Russia has had a long history of opposing US missile defense activities. Most recently, Russian concern focused on the alleged capability of the "third site" to intercept Russian ICBMs. The "third site" was a plan to place 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland and a large X-band radar in the Czech Republic proposed by the Bush Administration prior to its cancellation in 2009 by the Obama Administration. Now this same Russian concern has arisen regarding phases III and IV of the Phased Adaptive Approach to European missile defense proposed by the Obama Administration. This talk will assess the extent to which Russian concerns are valid in military/technical terms.
Speaker Biography:
Dean Wilkening is a Senior Research Scientist at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. He holds a Ph.D. in physics from Harvard University and worked at the RAND Corporation prior to coming to Stanford. His major research interests include nuclear strategy and policy, arms control, the proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons, bioterrorism, ballistic missile defense, and energy and security. His most recent research focuses on the broad strategic and political implications of ballistic missile defense deployments in Northeast Asia, South Asia and Europe. Prior work focused on the technical feasibility of boost-phase ballistic missile defense interceptors. His recent work on bioterrorism focuses on understanding the scientific and technical uncertainties associated with predicting the outcome of hypothetical airborne biological attacks and the human effects of inhalation anthrax, with the aim of devising more effective civil defenses. He has participated in, and briefed, several US National Academy of Science committees on biological terrorism and consults for several US national laboratories and government agencies.
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
Dean Wilkening
Senior Research Scientist
Speaker
CISAC
Antibiotics have represented the primary line of defense for treating bacterial infections since 1935 when the first sulfur-containing compounds were introduced. Many antibiotic compounds are produced naturally by microorganisms while some more recently developed antibiotics are chemically designed based on a knowledge of susceptible biochemical pathways or physiological processes in pathogenic bacteria. Ciprofloxacin (“cipro”), a synthetic broad-spectrum antibiotic, functions by interfering with DNA replication.
Increased use and mis-use of antibiotics has led to increased numbers of pathogenic bacteria that are resistant to one or more antibiotics. Some resistant microbes possess mechanisms that allow continued growth in the presence of multiple antibiotics. These multiply drug-resistant pathogenic bacteria may also possess pathogenic properties that result in significantly more severe disease than their drug-sensitive cousins. Medical misuse of antibiotics – prescribing antibiotics for viral infections, failure of patients to complete treatment with the full regiment of antibiotics, or application of antibiotics based on inaccurate or incomplete tests can lead to selection of antibiotic resistant bacteria that can then cause infections that cannot be treated with the antibiotic(s) to which they are resistant. Multiple drug resistance can quickly reduce or eliminate all antibiotic-based treatment options. Infections caused by antibiotic resistant bacteria are very difficult to treat and can sometimes lead to death of the patient.
Antibiotic resistance can also result from selection based on exposure to antibiotics present in the environment. More than 70% of the antibiotics sold in the U.S. are used as supplements to animal feed. The intestinal bacteria in the animals provided with such feed often show resistance to the antibiotics in the feed and, in some documented cases, have transferred this resistance to pathogenic microbes with which they share the environment.
A brief of history of antibiotic use and the medical and public policy factors that are, in part, responsible for increased antibiotic resistance in pathogenic microbes and for a decrease in the development of new antibiotics will be presented. An introduction to new directions that are being taken to develop a next generation of antibiotic compounds will also be provided.
Speaker Biography:
Paul Jackson received his Bachelor's of Science degree from the University of Washington in Cellular Biology and his Ph.D. from the University of Utah in Molecular Biology. He became a CISAC Visiting Scholar in September 2011. He was previously a CISAC affiliate.
For the past 18 years he has been studying bacterial pathogens, first working to develop DNA-based methods of detecting these microbes and their remnants in environmental and laboratory samples, then developing methods to differentiate among different strains of the same pathogenic species. Research interests include the study of different methods of interrogating biological samples for detection and characterization of content, and development of bioforensic tools that provide detailed information about biothreat isolates including full interrogation of samples for strain content and other genetic traits.
Methods he developed have been applied to forensic analysis of samples and aid in identifying the source of disease outbreaks. He contributed to analysis of the Bacillus anthracis present in the 2001 Amerithrax letters and conducted detailed analyses of human tissue samples preserved from the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak, providing evidence that was inconsistent with Soviet government claims of a natural anthrax outbreak.
His current work continues to focus on development of assays that rapidly detect specific signatures including antibiotic resistance in threat agents and other pathogens. More recent activities include identification and characterization of new antimicrobial compounds that are based on the pathogens' own genes and the products they encode. These include development of such materials as therapeutic antimicrobials, their application to remediate high value contaminated sites and materials, and their use to destroy large cultures and preparations of different bacterial threat agents. Efforts to address issues of antibiotic resistance and treatment of resistant organisms have recently been expanded to look at non-threat agent pathogens that cause problematic nosocomial or community-acquired infections of particular interest to the military.
Paul spent 24 years as a Technical Staff Member at Los Alamos National Laboratory where he was heavily involved in development of the biological threat reduction efforts there. He was appointed a Laboratory Fellow at Los Alamos in recognition of his efforts. He moved to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in 2005 where he is presently Senior Scientist in the Global Security and Physical and Life Sciences Directorates. In addition to his work at the National Laboratories, he has served on the FBI's Scientific Working Group for Microbial Forensics, on NIH study sections and review panels, and continues to serve on steering and oversight committees for other federal agencies.
The production and distribution of counterfeit medications has become a significant global public health issue. Though not as rampant in the United States, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has seen a 10 fold increase in the number of cases investigated, particularly a rise in illegally imported and diverted medications entering our legitimate drug supply. In order to curb these illegal activities, California and the federal government have introduced various pieces of legislation to address this. In addition, international entities, State Boards of Pharmacy and the FDA have begun promoting utilization of radio frequency identification technology and other technology to effectively track the medication supply. In a recent California survey, pharmacists felt strongly that the presence of counterfeit medications poses a problem in their pharmacy practice, but they still face several challenges in identifying counterfeit medications, counseling their patients, and forging their role in implementing legislative requirements.
This presentation will aim to provide an introduction to the international and domestic counterfeit drugs situation, discuss possible factors facilitating patient exposure to counterfeit medications, examine potential sources for counterfeit medications in the United States, identifiy federal legislation issues, discuss various forms of technology being used to combat counterfeit medications, and recognize the role of pharmacists and the challenges they face in dealing with counterfeit medications.
Speaker Biography:
Dr. Elaine Law is currently a Clinical Pharmacist specializing in Adult General Surgery at UCSF Medical Center and an Assistant Clinical Professor in the UCSF School of Pharmacy. She received a B.S. in Molecular, Cell and Developmental Biology from UCLA, earned a Doctor in Pharmacy from UCSF School of Pharmacy and completed a General Practice Pharmacy Residency at UCSF Medical Center. She holds a Board Certification in Pharmacotherapy and her research interests include roles pharmacists can play in public health issues including counterfeit medications and pharmacist-based immunization programs. She is an advocate of patient care in underserved areas and reaches out regularly to the Tenderloin communities and elderly populations of San Francisco through pharmacy health outreach programs.
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
Elaine Law
Assistant Clinical Professor
Speaker
UCSF School of Pharmacy
Ten years after the terrorist attacks, five leading experts weigh in on the state of the jihadist movement, U.S. intelligence, and the cost of safety.
Martha Crenshaw It depends on what we mean by safer. If we're asking how likely it is that we'll experience an attack of the magnitude of 9/11, I don't that it's likely. Our awareness of the possibility is so much greater. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the attack, is in custody. Other major players are dead or under arrest. Osama Bin Laden is gone. The drone strikes in Pakistan have been very effective. However, we're not entirely safe from the threat of terrorism against U.S. interests and citizens abroad. We're still vulnerable in many ways. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula are still threats. They've inherited anti-Americanism from the original Al-Qaeda, and while Al-Qaeda central is weakened, these affiliated groups will likely become stronger because of the power vacuum that's left in the jihadist movement. These different factions could unite. Al Qaeda itself was a merger of different national movements. This could happen again -- they could reconstitute themselves into a very powerful organization.
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar We are safer -- up to a point. In 2003 I wrote that there was little reason to think we were safer than we were on Sept. 11, 2001, and that in order to improve our security we would need to invest in meaningful long-term changes rather than focusing on quick fixes. Much has changed today. American attacks have been devastating to al-Qaeda, showing how 9/11 was perhaps a tactical success for the group but almost certainly a strategic miscalculation. Americans have forged alliances with countries throughout the world, sharing financial intelligence and pooling efforts to disrupt terrorist mobility. Many communities have made important strides in safeguarding airports and chemical plants. Federal lawmakers enacted landmark, bipartisan food safety legislation to bolster the safety of the food supply, and doctors working with public health authorities have enhanced their capacity to respond to infections and biosecurity threats such as the H1N1 virus. Meanwhile, pressing issues like cyber-security and emergency preparedness are starting to receive much-needed attention.
But Americans continue to face profound challenges, too. We must work to enhance the infrastructure that protects our public health, cyber-security, and emergency response. The Sept. 11 attacks starkly show the need to reconcile security goals with laws and constitutional principles. Policy makers and the public must focus attention on strengthening the economic and social foundations supporting America’s long-term position in the world. At the same time, the nation must remain determined, creative, and vigilant in confronting the continuing threats posed by non-state actors and failed states.
Karl Eikenberry If we talk about the defense of the homeland, we are clearly safer against the international terrorist threat. Our level of awareness is much higher. We were asleep when we got hit. And the systems that we've established, I think have made us safer. Now, that's very specifically against the terrorist threat. Is the United States of America stronger on a relative basis than on 9/11/2001 -- are we a stronger nation? I think the answer is no. I think that our economic strength has declined. And I think there's been a degree of militarization of our foreign policy over the last decade that’s made us less attractive globally.
Thomas Fingar We are safer with respect to the danger of a major terrorist attack than we were 10 years ago but not with respect to other risks that endanger more of our citizens and are more likely to occur. We have spent billions of dollars to detect, prevent, and respond to terrorist threats from abroad and we have reduced the already low probability of death or injury from terrorist attacks to even lower levels. These gains have had a high opportunity cost because achieving them was at the expense of efforts to reduce other dangers. Far more Americans continue to die from inadequate hospital procedures, unsafe food, drunk drivers, and other well-known dangers than have died in terrorist attacks. We will not be much safer until we address these and similar problems, repair and replace our aging infrastructure, and do more to prepare for the more severe weather that will result from climate change.
Amy Zegart Osama bin Laden is dead. Yet 10 years after 9/11, it would be dangerous and wrong to think that the terrorist threat is behind us. Violent Islamist extremism comes from many places, not just the 50 to 100 core al Qaeda fighters holed up along the Af/Pak border. The years 2009 and 2010 have seen a spike in plots against the U.S. homeland. Nearly all of them have come from radicalized homegrown terrorists or “franchise” groups with loose and murky ties to the core al Qaeda organization.
In addition, WMD terrorism remains a haunting future possibility. And the FBI has not made the leap from crime fighting to intelligence. FBI analysts, whose work is vital to connect dots and protect lives, are still treated like second class citizens -- labeled “support staff” alongside janitors and secretaries, and relegated to middle and lower rungs of the bureaucracy. So long as FBI analysts are treated like second-class citizens, Americans will get second-class security. These three factors -- diversification of the terrorist threat, the potential to combine destructive motives with devastating weapons, and the FBI's continued weaknesses -- suggest that the future may not be any safer than the past.
Ten undergraduates recently received the 2011 Deans' Award for Academic Accomplishment, which honors extraordinary undergraduate students for "exceptional, tangible" intellectual achievements. Among them: CISAC honors student Anand Habib, a senior majoring in biology with honors in international security studies. He is completing an honors thesis focusing on health governance.
Habib sees his work as an intentional synthesis of scholarship and larger social commitments. He has lived this out in many ways at Stanford, including working on behalf of politically and medically disenfranchised people in India, Mexico and Guatemala. On campus, he has turned the Stanford tradition of the annual Dance Marathon into a vehicle dedicated to addressing the HIV/AIDS pandemic by engaging not only Stanford students but also local communities and corporations, raising more than $100,000. His exceptional work was recognized by his participation in the Clinton Global Initiative University Conference in April.
English Associate Professor Michele Elam described Habib as a "superb critical thinker" whose work is characterized by "creative genius" and "mature insights." She holds him up as a model for others, saying that "he exemplifies exactly the kind of deeply informed, pragmatic and caring leadership that the world needs and Stanford enables."
Thomas Fingar is a Shorenstein APARC Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He was the inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow from 2010 through 2015 and the Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford in 2009.
From 2005 through 2008, he served as the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and, concurrently, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Fingar served previously as assistant secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (2000-01 and 2004-05), principal deputy assistant secretary (2001-03), deputy assistant secretary for analysis (1994-2000), director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1989-94), and chief of the China Division (1986-89). Between 1975 and 1986 he held a number of positions at Stanford University, including senior research associate in the Center for International Security and Arms Control.
Fingar is a graduate of Cornell University (A.B. in Government and History, 1968), and Stanford University (M.A., 1969 and Ph.D., 1977 both in political science). His most recent books are From Mandate to Blueprint: Lessons from Intelligence Reform (Stanford University Press, 2021), Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security (Stanford University Press, 2011), The New Great Game: China and South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform, editor (Stanford University Press, 2016), Uneasy Partnerships: China and Japan, the Koreas, and Russia in the Era of Reform (Stanford, 2017), and Fateful Decisions: Choices that will Shape China’s Future, co-edited with Jean Oi (Stanford, 2020). His most recent article is, "The Role of Intelligence in Countering Illicit Nuclear-Related Procurement,” in Matthew Bunn, Martin B. Malin, William C. Potter, and Leonard S Spector, eds., Preventing Black Market Trade in Nuclear Technology (Cambridge, 2018)."
Background. The optimal community-level approach to control pandemic influenza is unknown. Methods. We estimated the health outcomes and costs of combinations of 4 social distancing strategies and 2 antiviral medication strategies to mitigate an influenza pandemic for a demographically typical US community. We used a social network, agent-based model to estimate strategy effectiveness and an economic model to estimate health resource use and costs. We used data from the literature to estimate clinical outcomes and health care utilization. Results. At 1% influenza mortality, moderate infectivity (R(o) of 2.1 or greater), and 60% population compliance, the preferred strategy is adult and child social distancing, school closure, and antiviral treatment and prophylaxis. This strategy reduces the prevalence of cases in the population from 35% to 10%, averts 2480 cases per 10,000 population, costs $2700 per case averted, and costs $31,300 per quality-adjusted life-year gained, compared with the same strategy without school closure. The addition of school closure to adult and child social distancing and antiviral treatment and prophylaxis, if available, is not cost-effective for viral strains with low infectivity (R(o) of 1.6 and below) and low case fatality rates (below 1%). High population compliance lowers costs to society substantially when the pandemic strain is severe (R(o) of 2.1 or greater). Conclusions. Multilayered mitigation strategies that include adult and child social distancing, use of antivirals, and school closure are cost-effective for a moderate to severe pandemic. Choice of strategy should be driven by the severity of the pandemic, as defined by the case fatality rate and infectivity.
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and former FSI Advisory Board member Susan Rice '86 urged Stanford's graduating class to fight global poverty, conflict, and repression, saying "These massive disparities erode our common security and corrode our common humanity." Conflict-ridden states not only cause suffering for their people, she noted. "Poor and fragile states can incubate threats that spread far beyond borders -- terrorism, pandemic disease, nuclear proliferation, criminal networks" and more. "In our interconnected world," she said, " a threat to development anywhere is a threat to security everywhere."
When Susan Rice graduated from Stanford in 1986, the Soviet Union was
a formidable foe, China barely registered on the global economic scene
and the first computer laptops – weighing in at 12 pounds each – were
just hitting the market.
And if someone had told her that she'd serve in the Cabinet of the
country's first black president as ambassador to the United Nations, "I
would've asked them what they were smoking."
But in her remarks delivered during Stanford University's 119th
Commencement on Sunday, Rice put the advances of the past 24 years in
perspective. She called the fight against global poverty "not only one
of the great moral challenges of all time, but also one of the great
national security challenges of our time."
"The planet is still divided by fundamental inequalities," she said.
"Some of us live in peace, freedom and comfort while billions are
condemned to conflict, poverty and repression. These massive disparities
erode our common security and corrode our common humanity."
While she did not discuss any specifics of her role as the country's
ambassador to the United Nations or the organization's recent move to
impose a fourth round of sanctions on Iran, Rice did talk about the link
between poverty and security.
"When a country is wracked by war or weakened by want, its people
suffer first. But poor and fragile states can incubate
threats that spread far beyond borders – terrorism, pandemic disease,
nuclear proliferation, criminal networks, climate change, genocide and
more. In our interconnected age, a threat to development anywhere is a
threat to security everywhere." -Ambassador Susan Rice
Rice's address marked a very public return to Stanford. She graduated
with a bachelor's in history from the university as a junior Phi Beta
Kappa and Truman Scholar in 1986.
She was confirmed as ambassador to the United Nations in 2009 after
being nominated by President Obama. It was a job that followed her role
as Obama's senior adviser for national security affairs during his
presidential campaign in 2007 and 2008. Before that, she served as the
country's assistant secretary of state for African affairs and as a
special assistant to President Clinton. She was also a senior director
for African affairs at the National Security Council.
During a trip to a displaced persons camp in war-torn Angola in 1995,
Rice saw firsthand the global poverty she talked about on Sunday. Of
all the people she saw in the camp, she said one of her most striking
memories is the smile she received from a malnourished little boy when
she gave him her baseball cap.
But she's haunted by thoughts of what may have happened to him.
"I had to leave that camp," she said. "And when I did, I left that
little boy in hell. I like to think, and I sure hope, that kid is OK.
But he could well have become one of the 9 million children under the
age of 5 who die each year from preventable and treatable afflictions."
And that boy, she said, should be a symbol to Stanford's graduates of
the challenges that face them and the good they can do in the world.
"That little boy's future is tied to ours," she said. "Our security
is ultimately linked to his well-being. So we must shape the world he
deserves."
Rice's weighty remarks still left room for graduation levity. And the
student procession – known as the Wacky Walk – showcased much of it.
The graduates hit the field of Stanford Stadium with balloons and
signs thanking mom and dad. They were dressed as Egyptian kings and
Vikings, wizards and butterflies. Some wore bathing suits and flowing
togas. Others covered up with costumes paying homage to the pop culture
past of Pac-Man, as well as more timeless pursuits like dominoes and
poker.
It was a final blast of carefree fun for college students about to
contend with an uncertain job market.
"We have everything we need on campus," said Tyler Porras, a
graduating biology major who took to the field with a bolo tie and black
cowboy hat. "Now it's off to the real world where you need to find a
job."
The ceremony marked the award of 1,722 bachelor's degrees, 2,100
master's degrees and 980 doctoral degrees.
Departmental honors were awarded to 365 seniors, and 272 graduated
with university distinction. Another 74 graduated with multiple majors
and 33 received dual bachelor's degrees. There were 110 graduates
receiving both bachelor's and master's degrees.
Among international students, there were 102 undergraduates from 45
countries other than the United States, and 955 graduate students from
75 foreign countries.
"As you leave Stanford, I hope you carry a deep appreciation of the
values and traditions that are everlasting, as well as a willingness to
be bold and to approach challenges with a fresh perspective," Stanford
President John Hennessy told the graduates.
The day also gave parents a time to beam and brag.
"These kids have the potential to contribute so much to the world,"
said Tim Roake, whose daughter, Caitlin Roake, is graduating as a
biology major and is planning to join the Peace Corps.
Roake and his wife, Kathleen Gutierrez, had front-row seats in the
stadium bleachers next to Dave and Lori Gaskin. Their son, Greg, has
been dating Caitlin Roake since their freshman year.
"The last four years for Greg have been such an enriching experience
from an academic perspective but also on a personal level," Lori Gaskin
said. "I attribute that not only to the university but the wonderful
people he's met and the relationships he's made."
Exponential
advances in the life sciences, particularly in the realm of biotechnology, have
been held to raise the classic concerns of "dual-use" research: the
same technologies that propel scientific advances critical to human health, the
environment and economic growth also could be misused to develop biological
weapons, including for bioterrorism. However, there is significant
disagreement as to whether this depiction appropriately frames the nature of
the problem. Some scientists have characterized the prevailing policy
discourse on the life sciences as the "half-pipe of doom," a bipolar
approach that artificially disaggregates and decontextualizes the promise and
peril of advances in the life sciences. The panel will discuss proposals
to address such concerns, focusing on whether the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) offers a transferable model of scientific and policy
consensus-building for issues of safety and security of biotechnology.
Stephen J. Stedman joined CISAC in 1997 as a senior research scholar, and was named a senior
fellow at FSI and CISAC and professor of political science (by courtesy) in
2002. He served as the center's acting co-director for the 2002-2003 academic
year. Currently he directs the Ford Dorsey Program in International Policy
Studies at Stanford and CISAC's Interschool Honors Program in International
Security Studies. His current research addresses the future of international
organizations and institutions, an area of study inspired by his recent work at
the United Nations. In the fall of 2003 he was recruited to serve as the
research director of the U.N. High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change. Upon completion of the panel's report, A More Secure World: Our
Shared Responsibility, Annan asked Stedman to stay on at the U.N. as a
special advisor with the rank of assistant secretary-general, to help gain
worldwide support in implementing the panel's recommendations. Following the
U.N. world leaders' summit in September 2005, during which more than 175 heads
of state agreed upon a global security agenda developed from the panel's work,
Stedman returned to CISAC. Before coming to Stanford, Stedman was an associate
professor of African studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced
International Studies in Washington, D.C.
He has served as a consultant to the United Nations on issues of peacekeeping
in civil war, light weapons proliferation and conflict in Africa,
and preventive diplomacy. In 2000 Scott Sagan and he founded the CISAC Interschool
Honors Program in International Security Studies. Stedman received his PhD in
political science from Stanford University
in 1988.
Donald Kennedy is the editor-in-chief of Science, the journal
of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and a CESP
senior fellow by courtesy. His present research program entails policy
on such trans-boundary environmental problems as: major land-use
changes; economically-driven alterations in agricultural practice;
global climate change; and the development of regulatory policies.
Kennedy
has served on the faculty of Stanford University from 1960 to the
present. From 1980 to 1992 he served as President of Stanford
University. He was Commissioner of the US Food and Drug Administration
from 1977-79. Previously at Stanford, he was as director of the Program
in Human Biology from 1973-1977 and chair of the Department of Biology
from 1964-1972.
Kennedy is a member of the National Academy of
Sciences, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the American
Philosophical Society. He served on the National Commission for Public
Service and the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and
Government, and as a founding director of the Health Effects Institute.
He currently serves as a director of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, and as co-chair of the National Academies' Project
on Science, Technology and Law. Kennedy received AB and PhD degrees in
biology from Harvard University.
Drew Endy is a synthetic biologist with the Stanford Department of Bioengineering. He was a junior fellow and later an assistant professor in the Department of Biological Engineering at MIT prior to coming to Stanford in September 2008 as an assistant professor in the Department of Bioengineering. Endy's research focus is on synthetic biology. With researchers at MIT he works on the engineering of standardized biological components, devices, and parts, collectively known as "BioBricks." He is one of several founders of the Registry of Standard Biological Parts, and invented an abstraction hierarchy for integrated genetic systems. Endy is known for his opposition to limited ownership and supports free access to genetic information. He has been one of the early promoters of open-source biology, and helped to start the Biobricks Foundation, a non-profit supporting open-source biology.
Tarun Chhabra is a JD candidate and Paul and Daisy Soros
Fellow at Harvard Law School, and a doctoral candidate in international
relations at Oxford University. Tarun previously worked in the Executive
Office of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and on the staff of Annan's
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. He also served as a
consultant-advisor to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry on nuclear non-proliferation
and disarmament initiatives. He was a Fulbright Scholar in Russia at the Moscow
State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO) and received a Marshall
Scholarship to study at Merton College, Oxford, where he earned a MPhil in
international relations and was an instructor in international relations at
Stanford House. He holds a BA from Stanford University, where he worked
at the Martin Luther King, Jr., Papers Project and was in the honors program at
CISAC. Tarun is a Fellow of the Truman National Security Project and a member
of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Chris Field is the founding director of the Carnegie Institution's Department of Global Ecology, Professor of Biology and Environmental Earth System Science at Stanford University, and Faculty Director of Stanford's Jasper Ridge Biological Preserve. He also is co-chair of Working Group 2 of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and will lead the fifth assessment report on climate change impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. The author of more than 200 scientific publications, Field’s research emphasizes impacts of climate change, from the molecular to the global scale. Field’s work with models includes studies on the global distribution of carbon sources and sinks, and studies on environmental consequences of expanding biomass energy. Field has served on many national and international committees related to global ecology and climate change and was a coordinating lead author for the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Field has testified before House and Senate committees and has appeared on media from NPR “Science Friday” to BBC “Your World Today”. He is a member of the US National Academy of Sciences. Field received his PhD from Stanford in 1981 and has been at the Carnegie Institution for Science since 1984.
Stephen Stedman is a Freeman Spogli senior fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law and FSI, an affiliated faculty member at CISAC, and professor of political science (by courtesy) at Stanford University.
In 2011-12 Professor Stedman served as the Director for the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy, and Security, a body of eminent persons tasked with developing recommendations on promoting and protecting the integrity of elections and international electoral assistance. The Commission is a joint project of the Kofi Annan Foundation and International IDEA, an intergovernmental organization that works on international democracy and electoral assistance. In 2003-04 Professor Stedman was Research Director of the United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and was a principal drafter of the Panel’s report, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. In 2005 he served as Assistant Secretary-General and Special Advisor to the Secretary- General of the United Nations, with responsibility for working with governments to adopt the Panel’s recommendations for strengthening collective security and for implementing changes within the United Nations Secretariat, including the creation of a Peacebuilding Support Office, a Counter Terrorism Task Force, and a Policy Committee to act as a cabinet to the Secretary-General. His most recent book, with Bruce Jones and Carlos Pascual, is Power and Responsibility: Creating International Order in an Era of Transnational Threats (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2009).
Affiliated faculty at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
Hide publication sections
Off
Date Label
Stephen J. Stedman
Professor of Political Science (by courtesy) and Senior Fellow at CISAC and FSI
Speaker
Donald Kennedy is the editor-in-chief of Science, the journal of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and a CESP senior fellow by courtesy. His present research program entails policy on such trans-boundary environmental problems as: major land-use changes; economically-driven alterations in agricultural practice; global climate change; and the development of regulatory policies.
Kennedy has served on the faculty of Stanford University from 1960 to the present. From 1980 to 1992 he served as President of Stanford University. He was Commissioner of the US Food and Drug Administration from 1977-79. Previously at Stanford, he was as director of the Program in Human Biology from 1973-1977 and chair of the Department of Biology from 1964-1972.
Kennedy is a member of the National Academy of Sciences, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the American Philosophical Society. He served on the National Commission for Public Service and the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and Government, and as a founding director of the Health Effects Institute. He currently serves as a director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and as co-chair of the National Academies' Project on Science, Technology and Law. Kennedy received AB and PhD degrees in biology from Harvard University.
FSI Senior Fellow by courtesy
Donald Kennedy
President Emeritus of Stanford University; Bing Professor of Environmental Science and Policy, Emeritus and FSI Senior Fellow by courtesy
Speaker
Drew Endy
Assistant Professor of Bioengineering, Stanford University
Speaker
Tarun Chhabra
JD Candidate, Harvard Law School; DPhil, Oxford
Speaker
Jerry Yang & Akiko Yamazaki Environment & Energy Bldg.
473 Via Ortega, Room 221
Stanford, CA 94305
Phone: 650.736.4352
0
cfield@stanford.edu
Perry L. McCarty Director of the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment.; Professor for Interdisciplinary Environmental Studies, School of Earth, Energy & Environmental Sciences; FSI Senior Fellow, by courtesy
Chris Field is the Perry L. McCarty Director of the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment.
His research focuses on climate change, ranging from work on improving climate models, to prospects for renewable energy systems, to community organizations that can minimize the risk of a tragedy of the commons.
Field has been deeply involved with national and international scale efforts to advance science and assessment related to global ecology and climate change. He served as co-chair of Working Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change from 2008-2015, where he led the effort on the IPCC Special Report on “Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation” (2012) and the Working Group II contribution to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (2014) on Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability.
Field assumed leadership of the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment in September 2016. His other appointments at Stanford University include serving as the Melvin and Joan Lane Professor for Interdisciplinary Environmental Studies in the School of Humanities and Sciences; Professor of Earth System Science in the School of Earth, Energy & Environmental Sciences; and Senior Fellow with the Precourt Institute for Energy. Prior to his appointment as Woods' Perry L. McCarty Director, Field served as director of the Carnegie Institution for Science's Department of Global Ecology, which he founded in 2002. Field's tenure at the Carnegie Institution dates back to 1984.
His widely cited work has earned many recognitions, including election to the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, the Max Planck Research Award, the American Geophysical Union’s Roger Revelle Medal and the Stephen H. Schneider Award for Outstanding Science Communication. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and the Ecological Society of America.
Field holds a bachelor’s degree in biology from Harvard College and earned his Ph.D. in biology from Stanford in 1981.
Christopher Field
Director of the Carnegie Institution's Department of Global Ecology, Professor of Biology and Environmental Earth System Science, and FSI Senior Fellow, by courtesy, Stanford University
Speaker
Megan Smith, Vice President, New Business Development and General Manager, Google.org., argued that greater interconnectedness achieved by information technology is a major liberating force in the world. Whether it is aiding the coordination of protests or increasing transparency of governments, the exchange of information has huge benefits. This is not a new phenomenon. In places where people have been able to exchange information easily, social progress has followed. Megan cited the example of Seneca Falls, New York where the canal system allowed for extensive communication; it became significant in both the women's rights and abolition movements.
While a large proportion of the world is benefiting from greater interconnectedness, Africa still lacks the infrastructure to take full advantage. Submarine fiber optic cables are necessary for quick and cheap internet cables and many African countries, particularly in the east, are not connected to these, relying instead on satellites. This is likely to change over the next few years, bringing great potential for further development.
The mission of Google.org is to use technology to drive solutions to global challenges such as climate change, pandemic disease and poverty. The organization was set up as part of a commitment to devote approximately one percent of Google's equity plus one percent of annual profits to philanthropy, along with employee time. Google.org now places its strategic focus on those projects that can leverage the resources of Google staff, particularly its engineers.
Current projects that harness the power of information include:
Google Flu Trends: This uses aggregated Google search data to estimate flu activity up to two weeks earlier than traditional methods. This system has almost 90% accuracy in real time flu prediction and is therefore an extremely useful tool for health delivery agencies. It is now being used in 30 countries. Google is also starting to work in Cambodia to collect data around SARS.
Google Power Meter provides a system for consumers to understand their in-home energy use and to take steps to reducing this. The Meter receives information from utility smart meters and in-home energy management devices and visualizes this information on iGoogle (a personalized Google homepage).The premise underlying this project is that greater information is going to be crucial to tackling climate change and consumers ought to be able to be empowered to make informed decisions about their energy use.
Disaster relief: In response to the Haitian earthquake, a team of engineers worked with the U.S. Department of State to create an online People Finder gadget so that people can submit information about missing persons and to search the database. Google Earth satellite images have also been used to document the extent of damage.
