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Oriana Skylar Mastro
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Commentary
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This essay was originally published in Foreign Affairs magazine.

As Russian President Vladimir Putin intensifies his assault on Ukraine, a growing number of U.S. military and foreign policy analysts are voicing concern that China may be emboldened by Russia’s example and try to take Taiwan by force. “If Russia can grab chunks of Ukraine or install a puppet regime and withstand economic sanctions, that could embolden nationalists in China to look to Taiwan and think they could do the same,” Ian Johnson, a China expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, has argued. Representative Michael McCaul, Republican of Texas, made a similar argument in an interview last month, as did retired Army General Jack Keane, who said that Chinese President Xi Jinping sees “weakness in the West and how that can advantage him in terms of his national objectives as well.”

Xi is certainly watching events in Ukraine, but his calculus for whether to use force against Taiwan is shaped primarily by domestic factors, not foreign ones. As I have argued in Foreign Affairs, Chinese leaders are considering “armed reunification” with Taiwan more seriously than at any time in the last 50 years. But Xi will assert Chinese control over the island only if he is confident his military can conduct a successful amphibious invasion and if he believes the timing is right for his own career.


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Shifts in the international environment would be important for Taiwan if they changed Xi’s thinking on either count. But the war in Ukraine has not. Xi’s views about U.S. power and resolve and about the likely international response to an invasion of Taiwan probably remain unchanged. If anything, China’s desire not to invite comparisons with Russia at a time when the world is united against Moscow will lengthen its timeline for taking control of Taiwan, not shorten it.

Too Big to Sanction?

The economic sanctions that the United States, Canada, and many European countries have imposed on Russia give China little reason for pause. To the contrary, these punitive measures simply confirm Beijing’s previous assessments of the possible economic repercussions of using force against Taiwan. Chinese leaders expect the economic costs of an invasion to be heavy but acceptable—partly because of how the international community has responded to Chinese provocations in the past and partly because Beijing’s foreign policy is designed to convince countries to stay out of China’s “internal” affairs, such as the status of Taiwan.

That is not to say the economic measures Washington and its allies have imposed on Russia in recent days are insignificant. The United States and European countries have blocked Russia’s access to most of its foreign currency reserves, making it impossible for Moscow to intervene to prop up its collapsing currency. They have frozen the assets of senior Russian officials, including Putin himself. And they have moved to exclude big Russian banks from SWIFT, the global financial messaging system.

China’s ability to retaliate against the West with economic sanctions of its own is much greater than Russia’s.
Oriana Skylar Mastro

But the United States and its allies could do more to punish Russia. They could bar all transactions with Russia, whether trade or financial. They could seize all Russian assets within their jurisdictions. Washington could announce secondary sanctions on anyone using U.S. dollars for any transaction with Russia. Most important, the United States could use these and other measures to prevent Russia from exporting oil and gas. Letting Russia continue to export oil and gas would be like letting China sell consumer electronics even after it had taken Taiwan by force.

If the United States and its allies have been cautious in their response to Russia, they are likely to be even more restrained when responding to China — and Beijing knows it. China’s ability to retaliate against the West with economic sanctions of its own is much greater than Russia’s. Singapore, which announced trade and banking restrictions against Moscow, trades about $2.5 billion worth of goods with Russia each year — but $57 billion worth of goods with China. China’s leaders likely do not fear U.S.-led economic sanctions in the event of a Taiwan takeover because they probably think that China’s own productive capacity, resources, and friendly partners will allow them to survive on their own, especially since China will soon be the world’s largest economy. They are probably right. China could absorb the types of sanctions being imposed on Russia. And given China’s ability to inflict pain on Western countries, any measures levied against Beijing would likely be softer than those imposed on Moscow.

Taiwan Is Not Ukraine

The Western military response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will have an even smaller impact than sanctions on China’s thinking about Taiwan. True, neither the United States nor NATO has deployed troops to fight on Ukraine’s behalf. And U.S. military assistance to Ukraine has been modest: late last month, President Joe Biden instructed the State Department to release up to an additional $350 million worth of weapons from U.S. stocks to Ukraine.

But Russia would have to invade a NATO ally without provoking a U.S. military response for Chinese leaders to seriously question Washington’s commitment to defending Taiwan. Biden has made clear from the beginning of the crisis that his administration will never send troops to Ukraine—a stark contrast with his rhetoric on Taiwan. Just last week, Biden stated unequivocally that the United States would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. As a show of support, he also sent to the island a delegation of former U.S. officials led by Mike Mullen, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Chinese planners largely assume the United States would intervene militarily on behalf of Taiwan.
Oriana Skylar Mastro

In any case, Chinese planners largely assume the United States would intervene militarily on behalf of Taiwan. What some of them question is whether the United States could amass enough forces fast enough to blunt a Chinese assault on the island. Ironically, if the United States had launched a military operation in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Chinese leaders would have had further reason to question Washington’s ability to thwart a Chinese assault on Taiwan. The United States does not have the resources to fight the Russians in Europe and prepare adequately for a great-power war in Asia.  

Of course, these facts have not prevented China from trying to manipulate the narrative to undermine Taiwan’s resolve. Chinese state media has been flush with stories about how the United States did not come to Ukraine’s aid and therefore won’t come to Taiwan’s either. Like much of what appears on Chinese state media, however, these stories reflect what Chinese leaders want the world to believe—not what they believe themselves.

Not the Right Time

Chinese leaders are without a doubt considering an attack on Taiwan, but now is not the right time. China’s military is still honing the capabilities it would need to take and hold the island. And Xi is unlikely to take a dangerous gamble on Taiwan before the next Party Congress in late 2022, when he is widely expected to secure a third term as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. Xi is also working hard to lessen China’s technological dependence on the West, thus minimizing the impact on any further decoupling after a possible war. For all these reasons, an assault on Taiwan before 2025 is unlikely.

If anything, the crisis in Ukraine creates an additional incentive for China to wait. Beijing does not want the world to equate the two scenarios. From China’s perspective, Ukraine is an independent country engaged in a border dispute with Russia. Taiwan, by contrast, “has always been an inalienable part of China’s territory,” as China’s ambassador to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Deng Xijun, put it late last month. In other words, linking the two issues would undermine China’s claim to the island.

China also understands that moving against Taiwan now would solidify fears in the West of an axis of autocrats. The United States may not have the resolve to fight a protracted war to defend Taiwan. But suddenly faced with a need to defend freedom and democracy against an authoritarian alliance, Washington could muster a greater military response and convince its allies to do the same. Partly for this reason, China has desperately tried to maintain some semblance of neutrality during the Ukrainian crisis.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has certainly changed aspects of the international order. It has rallied European countries against Russia, prompted Germany to increase defense spending, and even convinced historically neutral countries such as Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland to take a stance against Moscow. From China’s perspective, however, nothing Russia or its adversaries have done meaningfully alters the calculus on Taiwan. 

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Oriana Skylar Mastro

Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies

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Russia’s War in Ukraine Doesn’t Presage a Chinese Assault on Taiwan

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Livestream event on March 1, 2022 at 6:30pm PST: "What's Next for Ukraine and Russia?"

This panel discussion will analyze the most recent developments in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, and what may lay ahead.

It will be moderated by Francis Fukuyama, director of Stanford’s Ford Dorsey Masters of International Policy Program and Olivier & Nomellini Senior Fellow in International Studies at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), with panelists Rose Gottemoeller, the Steven C. Házy Lecturer at FSI’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and deputy secretary general of NATO from 2016 to 2019, and Steve Pifer, the William J Perry Fellow at FSI and former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine.

 

PANELISTS:

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Rose Gottemoeller

Steven C. Házy Lecturer at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
Full Profile
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Steven Pifer

WIlliam J. Perry Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
Full Profile

 

MODERATOR:

Francis Fukuyama

Francis Fukuyama

Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Full Profile
Francis Fukuyama
Francis Fukuyama

Join via YouTube livesteam

Center for International Security and Cooperation
Encina Hall
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

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William J. Perry Lecturer, Freeman Spogli Institute
Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution
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Rose Gottemoeller is the William J. Perry Lecturer at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and Research Fellow at the Hoover Institute.

Before joining Stanford Gottemoeller was the Deputy Secretary General of NATO from 2016 to 2019, where she helped to drive forward NATO’s adaptation to new security challenges in Europe and in the fight against terrorism.  Prior to NATO, she served for nearly five years as the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at the U.S. Department of State, advising the Secretary of State on arms control, nonproliferation and political-military affairs. While Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance in 2009 and 2010, she was the chief U.S. negotiator of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with the Russian Federation.

Prior to her government service, she was a senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, with joint appointments to the Nonproliferation and Russia programs. She served as the Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center from 2006 to 2008, and is currently a nonresident fellow in Carnegie's Nuclear Policy Program.  

At Stanford, Gottemoeller teaches and mentors students in the Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy program and the CISAC Honors program; contributes to policy research and outreach activities; and convenes workshops, seminars and other events relating to her areas of expertise, including nuclear security, Russian relations, the NATO alliance, EU cooperation and non-proliferation. 

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Rose Gottemoeller Steven C. Házy Lecturer at CISAC
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Steven Pifer is an affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation as well as a non-resident senior fellow with the Brookings Institution.  He was a William J. Perry Fellow at the center from 2018-2022 and a fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin from January-May 2021.

Pifer’s research focuses on nuclear arms control, Ukraine, Russia and European security. He has offered commentary on these issues on National Public Radio, PBS NewsHour, CNN and BBC, and his articles have been published in a wide variety of outlets.  He is the author of The Eagle and the Trident: U.S.-Ukraine Relations in Turbulent Times (Brookings Institution Press, 2017), and co-author of The Opportunity: Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Arms (Brookings Institution Press, 2012).

A retired Foreign Service officer, Pifer’s more than 25 years with the State Department focused on U.S. relations with the former Soviet Union and Europe, as well as arms control and security issues.  He served as deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs with responsibilities for Russia and Ukraine, ambassador to Ukraine, and special assistant to the president and senior director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia on the National Security Council.  In addition to Ukraine, he served at the U.S. embassies in Warsaw, Moscow and London as well as with the U.S. delegation to the negotiation on intermediate-range nuclear forces in Geneva.  From 2000 to 2001, he was a visiting scholar at Stanford’s Institute for International Studies, and he was a resident scholar at the Brookings Institution from 2008 to 2017.

Pifer is a 1976 graduate of Stanford University with a bachelor’s in economics.

 

Affiliate, CISAC
Affiliate, The Europe Center
Steven Pifer WIlliam J. Perry Fellow at CISAC
Panel Discussions

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Facebook's Faces event flyer on blue and red background with photo of Chinmayi Arun
Join us on Tuesday, March 1 from 12 PM - 1 PM PT for a panel discussion on “Facebook’s Faces” featuring Chinmayi Arun, Resident Fellow at the Yale Law School in conversation with Nate Persily of the Stanford Cyber Policy Center. This weekly seminar series is jointly organized by the Cyber Policy Center’s Program on Democracy and the Internet and the Hewlett Foundation’s Cyber Initiative.

About The Seminar: 

Scholarship about social media platforms discusses their relationship with states and users. It is time to expand this theorization to account for differences among states, the varying influence of different publics and the internal complexity of companies. Viewing Facebook’s relationships this way includes less influential states and publics that are otherwise obscured. It reveals that Facebook engages with states and publics through multiple, parallel regulatory conversations, further complicated by the fact that Facebook itself is not a monolith. Arun argues that Facebook has many faces – different teams working towards different goals, and engaging with different ministries, institutions, scholars and civil society organizations. Content moderation exists within this ecosystem.
 
This account of Facebook’s faces and relationships shows that less influential publics can influence the company through strategic alliances with strong publics or powerful states. It also suggests that Facebook’s carelessness with a seemingly weak state or a group, may affect its relationship with a strong public or state that cares about the outcome.

To be seen as independent and legitimate, the Oversight Board needs to show its willingness to curtail Facebook’s flexibility in its engagement with political leaders where there is a real risk of harm. This essay hopes to show that Facebook’s fear of short-term retaliation from some states should be balanced out by accounting for the long-term reputational gains with powerful publics and powerful states who may appreciate its willingness to set profit-making goals aside in favor of human flourishing.

About the Speakers:

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Chinmayi Arun
Chinmayi Arun is a resident fellow of the Information Society Project at Yale Law School, and an affiliate of the Berkman Klein Center of Internet & Society at Harvard University. She has served on the faculties of two of the most highly regarded law schools in India for over a decade, and was the founder Director of the Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University Delhi. She has been a Human Rights Officer with the United Nations and is a member of the United Nations Global Pulse Advisory Group on the Governance of Data and AI, and of UNESCO India’s Media Freedom Advisory Group.

Chinmayi serves on the Global Network Initiative Board, and is an expert affiliated with the Columbia Global Freedom of Expression project. She has been consultant to the Law Commission of India and member of the Indian government’s multi stakeholder advisory group for the India Internet Governance Forum in the past.

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Nate Persily
Nathaniel Persily is the James B. McClatchy Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, with appointments in the departments of Political Science, Communication, and FSI.  Prior to joining Stanford, Professor Persily taught at Columbia and the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and as a visiting professor at Harvard, NYU, Princeton, the University of Amsterdam, and the University of Melbourne. Professor Persily’s scholarship and legal practice focus on American election law or what is sometimes called the “law of democracy,” which addresses issues such as voting rights, political parties, campaign finance, redistricting, and election administration. He has served as a special master or court-appointed expert to craft congressional or legislative districting plans for Georgia, Maryland, Connecticut, New York, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania.  He also served as the Senior Research Director for the Presidential Commission on Election Administration. His current work, for which he has been honored as a Guggenheim Fellow, Andrew Carnegie Fellow, and a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, examines the impact of changing technology on political communication, campaigns, and election administration.  He is codirector of the Stanford Cyber Policy Center, Stanford Program on Democracy and the Internet, and the Stanford-MIT Healthy Elections Project, which supported local election officials in taking the necessary steps during the COVID-19 pandemic to provide safe voting options for the 2020 election. He is also a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and a commissioner on the Kofi Annan Commission on Elections and Democracy in the Digital Age.

 

Seminars
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REGISTER

Come join The Journal of Online Trust and Safety, an open access journal for cutting-edge trust and safety scholarship, as we bring together authors published in our second issue for a webinar, hosted on March 1, 9:30-10:30am PT. 

The Journal of Online Trust and Safety draws from scholars in computer science, sociology, political science, law, and more.  Already in its first issue, the Journal has had considerable impact. Articles in this second issue will include: 

  • The Negative Consequences of Informing Voters about Deepfakes: Evidence from Two Survey Experiments by John Ternovski, Joshua Kalla, P. M. Aronow

  • Pride and Professionalization in Volunteer Moderation: Lessons for Effective Platform-User Collaboration by Joseph Seering, Brianna Dym, Geoff Kaufman, and Michael Bernstein

  • Risk Factors for Child Sexual Abuse Material Users Contacting Children Online: Results of an Anonymous Multilingual Survey on the Dark Web by Tegan Insoll, Anna K. Ovaska, Juha Nurmi, Mikko Aaltonen and Nina Vaaranen-Valkonen

  • New Frontiers: Moving Beyond Cyberbullying to Define Online Harassment by Autumn Slaughter and Elana Newman

  • A Synchronized Action Framework for Detection of Coordination on Social Media by Thomas Magelinski, Lynnette Hui Xian Ng and Kathleen M. Carley

  • Content-Oblivious Trust and Safety Techniques: Results from a Survey of Online Service Providers by Riana Pfefferkorn

  • Backlash or Bullying? Online Harassment, Social Sanction, and the Challenge of COVID-19 Misinformation by Timothy J. Foley and Melda Gurakar

  • Paved with Bad Intentions: QAnon’s Save the Children Campaign by Cody Buntain, Mila Johns, Monique Deal Barlow, and Mia Bloom

To hear from the authors about their new research, please register for the webinar here. To be notified about journal updates, please sign up for Stanford Internet Observatory announcements and follow @journalsafetech. Questions about the journal can be sent to trustandsafetyjournal@stanford.edu.
 

Panel Discussions
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image showing pills and an injection over a yellow background

The Stanford Internet Observatory will host analysts from the Virality Project to discuss the project’s findings from a year of observation and analysis on COVID-19 vaccine conversations online. The final report, “Memes, Magnets and Microchips: Narrative dynamics around COVID-19 vaccines,” will be available on February 24.

Join report contributors Renée DiResta, Kaitlyn Dowling, Cameron Hickey, Lily Meyersohn and Chase Small along with special guest Dr. Seema Yasmin, director of the Stanford Health Communication Initiative as they discuss the dynamics and impact of misleading information targeting the COVID-19 vaccines.

Panel Discussions
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 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 
 

SEMINAR RECORDING

Virtual only.

Sylvie Kauffmann
Seminars
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The Stanford Internet Observatory will host analysts from the Virality Project to discuss the project’s findings from a year of observation and analysis on COVID-19 vaccine conversations online. The final report, “Memes, Magnets and Microchips: Narrative dynamics around COVID-19 vaccines,” will be available on February 24.

Join report contributors Renée DiResta, Kaitlyn Dowling, Cameron Hickey, Lily Meyersohn and Chase Small along with special guest Dr. Seema Yasmin, director of the Stanford Health Communication Initiative as they discuss the dynamics and impact of misleading information targeting the COVID-19 vaccines.

REGISTER

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Renée DiResta is the former Research Manager at the Stanford Internet Observatory. She investigates the spread of malign narratives across social networks, and assists policymakers in understanding and responding to the problem. She has advised Congress, the State Department, and other academic, civic, and business organizations, and has studied disinformation and computational propaganda in the context of pseudoscience conspiracies, terrorism, and state-sponsored information warfare.

You can see a full list of Renée's writing and speeches on her website: www.reneediresta.com or follow her @noupside.

 

Former Research Manager, Stanford Internet Observatory
Kaitlyn Dowling
Cameron Hickey
Lily Meyersohn
Chase Small
Seema Yasmin
Seminars
Virality
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