Stanford University

Security

FSI scholars produce research aimed at creating a safer world and examing the consequences of security policies on institutions and society. They look at longstanding issues including nuclear nonproliferation and the conflicts between countries like North and South Korea. But their research also examines new and emerging areas that transcend traditional borders – the drug war in Mexico and expanding terrorism networks. FSI researchers look at the changing methods of warfare with a focus on biosecurity and nuclear risk. They tackle cybersecurity with an eye toward privacy concerns and explore the implications of new actors like hackers.

Along with the changing face of conflict, terrorism and crime, FSI researchers study food security. They tackle the global problems of hunger, poverty and environmental degradation by generating knowledge and policy-relevant solutions. 

Views of Nuclear Risk by Non-Nuclear-Weapon States

-

For spring quarter 2022, CISAC will be hosting hybrid events. Many events will offer limited-capacity in-person attendance for Stanford faculty, staff, fellows, visiting scholars, and students in accordance with Stanford’s health and safety guidelines, and be open to the public online via Zoom. All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 

REGISTRATION

Zoom

(Open to all)


In Person

(Stanford faculty, visiting scholars, staff, fellows, and students only)

                                                                                           

About the Event: Mainstream accounts of nuclear politics tend to focus on the actions of nuclear-weapon states (NWS), offering incomplete interpretations of the participation of non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) in the global nuclear order. These approaches usually portray NNWS as potential sources of nuclear instability and proliferation, especially those with the technical capabilities to build nuclear arsenals. However, NNWS have actively designed mechanisms to manage nuclear risks and crafted institutions to enforce them. Thus, this panel explores the agency of NNWS in nuclear politics to build a more comprehensive and accurate interpretation of their role in the global nuclear order. The presentations will explore how NNWS with developing economies balanced security and development in the negotiations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, how NNWS in various latitudes built regional mechanisms to manage nuclear risks with different levels of success, and how NNWS address fears that NWS might drag them into precipitous nuclear conflicts.


About the Speakers: 

Dr. Ryan A. Musto is the Director of Forums and Research Initiatives with the Global Research Institute at William & Mary. He holds a Ph.D. in history from The George Washington University, master’s degrees in international and world history from Columbia University and the London School of Economics, and a B.A. in history from New York University. Dr. Musto has served as a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at MIT and as a MacArthur Nuclear Security fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. He is a Cold War and nuclear historian with concentrations in U.S. and Latin American diplomatic history. Dr. Musto is currently writing a book on the international history of nuclear weapon free zones.

Dr. J. Luis Rodriguez is a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. He holds a Ph.D. and M.A. from the Department of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University. His research studies how the Global South builds and maintains limits on the use of force in international law and organization. Dr. Rodriguez focuses primarily on the negotiations to codify nuclear arms controls and humanitarian-intervention norms. Before joining the Ph.D. program at Johns Hopkins, he was a junior advisor to the Mexican Vice-Minister for Latin American Affairs, working on international security cooperation.

Dr. Lauren Sukin is currently a MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. In September 2022, she will join the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science as an Assistant Professor of International Relations. Dr. Sukin holds a Ph.D. and M.A. from the Department of Political Science at Stanford University. She also holds A.B.s from the Departments of Political Science and Literary Arts at Brown University (2016). Dr. Sukin’s research examines issues of international security, focusing on the role of nuclear weapons in international politics.

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to William J Perry Conference Room in Encina Hall may attend in person. 

Luis Rodriguez
Lauren Sukin
Ryan Musto
Seminars
Research Seminar Series

Reducing Nuclear Danger

-

For spring quarter 2022, CISAC will be hosting hybrid events. Many events will offer limited-capacity in-person attendance for Stanford faculty, staff, fellows, visiting scholars, and students in accordance with Stanford’s health and safety guidelines, and be open to the public online via Zoom. All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 

SEMINAR RECORDING

YouTube

                                                                                           


About the Event: Many scholars and policy-makers have stated that the war in Ukraine, the spread of nuclear weapons to new states, and the lack of arms control agreements outside of the New Start treaty make the world extremely dangerous.  Indeed, the Doomsday Clock of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists currently stands at 100 seconds to midnight, the closest to doomsday since the clock was invented in 1947. Is this estimate true and, if so, what can the leaders and people of the world do to reduce the risks? Following Dr. Perry's lecture will be a panel discussion with Governor Jerry Brown, Dr. Scott Sagan, Dr. Martin Hellman, and Ambassador Rose Gottemoeller. Dr. Perry will also be honored with the Cranston Peace Prize. This event is cosponsored by the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and the Global Security Institute (GSI). 

About the Speaker: William Perry is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor (emeritus) at Stanford University. He is a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute and the Hoover Institution, and serves as director of the Preventive Defense Project. He is an expert in U.S. foreign policy, national security and arms control. He was the co-director of CISAC from 1988 to 1993, during which time he was also a part-time professor at Stanford. He was a part-time lecturer in the Department of Mathematics at Santa Clara University from 1971 to 1977.

Perry was the 19th secretary of defense for the United States, serving from February 1994 to January 1997. He previously served as deputy secretary of defense (1993-1994) and as under secretary of defense for research and engineering (1977-1981). Dr. Perry currently serves on the Defense Policy Board (DPB). He is on the board of directors of Covant and several emerging high-tech companies. His previous business experience includes serving as a laboratory director for General Telephone and Electronics (1954-1964); founder and president of ESL Inc. (1964-1977); executive vice-president of Hambrecht & Quist Inc. (1981-1985); and founder and chairman of Technology Strategies & Alliances (1985-1993). He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

From 1946 to 1947, Perry was an enlisted man in the Army Corps of Engineers, and served in the Army of Occupation in Japan. He joined the Reserve Officer Training Corps in 1948 and was a second lieutenant in the Army Reserves from 1950 to 1955. He was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1997 and the Knight Commander of the British Empire in 1998. Perry has received a number of other awards including the Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal (1980 and 1981), and Outstanding Civilian Service Medals from the Army (1962 and 1997), the Air Force (1997), the Navy (1997), the Defense Intelligence Agency (1977 and 1997), NASA (1981) and the Coast Guard (1997). He received the American Electronic Association's Medal of Achievement (1980), the Eisenhower Award (1996), the Marshall Award (1997), the Forrestal Medal (1994), and the Henry Stimson Medal (1994). The National Academy of Engineering selected him for the Arthur Bueche Medal in 1996. He has received awards from the enlisted personnel of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force. He has received decorations from the governments of Albania, Bahrain, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Korea, Poland, Slovenia, and Ukraine. He received a BS and MS from Stanford University and a PhD from Pennsylvania State University, all in mathematics.

Bechtel Conference Center
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305

William J. Perry
Scott Sagan
Gov. Jerry Brown
Rose Gottemoeller
Martin Hellman
Seminars

Semiconductors, Supply Chains and Industrial Policy

headshots of Annet Aris, Sarah V. Stewart, Eva Maydell and Pierre-Arnaud Proux

Join us Tuesday, May 3rd from 12 PM - 1 PM PT for a webinar on Semiconductors, Supply Chains and Industrial Policy featuring Annet Aris of INSEAD, Sarah V. Stewart of Silverado Policy Accelerator Eva Maydell of the European Parliament and Pierre-Arnaud Proux, member of Executive Vice-President Margrethe Vestager’s Cabinet, in conversation with Marietje Schaake of the Cyber Policy Center. This weekly seminar series is jointly organized by the Cyber Policy Center’s Program on Democracy and the Internet and the Hewlett Foundation’s Cyber Initiative.

About The Seminar: 

A conversation exploring the economic and policy challenges resulting from the recent global chip shortage, with a discussion of issues such as protections against technology transfer efforts, the attraction and retention of high-skilled talent, and the strategic significance of the industry in light of accelerating digitization. How should the US and European governments tackle China’s market-distorting subsidies? How can onshore chip factory capacity be strengthened and secured? 

Together, this group will explore the history and future of the semiconductors industry and how policymakers across the Atlantic should respond to both vulnerabilities and opportunities.

About the Speakers

Annet Aris is Senior Affiliate Professor of Strategy at INSEAD. She joined INSEAD in 2003, her focus is on Digital transformation and disruption and its impact on society, industries and companies. She was nominated in 2010 and 2011 for the best teacher award by the MBA students. Annet has also extensive experience as a non-executive board member of a variety publicly listed companies across Europe. Currently she serves at the boards of Rabobank Group, Randstad NV, a global leader in HR services, the microchip machine manufacturer ASML NV, the intralogistics and forklift truck manufacturer Jungheinrich AG and the insurance company A.S.R. Netherlands N.V. Annet ranks in the top 10 most influential corporate directors in The Netherlands.

Sarah V. Stewart is the Executive Director of Silverado Policy Accelerator. Ms. Stewart has nearly two decades of experience as an international trade lawyer, trade policy expert, and trade negotiator. Immediately prior to joining Silverado, Ms. Stewart led the public policy efforts at Amazon on U.S. trade policy and export controls matters. From 2013 to 2018, Ms. Stewart worked for the Office of the United States Trade Representative, with her most recent position being the Deputy Assistant USTR for Environment and Natural Resources. During her time at USTR, Ms. Stewart was the lead environment chapter negotiator for the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations with the European Union. Prior to joining USTR, Ms. Stewart served in different legal and policy roles at The Humane Society of the United States and Humane Society International, including spearheading a first ever international legal group.

Eva Maydell is a Bulgarian Member of the European Parliament. In 2017, she was the first woman elected as President of the European Movement International (EMI), the largest pan-European network of civil society organizations. It is present in 34 countries and encompasses 38 International Associations. Maydell was first elected to the European Parliament in 2014 at the age of 28, the youngest member of the European People's Party (EPP) Group at the time. She was re-elected in 2019 and is serving her second term as an MEP.

Pierre-Arnaud Proux is a member of Executive Vice-President Margrethe Vestager’s Cabinet. He leads the Cabinet’s work on industrial policy, the internal market, space policy, and Important Projects of Common European Interest. He previously worked at DG Competition, assessing public support to the financial sector as well as aid to the real economy channelled through financial intermediaries.

Marietje Schaake (Moderator) is international policy director at Stanford University Cyber Policy Center and international policy fellow at Stanford’s Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence. Between 2009 and 2019, Marietje served as a Member of European Parliament for the Dutch liberal democratic party where she focused on trade, foreign affairs, and technology policies. Marietje is an (Advisory) Board Member with a number of nonprofits including MERICS, ECFR, ORF and AccessNow. She writes a monthly column for the Financial Times and a bi-weekly column for the Dutch NRC newspaper.

 

Marietje Schaake
Annet Aris
Sarah V. Stewart
Eva Maydell
Seminars

Beijing Is Used to Learning from Russian Failures

Authors
Oriana Skylar Mastro
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

This commentary first appeared in Foreign Policy.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been a double disaster for President Vladimir Putin, as he faces a poorly performing military combined with an inability to shield his country from economic punishment. Both of these possibilities historically have also been sources of apprehension for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). But China’s leadership turned its anxiety into action about 10 years ago, deliberately working to fix many of the problems and minimize the risks currently plaguing Russia in Ukraine.

One result is that the Chinese military is more likely to perform well even though it has not fought a war since 1979, when it lost thousands of troops in a punitive but brief invasion of Vietnam. Adding to that, China’s economy is both far larger and deliberately more diversified than Russia’s. A sanctions effort like the one presently aimed at Russia would be much harder to sustain against China. These two observations do not mean deterrence won’t hold, only that the unfolding events in Ukraine will likely do little to make Beijing more cautious.

Nearly everyone overestimated Russia’s military capabilities—including probably Putin himself. During its invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s air-ground coordination has been ineffective, and Russian forces have shown risk-adverse tendencies in the air. Russia has also struggled with logistics and keeping its military supplied. Notably, it appears that Russia acted on bad intelligence and therefore did not believe initial strikes that maxed out its firepower were necessary. Furthermore, many Russian weapons platforms are outdated (for example, its Cold War-era tanks), and modern Su-57 fighter jets and T-14 Armata tanks only exist in comparatively small numbers.

The Chinese military used to clearly exhibit the same deficiencies. But over the past decade, it has embraced significant reforms, creating a much more capable fighting force that should give even the United States pause.

Sign up for APARC newsletters to receive our experts' commentary and analysis.

 

Chinese President Xi Jinping identified similar training and competency issues [to the human element of Russia’s failures in Ukraine] in the PLA 10 years ago. But under his command, the PLA has been proactively implementing significant reforms to avoid similar pitfalls.

First, while Russia allowed its conventional capabilities to atrophy, Chinese military spending has exploded over the past three decades, increasing by 740 percent (in comparison to Russia’s 69 percent) from 1992 to 2017. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, China spent almost four times on its military in 2020 than Russia ($244.9 billion to $66.8 billion). In 1999, less than 2 percent of its fighter jets were fourth-generation, 4 percent of its attack submarines were modern, and none of its surface ships were. Twenty years later, not only did China have much more of everything, but the majority was the most advanced, modern versions available—with China exhibiting advantages over Russia, even in combat aircraft, a traditional area of weakness for China.

Indeed, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) commentators often refer to China’s economic might as one of the reasons their military would outperform Russia’s—Russia has been “stingy” with its military modernization and production of precision-guided munitions primarily because of a lack of resources. By contrast, China has more than 2,200 conventionally armed ballistic and cruise missiles, making the PLA Rocket Force the world’s largest ground-based missile force. Estimates place the number of missiles positioned against Taiwan alone at around 1,000.

Russia’s poor performance does remind us that it takes more than just a lot of fancy systems to win a war (though having more advanced systems and more of them surely would have helped). The human element of Russia’s failures is front and center. Putin probably did not have an open and honest communication channel with the military, which was fearful of providing unfavorable information to the erratic leader. Russian troops were largely considered incompetent, but Putin thought superior technology could overcome human deficiencies.

Chinese President Xi Jinping identified similar training and competency issues in the PLA 10 years ago. But under his command, the PLA has been proactively implementing significant reforms to avoid similar pitfalls. And unlike Putin, who apparently believed technology could overcome deficiencies in personnel, Xi came to the opposite conclusion. When he came to power, he took one look at the military and recognized that with all its fancy equipment, the PLA probably could not fight and win wars and perform the missions it had been assigned. Of particular importance, according to China’s national military strategy, was to fight local wars under informationalized conditions. This meant that the network between platforms and people—the ease of connectivity—was the main feature of modern warfare. China needed the best equipment; an advanced command, control, computers, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) network; and tons of precision-guided munitions. But perhaps most importantly, it needed troops that could leverage these systems to conduct seamless operations across services and top-down through the chain of command.

The Chinese military is learning lessons from Ukraine, whether it is to stockpile more precision-guided munitions, ensure solid command and control, or cut off internet access [...], which will only serve to improve its warfighting capability in the future.

What followed was a series of slogans—the two incompatibles, two inabilities, two big gaps, the five incapables—all designed to point out the organizational and personnel issues of the military and focus leadership attention and resources on fixing the issue. A massive military reorganization followed with moves such as reorganizing effective combat units to be smaller so that they can mobilize more quickly and can remain self-sufficient for long periods of time. This means, in contrast with the Russian military, the PLA will likely have less reliance on generals at the front lines. China also established theater commands to facilitate joint operations and prioritized realism in its military exercises to help it prepare for real combat. Part of all of this was Xi’s demand that the military communicate its failures and weaknesses so that they could be addressed. Moreover, to improve command and control, China has moved toward engaging in multidomain joint operations all while standing up a new joint operations center that will ensure that, unlike with the Russian military, orders will be communicated and understood at the lowest levels. Indeed, the main reason that Xi has not yet made a play for Taiwan is likely his desire to hone this command and control structure and practice joint operations in realistic conditions for a few more years—a cautious and pragmatic approach that the situation in Ukraine only encourages further.

The PLA itself acknowledges that it still has some distance to go with training, particularly with regard to joint operations, but it looks as if the hard work is paying off. The complexity and scale of China’s national military exercises are eye-opening. It takes a great deal of planning, synchronization, and coordination to take service-level operations to the joint level. China appears to have made great strides in this area. The United States has observed, for example, China executing deep-attack air operations in its exercises that have combined intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) with multi-domain strike; lift for rapid mobility and advanced fighter manuevers. Russia has relied heavily on artillery and tanks, now and historically, while the PLA is showing a more balanced approach to combined arms operations.

For all these reasons, we should not expect the Chinese military to perform as poorly in its first real military operation since 1979. The PLA is structurally superior to the Russian military. And the Chinese know it. Granted, it’s hard to know whether some of the outlandish claims in the Chinese media are true—that the PLA Air Force would actually “be able to take out the Ukrainian air force in one hour.” But one thing is for certain—the Chinese military is learning lessons from Ukraine, whether it is to stockpile more precision-guided munitions, ensure solid command and control, or cut off internet access to prevent the leaking of information to the West, which will only serve to improve its warfighting capability in the future.

That does not mean it’s perfect. China is still in the process of building its corps of noncommissioned officers, recruiting more college graduates and technical experts so as to be less reliant on conscripts and shift away from an officer-heavy structure. Also, there is always the possibility that Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, which has impacted even the highest levels of the military, may begin to impinge on these reforms. But to date, it seems that those against necessary reforms have been largely targeted. In other words, Xi has not had to choose yet between his goals of consolidating domestic power and the professionalization of the armed forces.

The economic side is less about what has happened in the past six weeks than what will happen in the next six months or even six years. As tempting as it is in the case of Russia’s invasion, the impact of economic sanctions cannot be properly evaluated over a short time period. The need for a longer time horizon also applies to Russia-China economic comparisons, as it will generally require more extensive and more durable sanctions to deter or compel China than it would Russia.

Russia is thought, at least, to be highly vulnerable to sanctions applied to date. And it is certainly the case that China can be harmed by sanctions. Beijing is more integrated in global trade and finance than Moscow and thus has more to lose. But integration cuts both ways—compared with Russia, more countries would be harmed to a greater extent by equivalent actions taken against China. Further, China has demonstrated greater capacity to weather extended economic blows. This combination of features reduces the willingness of the United States and others to enforce durable sanctions, a fact that Beijing well appreciates.

The CCP survived three decades of worse poverty than experienced by the Soviet Union at the time, a self-inflicted depression in 1989-90 paralleling in some respects the events that ended the Soviet Union, the global financial crisis, and another partly self-inflicted economic wound via China’s determination to maintain its zero-COVID policy in 2021-22.

During more recent events, Beijing has been able to mobilize first greater capital resources than Moscow and then far greater. In 2020, the World Bank put China’s gross fixed capital formation at 20 times Russia’s. Xi attacked some of China’s richest citizens, as well as other elements of the private sector, in part because he believed them too intertwined with foreign capital. These were voluntary steps by China that mirror how the world currently seeks to punish Russia. Whatever their wisdom, Xi knows China can afford them, while Russia’s capability is in doubt.

Some Russian foreign reserves have been effectively frozen and some financials excluded from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), limiting international transactions. In the short term, these steps could have a similar impact on China, but they would be much harder to sustain.

Beijing has conducted currency swaps with dozens of countries that will want their renminbi to be useful. China also holds foreign government bonds in amounts that countries cannot ignore. U.S. Treasurys see the largest holdings, but there are also sizable quantities of Japanese government bonds, for instance. With official Chinese reserves upwards of $3 trillion, perhaps five times Russia’s, a partial freeze would quickly wear on governments and firms looking for bond buyers.

For any SWIFT restrictions that interfere with outbound U.S. portfolio investment, that volume stood at $85 billion in Russia and $1.15 trillion in China in 2020. The stock of U.S. direct investment was 10 times higher in China than Russia—companies willing to exit Russia would face leaving a lot more behind in a China contingency. Most broadly, the yuan can erode the role of the dollar; the ruble certainly cannot. Beijing lacks the will to allow free movement of the yuan and make it a true reserve currency, but heavy, durable sanctions might change that.

On the goods side, existing pressure to spare Russian vital exports would be more intense in China’s case. The loss of Russian oil and gas exports of $230 billion in 2021 threatens energy markets. Chinese exports are at least as important within chemicals, textiles, household appliances, industrial machinery, and consumer electronics. Would they all be exempted?

Certain Russian exports, such as palladium, play supply chain roles beyond their direct financial value. As expected from its manufacturing and export volumes, China’s supply chain participation is far larger than Russia’s, extending from inputs crucial to global pharmaceuticals to processed rare earths crucial to clean-energy applications. Russian ships have been banned from some ports. By tonnage, Russia accounts for a bit over 1 percent of the world’s commercial fleet, while China accounts for more than 11 percent. Banning Chinese ships would cause seaborne trade to noticeably contract, hitting supply chains that would already be strained by the diversion of Chinese goods.

Even an area of clear Russian advantage—lower import dependence—is double-edged. Inhibiting Chinese imports of iron ore or integrated circuits, for example, would hit the country hard. But China is such a huge purchaser that many producers would refuse to join a sustained embargo against it. As elsewhere, the barriers to Russian imports adopted thus far could hurt China only in the unlikely event that they are maintained for many months.

From how to remain in power to how to advance on the international stage, militarily and economically, the CCP has been learning what not to do from the Russian or Soviet experience for decades. Chinese strategists are unquestionably evaluating whether the nature of warfare has changed or if they failed to consider some critical factors necessary for success. Chinese economists are certainly looking to identify missed vulnerabilities based on how the economic dimension of the war in Ukraine plays out—and will work to address them to prevent exploitation by the United States and others.

Not that it will all be easy for Beijing. But China is already better prepared than Russia, economically and militarily. The steps to support Ukraine and punish Russia are immediately less potent in a China contingency. And an unfortunate side effect of the tragedy in Ukraine is that China has a relatively low-cost opportunity to learn—it may become a more formidable challenger than it would’ve been otherwise. The United States and its allies should realize that their effectiveness with regard to Russia is highly unlikely to translate. In a Taiwan contingency, the United States must be able to immediately implement both a stronger package of actions aimed at China and also a second package aimed at minimizing the long-term cost of the first.

Read More

Protesters display placards in front of the Representative Office of the Moscow-Taipei Coordination Commission to protest against Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine on February 25, 2022 in Taipei, Taiwan.
Commentary

Invasions Are Not Contagious

Russia’s War in Ukraine Doesn’t Presage a Chinese Assault on Taiwan
Invasions Are Not Contagious
millward
News

Unpacking the Crisis in Xinjiang: James Millward on China's Assimilationist Policies and U.S.-China Engagement

APARC Visiting Scholar James Millward discusses PRC ethnicity policy, China's crackdown on Uyghur Muslims and other minorities in Xinjiang province, and the implications of the Xinjiang crisis for U.S. China strategy and China's international relations.
Unpacking the Crisis in Xinjiang: James Millward on China's Assimilationist Policies and U.S.-China Engagement
Hero Image
All News button
1
Subtitle

The invasion of Ukraine is offering useful lessons for the PLA.

Russo-Ukrainian War Highlights Cyber Threats to Satellite Communications

Authors
Gil Baram
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

On February 24, the first day of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, large parts of American satellite company Viasat’s KA-SAT network of high speed satellite services experienced disruptions resulting in partial network outages throughout Ukraine and several European countries. Tens of thousands of terminals suffered permanent damage and many were still offline more than two weeks later. Viktor Zhora, deputy chief of Ukraine’s State Service of Special Communication and Information Protection, described the satellite outage as “a really huge loss in communications in the very beginning of war.” Among others relying on KA-SAT are Ukraine’s military, intelligence, and police units.

Read the rest at The National Interest

Hero Image
All News button
1
Subtitle

Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine demonstrates that hypothetical scenarios of cyberattacks paralyzing satellite communications are already taking place.

Bug Bounties & Bridge-Building: Lessons from Cybersecurity Vulnerability Disclosure for Addressing Socio-Technical Harms

-

headshots of alex rice, camille francois and amit elazari

Join us on Tuesday, April 26th from 12 PM - 1 PM PT for “Bug Bounties & Bridge-Building: Lessons from Cybersecurity Vulnerability Disclosure for Addressing Socio-Technical Harms” featuring Camille François, Global Director for Trust & Safety at Niantic, Dr. Amit Elazari of Intel, and Alex Rice of HackerOne in conversation with Marietje Schaake of the Stanford Cyber Policy Center. This weekly seminar series is jointly organized by the Cyber Policy Center’s Program on Democracy and the Internet and the Hewlett Foundation’s Cyber Initiative.

About The Seminar: 

Join us for a conversation on the nascent adoption of ‘bug bounties,’ a popular bug-for-reward-style audit mechanism in the cybersecurity domain, (and related approaches, such as VDPs and pentesting) to the discovery of various social-technical harms, including those inflicted through algorithmic (or “AI”) systems. 

Following the recent publication by the Algorithmic Justice League (AJL) of a paper on the risks and opportunities presented by this shift, we are joined by one of the paper’s co-authors, Camille François, alongside practitioners with insights into these mechanisms from industry and government perspectives. Together, this group will explore these mechanisms in the context of emerging and historic practices, including as illuminated in AJL’s recent report.

Speakers:

Camille François works on the impacts of technology on society, with an emphasis on cyber conflict and information operations and currently serves as the global director of trust and safety at Niantic and is a lecturer at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. She was previously the chief innovation officer at Graphika where she oversaw its investigation, analyses and R&D teams and led the company’s work to detect and mitigate disinformation, media manipulation and harassment. François was previously a principal researcher at Google, in the “Jigsaw” team, an innovation unit that builds technology to address global security challenges and protect vulnerable users. François has advised governments and parliamentary committees on both sides of the Atlantic, investigated Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election on behalf of the U.S. Senate Select Intelligence Committee, and served as a special advisor to the chief technology officer of France. François is an affiliate scholar of the Harvard Berkman-Klein Center for Internet and Society, a Fulbright scholar and a Mozilla Fellow. She holds a masters degree in human rights from the French Institute of Political Sciences (Sciences-Po) and a masters degree in international security from the School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) at Columbia University.

Dr. Amit Elazari is a Director, Global Cybersecurity Policy at Intel Corporation and a Lecturer at University of California (UC), Berkeley School of Information Master in Information and Cybersecurity, as well as a member of the External Advisory Committee for the Center of Long Term Cybersecurity. She holds a Doctoral Degree in the Law (J.S.D.) from UC Berkeley School of Law, the world’s leading law institution for technology law, and graduated summa cum laude three prior degrees in law and business. Her research in cybersecurity, privacy and intellectual property has appeared in leading technology law and computer science journals, presented at conferences such as RSA, Black Hat, USENIX and USENIX Security, and featured at leading news sites such as The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post and the New York Times. She practiced law in Israel. 

Alex Rice is a founder and chief technology officer at HackerOne, the world's most popular bug bounty platform. Alex is responsible for developing the HackerOne technology vision, driving engineering efforts, and counseling customers as they build world-class security programs. Alex was previously at Facebook, where he founded the product security team, built one of the industry’s most successful security programs, and introduced new transport layer encryption used by more than a billion users. Alex also serves on the board of the Internet Bug Bounty, a nonprofit organization that enables and encourages friendly hackers to help build a more secure Internet.

Marietje Schaake
Camille François
Dr. Amit Elazari
Alex Rice
Seminars

Stanford University’s Korea Program Celebrates 20th Anniversary with Conference Spotlighting South Korean Wave, North Korean Geopolitics

News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

The Korea Program at Stanford's Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) will mark its 20-year anniversary with a conference focused on North Korea’s geopolitics and South Korea’s pop culture wave (Hallyu), two aspects of Korea that continue to intrigue the public. Exploring how to translate this public attention into an increased academic interest in Korea, the conference will be headlined by Ban Ki-moon, former United Nations Secretary-General, and Soo-Man Lee, Founder and Chief Producer of SM Entertainment, who will join a lineup of speakers including SUHO, leader of K-pop group EXO. The two-day event will take place on May 19 and May 20, 2022, at Stanford’s Bechtel Conference Center, and is free and open to the public.

Breaking with the format of a traditional academic conference, the event will bring together scholars and experts to envision new horizons for the field of Korean Studies. It will include panel discussions on issues such as security on the Korean peninsula, North Korean human rights, U.S.-DPRK relations, and the rising global popularity of South Korea’s soft power, with a focus on K-dramas and K-pop. Scholars from Stanford and other prestigious North American universities will join on-stage conversations with leading practitioners including Joohee Cho, Seoul Bureau Chief at ABC News, and Angela Killoren, CEO of CJ ENM America, as well as government officials including Kim Sook, the former South Korean Ambassador to the UN, and Joon-woo Park, the former South Korean Ambassador to the EU, both former visiting fellows at the Korea Program.

Kim Hyong-O, the former speaker of South Korea’s National Assembly as well as a Korea Program alum, and Geun Lee, the president of the Korea Foundation, will deliver remarks at a private dinner event, which will recognize major donors and supporters of the Program.

Conference Speakers
Conference speakers include (from left to right) Ban Ki-moon, Kathryn Moler, SUHO, Soo-Man Lee, Marci Kwon, Michael McFaul, Siegfried Hecker, Kim Hyong-O, Dafna Zur, H.R. McMaster, Michelle Cho, Gabriella Safran. |

“We are delighted to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Korea Program with such an outstanding lineup of speakers,” says Gi-Wook Shin, William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea at Stanford and the Program’s founding director. “For the past two decades, the Program has produced exceptional research on pressing issues, fostered connection between scholars and policymakers, and nurtured numerous students,” Shin notes. These accomplishments will be on display in the Korea Program’s new digital archives, which will be unveiled at the conference.

The event will also feature previews of two brand new documentaries, one on K-pop and the other on North Korean human rights, directed by Hark Joon Lee. “It is our hope that these documentaries will deepen global understanding of these issues and be used to help teach the next generation of students about Korea,” says Shin, who provided input on the films along with his research team at the Korea Program.

“We are incredibly grateful to those who have helped the Korea Program thrive over the past two decades,” notes Shin. “This conference will be an opportunity to share our thanks and reflect on our achievements while looking forward to the Program’s future.”

For conference registration, as well as the full agenda and speaker list, please visit the event page. Registration will open on Monday, May 2, 2022, at 9:00 a.m. PDT.

The conference will be live-streamed on APARC's YouTube channel.

About the Korea Program

The Korea Program at Stanford’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center is a West Coast hub of scholarship on contemporary Korea and the issues shaping the future of the Korean Peninsula and U.S.-Korea relations. Our work examines these topics from regional and comparative perspectives through cultural, political, and economic lenses. We train and support emerging Korea scholars and convene experts from academia, government, business, and civil society for dialogue, research, and publishing activities that inform policymakers in the United States and Korea and strengthen the bonds between the two countries. For more information, visit our website.

Media Advisory and Press Contact

Journalists interested in covering the conference should contact Shorenstein APARC’s Associate Director for Communications and External Relations Noa Ronkin at noa.ronkin@stanford.edu by May 17 at 9:00 a.m. PT to register. At the venue, they will be required to present a press credential from an established news organization. Freelance reporters should email a letter from the news organization for which they work to Noa Ronkin by the May 17 deadline. The press area is limited and press seating is not guaranteed.

Visit the conference webpage

Media Coverage - Yonhap News

View Article

Media Coverage - VOA Korean

Read More
Hero Image
All News button
1
Subtitle

The Korea Program at Stanford’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center will commemorate its 20-year anniversary with a two-day conference, convening eminent speakers from the K-pop industry, academia, and government, and unveiling two new documentary films.

Cyber Diplomacy and the Role of the Private Sector

-

image of Anna-Maria Osula advertising event on april 20, 2022 on a blue background

Please join us on Wednesday, April 20th for a talk with Anna-Maria Osula, visiting scholar from TalTech. At this event co-sponsored by Stanford University Libraries, Anna-Maria will be introducing her research on private sector initiatives to develop and promote cyber norms of behavior.

Research Overview:

Given the multistakeholder nature of running the Internet and governing information and communication technologies, nation-states are not the only entities interested in shaping norms of behavior for cyberspace. Non-state actors are directly impacted by any decision on international norms in cyberspace. They are also expected to behave as responsible actors, being tied by the agreements negotiated by states at the UN platform. This means that non-state actors are involved in building and promoting norms and also playing a role in their interpretation and implementation. Anna-Maria will talk about her research project where she analyzes the private sector involvement in advancing cyber norms in international fora such as the United Nations.

Bio:

Anna-Maria Osula, currently a Global Digital Governance Fellow at Stanford University, is a senior researcher at Tallinn University of Technology and a senior policy officer at Guardtime. Her current research focus is cyber diplomacy and international law applicable to cyber operations. She also serves as a research fellow at Masaryk University under the project “Cyber Security, Cyber Crime and Critical Information Infrastructures Center of Excellence.” Previously, she worked as a legal researcher at the NATO CCDCOE, undertaking projects on national cyber security strategies, international organizations, international criminal cooperation, and norms. In addition to a Ph.D. in law from the University of Tartu, she holds an LLM degree in IT law from Stockholm University.

ENCINA HALL, ROOM E008, 616 Jane Stanford Way Stanford University Stanford, CA

Anna-Maria Osula Global Digital Governance Fellow
Seminars

The Loop: How Technology is Creating a World without Choices and How to Fight Back

-

jacob ward photo with the loop book cover next to him on a blue background

Join us on Tuesday, April 19 from 12 PM - 1 PM PT for a book talk on “The Loop: How Technology is Creating a World without Choices and How to Fight Back” featuring Jacob Ward from NBC News, in conversation with Nate Persily of the Cyber Policy Center.  This weekly seminar series is jointly organized by the Cyber Policy Center’s Program on Democracy and the Internet and the Hewlett Foundation’s Cyber Initiative.

In The Loop: How Technology is Creating a World without Choices and How to Fight Back, Jake argues that AI is about to do to our ability to make decisions for ourselves what Google maps did to our ability to navigate. Drawing on interviews with over 100 scientists and 10-years of front-line reporting from the cutting edge of behavior-shaping technology, Jake’s book is a warning about our growing reliance on AI, and an encouragement to protect the best parts of being human.

Jacob Ward is a correspondent for NBC News, reporting for the TODAY show, Nightly News, MSNBC, and NBC News Now on the unanticipated consequences of science and technology in our lives. From 2018 to 2019, Jacob was a fellow at Stanford University’s Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, along with its partner the Berggruen Institute, which gave him space and companionship on the Stanford campus to write The Loop, his book about the effects of artificial intelligence on human decision making, with Hachette Book Group. Between 2016 and 2020, Jacob hosted a landmark four-hour television series on the science and implications of bias. Prior to that, he was a television correspondent for Al Jazeera, covering science and technology in the US and around the world. He was also editor-in-chief of Popular Science, the world’s largest science and technology publication.

Nathaniel Persily is the James B. McClatchy Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, with appointments in the departments of Political Science, Communication, and FSI.  Prior to joining Stanford, Professor Persily taught at Columbia and the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and as a visiting professor at Harvard, NYU, Princeton, the University of Amsterdam, and the University of Melbourne. Professor Persily’s scholarship and legal practice focus on American election law or what is sometimes called the “law of democracy,” which addresses issues such as voting rights, political parties, campaign finance, redistricting, and election administration. He has served as a special master or court-appointed expert to craft congressional or legislative districting plans for Georgia, Maryland, Connecticut, New York, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania.  He also served as the Senior Research Director for the Presidential Commission on Election Administration. His current work, for which he has been honored as a Guggenheim Fellow, Andrew Carnegie Fellow, and a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, examines the impact of changing technology on political communication, campaigns, and election administration.  He is codirector of the Stanford Cyber Policy Center, Stanford Program on Democracy and the Internet, and the Stanford-MIT Healthy Elections Project, which supported local election officials in taking the necessary steps during the COVID-19 pandemic to provide safe voting options for the 2020 election. He is also a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and a commissioner on the Kofi Annan Commission on Elections and Democracy in the Digital Age.

Nathaniel Persily
Jacob Ward
Seminars

"We Have Entered a New Historical Era": Larry Diamond on the Future of Democracy

Authors
Larry Diamond
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

In these next few minutes, I’d like to reflect on the moment we are at in world history, and what it means for the future of democracy. I know you have already heard a lot today, and will hear more tomorrow, about the war in Ukraine and its global implications. Here is my perspective.

Russia’s brutal and unprovoked aggression against Ukraine, which is now about to enter its seventh week, is the most important event in the world since the end of the Cold War.  9/11 changed our lives in profound ways, and even changed the structure of the U.S. Government. It challenged our values, our institutions, and our way of life. But that challenge came from a network of non-state actors and a dead-end violent jihadist ideology that were swiftly degraded. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the larger rising tide of authoritarian power projection, represent the return of great power competition. And more, they denote a new phase of what John F. Kennedy called in his 1961 inaugural address a “long twilight struggle” between two types of political systems and governing philosophies. Two years after JFK’s address, Hannah Arendt put it this way in her book, "On Revolution":

No cause is left but the most ancient of all, the one, in fact, that from the beginning of our history has determined the very existence of politics, the cause of freedom vs. tyranny.

That is what the war in Ukraine, the war FOR Ukraine, is about: not about Ukraine someday joining NATO, but about Ukraine — a country so important to Russia’s cultural heritage and historical self-conception — becoming a free country, a functioning liberal democracy, and thus a negation of and an insult to everything that Vladimir Putin and his kleptocratic Kremlin oligarchy cynically represent.

But it is not simply a “Resurrected Russia” (as Kathryn Stoner has termed it) that is counterposed to the global cause of freedom. The greater long-term threat comes from China’s authoritarian Communist party-state. China has the world’s fastest growing military and the most pervasive and sophisticated system of digital surveillance and control. Its pursuit of global dominance is further aided by the world’s most far-reaching global propaganda machine and a variety of other mechanisms to project sharp power — power that seeks to penetrate the soft tissues of democracy and obtain their acquiescence through means that are covert, coercive, and corrupting. It is this combination of China’s internal repression and its external ambition that makes China’s growing global power so concerning. China is the world’s largest exporter, its second largest importer, and its biggest provider of infrastructure development. It is also the first major nation to deploy a central bank digital currency; and it is challenging for the global lead in such critical technologies as AI, quantum computing, robotics, hypersonics, autonomous and electric vehicles, and advanced telecommunications.

A narrative has been gathering that democracies are corrupt and worn out, lacking in energy, purpose, capacity, and self-confidence. This has been fed by real-world developments which have facilitated the rise of populist challengers to liberal democracy.
Larry Diamond
Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at FSI

While China now innovates in many of these technologies, it also continues to acquire Western intellectual property through a coordinated assault that represents what former NSA Director General Keith Alexander calls “the greatest transfer of wealth in human history.” And every technological innovation that China can possibly militarize it does, through a strategy of “civil-military fusion.” With this accumulated power, Beijing plans to force Asia’s most vibrant liberal democracy, Taiwan, to “reunify with the motherland.” It also seeks to establish unilateral Chinese control over the resources and sea lanes of the South China Sea, and then gradually to push the United States out of Asia.

Russia’s aggression must be understood in this broader context of authoritarian coordination and ambition, challenging the values and norms of the liberal international order, compromising the societal (and where possible, governmental) institutions of rival political systems, and portraying Western democracies — and therefore, really, democracy itself — as weak, decadent, ineffectual, and irresolute. In this telling, the democracies of Europe, Asia, and North America — especially the United States — are too commercially driven, too culturally fractured, too riven by internal and alliance divisions, too weak and effeminate, to put up much of a fight.

At the same time, China, Russia, and other autocracies have been denouncing the geopolitical arrogance of the world’s democracies and confidently declaring an end to the era in which democracies could “intervene in the internal affairs of other countries” by raising uncomfortable questions about human rights. 

On the eve of the Beijing Winter Olympics on February 4, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping issued a joint statement denouncing Western alliances and declaring that there were no limits to the strategic partnership between their two countries. Many analysts believe Putin told Xi then that he was about to invade Ukraine and that Xi probably said, okay, just wait till the Olympics are over and make it quick. 

Four days after Xi’s closing Olympics fireworks display, Putin launched his own fireworks by invading Ukraine. It has been anything but successful or quick. Xi cannot possibly be pleased by the bloody mess that Putin has made of this, which helps to explain why China twice abstained in crucial UN votes condemning the Russian invasion, rather than join the short list of countries that stood squarely with Russia in voting no: Belarus, Eritrea, Syria, and North Korea. Xi must think that Putin’s shockingly inept and wantonly cruel invasion is giving authoritarianism a bad name.

Russia’s aggression must be understood in this broader context of authoritarian coordination and ambition, challenging the values and norms of the liberal international order and portraying Western democracies as weak.
Larry Diamond
Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at FSI

It is also costing China a lot of money in global trade at a time when China’s economic growth rate has slowed dramatically. And it’s undermining the narrative China was trying to push that the autocracies know what they are doing and represent the wave of the future. Moreover, this is coming at a moment when one of China’s two most important cities, Shanghai, is gripped by panic and a substantial lockdown over the Covid-19 virus, which Xi’s regime has no other means to control except lockdown, because it has refused to admit that the vaccines it developed are largely ineffective against the current strains of Covid, and instead import the vaccines that work.

All of this explains why this moment could represent a possible hinge in history as significant as the 1989-91 period that ended the Cold War. 2021 marked the fifteenth consecutive year of a deepening democratic recession. In both the older democracies of the West and the newer ones of the global South and East, the reputation of democracy has taken a beating. A narrative has been gathering that democracies are corrupt and worn out, lacking in energy, purpose, capacity, and self-confidence. And this has been fed by real-world developments, including the reckless and incompetent US invasion of Iraq, the 2008 financial crisis, steadily rising levels of economic inequality, widespread job losses, economic insecurity and status anxiety due to globalization and technological change, and the challenges of managing cultural diversity amid expanding immigration. These factors have fed or at least facilitated the rise of populist challengers to liberal democracy and the decay of democratic norms and institutions across many democracies — rich, poor, and middle-income. 

The Germans have a word for these trends in the global narrative:  “zeitgeist” — the spirit of the times, or the dominant mood and beliefs of a historical era. In the roughly 75 years since WWII, we have seen five historical periods, each with their own dominant mood. From the mid-1940s to the early 60s, the mood had a strong pro-democracy flavor that went with decolonization. It gave way in the mid-1960s to post-colonial military and executive coups, the polarization and waste of the Vietnam War, and a swing back to realism, with its readiness to embrace dictatorships that took “our side” in the Cold War. Then, third, came a swing back to democracy in southern Europe, Latin America, and East Asia, and a new wave of democracy, from the mid-1970s to around 1990. That period of expanding democracy was then supercharged by a decisively pro-democratic zeitgeist from 1990 to 2005, the so-called unipolar moment in which one liberal democracy, the U.S., predominated. That period ended in the Iraq debacle, and for the last 15 years, we have been in the tightening grip of a democratic recession and a nascent authoritarian zeitgeist. 

Could Russia’s criminal, blundering invasion of Ukraine launch a new wave of democratic progress and a liberal and anti-authoritarian zeitgeist? It could, but it will require the following things.

Freedom is worth fighting for, and democracy, with all its faults, remains the best form of government.
Larry Diamond
Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at FSI

First, Russia must fail in its bid to conquer and extinguish Ukraine. The United States and NATO must do everything possible, and much more than we are doing now, to arm and assist Ukraine militarily, and to punish Russia financially and economically.

Second, we must wage a more effective and comprehensive battle of information and ideas to expose Russia’s mendacity and criminality and to document its war crimes, not only before the court of public opinion, but in ways that reach individual Russians directly and creatively. We need an intense campaign of technological innovation to circumvent authoritarian censorship and empower Russian, Chinese, and other sources that are trying to report the truth about what is happening and to promote critical thinking and the values of the open society. In general, we need to promote democratic narratives and values much more imaginatively and resourcefully. The message of the Russian debacle in Ukraine is an old one and should not be difficult to tell: autocracies are corrupt and prone to massive policy failures precisely because they suppress scrutiny, independent information, and policy debate. Democracies may not be the swiftest decision makers, but they are over time the most reliable and resilient performers.

Third, we must ensure that we perform more effectively as democracies, and with greater coordination among democracies, to meet the challenges of developing and harnessing new technologies, creating new jobs, and reducing social and economic inequalities.

Fourth, to win the technological race, for example in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, biomedicine, and many other fields of science, engineering, and production, we must open our doors more widely to the best talent from all over, including China. We URGENTLY need immigration reform to facilitate this. As our late colleague George Shultz said:  Admit the best talent from all over the world to our graduate programs in science and engineering, and then staple green cards to their diplomas.

Finally, we have to reform and defend our democracy in the United States so that it can function effectively to address our major domestic and international challenges, and so that American democracy can once again be seen as a model worth emulating. We cannot do this without reforming the current electoral system of "first-past-the-post" voting and low-turnout party primaries, which has become a kind of death spiral of political polarization, distrust, and defection from democratic norms.

I believe we entered a new historical era on Feb 24. What the Ukrainian people have suffered already in these seven weeks has been horrific, and it will get worse. But the courage and tenacity of their struggle should renew our commitment not only to them but also to ourselves—that freedom is worth fighting for, and that democracy, with all its faults, remains the best form of government.

Larry Diamond

Larry Diamond

Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at FSI
Full Profile

Read More

Some of the original Ukrainian alumni from the Draper Hills Summer Fellowship gather in Kyiv in 2013.
News

A History of Unity: A Look at FSI’s Special Relationship with Ukraine

Since 2005, the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies has cultivated rich academic ties and friendships with Ukrainian scholars and civic leaders as part of our mission to support democracy and development domestically and abroad.
A History of Unity: A Look at FSI’s Special Relationship with Ukraine
Vladamir Putin and Xi Jinping shake hands.
News

Understanding the Global Rise of Authoritarianism

National security analyst and veteran podcaster Ben Rhodes joins Michael McFaul on World Class to discuss his new book, After the Fall: Being American in the World We've Made, and the reasons nationalism and authoritarianism are on the rise across the globe.
Understanding the Global Rise of Authoritarianism
Larry Diamond, center, with the Mosbacher family - Nancy, Bruce, Emily and Jack.
News

Larry Diamond Named Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies

CDDRL’s Larry Diamond, a world-renowned expert on comparative democracy, is recognized for a career of impact on students, policymakers and democratic activists around the world.
Larry Diamond Named Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Hero Image
All News button
1
Subtitle

Speaking at the April 2022 meeting of the FSI Council, Larry Diamond offered his assessment of the present dangers to global democracy and the need to take decisive action in support of liberal values.

Subscribe to Security