U.S.-China relations have deteriorated to a level unforeseen since the early 1960s. China’s rapid military modernization, maritime posturing, and diplomatic withdrawals signal a persistent security-focused approach from Beijing. What is to be done in an era of great power competition, where policies promoting careful coexistence and reduction of tensions are deprioritized?

In a new article for The Washington Quarterly titled “China’s America Policy: Back to the Future,” co-authors Thomas Fingar, Shorenstein APARC fellow, and David M. Lampton, a senior research fellow at the Johns Hopkins—SAIS Foreign Policy Institute and a former Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at FSI, explain the current tensions through a comprehensive analysis of the historical drivers of Chinese policy. The article enhances the understanding of Chinese grand strategy and proposes a series of policy prescriptions to help reduce the dangerous externalities of the diplomatic feud between Beijing and Washington.

March 2024 update: Thomas Fingar and David M. Lampton joined Kaiser Kuo, host of the Sinica Podcast, to discuss their Washington Quarterly article. Listen:

The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) sponsored the talk entitled "China's America Policy: Origins and Implications" by Dr. Tom Fingar on February 15, 2024. Watch:

Unhelpful Caricatures of China

Fingar and Lampton begin the article by acknowledging that U.S. policy is an important driver of Chinese behavior. They argue that U.S. policy has often been based on inaccurate and oft-counterproductive characterizations of China.

The authors challenge reductivist portrayals of Chinese strategy as purely ideological are misleading, asserting that “describing the PRC as an autocracy means interpreting its behavior as part of an ideological crusade to preserve the regime and thwart U.S. ambitions” and that  “Beijing’s Communist Party leaders, like leaders in all countries, seek to preserve their political system, but that is not their only objective.”

Fingar and Lampton also dispute the prevailing view in Washington of China as an “unstoppable juggernaut determined — and/or destined — to displace the United States and remake the international system,” emphasizing instead that current PRC behavior is better understood as the product of perceived weakness and fragility.

To manage the current impasse, the authors suggest that Washington must avoid exacerbating the situation and must shape Chinese perceptions in a way that might facilitate a transition to a more cooperative coexistence.

The True Drivers of China’s Strategy

The authors purport that, over the centuries, China’s policy options have coalesced into one of two comprehensive approaches: one that prioritizes national and regime security, and another prioritizing economic and social development.

The first approach assumes a hostile international environment and promotes “economic autarky, tighter domestic social control, ideological conformity, a leader-in-charge approach to governance, and deep suspicion of foreigners.” The second “emphasizes the gains to be made through interdependence and openness, places less emphasis on ideology, and instead underscores the importance of experts, pragmatism, initiative and innovation.”

These two drivers, in the authors’ view, neatly explain the last century of Chinese grand strategy and frame the current administration’s emphasis on security and coercive Wolf Warrior Diplomacy.

Theories of Encirclement

The authors add that, both historically and currently, an important category of factors shaping Chinese policy is assumed subversion, that is, “persistent attitudes […] centered on suspicion and fear of outsiders (foreign countries and groups) and social forces swirling in China itself [...] Almost any action that could be negative for China is perceived as taken to weaken the regime.”

Chinese commentators often cite U.S. foreign policy activities — including Secretary of State Clinton’s statements about maritime claims at the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum, the Obama Administration’s 2011 “Pivot to Asia,” NATO’s and other security groupings’ involvement in Asia, and alleged U.S. efforts to foment regime change through “peaceful evolution” — as a rationale for Beijing’s increased assertiveness.

However, Fingar and Lampton see these as excuses and contributing factors to decisions primarily motivated by concerns about a perceived growing danger of domestic instability that would impede economic growth and erode regime legitimacy.

What can be done?

In the final section of the article, the authors reflect on the poor state of U.S.-China ties, arguing that “relations will spiral unless domestic factors persuade Beijing to reprioritize growth and development.” Indeed, Xi Jinping’s return to the security-minded policy package signifies a departure from the cooperative approach prevalent in the latter half of the 20th century. The authors emphasize that an escape from the current downward trajectory in U.S.-China bilateral relations “will not occur without joint efforts and a change in the domestic politics of both societies.”

For this to happen, Beijing must first perceive less hostile intent from Washington. According to the authors, this will be no easy feat. Despite common expressions of intent to improve relations and to put a “floor” under the relationship voiced at ministerial-level meetings and recent meetings between Biden and Xi, little has improved in real terms. “Even limited and tangible efforts to pick low-hanging fruit such as mutual reduction of tariffs, restoration of academic exchanges, and reopening closed consulates remain dormant or ineffective.”

For Fingar and Lampton, Washington needs an approach that does not depend on prior or simultaneous moves by Beijing. The authors provide three concrete areas that may help bolster U.S.-China ties. The first is to avoid behaviors that push “PRC hot buttons” and trigger predictable reactions that stymie meaningful dialogue. The U.S. must continue to conduct necessary and appropriate military exercises in international waters and airspace and should call out dangerous or unprofessional actions by the PLA Navy or Air Force.

To this end, the U.S. should also avoid making statements and take actions that make it difficult for Beijing to respond positively, as “many third country observers are spring-loaded to criticize US inaction to reduce tensions [...] Conversely, PRC initiatives should be treated seriously, examined carefully, and addressed appropriately.”

The second area of improvement is to avoid declaring preconditions for discussions or taking actions that may not be in U.S. interests. Such preconditions rarely, if ever, have eased or accelerated desirable outcomes, and imposing conditions further complicates the resolution of issues and indicates to third countries that the United States is solely responsible for tensions.

To start the process, the authors suggest that “both sides ought to pick some low-hanging policy fruit like reopening consulates in Houston and Chengdu and increasing mutual media access [...] Both sides should see the benefit of having more than 350 American students studying in China.”

The third and most complicated issue is Taiwan. “Taiwan-related issues are the elephant in the room that cannot be ignored, but there is nothing to be gained by abandoning the policy of strategic ambiguity or further muddying the US position,” write Fingar and Lampton.

The authors suggest that the correct response to speculation on this issue should be “restatement of the USG position that the use of force in the Taiwan Strait is unacceptable, that there will be absolutely no support for Taiwan independence unless Taipei and Beijing peacefully reach agreement, and that relations between the people of Taiwan and the United States will remain unofficial [...] Washington needs to stop nibbling around the edges of the One China Policy.”

Only when progress is made on these three areas will perceived threats to Beijing begin to diminish. In the meantime, the current U.S. and Chinese framework of great power competition that “justifies efforts to hobble the other, is harmful to both countries and impedes international efforts to address global challenges.”

The authors deploy the “first law of holes” as a good place to start: “When you are in a hole as we are now in the relationship with China, stop digging. Making things worse is a poor way to seek improvement.” A reduction in tensions will not be easy, but tangible and modest measures to avoid hostility and work toward bounded competition and even cooperation on transnational challenge areas like pandemic disease and climate change mitigation should remain a possibility. 

This article originally appeared in the Stanford Report.

The future of clean energy, quantum technology, and innovation were among the topics of discussion between Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol at an event held at Stanford University.

The historic meeting, which took place on Nov. 17 during the last day of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, was hosted by the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and the Hoover Institution. It was one of seven convenings between the two leaders this year to strengthen bilateral relations between their countries. Such a meeting would have been unthinkable just over a year ago because of decades of tense relations. Since Yoon and Kishida took office, they have taken steps towards rapprochement and building trust that their predecessors could not achieve.

“We at Stanford are deeply honored to be hosting these two leaders on the same stage for another historic chapter in relations between their two countries,” said Michael McFaul, the director of FSI, in his opening remarks.

Condoleezza Rice, the Tad and Dianne Taube Director of the Hoover Institution, moderated the discussion, which centered around innovation and the future of science and technology.

“Democratic allies need very much to discuss both the challenges and the opportunities that technologies bring,” said Rice, who served as the 66th secretary of state of the United States.

The event was one of several visits that saw dignitaries from Asia visiting the Stanford campus while they were in the Bay Area for the APEC summit in San Francisco.

Calls for collaboration

Balancing the risks and opportunities of technology was a recurring theme during the discussion between the leaders of Japan and South Korea, with each of them calling for increased collaboration and cooperation among countries with shared values.

“In the field of science and technology, no one country alone can drive innovation that will change the world,” said Kishida in his opening remarks.

For example, Kishida said, various countries now contribute key elements to innovations such as semiconductors, quantum computing, and generative AI.

“If there is one element missing, there will be no innovation,” Kishida said. “New ideas emerge through a multi-layered exchange between diverse people.”

Convening at Stanford

In Yoon’s opening remarks, he reflected on how Stanford is entwined with Korea’s own efforts to expand educational opportunities in the field of science and technology.

Yoon shared how in the 1960s, then-President Park Chung Hee reached out to the U.S. for help in cultivating South Korea’s engineering talent.

Frederick Terman – who served as dean of the School of Engineering from 1944 to 1958 and provost from 1955 to 1965 and is known as “the father of Silicon Valley” – visited Korea and compiled his observations in The Terman Report. This report, which included contributions from four other experts, led to the creation of the Korea Advanced Institute of Science in 1971, which later was renamed Korea Institute of Science and Technology, or “KIST.”

“At that time, Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world, but policies for establishing a scientific and technological state with KIST at the core has resulted in Korea achieving the current status of freedom and prosperity,” Yoon said. “Just like the motto of Stanford, the winds of freedom blew all the way across to Korea.”

Now, Yoon said he and Kishida are expanding the scope of Korea-Japan relations to include cultivating collaboration in science and technology in their diplomacy.

Technology can propel economic growth, creating new jobs and opportunities, Yoon said. But he also warned that technology can leave some people behind.

Yoon emphasized that the three countries must work together to reduce the digital divide and ensure that the world has fair access to new technologies – “and thereby contribute to the sustainable peace and prosperity of the international community through such trilateral cooperation,” he said.

Yoon also urged for trilateral cooperation in accelerating the pace of advancement towards carbon neutrality goals with carbon-free energy technologies such as nuclear power and hydrogen. Yoon also said he “is looking forward to proposing the establishment of a hydrogen ammonia global value chain in which Japan and Korea will be the main participants.”

Addressing the climate challenge

The leaders referenced equity, carbon neutrality, and clean energy again when Rice asked them about their plan to address the current climate challenge.

Yoon shared his concerns about the uneven effects of carbon emissions, pointing out how advanced economies have emitted more carbon dioxide compared to developing or low-developed countries, yet it has been the developing nations that are most negatively impacted.

“We have to cooperate internationally to help bridge the climate divide,” Yoon said.

Kishida cited the Doerr School of Sustainability – which was made possible through a generous gift by the engineer and venture capitalist John Doerr – as an example of entrepreneurs making investments in innovative, sustainable solutions to the climate crisis.

The potential in quantum technology

Rice also asked the leaders about quantum technology, which the Biden administration has invested over $1 trillion in advancing.

Kishida said how the full transformation of quantum technology has yet to be imagined – “quantum technology is a complete game changer,” he said.

For example, Yoon said, quantum technology has the potential to disable encryption systems or wiretapping. He also pointed out how it can also lead to improvements in the detection of submarines – prompting new implications for national security.

Yoon and Kishida both saw opportunities for Japan, Korea, and the U.S. to work together, emphasizing how each country has strengths and weaknesses that can complement one another.

“Quantum technology, I believe, is the area where global cooperation is the most crucial because there is no one country in the world that has a complete understanding of it,” Yoon said.

New mindset to advancing carbon neutrality

During the Q&A portion of the event, the leaders were asked how their countries are ensuring the world is united in solving the global climate crisis.

“Climate change is the biggest global challenge we face today and I think all countries share a common sense of crisis,” Kishida responded. Kishida emphasized Yoon’s earlier point about how each country experiences climate change differently – therefore, there must be “diverse pathways” to innovation that “transcend national borders.”

Yoon said that transitioning to carbon-free energy should not be viewed as a cost but rather as an investment in a new market and industry.

“It should be understood as an asset or an industry that would translate into this becoming a market,” said Yoon, who reiterated the need for cooperation to be fair and just. “We need to change our mindset.”

The event closed with remarks from Gi-Wook Shin, the director of APARC and a professor of sociology in the School of Humanities and Sciences.

“This momentous occasion has built on deepening ties between Japan and the Republic of Korea,” said Shin. “We are so honored to be part of this journey.”

In the Media

The historic meeting of the Japanese and South Korean leaders on the Stanford campus received wide coverage in the media. Selected coverage includes:

• KTVU
• ABC News
• Bloomberg News
• Reuters
• Nikkei Asia
• Mainichi Shimbun
• Japan Times
• Dong-a Ilbo
• Korea Herald
• Korea Times
• Korea JoongAng Daily
• Yonhap

See also the report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

This essay originally appeared in The Diplomat.

With major crises in Gaza and Ukraine, the Biden administration might be tempted to overlook the importance of Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s mid-November visit to Washington. That would be a mistake. Indonesia is an important country that is heading into crucial presidential elections in early 2024, and the results of Jokowi’s visit could go a long way to shaping the next Indonesian government’s attitudes toward its relations with the United States.

Although U.S.-Indonesian security cooperation is good and trade has grown, by all accounts Jokowi and his team are heading to Washington feeling less than satisfied on several fronts. First, Indonesians remain upset by President Joe Biden’s decision to skip the recent Indonesia-hosted East Asia Summit, which they took as a serious snub. Biden invited Jokowi in part to make up for that absence, but the White House might have underestimated the extent to which Indonesians remain upset over the initial affront. The protocol-conscious government no doubt will also contrast their modest White House schedule with the lavish welcome recently received by Australian Prime Minster Anthony Albanese.

Indonesian authorities also remain unhappy with what they see as Washington’s failure to deliver on the high-profile Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP), under which the U.S. committed to lead G-7-plus efforts to mobilize $20 billion to support Indonesia’s accelerated transition from coal to cleaner energy. Indonesian officials have complained publicly for months that the U.S. has pressed them to take difficult steps while offering little in the way of concessional financing to pay for it. The reality is more complicated, but the perception in Jakarta that Washington “sold them a bill of goods” is real. Some Indonesian officials have contrasted that with substantial Chinese funding on priority infrastructure initiatives, highlighting the regional perception of U.S. weakness vis-à-vis China as a reliable economic partner. (The Indonesians have largely ignored the fact that the U.S. is their second-largest export market and has risen rapidly to be their fourth-largest source of foreign direct investment.)

Jokowi also is looking for Biden to move forward on a proposed limited free trade agreement under which Indonesian critical minerals (namely nickel and processed nickel) would meet the criteria for inclusion in the electric vehicle tax credits provided for in the Inflation Reduction Act. The Biden administration reportedly is interested in such a deal, which by promoting diversification of both suppliers for the U.S. and markets for Indonesia would be in the U.S. national interest. It has, however, hesitated to proceed due to concerns about the congressional reaction, environmental and labor issues, and heavy Chinese investment in Indonesian nickel mining.

Finally, one has to assume that the Gaza crisis will be at the top of Jokowi’s agenda (if not Biden’s) when the two presidents meet. Indonesia, home to the world’s largest Muslim population, has long supported the Palestinian cause and has vigorously pursued diplomatic efforts to achieve an immediate ceasefire. While working hard to keep the issue from blowing up domestically, there is no question but that Indonesian public opinion (and genuinely held beliefs among top officials) has put the two governments at odds over the crisis.

At this late date, there is little prospect of major initiatives coming out of the Biden-Jokowi meeting that would ease Indonesian concerns or generate significant positive momentum. There is, however, still time to make some small investments that could result in Jokowi and his team leaving Washington feeling more positive about the relationship.

First, on Gaza, the meeting will not resolve the two countries’ differences, but it is important that Biden listen to and engage with Jokowi seriously on the issue and that he highlights his efforts to encourage Israel to show restraint and to promote a humanitarian pause. Jokowi’s post-meeting public comments about this discussion likely will have a significant influence on the Indonesian public and media perceptions of the U.S. role, so it is critical that Biden do all he can to ensure those comments are positive.

Second, it is important that Biden understand that Jokowi and many Indonesians are still upset over the president’s decision to skip the recent Jakarta summit. Biden cannot undo that, but he can and should acknowledge it in his discussion with Jokowi and emphasize that he appreciates how important Indonesia is.

Even such moves will only go so far without some movement on JETP and the critical minerals trade question. On the former, there isn’t time to achieve major progress before the meeting, but President Biden should instruct his team to redouble their efforts to mobilize funding and get the initiative moving. This goes beyond Indonesian concerns and gets to the heart of regional wariness about Washington being able to put meat on the bones of its various economic initiatives.

On critical minerals, Biden should agree to send trade officials to Jakarta to discuss the outlines of a possible agreement, though he will have to be careful not to overcommit absent confidence he will be able to deliver. Indonesia, for its part, needs to stop rotating ambassadors through Washington so quickly and install an envoy who can effectively make the case for a limited trade deal to Congress and others.

Some serious, last-minute work needs to be done to ensure that next week’s meeting between the leaders of the world’s second and third-largest democracies does more than highlight the differences and problems in the relationship.

In 2018, the South Korean Supreme Court passed a series of rulings requiring Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Nippon Steel of Japan to compensate 14 Korean citizens for their unpaid labor. As of yet, neither company has agreed to comply with the ruling. The South Korean government has since announced plans to compensate survivors who were forced to work in Japanese mines and factories during the wartime period, but this remains a unilateral decision on the part of the Yoon administration, not a bilateral position between South Korea and Japan.

These tensions have ripple effects far outside of East Asia. Writing for Toyo Keizai, Daniel Sneider, an FSI Lecturer in International Policy with a focus on Asia, explains the broader geopolitical implications of these issues:

“The Americans have been urging the two countries to settle these problems in order to ease the way to the kind of security cooperation that has become visible in recent months. Joint military exercises for missile defense and other small steps to intensify trilateral coordination are taking place and a resolution of the history of problems may be key to moving ahead.”

Steps Forward

The last year has seen increased efforts to restore more functionality to the South Korea-Japan relationship. President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida met briefly on the sidelines of the September 2022 UN General Assembly meeting in New York, which was followed by respective visits of Yoon to Tokyo in March 2023 and Kishida to Seoul two months later in May, the first such visits in over 11 years.

The Camp David summit, which brought the U.S., South Korea, and Japan together as strategic partners, is the latest step on the hoped-for road to institutionalized security cooperation between the three nations.

Speaking to NBC, Shorenstein Fellow Thomas Fingar explained the significance of the weekend.

“The importance of this [summit] is that it was a genuine trilateral meeting, which means the Japanese and the Koreans are talking to one another as opposed to the U.S. dealing separately with each of them.”

In contrast to the idyllic Camp David setting, the three leaders are faced with a weighty set of issues, noted Sneider, including the crisis triggered by the Ukraine war, North Korea’s aggressive posture, as well as growing concerns about China.

Oriana Skylar Mastro, an FSI Center Fellow and an expert on security, conflict resolution, and the Chinese military elaborated further on the mutual pressures South Korea, Japan, and the United States face:

“Since President Biden came into office, he’s really stressed strengthening alliances and partnerships as a way of protecting U.S. interests abroad. I'm sure there has been much work behind the scenes to try to get these two countries to come together. In terms of the timing [of this summit], it's of course partially because of the accumulation of these concerns over China. I think also the war in Ukraine has done a lot to really open up leaders' eyes to the dangers of having neighbors with territorial hopes and claims that also have strong militaries that could potentially be undeterred from using force. I think it's fair to say that this has also pushed these two countries to rethink their own strategies for security.”

An Uncertain Future

The official summit documents outline both a vision of partnership and offer a variety of practical agreements on everything from annual leadership summits to meetings on economic and cyber security, and a proposal for how to move forward with joint military exercises. Notably, the two-paragraph ‘commitment to consult’ on responses to ‘regional challenges, provocations, and threats affecting our collective interests and security’ — while not a fully embodied collective security agreement — is nonetheless a “stunning achievement,” says Daniel Sneider.

Despite agreeing on a hefty laundry list of shared concerns and security goals, the way forward for additional trilateralization between the United States, Japan, and South Korea is not necessarily clear. Oriana Mastro explained: 

“Even though they might have shared threat perceptions, there is still a lot of trust that has to happen between nations for them to take coordinated military approaches. If two countries, for example, exercise together — and that's one of the things that the Biden administration is hoping to get out of this summit: more routine trilateral exercises — you get to learn a lot about another country's military, and that only really happens between friends. That’s also true of intel sharing. When you share intelligence, you’re not only sharing information, you're sharing how you get intelligence, which can also be sensitive. So while they've shared these threats for a while, it hasn't really gotten to the level in which they were willing to take risks in terms of the relationship between South Korea and Japan to become closer in the security space in a way that would help them combat these issues together.”

Besides the challenges of international diplomacy, Yoon, Kishida, and Biden also face domestic hurdles that could hinder further cooperation.

In a comment to the Wall Street Journal, Gi-Wook Shin noted that, “Yoon only entered politics a few years ago. If his party loses the election, I don’t know who will stay with him.” Improving South Korea-Japan relations was a major platform of the Yoon campaign, and backlash against his administration could yield disinterest or even renewed hostility toward continuing his efforts. 

Daniel Sneider sees similar challenges for Biden and Kishida. Writing in East Asia Forum, he cautioned:

“President Joe Biden is already embroiled in an election campaign that threatens to bring Donald Trump and his isolationist views back to power. The Camp David summit was barely noticed amid the constant flow of domestic political news, though it mostly received welcome praise in the media. . . Imprisoned by domestic politics, the White House will likely be unable to give substance to this emergent partnership.”

In the case of Kishida, the decision to release wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear site, which came just days after the conclusion of the summit, has been particularly counterproductive. Sneider continued:

“Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has been waiting for a bump from the Camp David summit. But he is experiencing a deepening slide in opinion polls. The Fukushima release faces opposition within Japan, including from fishermen and others worried about boycotts of Japanese products in China and South Korea. Talk of an early parliamentary election in Japan, intended to consolidate Kishida’s claim to long-term leadership, is now on hold.”

Where is the trilateral U.S.-Japan-South Korea relationship headed next? Follow FSI scholars to stay informed about the latest developments. Register to receive alerts to your inbox either weekly or monthly.   

In July 2023, Professor Rozelle joined a group of ten academics from the US, including both professors and think tank professionals, and traveled to China where they met with 12 scholars from China. The group spent three days at Peking University in discussion and went on several site visits around Beijing (to the Foreign Ministry; Xinhua New Agency; American Chamber of Commerce in Beijing; the US Embassy) where they furthered dialogue on the current state of scholarly exchange and how to improve it.

There were several key takeaways from the meetings:

Scholarly exchange is still occurring but at a much lower level compared with 5 to 10 years ago. 
Scholarly exchange is suffering collateral damage from the deteriorating US-China relations.

Challenges to scholarly exchange exist within both countries.
Rozelle remarked, “when we [the 10 academics from the US] got together with our academic colleagues from China, we immediately bonded and opened up with a sense of camaraderie, we almost immediately knew we were facing the same challenges on both sides of the Pacific.”

Through discussion, Rozelle documented 15 different issues that are inhibiting research efforts within China, (such as increased privacy laws, shutting off access to public databases, putting strict limits on access to archives, and more,) and 10 things in the US hindering research (such as, not issuing visas to engineering/biomedicine/science Ph.D students and post-docs from China). 

The biggest issue both sides face is the perception that scholarly exchange may compromise national security.
A small fraction of scholarly exchange is related to national security issues, the other share of scholarly exchange is much more related to positive outcomes in research, technology, and national growth. A secular decline of scholarly exchange is going to have large negative impacts on growth, equity and happiness in both countries as well as around the world.

Leaders in both countries need to define what types of scholarly exchange concern national security.
What can be done to improve scholarly exchange? Both countries have stated that scholarly exchange is related to national security, which is what has led to the decline (and prohibition, in some cases,) of scholarly exchange.

The challenge is that there has been no definition or clarification given of what types of scholarly exchange are sensitive to this matter. As a result, lower-level bureaucrats both in the United States and in China have taken risk-averse approaches in implementing these efforts by making it difficult to do almost all research. The two groups of scholars almost unanimously agreed that what is urgently needed is for upper-level leaders in the two countries to officially define what specific topic areas are national security concerns, and which are not.

In early October 2023 the delegation from China will join the US delegation in Washington DC to continue the conversation and strategize on how to foster more scholarly exchange between the two nations.

Rozelle is currently working on producing a brief that will seek to demonstrate both the benefits of US-China scholarly exchange as well as the cost of the disruption. Once published, the brief will be part of the overall effort as well as being linked here.
 

An economist by training, Khanna advocates for new trade policies and strategic business partnerships to be front and center in U.S. diplomacy with China. This “rebalancing,” as Khanna termed it, is a call for both countries to pursue a fuller, more robust economic development strategy while continuing to engage with each other.

Drawing inspiration from President John F. Kennedy’s commencement address at American University in 1963, Khanna urged listeners not to view “conflict as inevitable, accommodation as impossible, and communication as nothing more than an exchange of threats,” when it comes to managing the U.S.-China relationship.

Instead, Khanna outlined four key principles he believes will be crucial to navigating the tense years ahead. These include:

1. An economic reset to reduce trade deficits and tensions
2. Open lines of communication
3. Effective military deterrence
4. Respect for Asian partners and robust economic engagement with the world

Khanna is clear-eyed that these goals will take time to realize. Bringing jobs back to the United States will require large investments in domestic infrastructure. Leaders in Washington will need patience, persistence, and help from partners outside of politics to bridge communication gaps and ensure Beijing picks up its phones in moments of tension. Reallocating defense spending in a way that is fair both to American taxpayers and partners like Taiwan will need cooperation from lawmakers on both sides of the aisle.

But Khanna is confident that these barriers can be overcome. 

“I believe a constructive rebalancing with China can maintain the peace,” he told the audience. “It will not happen overnight. It will not happen with one president or one congressman. But it will happen if all of us - military and business leaders, educators, unions, activists, foreign policy experts and students work toward this goal. [We will win by] helping our own nation flourish and by putting our system and our promise of freedom on display for the world to see.”

Click the link to read Congressman Khanna's full remarks on
"Constructive Rebalancing with China."