Why did state-building efforts in Afghanistan fail? In a CDDRL Seminar Series talk, University of Pittsburgh Professor of Public and International Affairs Jennifer Brick Mutrazashvili argued that the answer lies in the bureaucratic legacies the country inherited from the Soviet era.

Building on her fieldwork in Afghanistan and long engagement with relevant stakeholders on the ground, Murtazashvili explained that the country’s domestic institutions remained static even after the 2001 US-led intervention. Even though presidential elections were convened and a nominally democratic process was put in place, Afghan political institutions retained their longstanding feature. That is, power remained centralized by the executive without any meaningful devolution of authority to subnational structures, notwithstanding the persistence of informal governance bodies at the local level in some parts of the country.

Executive centralization of power was due to the persistence of governance patterns dating back to the Soviet era. These patterns were shaped by the influx of Soviet aid beginning in the 1950s. Soviet influence helped build highly centralized and dysfunctional institutions, which persisted through 2001. Instead of restructuring these institutions after 2001, the international community worked to preserve their centralized features, fearing that decentralization could empower local warlords. This approach aligned with the interest of national leaders who saw centralization as key to their hold on power and control over state resources. 

The Afghan public was uneasy about continued centralization. Public opinion data underscored the widespread sentiment that opportunities for participation in government were limited. People wanted to be represented by local leaders. Numerous protests broke out when the Kabul national leadership handed governorships to individuals hailing from regions other than the ones they were tasked with governing. 

These dynamics deepened feelings of disenfranchisement among communities residing outside the capital. Participation in elections declined as Afghans were disillusioned by the lack of change. With the waning of trust in democratic institutions and people failing to experience tangible change in how they are governed, the political fortunes of the Taliban grew. 

State building, Murtazashvili argued, failed in breaking from the Soviet-era legacies of centralization.

How serious is the threat to democracy in the United States and around the world? In a CDDRL/TEC REDS Seminar talk, Daniel Treisman argued that claims of a global democratic decline and authoritarian backsliding are exaggerated and lack empirical evidence.

Treisman, who is a professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles, questioned the assertion that the proportion of democracies in the world has been decreasing, showing, that, according to Polity data, it stands at an all-time high. At worst, the proportion has been plateauing, according to V-Dem ratings. Indeed, V-Dem’s liberal democracy rating and Freedom House’s “free state” rating have downscored a number of countries in recent years. Yet, Treisman indicated, inconsistencies across the two lists of downgraded countries suggest that the evidence is unclear and the assessments behind these trends are subjective. Although the momentum of democratization has slowed down in recent times, Treisman added, we have not entered a period of total decline. 

How much of the recent trend in democratic breakdown was expected? Treisman’s analysis shows that a country’s level of economic development and democratic history were strong predictors of decline, which is consistent with prior theoretical expectations. Most countries that democratized during the third wave were poorer than the average democracies worldwide. They were also – by definition – newer. These two factors made them prone to backsliding, and according to the model, the breakdowns that we have observed can be attributed to these two factors.

Treisman also challenged proliferating claims that the United States faces a serious risk of a democratic breakdown. Based on its income level and long democratic experience, the odds of breakdown are extremely low. That said, erosion in the quality of democracy is still quite plausible. 

Finally, Triesman questioned the notion that falling public support for democracy and erosion of elite norms have been driving observed incidents of democratic decline. Popular support for democracy seemed relatively high in backsliding democracies. Given how difficult it is to quantify shifts in elite norms, there has yet to be clear cross-national evidence showing an association between elite norms and democratic backsliding.

While Treisman believes there is no evidence to justify extreme alarmism around the issue of global democratic decline, the possibility of chaos and unfairness at the margins of established democracies warrants much attention and vigilance.

How and why do armed actors intervene in democratic politics? In a CDDRL seminar series talk, postdoctoral fellow Andres Uribe presented a multifaceted theory explaining the strategies violent groups adopt to influence democratic processes. The talk drew on Uribe’s research on Colombia and Peru.

Uribe shows that armed groups face a choice between co-opting or undermining democracy. More specifically, groups pursuing co-optation try to influence the existing political process through either “corruption” or “capture.” Corruption entails the use of positive inducement to shape the behavior of elected officials or voters, whereas capture entails the use of the threat of force to achieve similar goals.

Those groups seeking to attack democracy do so through two different strategies. The first is “delegitimization,” which could involve attacks on elections and voting sites. The second is “displacement” or the violent removal of the democratic system and its replacement with an entirely different political order.

What determines a given armed group’s choice of strategies (i.e., corruption, capture, delegitimization, or displacement)? The answer, according to Uribe, is determined by the group’s ideological compatibility with democracy and its coercive capacity. Among groups professing ideologies compatible with democracy, they are likely to engage in corruption under low levels of coercive capacity, and capture under higher levels. As for groups whose aims are incompatible with the democratic process, they tend to pursue delegitimization when their coercive capacity is low, and displacement at higher levels of coercive capacity.

Uribe tested his theory based on a paired comparison of Peru’s Sendero Luminioso (SL) and Colombia’s FARC. To characterize each group’s relative ideological compatibility with democratic politics, he drew on a corpus of 7500 documents spanning 21 Latin American countries. He found FARC to be more compatible with democracy than the average armed actor, while SL was less compatible.

To measure coercive capacity, Uribe used data on coca production and cocaine retail pricing in the US as reflective of SL’s and FARC’s military finances. Using casualties in attacks against democracy as an indicator, he found that when FARC possessed a high coercive capacity, there was a slight increase in the number of victims, whereas a similar increase in Sendero’s capacity yielded a 15-fold increase in the number of deaths.

Uribe’s analysis shows that during electoral contests, FARC attempted to reduce the conservative vote share, whereas SL attempted to reduce overall turnout. These outcomes are consistent with Uribe’s theory — FARC’s compatibility with democracy pushes them to work within the system, focusing their attacks on the other party. Sendero, conversely, attempts to prevent all participation in the democratic process.

Uribe’s findings suggest the importance of ideology in understanding how armed actors behave and emphasizes that they do not all share the same motivations. His work also highlights the way some groups play the democratic game using violence, a choice previously seen as mutually exclusive.

In a CDDRL seminar series talk, Daniel Chen — Director of Research at the French National Center for Scientific Research and Professor at the Toulouse School of Economics — examined whether data science can improve the functioning of courts and unlock their impact on economic development. Improving courts’ efficiency is paramount to citizens' confidence in legal institutions and proceedings.

In a nationwide experiment in Kenya, Chen and his co-authors employed data science techniques to identify the causes of case backlog in the judicial system. They developed an algorithm to identify major sources of court delays for each of Kenya’s 124 court stations. Based on the algorithm, they compiled a one-page report — specific to the local court and tailored to that month’s proceedings — which provided an analysis of court adjournments, reasons for delay, and tangible action items.

To measure the effect of these one-pagers, Chen established two treatment groups and one control. Those in the first treatment group received a singular one-pager, sent just to the courts. The second received one for the courts and one for a Court User Committee (CUC). The committee, which consists of lawyers, police, and members of civil society, was asked to discuss the one-pagers during their quarterly meetings. 

To measure the relevant effects, the authors examined three primary outcomes, namely: (1) adjournment (or case delay) rates; (2) quality and citizen satisfaction; and (3) measures of economic development, including contracting, investment, and business creation. 

Results showed the intervention was associated with a 22 percent improvement in adjournments, or a decline in trial length by 120 days. They found that there was no effect on either the number of cases filed or the proxies for quality. Citizen satisfaction rates also went up, with a reduction in complaints about speed and quality, and the intervention was associated with an increase in formal written contracts and higher wages.

In a CDDRL research seminar, postdoctoral fellow María Ignacia Curiel presented her research findings on the impact of institutional safeguards on rebel party mobilization. Commonly found in post-civil war contexts, institutional safeguards, such as guaranteed seats in elected bodies, are often employed to placate rebel groups and integrate them into peaceful politics. They are often viewed as essential to a peaceful democratic transition and preventing future recidivism. But how do these safeguards impact rebel party mobilization? Based on extensive research on Colombia’s “Comunes,” a party established by the rebel group the FARC in 2016, Curiel finds that guaranteed parliamentary representation disincentivized the participation of the party’s civilian base.

Curiel’s study surveyed 251 members of Comunes’ base from 74 municipalities. Of those surveyed, 46 percent were ex-combatants, and the rest were civilians. Participants were asked questions measuring their support for the party, as well as their plans to engage in activities related to the upcoming regional elections, such as voting, campaigning, etc. A randomly assigned audio recording “primed” the subjects by reminding them of the terms of the peace agreement, specifically the stipulation that ten seats of the national legislature would be reserved for Comunes lawmakers. 

Among civilians, those treated with the prime were less likely to invest time in party-building activities relative to the control group. According to Curiel, this is attributed to the fact that those reminded of the seat reservations are more aware that their individual efforts matter less for party survival.

Among ex-combatants, however, there was no distinguishable difference in commitment to party building across primed and non-primed groups. The lack of an observed effect, Curiel argues, is not surprising, considering that ex-combatants were once willing to pursue violence on behalf of the party’s founding movement, hence their commitment to contribute to the party regardless of institutional safeguards. They may also hold closer ties to rebel commanders who now hold political positions in Congress. 

Curiel’s findings show that institutional safeguards meant to guarantee the representation of parties formed by former rebel groups may actually weaken such parties’ grassroots support.

In a CDDRL seminar series talk, FSI’s Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy Larry Diamond provided a comprehensive view of the global state of democracy. Drawing on Freedom House data, he noted that, for the first time since 2006, almost as many countries made gains in freedom as those that experienced declines. While the trend may seem promising, Diamond cautioned that the future of the current global democratic recession is anything but certain.

Diamond’s analysis draws on a democracy measure averaging three different indicators, namely those of Freedom House, Economist Intelligence Unit, and Varieties of Liberal Democracy. Although aggregate global trends show that democratic decline has been moderate since 2006, with the largest erosion occurring in Sub-Saharan Africa, the picture looks more concerning upon closer examination. Among countries with populations over 1 million, the percentage of democracies is only 43 percent, which marks a 20-percentage point drop from 2006. Considering that India and Indonesia can no longer be classified as clearly democratic, Diamond explained, only a quarter of the world’s population today live under democracies (compared to 54 percent in 2006). The ratio of democratic transitions to autocratic breakdowns, moreover, has been declining, especially in the last five years.

Diamond’s presentation underscored the centrality of the rule of law in driving democratic decline rates. Based on Freedom House data, the rule of law has lagged behind political rights and civil liberties in many countries. In explaining the roots of the democratic recession, Diamond highlighted the erosion of normative commitments to democracy, weakening institutions, and poor economic and political performance. 

Despite the alarming global trends and the setbacks suffered in longstanding democracies such as India, the illiberal populist currents driving this democratic recession can be reversed, as evidenced by the recent defeat of Poland’s Law and Justice Party at the polls. Diamond ended his talk by noting that the near-term trajectory of global democracy will largely be shaped by the outcome of elections in the United States and India in 2024.

Watch a recording of Diamond's talk below, or explore upcoming CDDRL events here.

Does decline in the rule of law bear an economic cost? In a CDDRL seminar series talk, the Center’s Gerhard Casper Fellow in Rule of Law Janka Deli addressed this question. Using European Union (EU) trade data, she challenges the conventional wisdom that deterioration in the rule of law generates decline in economic vitality, on the belief that markets tend to punish states whose conduct violates liberal rule of law norms.

In the past decade, the rule of law has declined among EU member states, with Poland and Hungry embodying this trend. While conventional wisdom assumes that rule of law and economic growth move hand in hand, Deli presented findings betraying this expectation. With the EU as a case study, Deli examines how deteriorations in the rule of law, measured in terms of breaches in international investment agreements, affect bilateral trade.

What happens to the economy when rule of law declines? Deli finds that, on average, rule-of-law-related breaches of investment agreement are associated with a decline in exports due to trade losses suffered by Spain and Italy. In contrast, among newer EU member states, that trend was in the reverse. Decline in the rule of law, evidenced by repeated breaches of investment agreements, was accompanied by an increase in exports.

In making sense of this counterintuitive trend, Deli hypothesizes that norms and expectations surrounding investment agreement breaches vary across “old” and “new” EU states. Put simply; trading partners may be employing higher standards in dealing with investment breaches involving old member states while showing more tolerance to similar violations by new member states.

Deli’s findings challenge the belief that markets’ “invisible hand” will always punish illiberal economic practices and behavior, thereby steering countries toward liberal values and commitments. In the realm of EU trade, the empirical realities suggest otherwise.

How have EU (European Union) accession and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) enlargement affected commitments to liberalism in EU countries? Claremont McKenna College Professor of Government Hilary Appel presented findings from her research on this question at a Rethinking European Development and Security (REDS) seminar, cosponsored by CDDRL, The Europe Center, and the Hoover Institution.

Appel’s talk addressed the rise of Euroscepticism, illiberalism, and economic nationalism, as expressed by populist leaders in Eastern Europe over the last decade. Whereas many assume these trends have emerged in response to EU accession and NATO enlargement, her research suggests otherwise.

As NATO and the EU extended conditional membership invitations to Eastern European countries in the 1990s, many saw these steps as opportunities for advancing liberal governance. Appel highlighted the intrusive nature of the conditions imposed on these countries in that context. Specifically, that they were required to cede policy autonomy, rewrite laws to meet EU standards, and submit to bureaucratic monitoring. 

Some have argued that the invasive nature of this process has generated domestic backlash in these countries and, as a result, a declining commitment to liberal policy, as evidenced by the growing Eurosceptic and illiberal rhetoric of populist leaders like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán. Appel’s research pushes back on this argument.

Her talk cited public opinion data showing that peaks in Euroscepticism occurred primarily in the 2010s and not during either EU accession processes. Furthermore, she added, anti-liberal sentiment does not seem to run deep in public opinion polls, even though many populist leaders continue to use Brussels as a “punching bag” for policy failures.

The rise of populism, according to Appel, coincided with a climate in which the EU was ineffective in penalizing member states for violating previously agreed upon conditions and norms. The initial success of some populist leaders who openly rejected liberal policies and values, she explains, has demonstrated that there was no real consequence for subverting EU guidelines. Thus, other politicians followed suit, embracing populist rhetoric and policies. Put simply, the assumption that EU accession would constrain leaders of new member states (and lock them in a path of liberalization) proved misguided. 

Using the war in Ukraine as a lens for assessing the strength of EU and NATO alliances, Appel finds that alliance in Europe is stronger than expected, and the war has led to a renewed appreciation of NATO. That said, the war has not necessarily caused the electorate to turn away from Eurosceptic leaders. The war has also shifted EU priorities to the extent that condemnation of illiberalism has been put on the back burner for countries like Poland largely due to their instrumental support in aiding Ukrainian refugees.