As nationalism and identity politics have come to dominate public spheres around the world, researchers strive to understand the repercussions of such political behavior. How does nationalism affect the health of a democratic system, and when might it foster well-functioning liberal democracy?

This is the central question that Gidong Kim, APARC’s 2023-25 Korea Program Postdoctoral Fellow, seeks to answer. Kim’s research, situated at the intersection of comparative politics and political economy, focuses on nationalism and identity politics, inequality and redistribution, and migration in South Korea and East Asia. He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Missouri. In his dissertation, “Nationalism and Redistribution in New Democracies: Nationalist Legacies of Authoritarian Regimes,” he investigated the micro-level underpinnings that sustain weak welfare systems in developmental states. 

As part of his fellowship, Kim works with the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL), a new initiative housed at Shorenstein APARC under the directorship of Professor Gi-Wook Shin. The Lab works to provide evidence-based policy recommendations to help implement structural reforms that foster a “Next Asia” characterized by social, cultural, and economic maturity.

On January 24, 2024, Dr. Kim will present his research at a seminar hosted by the Korea Program. You can register for the event, "Narratives of Inclusion: Evidence from South Korea’s Migration Challenge."

We caught up with Dr. Kim to hear more about his fellowship experience this academic year and what’s next. The conversation has been slightly edited for length and clarity. 

First off, can you describe your current research project?

Broadly speaking, as a comparative political scientist, I study nationalism and its behavioral consequences with a regional focus on Korea and East Asia. More specifically, because nationalism is sometimes harmful to liberal democracy, but it can also be helpful, I research when and how national sentiments have either negative or positive effects on liberal democracy through citizens’ political attitudes and behaviors, such as voting behavior, redistribution preferences, migration attitudes, and public opinion on foreign policy.  

How did you come to be interested in this topic?

I was born and raised in South Korea and earned my B.A. and M.A. in political science at a Korean university before pursuing my Ph.D. in the United States. Because I was originally interested in partisan politics, my goal was to understand how American voters think and behave, so that I can explain Korean politics using theories developed in the United States. However, as I took graduate seminars about American politics, I – both as a Korean and as an East Asian – learned that such theories could not be applied well to the Korean and East Asian context.  

It was my second year of the Ph.D. program when I had academic dissatisfaction about the discrepancy between Western theories and East Asian reality. Dr. Aram Hur, my doctoral advisor, has significantly influenced my academic interests and identity. Every conversation that I had with her led me to new insights.

In particular, we focused on nationalism, which can arise not only from each country’s different historical trajectories but also from citizens’ different interpretations and understandings of such trajectories. Since then, based on my personal experience and knowledge of Korea, I tried to challenge the extant political science theories to offer my explanation of Korean and East Asian political dynamics, especially through a lens of nationalism.  

How has your time at APARC as a Korea Program Postdoc helped your research?

APARC provides me with the best academic environment. First, everyone at the Center is open and always welcomes me whenever I need their help. For example, if I want to develop and sharpen my research ideas, I can share my ideas anytime with excellent scholars who always give me constructive feedback. I believe the in-person conversations I can have whenever necessary are the best part of APARC from which I benefit.

Moreover, both the Korea Program and APARC organize many events. Our events feature not only scholars but also policymakers. This is a tremendous help because I believe the ultimate goal of doing research is to make a better society. 

I felt that many U.S. social science Ph.D. programs, including in political science, aim to train their Ph.D. students as researchers who can write papers, less as leaders who can contribute to our communities. But the diverse events at the Korea Program and APARC keep reminding me of the importance of both roles by giving me a balanced perspective.

Are there any individuals who you connected with during your time at APARC?

Since I came here, I met diverse faculty members and excellent students. But I want to share my interactions with Research Fellow Dr. Xinru Ma and Postdoctoral Fellow Dr. Junki Nakahara. Because we share an office, we always have opportunities to discuss our research ideas, different perspectives, and even daily lives. In particular, while I’m a comparative political scientist, Xinru is an international relations (IR) scholar and Junki is a communication scholar. Because we have different academic foundations, this collaborative environment is extremely helpful for me to sharpen my research ideas.

Can you describe the new SNAPL lab and share a bit about your experience?

SNAPL is led by Prof. Gi-Wook Shin, and its full name is ‘Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab.’ As you can see from the name, SNAPL has two main goals. First, we address emerging political, social, economic, and cultural challenges in Asia that can direct the ‘next’ Asia. Second, we also try to provide ‘policy’ solutions to those challenges to make the next Asia better. In other words, our ultimate goal is to upgrade Asia to the next level.  

For those goals, we gather every week. Because Xinru, Junki, and I are leading different, but interconnected, projects at SNAPL, we share ongoing respective research at our weekly meetings with Prof. Shin as well as our two excellent research associates, Haley and Irene. 

When we discuss together, we sometimes criticize each other and sometimes cannot reach a consensus. But eventually, our active debates lead us to come up with new ideas and find solutions together. 

This weekly SNAPL meeting is my favorite time because I can share my research, get insightful feedback from Prof. Shin, learn from Xinru and Junki, and also get excellent support from both Haley Gordon and Irene Kyoung. I believe this is the best way of doing research, which is extremely rare in the social science field.

What is on the horizon for you? What's next?

First, as a junior scholar, I plan to focus on my research into nationalism and its political behavioral consequences. The projects I am leading at SNAPL focus on how the international relations context, such as the growing U.S.-China tensions and dynamics of alliance relationships, shapes global citizens’ attitudes toward neighboring countries and foreign policy. Because these projects are fundamentally related to national sentiments, by focusing on my SNAPL projects, I want to not only contribute to SNAPL as a postdoctoral fellow but also produce good research as an independent scholar.

Second, as my long-term goal, I want to further promote Korean studies in the United States. Despite the growing academic and public interest in Korea, many people still have a limited understanding of the country. 

As a scholar, one way that I can think of to offer a better explanation of Korea is to actively produce scholarly works, such as books and papers, and more importantly, to share them through diverse networks. Thus, someday in the future, I want to lead an institute for Korean Studies and create diverse channels to share such works. 

U.S.-China relations have deteriorated to a level unforeseen since the early 1960s. China’s rapid military modernization, maritime posturing, and diplomatic withdrawals signal a persistent security-focused approach from Beijing. What is to be done in an era of great power competition, where policies promoting careful coexistence and reduction of tensions are deprioritized?

In a new article for The Washington Quarterly titled “China’s America Policy: Back to the Future,” co-authors Thomas Fingar, Shorenstein APARC fellow, and David M. Lampton, a senior research fellow at the Johns Hopkins—SAIS Foreign Policy Institute and a former Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at FSI, explain the current tensions through a comprehensive analysis of the historical drivers of Chinese policy. The article enhances the understanding of Chinese grand strategy and proposes a series of policy prescriptions to help reduce the dangerous externalities of the diplomatic feud between Beijing and Washington.

March 2024 update: Thomas Fingar and David M. Lampton joined Kaiser Kuo, host of the Sinica Podcast, to discuss their Washington Quarterly article. Listen:

The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) sponsored the talk entitled "China's America Policy: Origins and Implications" by Dr. Tom Fingar on February 15, 2024. Watch:

Unhelpful Caricatures of China

Fingar and Lampton begin the article by acknowledging that U.S. policy is an important driver of Chinese behavior. They argue that U.S. policy has often been based on inaccurate and oft-counterproductive characterizations of China.

The authors challenge reductivist portrayals of Chinese strategy as purely ideological are misleading, asserting that “describing the PRC as an autocracy means interpreting its behavior as part of an ideological crusade to preserve the regime and thwart U.S. ambitions” and that  “Beijing’s Communist Party leaders, like leaders in all countries, seek to preserve their political system, but that is not their only objective.”

Fingar and Lampton also dispute the prevailing view in Washington of China as an “unstoppable juggernaut determined — and/or destined — to displace the United States and remake the international system,” emphasizing instead that current PRC behavior is better understood as the product of perceived weakness and fragility.

To manage the current impasse, the authors suggest that Washington must avoid exacerbating the situation and must shape Chinese perceptions in a way that might facilitate a transition to a more cooperative coexistence.

The True Drivers of China’s Strategy

The authors purport that, over the centuries, China’s policy options have coalesced into one of two comprehensive approaches: one that prioritizes national and regime security, and another prioritizing economic and social development.

The first approach assumes a hostile international environment and promotes “economic autarky, tighter domestic social control, ideological conformity, a leader-in-charge approach to governance, and deep suspicion of foreigners.” The second “emphasizes the gains to be made through interdependence and openness, places less emphasis on ideology, and instead underscores the importance of experts, pragmatism, initiative and innovation.”

These two drivers, in the authors’ view, neatly explain the last century of Chinese grand strategy and frame the current administration’s emphasis on security and coercive Wolf Warrior Diplomacy.

Theories of Encirclement

The authors add that, both historically and currently, an important category of factors shaping Chinese policy is assumed subversion, that is, “persistent attitudes […] centered on suspicion and fear of outsiders (foreign countries and groups) and social forces swirling in China itself [...] Almost any action that could be negative for China is perceived as taken to weaken the regime.”

Chinese commentators often cite U.S. foreign policy activities — including Secretary of State Clinton’s statements about maritime claims at the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum, the Obama Administration’s 2011 “Pivot to Asia,” NATO’s and other security groupings’ involvement in Asia, and alleged U.S. efforts to foment regime change through “peaceful evolution” — as a rationale for Beijing’s increased assertiveness.

However, Fingar and Lampton see these as excuses and contributing factors to decisions primarily motivated by concerns about a perceived growing danger of domestic instability that would impede economic growth and erode regime legitimacy.

What can be done?

In the final section of the article, the authors reflect on the poor state of U.S.-China ties, arguing that “relations will spiral unless domestic factors persuade Beijing to reprioritize growth and development.” Indeed, Xi Jinping’s return to the security-minded policy package signifies a departure from the cooperative approach prevalent in the latter half of the 20th century. The authors emphasize that an escape from the current downward trajectory in U.S.-China bilateral relations “will not occur without joint efforts and a change in the domestic politics of both societies.”

For this to happen, Beijing must first perceive less hostile intent from Washington. According to the authors, this will be no easy feat. Despite common expressions of intent to improve relations and to put a “floor” under the relationship voiced at ministerial-level meetings and recent meetings between Biden and Xi, little has improved in real terms. “Even limited and tangible efforts to pick low-hanging fruit such as mutual reduction of tariffs, restoration of academic exchanges, and reopening closed consulates remain dormant or ineffective.”

For Fingar and Lampton, Washington needs an approach that does not depend on prior or simultaneous moves by Beijing. The authors provide three concrete areas that may help bolster U.S.-China ties. The first is to avoid behaviors that push “PRC hot buttons” and trigger predictable reactions that stymie meaningful dialogue. The U.S. must continue to conduct necessary and appropriate military exercises in international waters and airspace and should call out dangerous or unprofessional actions by the PLA Navy or Air Force.

To this end, the U.S. should also avoid making statements and take actions that make it difficult for Beijing to respond positively, as “many third country observers are spring-loaded to criticize US inaction to reduce tensions [...] Conversely, PRC initiatives should be treated seriously, examined carefully, and addressed appropriately.”

The second area of improvement is to avoid declaring preconditions for discussions or taking actions that may not be in U.S. interests. Such preconditions rarely, if ever, have eased or accelerated desirable outcomes, and imposing conditions further complicates the resolution of issues and indicates to third countries that the United States is solely responsible for tensions.

To start the process, the authors suggest that “both sides ought to pick some low-hanging policy fruit like reopening consulates in Houston and Chengdu and increasing mutual media access [...] Both sides should see the benefit of having more than 350 American students studying in China.”

The third and most complicated issue is Taiwan. “Taiwan-related issues are the elephant in the room that cannot be ignored, but there is nothing to be gained by abandoning the policy of strategic ambiguity or further muddying the US position,” write Fingar and Lampton.

The authors suggest that the correct response to speculation on this issue should be “restatement of the USG position that the use of force in the Taiwan Strait is unacceptable, that there will be absolutely no support for Taiwan independence unless Taipei and Beijing peacefully reach agreement, and that relations between the people of Taiwan and the United States will remain unofficial [...] Washington needs to stop nibbling around the edges of the One China Policy.”

Only when progress is made on these three areas will perceived threats to Beijing begin to diminish. In the meantime, the current U.S. and Chinese framework of great power competition that “justifies efforts to hobble the other, is harmful to both countries and impedes international efforts to address global challenges.”

The authors deploy the “first law of holes” as a good place to start: “When you are in a hole as we are now in the relationship with China, stop digging. Making things worse is a poor way to seek improvement.” A reduction in tensions will not be easy, but tangible and modest measures to avoid hostility and work toward bounded competition and even cooperation on transnational challenge areas like pandemic disease and climate change mitigation should remain a possibility.