suggest that these features can be understood as emerging from a tariff bargaining forum that emphasizes the GATT pillars of MFN and multilateral reciprocity, and we offer evidence that the relaxation of strict bilateral reciprocity facilitated by the GATT multilateral bargaining forum was important to the success of the GATT approach.

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American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
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Kyle Bagwell
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Callista Wells
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To celebrate its May Release, the Stanford China Program hosted a virtual book launch event for Fateful Decisions: Choices That Will Shape China’s Future (Stanford University Press) on June 2nd. Joining co-authors Thomas Fingar (Shorenstein APARC Fellow, Stanford University) and Jean C. Oi (Director, Stanford China Program; William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics, Stanford University) were contributors Karen Eggleston (Senior Fellow at FSI; Director of the Asia Health Policy Program, Shorenstein APARC, Stanford University), Barry Naughton (Sokwanlok Chair of Chinese International Affairs, School of Global Policy and Strategy, UC San Diego), and Andrew Walder (Senior Fellow at FSI; Denise O'Leary and Kent Thiry Professor, Stanford University). As Fingar and Oi point out in their volume, despite China’s extraordinary growth over the past 40 years, the country’s future is uncertain. China has enjoyed optimal conditions for development since the 1980s, but new hurdles including an aging populace, the loss of comparative economic advantage, a politically entrenched elite, and a population with rising expectations will test the country’s leaders. With each focusing on a different facet of China’s challenges, the panelists gathered to share their expertise and provide the audience with a glimpse into what the future might hold for this important country.

Following an introduction from Professor Jean Oi, the program kicked off with Professor Barry Naughton of University of California, San Diego, who discussed his chapter entitled “Grand Steerage.” Professor Naughton argued that, as it plans for the future, China’s policymaking is becoming increasingly technology-focused, particularly in the realm of economic policy. Naughton further notes that China’s economy is becoming simultaneously more state-guided and more centered around technology. This decision is a gamble, though: China is investing heavily in high-tech industries, advancing massive, centrally steered projects like the Greater Bay Area initiative and the Xiong’an New District. If they are successful, says Naughton, this will indeed be an incredible success. But, if they are not, China’s losses will be major: “There’s not really a middle ground.”

After Professor Naughton was Professor Karen Eggleston, an expert on health policy in Asia. Professor Eggleston’s chapter, “Demographic and Healthcare Challenges,” deals with emerging obstacles for China’s healthcare system, including population aging and the problems that come with it, like chronic diseases and elder care. Although China’s healthcare system has improved dramatically in recent decades, it has done so unevenly, notes Eggleston: life expectancy has greatly increased, but with disparities according to income, region, and urban vs. rural status; universal healthcare is available, but the benefit level is low, effectively limiting the standard of care many can receive. The ratio of health spending to GDP is also increasing, yet it is still modest compared to high-income countries. The COVID-19 crisis has, of course, introduced even more challenges: Will China be able to distribute future vaccines equitably? Will this crisis negatively affect young people’s decisions to choose healthcare as a career? Will telemedicine, which has seen a surge under the pandemic, improve or exacerbate existing disparities? China faces a multitude of constraints and choices going forward if it hopes to meet its population’s healthcare needs.

The audience then had a chance to hear from co-editor Thomas Fingar, speaking on his chapter, “Sources and Shapers of China’s Foreign Policy.” Fingar noted three key takeaways from both his chapter and his talk: Firstly, China’s foreign policy is a fundamental part of its national policy. Secondly, the global political environment plays an important role in shaping both foreign and domestic policy which, thirdly, plays an important role in shaping foreign policy. The conditions that allowed China to flourish over the past 40 years, emphasized Fingar, are very different from those of the present. In the 1970s and 80s, China was able to take advantage of Cold War bipolarity, globalization was in its infancy, and “China was the only significant developing country willing to embark, at that time, on the export-led path of development.” In recent years, though, China’s behavior internationally has alienated other countries; there are many competitors pursuing its style of development; and its needs and aspirations have changed, requiring more raw materials and depending upon multi-national economic agreements. Fingar suggests two potential foreign policy options: China could continue with its wolf warrior diplomacy, which has “alienated essentially all China’s neighbors to some degree,” or it could return to a style more similar to that of the 1980s and 90s Reform and Opening era. It remains to be seen which style will win out.

Finally, Professor Andrew Walder concluded the program with his discussion of China’s political future at large. His chapter, “China’s National Trajectory,” follows China’s remarkable advancement in recent years and “tr[ies] to divine what a lower growth era will mean for China’s political future.” The last 40 years of rapid growth have generated support for China’s political system, more patriotism, the near eradication of democracy movements, and an elite unity not seen in the 1970s and 80s. However, low growth rates could mean a reversal for many of these trends, says Walder. While the aforementioned support for and stability of the Chinese government was maintained by ever-improving living standards and upward mobility, a low growth period (coupled with an aging population) means the government will no longer be able to rely on these trends for popular support. Rather, it will need to improve its provision of public services to address present-day challenges. Regardless, argues Walder, the low growth era will undoubtedly lead to “dynamic changes underneath the façade of stability of Chinese politics….”

For more insights on the modern obstacles China faces and what they mean for the country’s future, check out Fateful Decisions: Choices That Will Shape China's Future, available for purchase now.

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Elderly Chinese citizens sit together on a park bench.
Q&As

Karen Eggleston Examines China’s Looming Demographic Crisis, in Fateful Decisions

Karen Eggleston Examines China’s Looming Demographic Crisis, in Fateful Decisions
Quote from Thomas Fingar and Jean Oi from, "China's Challeges: Now It Gets Much Harder"
Commentary

Now It Gets Much Harder: Thomas Fingar and Jean Oi Discuss China’s Challenges in The Washington Quarterly

Now It Gets Much Harder: Thomas Fingar and Jean Oi Discuss China’s Challenges in The Washington Quarterly
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Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow
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Scot Marciel was the Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, affiliated with the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center from 2022-2024. Previously, he was a 2020-22 Visiting Scholar and Visiting Practitioner Fellow on Southeast Asia at APARC.  A retired diplomat, Mr. Marciel served as U.S. Ambassador to Myanmar from March 2016 through May 2020, leading a mission of 500 employees during the difficult Rohingya crisis and a challenging time for both Myanmar’s democratic transition and the United States-Myanmar relationship.  Prior to serving in Myanmar, Ambassador Marciel served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific at the State Department, where he oversaw U.S. relations with Southeast Asia.

From 2010 to 2013, Scot Marciel served as U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, the world’s fourth most populous country.  He led a mission of some 1000 employees, expanding business ties, launching a new U.S.-Indonesia partnership, and rebuilding U.S.-Indonesian military-military relations.  Prior to that, he served concurrently as the first U.S. Ambassador for ASEAN Affairs and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Southeast Asia from 2007 to 2010.

Mr. Marciel is a career diplomat with 35 years of experience in Asia and around the world.  In addition to the assignments noted above, he has served at U.S. missions in Turkey, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Brazil and the Philippines.  At the State Department in Washington, he served as Director of the Office of Maritime Southeast Asia, Director of the Office of Mainland Southeast Asia, and Director of the Office of Southern European Affairs.  He also was Deputy Director of the Office of Monetary Affairs in the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs.

Mr. Marciel earned an MA from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and a BA in International Relations from the University of California at Davis.  He was born and raised in Fremont, California, and is married with two children.

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