This article by Oriana Skylar Mastro originally appeared in The Interpreter, a daily publication of the Lowy Institute.

There is no end in sight for the ongoing China-India border crisis. In June, China and India’s border dispute along the LAC (Line of Actual Control) resumed after a decades-long halt to the fighting, with the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and an unspecified number of casualties on the Chinese side. After a few months of relative calm, tensions erupted in late August with “provocative military movements” near Pangong Tso Lake and a Tibetan soldier’s death in India’s Special Frontier Forces. Only a few weeks ago, both sides accused each other of firing warning shots, the first use of live fire in 45 years.

Although China and India’s foreign ministers recently agreed to disengage at talks in Moscow during the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting, troops remain massed at the border. China is reportedly building military infrastructure. Many worry that increased tensions could lead to war, especially given India’s limited options.

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As the second- and fourth-largest militaries in the world – and two nuclear powers at that – soon enter the fifth month of a standoff, the world has been relatively silent. All countries, especially the United States, should help China and India avoid an armed confrontation. Wars happen, especially over territory. And it wouldn’t be the first time the two countries have fought over this issue. Fifty-eight years ago, the two countries found themselves at war when massed Chinese artillery opened fire on a weak Indian garrison in Namka Chu Valley, in an eastern area China considers Southern Tibet and India calls Arunachal Pradesh. China launched a simultaneous assault against the western sector, clearing Indian posts north of Ladakh. After 30 days of sporadic fighting, the war came to an end with a unilateral Chinese withdrawal from much of the territory it had seized.

But such a unilateral ceasefire is extremely rare. Most contemporary conflicts end through a negotiated settlement. This means getting the two countries to talk to each other face-to-face during a war can be necessary for war termination. But my research shows this does not come easily – states are often concerned that a willingness to talk will communicate weakness to their adversary, who, in turn, will be encouraged to continue the fighting. Only when states are confident their diplomatic moves will not convey weakness, and their adversary does not have the will or capabilities to escalate is a belligerent willing to come to the negotiating table.

Continue reading Mastro's comments in The Interpreter >>

This analysis by Arzan Tarapore was originally published at The Monkey Cage by The Washington Post.

Last week, the India-China border standoff came the closest it has yet to war. As Taylor Fravel explained, the long-standing border dispute dates from the 1962 Sino-Indian War. The dispute came to a boil in May when a large force of Chinese soldiers crossed the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the disputed border between the two countries since 1962. A deadly skirmish in June temporarily raised tensions, but it was the result of tragic happenstance rather than large and risky military maneuvers.

Tensions have escalated more seriously since late August because both sides have jostled for tactical advantage, creating incentives for each side to outflank or even fight the other.

Here’s where things stand in this crisis.

Aggressive tactical maneuvers led to rising tensions

A new phase of the four-month-long border crisis opened when Indian special forces quietly occupied several peaks in the mountainous Chushul sector of Ladakh during the night of Aug. 29-30. These peaks sit on India’s side of the LAC, just south of a divided lake — Pangong Tso — but had been left unoccupied in accordance with confidence-building agreements. They were the site of tenacious fighting in the 1962 border war and hold particular tactical significance because they overlook an important pathway through the mountains between India and China.

Occupying the high ground in Chushul was designed to prevent Chinese forces from establishing an even stronger position. India also may have calculated that it could negotiate a withdrawal from those tactically valuable peaks in return for a Chinese withdrawal from areas seized after May.

Tensions rose. Indian and Chinese troops also scrambled to secure high ground overlooking new Chinese fortifications on the north bank of Pangong Tso. They reinforced their positions with additional aircraft and armor and accused each other of firing the first gunshots on the LAC since 1975. Some Indian analysts warned that China might risk war to reverse India’s occupation of the Chushul peaks.

Continue reading Arzan's full analysis on Monkey Cage at The Washington Post >>

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This op-ed by Arzan Tarapore originally appeared in The Hindu.

Over four months ago, the Chinese army entered territory that India has long considered its own, and never left. In effect, the multiple incursions have changed the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and India has lost territory, at least for the time being. How could this happen?

In part, it was a failure of the warning-intelligence system. Either Indian intelligence services did not collect sufficient data of Chinese intentions and early moves, or they did not interpret it correctly, or their policy and military customers failed to take the warning seriously. Wherever the fault lay, the system apparently failed.

In part, however, the problem also lay in the Army’s concepts for defending the country’s borders. It is, as the current crisis shows, simply not postured or prepared for the type of security threat China presents. (Continue reading the full article in The Hindu.)

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U.S. policymakers are counting on India as a natural strategic partner. They focus on India’s increasing national power and its enticing potential as a counterbalance to China. But what happens if India’s strategic preferences shift? Will it fulfill its potential so that the U.S. strategic bet pays off?

In a special report, Exploring India's Strategic Futures, published by the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), APARC South Asia Research Scholar and NBR Nonresident Fellow Arzan Tarapore identifies a set of challenges for American strategists, illustrating alternative futures of India as a strategic actor and focusing on futures that may pose challenges to U.S. security interests.

Tarapore uses a novel method of major/minor trends to demonstrate that India’s strategic preferences are not fixed but could vary discontinuously under different environmental conditions. Based on detailed historical analysis, this method offers a powerful tool to sensitize decision makers to a range of possible futures. He analyzes three plausible scenarios:

First, a revisionist India driven by Hindu-nationalist ideology to settle the score with Pakistan, which will require it to keep the China front quiet and accommodate China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Eurasia. This scenario may severely complicate U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific and its efforts to counterbalance China.

Second, a risk-acceptant Indian military that engages in brinkmanship, which may endanger strategic stability with both Pakistan and China. In this scenario, rather than keeping the Chinese military in check, India may paradoxically have the opposite effect.

Third, an India that expands its competition with China into continental Eurasia, making common cause with U.S. rivals such as Russia and Iran. This scenario illustrates the tensions in a U.S. global strategy that lacks prioritization and prompts Washington to more carefully consider its preferences in Central Asia.

Tarapore by no means suggests that such futures are likely — they are decidedly unlikely — but rather that U.S. strategists should consider them plausible. Indeed, the three scenarios are all grounded in political processes that have long existed in India, from communalism to military adaptation, to the balancing of external threats. Therefore, argues Tarapore, U.S. policymakers should not assume Indian strategic preferences are stable. They must consider scenarios in which India might challenge U.S. security interests.

Moving toward renewables

Somewhat analogous to the corn industry in the U.S., which has shifted about 40 percent of its output to ethanol production in recent years, policymakers in India – many of whom benefit financially from the sugar industry – are currently exploring how to use sugarcane to increase energy independence and shift toward renewable energy use.

The Indian government has set a goal to increase the ethanol-to-gasoline blending rate from its current rate of about 6 percent to 20 percent by 2030 and introduced several policies to promote production of ethanol from sugarcane. The increased blending rate is a “desirable goal for improved energy security,” the researchers write. However, its effects on human health and the environment will largely depend on which sugar product ends up being the main feedstock: juice extracted from crushed sugarcane, or molasses, a by-product from sugar processing.

Meeting E20 by 2030: additional sugarcane, water and land resources needed, and extra sugar produced. Meeting the 20% ethanol-to-gasoline blending rate by 2030 with ethanol produced from molasses would require additional water and land resources and produce extra sugar. In contrast, ethanol produced from sugarcane juice could meet the blending target without risking water and land resources and would reduce extra sugar. (Image credit: Lee et al. / Environmental Research Letters)

India’s national policy on biofuels only recently began allowing use of sugarcane juice in ethanol production, in addition to molasses.

“If the energy industry continues to use molasses as the bioethanol feedstock to meet its target, it would require additional water and land resources and result in the production of extra sugar,” said co-author Anjuli Jain Figueroa, a postdoctoral researcher in Earth system science. “In contrast, if the industry used the sugarcane juice to produce ethanol, the target could be met without requiring additional water and land beyond current levels.”

Using sugarcane juice to create ethanol could also help alleviate government spending to subsidize sugar and sell it below cost in its public distribution system.

Entrenched incentives

The public distribution system of sugar in India dates to the 1950s, when frequent famines plagued the country. Back then, sugar helped to meet basic calorie requirements. But today – with micronutrient deficiency leading to illness, disabilities and even death – the Indian government is more concerned with nutrition.

“In India right now, even poor populations have met their basic calorie needs,” said Naylor, who is also a senior fellow at the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment. “They have been able to buy sugar at subsidized prices, but meanwhile they don’t have access to adequate protein and micronutrients for cognitive growth and for physical well-being.”

Micronutrient content and calories of sugar and selected crops. Sugar provides empty calories with no nutritional value. (Image credit: Lee et al. / Environmental Research Letters)

Sugarcane cultivation in India has expanded in part because of policies that incentivize production, including a minimum price, guaranteed sales of sugarcane and public distribution of sugar. These regulations have become entrenched over many generations, making the crop highly profitable to the 6 million farmers in the country, but the empty-calorie crop reduces the amount of resources available for micronutrient-rich foods. 

“Using scarce natural resources to produce a crop that doesn’t fulfill nutritional needs for the second most populated country in the world can place pressure on the global food system if more and more food imports are required to meet the rising demand in India,” Naylor said.

Balancing act

The researchers focused their analysis on Maharashtra in western India, one of the country’s largest sugarcane-producing states. Sugarcane cultivation in Maharashtra has increased sevenfold in the past 50 years to become the dominant user of irrigation water. The study found that in 2010-11, sugarcane occupied only 4 percent of Maharashtra’s total cropped areas but used 61 percent of the state’s irrigation water. Meanwhile, irrigation for other nutritious food crops remained lower than the national averages.

Irrigation water use by major crops or crop groups in Maharashtra from 1970–71 to 2010–11. In Maharashtra, irrigation water use by sugarcane has increased more rapidly than any other crop over time, and sugarcane has used the highest share of total irrigation water in all time periods. (Image credit: Lee et al. / Environmental Research Letters)

“Irrigation of sugarcane in our study region is about four times that of all other crops and has doubled from 2000 to 2010. This resulted in about a 50 percent reduction of river flow over that period,” said co-author Steven Gorelick, the Cyrus Fisher Tolman Professor at Stanford Earth. “Given that this region is susceptible to significant drought, future water management is likely to be quite challenging.”

As part of continued efforts to examine the Indian sugar industry and its impacts, lead author Ju Young Lee, a PhD student in Earth system science, also developed satellite imagery analyses to identify sugarcane from space.

“Despite the importance of sugarcane in the water, food and energy sectors in India, there are no reliable sugarcane maps for recent years and in time series,” Lee said. “Using remote sensing data, I am developing current time-series sugarcane maps in Maharashtra – an important step forward.”

The researchers worked with stakeholders in India, including NGOs, academics and government officials, to focus the goals of the project. The research is part of Food Water Energy for Urban Sustainable Environments (FUSE), an international consortium supported in part by the National Science Foundation through the Belmont Forum to address competition for scarce resources in stressed urban food-water-energy systems – including the impacts of climate variability.

Naylor is also a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and a professor, by courtesy, of economics. Gorelick is also lead principal investigator of FUSE and a senior fellow at the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment.

The research was supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation.

Lead study author Ju Young Lee, center, is pictured with local farmers and agricultural experts while visiting a sugarcane field in Maharashtra in western India in August 2018. (Image courtesy of Ju Young Lee)

A team of SHP faculty and researchers, together with Stanford Medicine graduate and medical students and in collaboration with colleagues at CIDE in Mexico, have launched a modeling framework to investigate the epidemiology of COVID-19 and to support pro-active resource planning and policy evaluations for diverse populations and geographies — including California, Mexico and India.

The Stanford-CIDE Coronavirus Simulation Model — or SC-COSMO — incorporates realistic demography and patterns of contacts sufficient for transmission of the virus that has infected more than 2 million people worldwide and claimed more than 125,600 lives, according to the widely used Johns Hopkins COVID-19 map which is updated several times a day.

The SC-COSMO model also incorporates non-pharmaceutical interventions, such as social distancing, timing and effects on reductions in contacts which may differ by demography.

Jeremy Goldhaber-Fiebert, an associate professor of medicine at Stanford Health Policy, is the principal investigator of the project, along with Fernando Alarid-Escudero, an assistant professor at the Center for Research and Teaching in Economics (CIDE) in Mexico and Jason Andrews, an assistant professor of medicine (infectious diseases) at Stanford Medicine. Other SHP faculty among the 20 investigators and staff members who are working on the project are Joshua Salomon and David Studdert, both professors of medicine.

The SC-COSMO team is a multi-disciplinary, multi-institutional team including expertise and experience in infectious disease, epidemiology, mathematical modeling and simulation, statistics, decision science, health policy, health law and health economics.

“As COVID-19 transmission occurs throughout the world’s diverse populations, it is critical to efficiently model and forecast its future spread between and within these populations and to appropriately reflect uncertainty in modeled outcomes,” Goldhaber-Fiebert said. “Doing so supports timely resource planning and decision making between potentially appropriate and effective interventions that balance the trade-offs they embody.”

The team is currently working on three projects:

1. The researchers are providing California with county-level COVID-19 estimates for such things as the number of infections, detected cases and projections of future needs for hospital and ICU beds, personal protective equipment (PPE) and ventilators.
2. The project is working on potential strategies to mitigate the COVID-19 pandemic in Mexico by focusing on three specific objectives: collecting, synthesizing and openly sharing the most relevant and useful data; accelerating the development of the SC-COSMO model and its adaptation to the Mexican situation; and identifying a set of mitigation strategies, comparing the health and economic consequences in the population in the medium and long term.
3. They are developing forecast models of the COVID-19 epidemic in India with the Wadhwani Institute of Artificial Intelligence and its Indian government partners, providing a rapid response to urgent needs for planning and resource allocation.