This paper describes the development of the first community service learning program for democratic education in South Africa. The Democracy Education Project, which is based on Swarthmore College's innovative Democracy Project, was designed and implemented by a Swarthmore College student working with a high school in a Black community near CapeTown. This case study demonstrates that the successful transposition of a model of community service learning from one country to another requires recognizing the complex relationships among history and culture, and theories and practices of democratic education. It is also crucial to involve the new community as an equal partner at every step of the process. Together, the Democracy and the Democracy Education Projects suggest the potential of community service learning for strengthening citizenship, and for bridging the gaps between races, in the United States as well as in South Africa.

This second edition of the highly regarded Politics in Developing Countries again presents case studies of experiences with democracy in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, along with the editors' synthesis of the factors that facilitate and obstruct the development of democracy around the world. The new edition adds a chapter on South Africa and brings the other nine studies current through 1994.

The recent developments covered in the book include:

• the reemergence of democratic politics in Chile
• the impeachment of President Collor and the crisis of democracy in Brazil
• the growing pressure for substantive democratization in Mexico
• the 1994 elections in Chile, Brazil, and Mexico
• the leadership transition in Turkey following the death of President Ozal
• the growing ethnic and religious strife in India
• the overthrow and reemergence of democracy in Thailand and the country's economic boom
• the quest for democratic consolidation in South Korea under new President Kim Young Sam
• the political and economic crisis in Nigeria
• the difficulties facing the one-party dominant regime in Senegal following the 1993 elections
• the 1994 elections and democratic transition in South Africa

The tasks of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention are neither self-evident nor value-neutral, as some of their proponents seem to believe. Diplomacy that aims to resolve long-standing conflicts may have to take sides and coerce powerful parties into concessions. Diplomacy that aims to manage conflict so that it does not become violent may have to sacrifice a quest for justice in deference to the powerful. Prevention might conflict with important national and even global interests. If, as President Clinton has suggested many times, the primary American interest in Bosnia is thwarting the spread of the war, then the arms embargo has been an unqualified success. If, however, the primary American and global interest has been denying Serbian aggression and upholding the principle of Bosnian sovereignty, then the embargo has failed.

A focus on prevention ignores the role that conflict plays in driving political change in societies. For grievances to be redressed, they must be vocalized. If they are vocalized, those with a stake in the status quo will attempt to suppress them. Often the balance of change depends on the ability of the grieved to amplify the conflict to increase their support. If we have learned anything from the disparate cases of conflict resolution in recent decades -- the civil rights movement in the United States, the fight for human rights in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the fight for national self-determination in the Middle East, the fight against apartheid in South Africa -- it is that some conflicts must be intensified before they are resolved.

Preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention do not lessen the difficulty of choices for leaders, nor do they really lessen costs. For either to succeed, policymakers must still spell out their interests, set priorities among cases, and balance goals with resources. The president will still need to educate the American people about the rationale behind a policy and convince them of the need for action. Absent well-defined interests, clear goals, and prudent judgment about acceptable costs and risks, policies of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention simply mean that one founders early in a crisis instead of later.

In April 1994, black and white South Africans for the first time will vote for a nonracial government. This watershed election is one of many recent profound changes in Southern Africa, including independence in Namibia, democratic elections in Zambia, a peace agreement in Mozambique, and renewed civil war in Angola.

The authors explore the sources and dynamics of the political, economic, and diplomatic transformations taking place in Southern Africa. They recount how Southern Africa has long endured costly, violent domestic and interstate conflicts, often complicated and intensified by external interventions and interests. They also analyze the various attempts to resolve Southern Africa's conflicts. They suggest that the democratic transition in South Africa opens the possibility to create a secure Southern Africa, but they also note that past conflict legacies and new unanticipated conflicts could stand in the way. The challenge ahead will be to create new institutions at the national and regional levels that can help political players resolve conflict without resorting to violence.

This paper examines technical and institutional possibilities for improving the ability of the international safeguards regime to prevent or slow the spread of nuclear weapons. It relies strongly on the experience of the recently uncovered Iraqi nuclear-weapons program and the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations in the discovery of the program's extent and scope.

The Iraqi program and its exposure following the Gulf War surprised and disturbed much of the international community. However, the shock generated by the extent and the size of an effort that had been suspected but remained grossly underestimated and misunderstood has given a strong political impetus to the will of the international community for strengthening the non-proliferation regime.

This paper makes a number of suggestions based on a review of the Iraqi effort and on an assessment of possible future attempts by other nations to acquire nuclear weapons.

Challenging the literatures on war termination, civil war, and revolution--which typically dismiss the possibility of negotiated settlement--Stephen Stedman examines the problem of negotiations during civil wars and demonstrates that third party mediation can help resolve such conflicts.

Stedman analyzes four international attempts to mediate a settlement to the Zimbabwean civil war of the 1970s and compares the three failed negotiations--the 1974-1975 Kenneth Kaunda/John Vorster "detente" exercise, the Henry Kissinger mediation that led to the Geneva conference of 1976, and the Anglo-American initiatives of David Owen and Cyrus Vance in 1977-1978--with the successful 1979 Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia, chaired by Lord Carrington. Drawing on primary sources not available previously, his discussion of the factors that distinguish the failures from the successful attempt is a major contribution to conflict resolution theory, particularly with reference to the work of William Zartman. A final chapter considers the lessons of the Zimbabwe experience for South Africa today.

The American policy of assisting "freedom fighters" in their struggle against "Marxist" regimes in the Third World- the so-called Reagan Doctrine- represents one of the most significant foreign policy innovations of the Reagan presidency. By the close of the Reagan administration, the policy appeared to have achieved sweeping results in forcing communism to retreat in Afghanistan, Angola, and Kampuchea. Proponents of the policy have attributed the 1988 peace settlement between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, and subsequent discussions on Angolan national reconciliation, to the Reagan doctrine"s success.