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By May Wong
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The heated debate over the line between liberty and national security took center stage as Gen. Michael Hayden, former director of the National Security Agency and CIA, defended government surveillance programs at Stanford’s launch this week of “The Security Conundrum” speaker series.

If such surveillance methods were further restricted, “that smaller box, in my professional judgment, would make the job of the NSA harder and would probably make you less safe,” Hayden told a packed audience at the event co-sponsored in part by the university’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC).

Hayden admitted to being “prickly” as he discussed privacy concerns over NSA’s collection and storage of phone and email metadata covering billions of calls and messages by American citizens. The surveillance programs, which were exposed last year by leaks from NSA contractor Edward Snowden, were only used after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, given “the totality of the circumstances,” Hayden explained.

Hayden was director of the NSA from 1999 to 2005. He then led the CIA from 2006 to 2009.

 

The metadata collection “is something we would have never done on Sept. 9 or Sept. 10. But it seemed reasonable after Sept. 11,” he said. “No one is doing this out of prurient interests. No, it was a logical response to the needs of the moment.”

Amy Zegart, CISAC’s co-director and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, led the conversation with the four-star general. She pointed out that a majority of Americans distrusts the NSA and believes the agency is lying.

Hayden stressed that the phone records were similar to billing statements – detailing who made the calls and when. “There is no content. It is not electronic surveillance. Not at all.”

 

zegart hayden CISAC Co-Director Amy Zegart leaders a talk with former NSA and CIA Director Michael Hayden at the inaugural "Security Conundrum" speakers series on Oct. 8, 2014.

 

Though he understands why the operation is “theoretically frightening,” in reality, it’s designed to aid in the capture of terrorists within the United States, Hayden said.

“To listen to the content of the calls would violate the laws of the United States. It would violate the laws of physics,” he said. He challenged if anyone could offer “concrete evidence” of harm stemming from the phone data collection.

In defining the right to privacy, Hayden cited his philosophy behind the balancing act between security and liberty.

“Privacy is the line we continually negotiate for ourselves as unique creatures of God and as social animals,” he said. “There are some things that the community has the right to know – and there are other things that they clearly do not have the right to know.”

The debate is over where that line is drawn, between “what is mine” and “what is owed the collective,” he said.

Hayden noted that the phone and email metadata collection programs are only a small part of the larger issues the nation faces as it deals with increasingly adept enemies and the surveillance abilities of other nations.

 

“I’m just simply saying – who knows more about you? One of the least of your worries is the government,” he said, half-jokingly. He noted that Google knows more about Americans than does the U.S. government, and the Silicon Valley company uses that data for commercial purposes.

Addressing how tech companies are becoming more reluctant to cooperate with government requests for email communication data, Hayden said he didn’t have an answer about how to address the relationship.

There is a call for transparency of what the government is doing, but Hayden said “translucency” might be the better option, so as to not reveal all that the U.S. does for foreign intelligence.

“This is an enterprise that’s based on absolute secrecy,” he said of the NSA.

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“We have to give American people enough information to be at least tolerant, if not supportive, of what the American government is doing.”

But to achieve that, “it’s not transparency,” he said. “We actually have to be translucent … where you have the glass … and you get the broad patterns of movemen

The danger of not being able to target emails, Hayden said, would be that emails become a safe haven for enemies. “If we don’t’ do it, if you’re not going to let us do this stuff … over the long term, it puts your liberty at risk because bad stuff will happen.”

“The Security Conundrum” speaker series looks behind and beyond the headlines, examining the history and implementation of the NSA operations, the legal questions generated by them, the media’s role in revealing them, and the responsibility of Congress to oversee them.

Each guest speaker, in conversation with Stanford scholars, will probe the problems from different vantage points to explain the political, legal and technological contours of the NSA actions, as well as outline ways to preserve the nation’s security without sacrificing our freedoms.

On Nov. 17, journalist Barton Gellman will be the featured speaker. He is known for his Pulitzer Prize-winning reports on the 9/11 attacks and has led the Washington Post's coverage of the NSA. On April 10, Reggie Walton, the former presiding judge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, will take the stage as the speaker on April 10.

Along with FSI and CISAC, the series is also co-sponsored by the Hoover Institution, Stanford Continuing Studies, Stanford in Government, and the Stanford Law School.

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Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Ash Carter will join Stanford this academic year as a lecturer at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and a distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution.

Carter, who has a PhD in theoretical physics, served in the Clinton and Obama administrations and is well known in academic and technology circles. 

"I am honored to join the remarkable team at Stanford, one of the country's top universities and a key center for technological and business innovation,” Carter said. “The regional context of Silicon Valley was also an important attraction for me: the creative – even unorthodox – approaches to solving challenges are a model for both the private and public sectors. All that combined with a motivated faculty and a dynamic student population made Stanford a great opportunity. And as a scientist, I was always encouraged as a student to use my knowledge for the public good, and I hope to inspire the same thinking in students here.”

At FSI, Carter will be the Payne Distinguished Visitor and will be responsible for delivering several lectures. He will also deliver the annual Drell Lecture, which is sponsored by FSI’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC).

"Ash will bring to Stanford incomparable experience handling some of the most complex security issues facing the United States and the world,” said FSI Director Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar. “We are fortunate to have him at FSI, and know that he will make great contributions to the Institute's research and teaching missions."

"It is a true honor to have Secretary Carter join the Hoover Institution as a distinguished visiting fellow,” said Hoover Director John Raisian. “An expert on a broad range of foreign policy and defense matters, Ash brings a unique and worldly perspective, one that is in keeping with our mission statement of promoting ideas that define a free society. My colleagues and I look forward to having him join the fellowship."

Carter stepped down from his post at the Pentagon late last year after serving two years as the Deputy Secretary of Defense. As the agency’s second-ranking civilian, he oversaw a $600 billion budget and 2.4 million uniformed and civilian personnel. From 2009 to 2011 Carter was the Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.

“Ash Carter is an extraordinary scholar statesman who thinks deeply, probes broadly, and transforms the organizations he leads,” said Amy Zegart, CISAC’s co-director. “We are thrilled to have him join the CISAC community.”

Carter joined the Defense Department from Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, where he was a professor and chair of the International Relations, Science, and Security faculty.

Carter’s connection with the technology business dates to his previous position as a senior partner at Global Technology Partners, where he advised major investment firms on technology and defense. He is currently working with several companies in Silicon Valley.

Carter earned his bachelor’s degrees in physics and in medieval history from Yale in 1976, summa cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa. He was a Rhodes Scholar and received his doctorate in theoretical physics from Oxford in 1979.

He was a physics instructor at Oxford, a postdoctoral fellow at Rockefeller University and M.I.T., and an experimental research associate at Brookhaven and Fermilab National Laboratories. From 1993 to 1996, Carter served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, responsible for policy regarding the former Soviet states, strategic affairs, and nuclear weapons policy.

Carter recently joined the Markle Foundation to help lead the "Economic Future Initiative" to develop groundbreaking ideas for empowering Americans in today’s networked economic landscape.

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Clifton B. Parker
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A new Stanford speaker series, "The Security Conundrum," explores how America can strike the right balance between security and liberty in a dangerous world. Nationally prominent speakers will engage in candid conversations on thought-provoking topics and issues. 

In an age of terrorism and technology, fundamental questions have arisen about how a democratic society like the United States can find the right balance between security and liberty.

That's the puzzle behind a new Stanford speaker series, "The Security Conundrum," which kicks off at 7:30 p.m. Oct. 8 with Gen. Michael Hayden, the former director of the National Security Agency and the CIA.

The event, "Inside the NSA," is free and open to the public. It will be held at the CEMEX Auditorium, 641 Knight Way on the Stanford campus.

As part of the speaker series during the academic year, other nationally prominent experts will visit Stanford, where they will dive deep into conversations with campus experts.

On Nov. 17, journalist Barton Gellman will be the featured speaker. He is known for his Pulitzer Prize-winning reports on the 9/11 attacks and has led the Washington Post's coverage of the NSA. On April 10, Reggie Walton, the former presiding judge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, will take the stage as the speaker. Also, U.S. Sen. Dianne Feinstein has agreed to participate, though the date for her appearance has not yet been scheduled.

Hayden on the rise of NSA surveillance

In conversation with Stanford scholar Amy Zegart, Hayden will provide an insider's account about the origins and development of the NSA programs. After the 9/11 attacks, at the request of the White House, Hayden intensified and expanded NSA wiretapping operations of various communications between Americans and terrorist suspects abroad in hopes of detecting and preventing another terrorist attack.

Hayden was the first principal deputy director of national intelligence (2005-2006) and director of the National Security Agency (1999-2005). He is a retired U.S. Air Force four-star general and is now a principal of the Chertoff Group.

Zegart, co-director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, said, "There is no better place to engage in this kind of multifaceted, open inquiry than a university."

She noted that there is "no better university" to explore such an issue than Stanford – with its home in Silicon Valley and faculty involved in national security issues. She described the institution as a "trusted convener on issues of national importance."

Zegart said that after the NSA's widespread efforts at mass surveillance were revealed last year, she and CISAC Consulting Professor Philip Taubman envisioned a campus conversation examining the relationship between secrecy, security and liberty in the digital age.

"These are thorny and complex questions with wide-ranging and often strongly held views," she added.

"The Security Conundrum" is co-sponsored by Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, the Center for International Security and Cooperation, the Hoover Institution, Stanford Continuing Studies, Stanford in Government and Stanford Law School.

The NSA and Silicon Valley

Each talk, Zegart said, will focus on a different issue and include a different expert. The idea is to go beyond the headlines to examine in depth NSA operations, legal issues, the media's role and the responsibility of Congress in overseeing intelligence gathering. Another topic is NSA's uneasy and evolving relationship with Silicon Valley.

The U.S. government's initial efforts in data collection – involving some Silicon Valley companies – were executed without a court order and after being revealed by the New York Times were subsequently placed under judicial review.

Over time, the NSA's efforts grew into the multidimensional programs exposed by Edward Snowden, including the collection and storage of phone and email metadata covering billions of calls and messages between American citizens.

Zegart said, "We designed 'The Security Conundrum' to be a speaker series rather than a one-off event so that each session could provide a deeper dive into one perspective at a time. I hope that each speaker in the series gets people talking and thinking about perspectives they might not have considered before."

 

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FSI's Francis Fukuyama and former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry, a William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at CISAC, write in the Financial Times that President Barack Obama's stance on ISIS is "overpromising" and that the United States should follow lessons from British history and pursue a more sustainable strategy known as "offshore balancing."

FSI's Francis Fukuyama and former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry,  a William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at CISAC, write in the Financial Times that President Barack Obama's stance on ISIS is "overpromising" and that the United States should follow lessons from British history and pursue a more sustainable strategy known as "offshore balancing."

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In an age of terrorism, where should a democratic society draw the line on government surveillance? Edward Snowden’s explosive disclosures about the National Security Agency’s intelligence-collection operations have ignited an intense debate about the appropriate balance between security and liberty in America. In a special series this year, nationally prominent experts will explore the critical issues raised by the NSA’s activities, including their impact on our security, privacy, and civil liberties. This timely series will address one of the most challenging questions the nation faces today as it tries to strike the right balance between safety and liberty.

The Security Conundrum will look behind and beyond the headlines, examining the history and implementation of the NSA operations, the legal questions generated by them, the media’s role in revealing them, and the responsibility of Congress to oversee them. It will also address the NSA’s uneasy and evolving relationship with Silicon Valley. Each session in the series is designed to explore these issues from a different vantage point. The guest speakers, in conversation with Stanford scholars, will probe the problems, explain the political, legal, and technological contours of the NSA actions, and outline ways to preserve the nation’s security without sacrificing our freedoms. 

Inside the NSA: An Evening with General Michael Hayden 

General Michael Hayden was director of the National Security Agency on September 11, 2001. After the attacks, at the request of the White House, he intensified and expanded NSA wiretapping operations of various communications between Americans and terrorist suspects abroad in hopes of detecting and preventing another terrorist attack. These initial efforts were executed without a court order and after being revealed by The New York Times, were subsequently placed under judicial review. Over time, the NSA’s efforts grew into the multidimensional programs exposed by Edward Snowden, including the collection and storage of phone and email metadata covering billions of calls and messages between American citizens. 

In conversation with Amy Zegart, General Hayden will provide an insider’s account about the origins and development of the NSA programs. He will also discuss the directives and mechanisms to control them, and the disagreements within the Bush administration about the extent of the wiretapping. He will offer his views on the justification, legal status, scale, and effectiveness of the NSA monitoring.

Michael V. Hayden
Former Director of the CIA and the NSA
Michael V. Hayden served as Director of the CIA (2006–2009), First Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (2005–2006), and Director of the National Security Agency (1999–2005). He is a retired United States Air Force four-star general and is now a principal of The Chertoff Group.

Amy Zegart
Davies Family Senior Fellow and Associate Director, Hoover Institution; Professor, by courtesy, of Political Science; Co-Director, Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation
Amy Zegart’s publications include Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 and Eyes on Spies: Congress and the United States Intelligence Community. She has served on the National Research Council’s panel on improving intelligence analysis.

The Security Conundrum is co-sponsored by Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, the Center for International Security and Cooperation, the Hoover Institution, Stanford Continuing Studies, Stanford in Government, and the Stanford Law School.

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641 Knight Way, Stanford University

General Michael Hayden Former Director of the CIA and the NSA Speaker CIA, NSA

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Stanford University
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Amy Zegart is a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, the Morris Arnold and Nona Jean Cox Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, and Professor of Political Science by courtesy at Stanford University. She is also a contributing writer at The Atlantic. The author of five books, Zegart is an internationally recognized expert in U.S. intelligence, emerging technologies, and global political risk management.

Her award-winning research includes the leading academic study of intelligence failures before 9/11 — Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 (Princeton, 2007). Her most recent book is the bestseller Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence (Princeton, 2022), which was nominated by Princeton University Press for the Pulitzer Prize. She also co-authored Political Risk: How Businesses and Organizations Can Anticipate Global Insecurity, with Condoleezza Rice (Twelve, 2018) and co-edited Bytes, Bombs, and Spies: The Strategic Dimensions of Offensive Cyber Operations with Herbert Lin (Brookings, 2019). Her op-eds and essays have appeared in Foreign Affairs, Politico, the New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal

Zegart has advised senior officials about intelligence and foreign policy for more than two decades. She served on the National Security Council staff, as a presidential campaign foreign policy advisor, and has testified before the House and Senate Intelligence committees. 

In addition to her research and teaching, she led Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, founded the Stanford Cyber Policy Program, and served as chief academic officer of the Hoover Institution. Before coming to Stanford, she was Professor of Public Policy at UCLA and a McKinsey & Company consultant.

She is the recipient of a Fullbright Fellowship, the American Political Science Association's Leonard D. White Dissertation Prize, and research grants from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Hewlett Foundation, the Smith Richardson Foundation, and the National Science Foundation.

A native of Louisville, Kentucky, Zegart received an AB in East Asian studies, magna cum laude, from Harvard and a PhD in political science from Stanford. She serves on the board of directors of the council on Foreign Relations, Kratos Defense & Secretary Solutions (KTOS), and the American Funds/Capital Group.

Amy Zegart Co-director, CISAC; Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution Speaker FSI, CISAC, Hoover Insitution
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While there is no one-size-fits-all approach to the war on terror, the United States needs to reconsider its strategy in dealing with these threats, a Stanford scholar says.

"For the United States, a counterterrorism strategy cannot be considered in isolation from other policies," said Martha Crenshaw, a terrorism expert and senior fellow at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, in an interview.

"This means that our actions should be justifiable and transparent." 

In a chapter of a new book, Crenshaw advocates vigilance against terrorism, while not overreacting. It is not prudent to be complacent about the impact of terrorism on international security, though it is by no means an "existential threat" for developed countries, she wrote.

Crenshaw founded the Mapping Militant Organizations project to identify militant organizations globally and trace how they arise, their root causes and their connections.

In an interview, she said, "We are all fond of saying that there is no military solution to a political problem and that the states that are directly threatened by terrorism, such as Pakistan, Afghanistan or Iraq, should muster the resolve and resources to combat it. But we haven't figured out how to implement these rather abstract prescriptions and admonitions."

She suggested that there is a role for military force and outside powers, but it should be limited and precise in intent. 

America's actions against terrorism should not violate democratic norms, Crenshaw said. "And we should not veer erratically between complacency and alarm, but take a middle ground."

She said context is all-important. "It's frustrating, but there is no one-size-fits-all strategy. Similar countries have reacted differently to terrorism yet produced the same overall outcome."

Negotiation and compromise?

One challenge for countries like the United States is to find alternatives in confronting terrorism. For example, governments may need to decide whether to recognize or negotiate with groups they deem as terrorist entities.

"Is compromise possible?" she wrote, citing failures in Sri Lanka and Colombia but success in Northern Ireland on this front. There is no consistent answer, she said.

An approach of realism and expectations of mixed results may define the best way forward, she said.

"Perhaps the most important lesson for the international community is that the process of ending terrorism is likely to be slow and arduous, requiring gradualism, endurance and commitment despite setback," Crenshaw wrote.

She added, "States may not be able to prevent or eradicate terrorism, but they can manage their reactions to it."

She advocates "capacity building," or giving local governments the capacity to deal with terrorism by building more effective security institutions in the broadest sense.

"What happens at the local level is important to overall international security," Crenshaw said. "Terrorism threatens the stability of already weak and fragile states, thus contributing to state collapse, ungoverned spaces, social dislocation, repression and economic decline."

Drone debate

Crenshaw said that the United States increasingly prefers the use of drones rather than large-scale military options in the fighting of terrorism.

"Drones are a highly efficient means of implementing a policy of targeted killings of leaders of militant groups," she wrote.

Drone usage began under the Bush administration, she noted, and peaked in 2010 under the Obama administration. "Future U.S. counterterrorism strategy will rely on the covert use of limited force, utilizing drones and special operations forces," she wrote.

What are the implications of drone warfare? Crenshaw said that questions remain unanswered about how international law applies to drones, as well as issues of accountability and transparency.

"Despite their precision," she said, "drones kill civilians."

Political violence

It is difficult to predict when and where terrorism may strike, she said. Terrorists are innovative and they experiment, especially when faced with adjusting to new obstacles.

"For example, just when hijackings were thought to be a relic of the past, Al Qaeda combined them with suicide missions to achieve the devastating 9/11 surprise," Crenshaw wrote, referring to the Sept. 11, 2001 attack on the Pentagon and New York's World Trade Center.

She said that Muslims bear the brunt of terrorism, suffering between 82 percent and 97 percent of all deaths. In terms of trends, suicide missions are increasingly used as a lethal tactic.

From 1991 to 2001, there were 170 suicide attacks causing 2,077 deaths, while since 9/11, there have been 2,130 such attacks resulting in 26,866 deaths. Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan are the most common places where terror incidents occur.

Why have terrorists been so unsuccessful in wielding radiological, chemical or biological weapons? So far, the Japanese subway sarin attacks in 1995 remain the only instance of chemical weapons being used by a terrorist group. "Are the acquisition and use of such weapons too difficult? The answers are still elusive," Crenshaw said.

Meanwhile, "cyberterrorism" has largely been conducted by sophisticated state actors – like the Stuxnet virus that damaged the Iranian centrifuges – and not terrorists. It remains to be seen whether terrorists have such capabilities, Crenshaw wrote.

Crenshaw's chapter, "Dealing with Terrorism," will be published by the United States Institute of Peace in the forthcoming new book, Managing Conflict in a World Adrift.

She noted, "Terrorism has been a common strategy for challenging the status quo for quite a long period of time – at least since the European revolutionary and anarchist movements of the late 19th century. There is no reason to think it will disappear."

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About the Topic: U.S. government leaders are making extraordinary efforts to prevent and protect against cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure.  Plans for responding to and recovering from such attacks receive far less attention and are deeply flawed -- especially for catastrophic events when effective plans will be most vital.  Given the rapid growth of cyber threats to the power grid and other critical infrastructure, we should not only continue to strengthen prevention and protection measures, but also assume that a catastrophic cyber-attack will occur and ramp up U.S. response plans and capabilities accordingly. I will argue that the Interim National Cyber Incident Response Plan (which governs the U.S. cyber response system) should be replaced by a plan that is better aligned with industry needs and with “traditional” U.S. disaster response plans, especially the National Response Framework. I will also propose how to structure cyber response planning to maximize “deterrence by denial” and reduce the potential attractiveness of attacking U.S. critical infrastructure for state and non-state adversaries. 

 

About the Speaker: Paul N. Stockton is Managing Director of Sonecon, LLC. Before joining Sonecon, Dr. Stockton served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs from June, 2009 until January, 2013.  In that position, helped lead the Department’s response to Superstorm Sandy and other disasters, guided the Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection program, and oversaw policies and programs to secure DOD’s domestic installations and personnel against terrorism. In September, 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel appointed Dr. Stockton to co-chair the Independent Review of the Washington Navy Yard Shootings, which recommended major changes to the Department’s security clearance system that are now being implemented.  Dr. Stockton’s recent publications include articles on cyber security in the Yale Law and Policy Review and other journals. Dr. Stockton holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University and a BA Summa Cum Laude from Dartmouth College.

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Paul Stockton Managing Director Speaker Sonecon, LLC
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Abstract: Zero-day exploits (ZDEs) are programs that make use of newly-discovered software vulnerabilities to allow attackers to break into and manipulate information systems. A market for software vulnerabilities and exploits has developed, with military and intelligence agencies sometimes paying over $100,000 for exploits and software vendors offering bounties for their disclosure. Labeled a ‘digital arms race’ by some, it is generating a transnational debate about control and regulation of cyber capabilities, the role of secrecy and disclosure in cybersecurity, the ethics of exploit production and use, and the implications of trading software vulnerabilities for a secure and reliable Internet.

This research uses concepts and methods of science and technology studies (STS) and institutionalism to the debate over the production, sale and regulation of ZDEs. The goal of this research is to advance understanding of the way discourses are related to the emergence of governance institutions. The work also sheds light on the socio-technical and economic consequences of efforts to control software vulnerabilities and exploits, and make more transparent applications of ZDEs and cyber capabilities.

This talk will report on the ongoing dissertation work and explore how the discourse on software vulnerabilities and exploits is co-produced along with new institutions and practices in cybersecurity.

 

About the Speaker: Andreas Kuehn is a Ph.D. Candidate in Information Science and Technology and a Fulbright Scholar at Syracuse University. He joined CISAC as a Zukerman Cybersecurity Predoctoral Fellow in October 2014. Before joining Stanford, he was a visiting graduate student at Cornell University’s Department of Science & Technology Studies.

In his dissertation research, Andreas examines the discourse and the emerging institutions in cybersecurity with a particular focus on software vulnerability and exploit markets. The trade with exploitable security flaws in software and their use in cyber attacks has sparked a controversy about the control and regulation of information technology, and the role of secrecy and disclosure in achieving cybersecurity. While at CISAC, Andreas is conducting qualitative, empirical research on cybersecurity institutions.

His broader research agenda is informed by Science and Technology Studies and Internet Governance to study emerging technology and its relation to privacy, security, and surveillance. Previous research included an NSF-funded project on deep packet inspection technology (DPI) and its implications on Internet governance (www.deeppacket.info), and the use of information technology in the public administration (e.g., enterprise architecture, standardization, interoperability).

Andreas worked in various research positions for the Austrian Ministry of Finance, the Swiss E-Government Institute, the Swiss Federal Office of Communications, and the Malaysian National Advanced IPv6 Centre of Excellence. The Austrian Computer Society awarded him an eGovernment Innovation Award for his research on multidisciplinary actor coordination and collaboration in large scale public ICT efforts. Andreas holds a M.Sc. in Information Systems from the University of Zurich, Switzerland, and an M.Phil. in Information Science and Technology from the School of Information Studies at Syracuse University. He is originally from Zurich, Switzerland.

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Andreas Kuehn Zukerman Cybersecurity Predoctoral Fellow Speaker CISAC
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CISAC Consulting Professor Thomas Hegghammer writes in this Lawfare Foreign Policy Essay: Calculated Caliphate that the move by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to declare itself an Islamic State with a caliphate as its leader is a "bold and unprecedented" move.

Hegghammer, director of terrorism research at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment and a leading scholar of the jihadist movement, explores the motivations, both strategic and ideological, behind the recent ISIS revelations in Iraq.

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Olivier Nomellini Professor Emeritus in International Studies at the School of Humanities and Sciences
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Coit Blacker is a senior fellow emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, the Olivier Nomellini Professor Emeritus in International Studies at the School of Humanities and Sciences, and a Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education. He served as director of FSI from 2003 to 2012. From 2005 to 2011, he was co-chair of the International Initiative of the Stanford Challenge, and from 2004 to 2007, served as a member of the Development Committee of the university's Board of Trustees.

During the first Clinton administration, Blacker served as special assistant to the president for National Security Affairs and senior director for Russian, Ukrainian and Eurasian affairs at the National Security Council (NSC). At the NSC, he oversaw the implementation of U.S. policy toward Russia and the New Independent States, while also serving as principal staff assistant to the president and the National Security Advisor on matters relating to the former Soviet Union.

Following his government service, Blacker returned to Stanford to resume his research and teaching. From 1998 to 2003, he also co-directed the Aspen Institute's U.S.-Russia Dialogue, which brought together prominent U.S. and Russian specialists on foreign and defense policy for discussion and review of critical issues in the bilateral relationship. He was a study group member of the U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century (the Hart-Rudman Commission) throughout the commission's tenure.

In 2001, Blacker was the recipient of the Laurence and Naomi Carpenter Hoagland Prize for Undergraduate Teaching at Stanford.

Blacker holds an honorary doctorate from the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Far Eastern Studies for his work on U.S.-Russian relations. He is a graduate of Occidental College (A.B., Political Science) and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (M.A., M.A.L.D., and Ph.D).

Blacker's association with Stanford began in 1977, when he was awarded a post-doctoral fellowship by the Arms Control and Disarmament Program, the precursor to the Center for International Security and Cooperation at FSI.

Faculty member at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
Faculty member at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
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Coit D. Blacker Senior Fellow; Olivier Nomellini Professor in International Studies, School of Humanities and Sciences; CISAC and CDDRL Faculty Member Moderator
Martha Crenshaw Senior Fellow at FSI; Professor of Political Science (by courtesy) Moderator
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