The faculty and staff of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) at Stanford University condemn in the strongest terms the unprovoked Russian assault on Ukraine.

This attack was not motivated by any legitimate security concerns on the part of Moscow. Rather, it was designed to undermine the current democratically-elected government in Ukraine, and demonstrate the impossibility of democracy anywhere in Russia’s neighborhood. President Putin has stated clearly that he does not believe in Ukraine’s right to exist as an independent, sovereign nation; rather, he believes it is part of a greater Russia. For all the flaws in Ukrainian democracy, the vast majority of Ukrainians cherish their independence and do not want to be absorbed into a kleptocratic dictatorship.

CDDRL has a special relationship with Ukraine. For more than a decade, we have hosted a series of leadership programs that included many, many Ukrainians. These programs include the Draper Hills Summer Fellows Program, the Leadership Academy for Development, and the Ukrainian Emerging Leaders Program. We made these investments in citizens of Ukraine out of a belief that Ukraine constituted the front line in a struggle over democracy globally. There are today about 150 Ukrainian graduates of our different programs, and among them, we have many close friends and colleagues who remain in their country today fighting bravely against Russia’s unprovoked aggression. All of them are in grave danger today. In the coming days and weeks, we will do whatever we can to support them, and can only wish for the best in these very dark times.

We hope that the US government, our NATO allies, and all countries and people who cherish democracy will do their utmost to push back against this Russian aggression, and help to restore an independent, democratic Ukraine.

~ The faculty and staff of CDDRL

This commentary was originally published by The Wall Street Journal.

A Russian invasion of Ukraine would be the most consequential use of military force in Europe since World War II and could put Moscow in a position to threaten U.S. allies in Europe. Many in the American foreign-policy establishment argue that the appropriate U.S. response to any such invasion is a major American troop deployment to the Continent. This would be a grave mistake.

The U.S. can no longer afford to spread its military across the world. The reason is simple: an increasingly aggressive China, the most powerful state to rise in the international system since the U.S. itself. By some measures, China’s economy is now the world’s largest. And it has built a military to match its economic heft. Twenty-five years ago, the Chinese military was backward and obsolete. But extraordinary increases in Beijing’s defense budget over more than two decades, and top political leaders’ razor-sharp focus, have transformed the People’s Liberation Army into one of the strongest militaries the world has ever seen.

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China’s new military is capable not only of territorial defense but of projecting power. Besides boasting the largest navy in the world by ship count, China enjoys some capabilities, like certain types of hypersonic weapons, that even the U.S. hasn’t developed.

Most urgently, China poses an increasingly imminent threat to Taiwan. Xi Jinping has made clear that his platform of “national rejuvenation” can’t be successful until Taiwan unifies with the mainland—whether it wants to or not. The PLA is growing more confident in its ability to conquer Taiwan even if the U.S. intervenes. Given China’s military and economic strength, China’s leaders reasonably doubt that the U.S. or anyone else would mount a meaningful response to an invasion of Taiwan. To give a sense of his resolve, Mr. Xi warned that any “foreign forces” standing in China’s way would have “their heads . . . bashed bloody against a Great Wall of steel forged by over 1.4 billion Chinese people.”

The U.S. must defend Taiwan to retain its credibility as the leader of a coalition for a free and open Indo-Pacific. From a military perspective, Taiwan is a vital link in the first island chain of the Western Pacific. If Taiwan falls into Chinese hands, the U.S. will find it harder to defend critical allies like Japan and the Philippines, while China will be able to project its naval, air and other forces close to the U.S. and its territories. Taiwan is also an economic dynamo, the ninth-largest U.S. trading partner of goods with a near-monopoly on the most advanced semiconductor technology—to which the U.S. would most certainly lose access after a war.

The Biden administration this month ordered more than 6,000 additional U.S. troops deployed to Eastern Europe, with many more potentially on the way. These deployments would involve major additional uncounted commitments of air, space, naval and logistics forces needed to enable and protect them. These are precisely the kinds of forces needed to defend Taiwan. The critical assets—munitions, top-end aviation, submarines, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities—that are needed to fight Russia or China are in short supply. For example, stealthy heavy bombers are the crown jewel of U.S. military power, but there are only 20 in the entire Air Force.

The U.S. has no hope of competing with China and ensuring Taiwan’s defense if it is distracted elsewhere. It is a delusion that the U.S. can, as Pentagon press secretary John Kirby said recently, “walk and chew gum at the same time” with respect to Russia and China. Sending more resources to Europe is the definition of getting distracted. Rather than increasing forces in Europe, the U.S. should be moving toward reductions.

There is a viable alternative for Europe’s defense: The Europeans themselves can step up and do more for themselves, especially with regard to conventional arms. This is well within Europe’s capacity, as the combined economic power of the NATO states dwarfs that of Russia. NATO allies spend far more on their militaries than Russia. To aid its European allies, the U.S. can provide various forms of support, including lethal weapons, while continuing to remain committed to NATO’s defense, albeit in a more constrained fashion, by providing high-end and fungible military capabilities. The U.S. can also continue to extend its nuclear deterrent to NATO.

The U.S. should remain committed to NATO’s defense but husband its critical resources for the primary fight in Asia, and Taiwan in particular. Denying China the ability to dominate Asia is more important than anything that happens in Europe. To be blunt: Taiwan is more important than Ukraine. America’s European allies are in a better position to take on Russia than America’s Asian allies are to deal with China. The Chinese can’t be allowed to think that America’s distraction in Ukraine provides them with a window of opportunity to invade Taiwan. The U.S. needs to act accordingly, crisis or not.

Ms. Mastro is a center fellow at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, part of Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and a nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Mr. Colby is a principal at the Marathon Initiative and author of “The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict.”

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Nataliya Gumenyuk
Founding Director of the Public Interest Journalism Lab
DHSF class of 2018

As a journalist who covers conflict, today I am 100% consumed by the current situation in Ukraine. It is my job to explain what’s going on to a global audience, as well as to the Ukrainian one. Yet I and other Ukrainian professionals feel a bit trapped. The situation is so uncertain, we cannot afford to cancel all other plans; we are always busy with so many things happening, we can neither cancel nor fully engage. I am saddened that so much of our strength and energy is wasted on this situation. And on top of everything we are thinking about our families and considering various scenarios. As for myself – I am on duty.

Russia’s demands are not about Ukraine, they are about changing the international security architecture, canceling the ‘open door’ policy by NATO, which undermines the whole idea of the alliance. If Russia is allowed to invade further (and by the way Russia has already occupied parts of Ukrainian territories since 2014) – we are essentially agreeing that it’s acceptable to conquer other states by force.

The key takeaways for me are that we really should be discussing the current international relations system and to what extent it is able to protect countries outside of these alliances, and young democracies when they are threatened and bullied. This is a discussion not only about Eastern Europe.

Nataliya Gumenyuk is a Ukrainian author and journalist specializing in foreign affairs and conflict reporting. Gumenyuk is the author of the book “The Lost Island: Tales From Occupied Crimea” (2020), based on six years of reporting from the annexed peninsula. You can read some of her recent work here: 

• Full-scale war in Ukraine is not inevitable. We journalists must stop suggesting the contrary. (Vox Europe)
• Ukrainians can't afford to be afraid (The Washington Post)
• What makes Putin fear Ukraine? (The New Yorker)
   

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Oleksiy Honcharuk
Former Prime Minister of Ukraine
2021 Bernard and Susan Liautaud Visiting Fellow at CDDRL and the Freeman Spogli Institute

Democracy is one of the primary threats for Putin. Russia invaded Ukraine because of our choice to be a free, democratic country. That’s why the war between Ukraine and Russia is not a regional conflict – it is an important part of a larger war for democracy. 

Global democracy has been in a recession for at least the last 15 years due to a lack of democratic leadership around the world. It looks like the West has forgotten about the real value of democracy and has taken it for granted. This was a mistake and Ukraine is already paying a big price for it. Ukraine is now a beacon of democracy for millions of people in Eastern Europe and Asia, and we cannot lose this battle. 

I want Ukraine to be a successful, free country but Putin is trying to destroy it. I'm not scared and I am ready to fight for democracy.

More from Oleksiy Honcharuk:

• Ukraine vs Russia: War for Democracy (2021 Liautad Lecture)
   

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Oleksandra Matviichuk
Head of the Center for Civil Liberties (Ukraine)
UELP 2017-18

Russia under Putin has finally turned back into an empire. Unfortunately, the empire cannot remain stable. Putin thinks in terms of the Soviet Union. But now Russia does not have enough resources to play a full game, so the Kremlin is betting on war.

This is not about the war between Russia and Ukraine – it is about the war between authoritarianism and democracy. Thus, Ukraine acts in an unexpected role as an outpost that protects the values of the free world. Putin does not fear NATO, but the values of freedom in the post-Soviet space because it threatens his authoritarian regime.

We are preparing for a new armed attack by Russia. Recently, the President of Ukraine gave a press conference to foreign media, which raised many questions. However, there is something that the Kremlin cannot understand and that is underestimated in the West: People in America and the EU have lived for years with efficient and stable state institutions. We have never had such a luxury in Ukraine, so we are not used to relying on the government at critical moments.

I have been working in the field of human rights for more than twenty years, the last eight of which were focused on the war with Russia, so I have no illusions. Human rights defenders, journalists, and civil society activists will be the first targets of Russia's armed aggression. We have seen this before during the seizure of Crimea and Donbas when in order to gain rapid control of the region a non-violent minority was physically destroyed or driven out for their resistance. I have talked to my fellow human rights defenders, and I can say the following: We will stay in Ukraine and protect human rights as much as we can.

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Nataliya Mykolska
Strategic transformations expert, Member of the Board Ukrhydroenergo JSC
UELP 2018-19

The Russian aggression against Ukraine and potential military invasion is not only about Ukraine. It is about democracy prevailing in the former CIS region and Ukraine being a success story. A truly independent and successful Ukraine is a major threat to Putin’s autocratic regime in Russia and his short and long-term prospects in the region. 

We, Ukrainians, are ready to fight for our values, our freedom, our dignity, our country, our land, and the future of our children. We have done so in 2014 and have continued to do so for eight years. There is no other way for us to move forward.

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Ivan Prymachenko
Founder, Prometheus
UELP 2018-19

In 1946 George Kennan famously wrote the following about the Soviet state: "impervious to the logic of reason it is highly sensitive to the logic of force. For this reason, it can easily withdraw – and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point."

In 2022, this description is still fitting for the self-declared successor of the USSR – Putin's Russia. The best way to provoke Putin now is to show weakness. The best way to achieve peace is to demonstrate strength by preparing a devastating sanctions package against Russia and delivering modern weapons to Ukraine.

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Artem Romaniukov
Co-founder at SaveDnipro / SaveEcoBot, Co-founder at Civil Control Platform
UELP 2019-20

There are two competing points of view here in Ukraine on what is going on. The first is that Ukraine is a bargaining chip between Russia and "the West.” This means there will be no exacerbation of war, just bluffing.  

Second is that Putin for some reason felt that this was the right time to push for his agenda and started to raise the stakes, but "the West" appeared to be more united than ever before, providing Ukraine with lethal weapons and making strong claims. This means he may find himself in a stalemate with no choice except to invade Ukraine and become a pariah in the international community. 

It looks like president Zelensky believes in the first scenario. But the relevant emptiness on Kyiv streets in recent days shows that Ukrainians do not always share the government's view.

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Igor Rozkladaj
Deputy Director at the Center for Democracy and Rule of Law
DHSF class of 2018

Democracy is the best thing that we have in the modern world. But democracy needs to be trained – much like muscles on your body – or else it will become weak.

In a time of economic stress, pandemic, and uncertainty people seek simple explanations and decisions– that is the Achilles' heel of democracy. And in combination with disinformation and easy money, autocratic regimes can take hold. That's how the Soviet Union and modern Russia manipulated the Western world and did it with great success.

Russia always was and still is an authoritarian country. Nowadays under the autocratic Putin regime, we see increased militarization and pressure on independent people to stop their activities or face being arrested. 

Ukrainians, whose territories have been occupied by Russia, whose language and culture was under imperial pressure, whose identity is now denied now by Russia’s leadership, whose millions of people were killed in famines and wars know the real face of this country. The reforms we have made in Ukraine since 2014 are vitally important, from anti-corruption to decommunization. This conflict is not only about Ukraine, but about stopping Putin’s vision of  “Russkyi mir” from spreading throughout the region. 

We Ukrainians have made three attempts to wrench ourselves away from Russian influence: in 1991, 2004, and 2013-14. We have been at war with "unidentified little green men" for the last 8 years. We lose our best people to protect our country from Putin’s ambitions, and yet still fight. The question is what will prevail: corruption and kleptocracy from Putin or the democratic values that millions of Ukrainians have sacrificed for.

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Olexandr Starodubtsev
Deputy Head at the National Agency for Corruption Prevention
UELP 2017-18

The war that Russia started in 2014 is hybrid in nature. Misinformation and cyber-attacks by Russia have become commonplace in Ukraine since then. Of course, Ukrainians feel worried today about the latest news, but we see the support of international partners, including supplies of weapons. We hope that these weapons will not have to be used and that the latest signals from Russia are just another attempt to intimidate Ukraine and the global community.

For our part, we at the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) are preparing for a new Russian cyber-attack. The NACP maintains several strategic portals, such as a register of e-declarations of all public officials, and has access to 17 other government databases. It is important for us that these data do not fall into the hands of the enemy. The last big cyber-attack did not affect us significantly because of the high level of training of our IT specialists. Therefore, we are confident that we will be able to resist future attacks.

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While the West is trying to negotiate a de-escalation of Russia’s buildup of forces on the borders of Ukraine, Putin renegotiates the world order. It’s not only Ukraine’s NATO integration he is concerned with. Putin wants informal veto power in NATO and the EU as well as a quiet funeral ceremony for the rule-based international order. The West needs two things to counteract such a scenario. First, unity and readiness to defend its redlines, which can be costly.  Second,  a long-term comprehensive strategy to withstand Putin. Because even if we succeed in stopping his invasion now, make no mistake, it will not be his last move.

More from Svitlana Zalishchuk:

• Digital Disinformation Forum: Francis Fukuyama interview with Svitlana Zalischuk

STEVEN PIFER: You would not see American or NATO forces on the ground, fighting the Russians on Ukraine's behalf. I don't want the Ukrainian government to make a decision based on a miscalculation of how much help they can get from the West.

Listen on NPR

By stepping up its military presence along the Ukrainian border, Russian President Vladimir Putin hopes that Ukraine and the West will make concessions and Ukraine will realign itself back to Moscow, says Stanford scholar Steven Pifer. But nothing has alienated Ukraine more than Kremlin policy over the past eight years, particularly Russia’s military seizure of Crimea in 2014 and its role in the Donbas conflict that has claimed more than 13,000 lives, he said.

Here, Pifer, the William J. Perry Fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), discusses what Putin hopes to accomplish by amassing military troops along the Ukrainian border and why Ukraine’s democratic ambitions pose such a threat to Russia’s authoritarian leader.

Read the rest at Stanford News

Click the link for a transcript of “Ukraine, Russia and the Fight for Democracy.”

The Complicated History Between Russia and Ukraine
 

Ukraine played a key role in the collapse of the Soviet Union, and it came out as the biggest independent country of the former Soviet states. Ukraine decided to be a democracy, thankfully, and this has been our path for the last thirty years.

This is a great achievement for our nation, because if you look around our country, even among hundreds of other successful European countries, there are not many other good examples of democracy. They have problems: Turkey has problems; Belarus has problems; Kazakhstan as well. We have some problems with corruption, but we are still an electoral democracy with fair elections.

Now, unfortunately, Russia understands itself as the successor, or empire, coming after the Soviet Union, and Putin has said many times that this collapse was the biggest catastrophe in the last twenty years of the last century. For him, Ukraine’s success is a tragedy.

Putin has invaded Ukraine before during the annexation of Crimea. He tried to divide Ukraine into a Russian, authoritarian Ukraine and a European, democratic Ukraine. But he failed. Our civil society worked hard to create voluntary military and paramilitary organizations and units, and Ukrainians pushed back as a nation.

And that was a moment when Putin understood, finally, that he lost Ukraine not only as an economic partner, but ideologically. Ukrainians chose freedom. We chose democracy. And for Putin, it's very dangerous to have examples of successful democratic countries – especially Slavic Orthodox Christian countries with close ties to Russia – like Ukraine. Putin needs the Russian people to believe that democracy is a weak, failing idea that doesn’t work.

A Struggle Broader Than One Country
 

This buildup of Russian troops along the Ukrainian border is not juist a regional conflict, and it's not just about NATO. It’s a battle between two conceptually different systems: the authoritarian system and the democratic system. It’s an attack towards democracy and the Western world. Our values in the Western world are a threat for Mr. Putin himself.

Putin is trying to shape the situation and to undermine the trust among countries and among people. He's trying to create destabilizing situations like an immigration crises, organize sabotages among the military, have political murders, and so on and so forth.

This buildup is only one element of this game to create one more additional crisis to attract attention, and to create a situation where Western leaders have to decide and make very hard decisions. Putin is trying to show that, “If I do attack, nobody will protect you. All of these values you have are just fairy tales. The West is weak, the West is insincere. When they tell you that values matter, it’s a lie because the only real value is money. There is no democracy.”

The Role of the West in Supporting Democracies
 

For Putin, the weak reaction from the West to the aggression towards Ukraine was a signal that it was acceptable to act like this. That's why Putin is raising the stakes and why he will continue to raise the stakes every year. Right now, the sanctions policy and general Western policy is creating a situation where time is playing against the victim, not against the aggressor.

Putin’s strategy is to wait, to use all his resources to undermine his democratic opponents, and to make sure that the next politicians in the western world will be more flexible. And maybe in 10 years or 15 years when the annexation of Crimea has become deep history, he will find some new trade-off with the next generation of democratic leaders.

This is why there needs to be a new model of smart or cascading sanctions where the EU adopts a package of sanctions for some period of time, maybe five, seven or ten years, and every next wave, every next package of sanctions will automatically come into power if the problem is not solved. So every single day, it automatically raises the price for the aggressor.

Supporting fragile democracies is not just about making a morally right choice; these countries on the frontlines that have paid an additional price – an additional tax, if you will, for democracy, and have taken on additional burdens, because they choose the democratic path. Whether it’s Ukraine or other countries, we need Western support now in a much bigger way than we have it now.

For more from Oleksiy Honcharuk, listen to his his remarks on "Ukraine vs Russia: The War for Democracy," given as a Liautaud Lecture at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL).

At dinner at the American ambassador’s residence in Moscow some years ago, I asked a former senior foreign policy official if anyone in the Kremlin understood Ukraine.  He replied that someone there understood Ukraine very well.  He then added “but nobody listens to him.” 

The abject failure of Russian policy toward Ukraine over the past seven years suggests the Kremlin and Vladimir Putin have a flawed understanding of the country. 

On Dec. 17, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said, “Have we [Russia] lost Ukraine as a partner, ally and so on?  At this point, yes, completely.” 

The Russian leadership presumably did not intend this.  Thus, the question of whether the Kremlin and Putin understand Ukraine.  Many signs suggest that they do not. 

Putin’s last visit to Kiev occurred in 2013, when he traveled to mark the 1025th anniversary of Kievan Rus’s acceptance of Christianity. In a speech Putin said, “We are all spiritual heirs of what happened here 1025 years ago.  And in this sense we [Ukrainians and Russians] are, without a doubt, one people.”  

What an utterly tone-deaf statement to make in Ukraine.  Millions of ethnic Ukrainians heard it as a denial of their culture, history and language.  Putin has since often repeated that point. 

Russia’s use of military force to seize Crimea following the Maidan Revolution could hardly be expected to win over Ukrainian sympathies.  Nor would sparking and sustaining a conflict in Donbas that has now claimed more than 13,000 lives. 

Shortly after the Russia-Ukraine conflict began in 2014, Putin and other Russians started speaking of “Novorossiya” — the idea that much of eastern and southern Ukraine would rise in revolt against Kiev.  The allure of Novorossiya held sway in Moscow long after it became clear that there was little enthusiasm among Ukrainians for breaking away. 

Volodymyr Zelenskiy won the Ukrainian presidency in 2019.  He came to office a political novice who comfortably spoke Russian and promised a different approach from that of his predecessor, whom Moscow despised.  Zelensky endorsed the Minsk agreements as the basis for resolving the Donbas conflict and spoke approvingly of the “Steinmeier formula” for moving forward—politically risky steps for the new president given growing frustration and anger in Ukraine about the failure of the Minsk agreements to deliver peace in Donbas. 

What did that get Zelensky?  Putin agreed to a meeting in December 2019 with the Ukrainian leader, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron.  The meeting produced agreement on a prisoner exchange, a full ceasefire in Donbass and a follow-up meeting in spring 2020.  Only the prisoner exchange occurred. 

Rather than seek compromise, the Kremlin leaders seemed to calculate that they could force the newcomer to make humiliating concessions.  

Moscow increasingly took the position that it was not a party to the conflict — despite a Russian signature to the Minsk II agreement — and sought to force Kiev to deal directly with the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics.”  The Kremlin now swats away any request by Zelensky to meet Putin. 

The unsurprising result:  Zelenskiy’s attitude toward Moscow has hardened.  While he brought to office an ambivalent view of the Ukraine-NATO relationship, he now publicly calls for an early membership path for Ukraine.  

Kremlin policy has driven Ukraine away.  More than anything else, it has persuaded the Ukrainian government and an increasingly large segment of the Ukrainian population that they can find security and stability only if their country is anchored in institutions such as the European Union and NATO. 

The Kremlin appears intent on continuing this course.  Putin released an essay in July in which he all but denied Ukraine’s right to exist as a sovereign nation.  In October, former President Dmitry Medvedev termed talking to Kiev “pointless.”   

The Russian military has massed tens of thousands of troops and tanks, artillery and other combat vehicles in staging areas near Ukraine, suggesting that Russia is preparing a major military assault. 

That would not bring Ukraine back to Russia.  It would instead generate more sanctions on Russia, an increased flow of Western arms to Ukraine, a bolstering of NATO military presence near Russia’s borders — and dead Russian soldiers.   

The Russian military is undoubtedly stronger, but the Ukrainian military would exact a price.  Moreover, Kiev is preparing for partisan warfare, and an early December poll showed that one-third of those asked, including one-fourth in the country’s east, would take up arms if the Russians invade. 

It is time for the Russian leadership to reexamine the premises on which it has based its approach.  Bad understanding leads to bad policy, and the Kremlin appears poised to make another in a line of mistakes in its approach toward Ukraine.  This one would prove a tragedy for Ukraine … but also for Russia. 

Originally for The Moscow Times

As Russian troops gather on Ukraine’s borders, the outstanding question is whether Russian President Putin is prepared to bear the domestic and international costs of a full-scale invasion or if he’ll stop at pressuring NATO and the West for political concessions. Steven Pifer explains why a military incursion in 2022 will not be as easy for Russia as annexing Crimea in 2014, and where there are avenues for dialogue to defuse the brewing confrontation.

Read the rest at Brookings

Click the link for a transcript of "Why Right Matters to Democracy Here and Abroad."

Upholding Democracy At Home
 

It's really kind of quizzical how an immigrant refugee kid from Kyiv ends up in the White House working on Russia and Ukraine policy. And that’s what my book is really about; it talks about some of the key moments from my background and my family's background that I drew on in making those fateful decisions that I did on January 25, and how they carried me through my congressional testimony.

I made that report without any hesitation, because I thought there was an opportunity to right the course of events. I didn't really think that these things were going to enter the public view. I just did what I thought was right, and then when I was called to testify about making these reports, I followed through. Even there, it was not a hard decision about what the right thing to do was. I was not going to put my interests ahead of U.S. interests.

Supporting Democracy Abroad
 

When we see everything that’s happening in the world right now, I can understand why people look at someplace like Ukraine and think, “Why should we care about what happens there?”

But Ukraine makes a really compelling normative case for where Russia could end up, which I think everyone would agree is important. I think about the example of West Germany making East Germany unviable in the Cold War. Both countries started at the same place: decimated. But West Germany, being democratic and prosperous and enjoying basic human rights, thriving economy, made East Germany unviable and demonstrated Germany as a failure.

In much the same way, Ukraine could do the same thing for Russia. As we both know, Putin believes that Ukraine and Russia are the same people separated by an artificial boundary; the share roots and have a shared identity. Now, that's a vast oversimplification. That's not entirely true. But that's what he believes. And that's what he's convinced this population of. So, how would he explain 20 years from now, or in 2036, when he's done with his latest term in office, and there's somebody else that's looking to step in: How can another authoritarian leader step in and say, “We’re going to continue the course with managed democracy,” when Ukraine is prosperous?

It makes a really compelling case for a path that Russia could take on a path that would take it towards democracy. That would be a difficult road, but it's a viable path, because Ukraine is the example. And that's important not just because of our strategic aspirations for Russia, but also because it has an impact on China also. You've heard me talk about this notion that all of Russia's national security threats are from a belligerent rising, coercive China; they're not from the West.

The West is held out as a boogeyman at the moment, because it's useful to the regime. It's important to the regime to fight against the West as the aggressor and to couch the West as a failure and decadent for regime stability purposes. But from a national security perspective, I think any reasonable assessment would indicate that those threats are really not emanating from the West, but from the East. So supporting Ukraine also empowers our competition with China. That's why I think that the Biden administration should be unconstrained in its support of Ukraine.

More from Alexander Vindman
 

Watch the book talk FSI hosted with Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman (Ret.) for Here, Right Matters.