Russia’s massing of military power near Ukraine was certain to dominate the December 7 video conference between Presidents Biden and Putin. A Russian assault would turn into a bloody affair (for Russians and Ukrainians alike) and plunge relations between Russia and the West deeper into crisis. Is Putin prepared to take that step?  Perhaps even he has not yet decided.

By all appearances, Biden did what he had to do. He spelled out for Putin the costs that would ensue if Russia attacked. These include more painful Western economic sanctions, more military assistance for Ukraine, and a bolstering of NATO’s military presence in the Baltic states and Poland. Moreover, he strengthened his hand by consulting the day before with the leaders of Britain, Germany, France and Italy.  That meant he could talk to Putin on the basis of a consolidated Western position.

Biden also described a way out of the crisis: de-escalation and dialogue, or dialogues, to address the Russia-Ukraine conflict in Donbas and broader European security questions. Neither of those discussions will prove easy. For example, NATO will not, and should not, accede to the Kremlin’s demand that the alliance renounce its "open door" policy on enlargement. But diplomacy is all about finding ways to defuse such difficult problems.

Did Biden succeed? That remains to be seen. One thing to watch is whether Moscow’s recent over-the-top rhetoric moderates. Of course, the more important signal would come from the movement of Russian troops away from Ukraine and back to their regular garrisons.

Read more views on what the Biden-Putin video call means for the regional security situation on Atlantic Council.

All eyes are on Ukraine (including ours). Steven Pifer, a William J. Perry Research Fellow at CISAC and former ambassador to Ukraine, joins co-host Tom Collina to discuss Putin’s motivations for Ukraine and more. 

Ploughshares Fund · Will Russia Invade Ukraine?

As if living in space weren’t difficult enough. The Russian military recently tested a direct-ascent antisatellite, or ASAT, missile on an old Soviet orbital, Cosmos 1408.

Read the rest at the Chicago Tribune*

*This article is behind a paywall.

Europe currently faces several crises exploited or instigated by Russia.  Speculation runs rampant regarding what Vladimir Putin hopes to achieve.  He should take care not to overplay his hand.

One crisis came to a head over the past two months as the cost of natural gas in Europe skyrocketed.  While down from peaks in October, the price now hovers at about four times what it was at the beginning of the year.  Russia did not cause this crisis—its roots lie in factors such as abnormally high energy demand and reduced gas production in Europe—but Moscow certainly has exploited the situation.

The Kremlin maintains that gas sales to Europe are “a purely commercial issue.”  One would expect, however, that Russia’s Gazprom would eagerly increase gas exports, attracted by the dramatically increased prices.  But gas flows remain significantly below what they could be.  In October, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak suggested that gas flows could increase if the Nord Stream 2 pipeline that runs under the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany began operation.  That overlooks the fact that Russia already has plenty of pipeline capacity to move additional gas to Europe … if it wanted to do so.

Belarusian strongman Alexander Lukashenko manufactured the second crisis, playing out along the border with Poland.  Belarus has attempted to force migrants and economic refugees from the Middle East into Poland.  Lukashenko is unhappy that the European Union does not recognize him as president and has applied sanctions as Minsk cracked down on domestic opposition, including forcing down a civilian airliner to arrest one of the passengers in May.

This despicable weaponization of migrants is likely Lukashenko’s brainchild.  Moscow has nevertheless aligned itself with Minsk.  When Poland reinforced its border police with regular army soldiers, the Russian air force flew nuclear-capable bombers over Belarus in response.

The third crisis stems directly from Moscow having positioned military forces near Ukraine’s borders, raising questions about a possible Russian assault.  The Russian military carried out a similar build-up last spring, though nothing came of it.  However, relations between Kyiv and Moscow have only worsened.  In July, Putin published a 6,000-word essay that all but denied Ukraine’s right to exist as an independent state.  In October, former President Dmitry Medvedev asserted that it was “pointless” to negotiate with Kyiv.

While Moscow denies ill intent, in recent days Secretary of State Antony Blinken and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg have publicly cautioned Russia about using force against Ukraine.  French President Emmanuel Macron stated that France was ready “to defend the territorial integrity of Ukraine,” and Britain prepared to send 600 troops to the country.

This all plays out as the Kremlin tightens the repressive screws at home.  The Russian Prosecutor General’s Office moved last week to close down the Memorial Human Rights Center.  The best-known human rights entity in Russia, it was established and allowed to operate in Soviet times.

These crises all put pressure on Europe and the West, as they no doubt were intended to.  But Putin and the Kremlin in each case run the real risk of miscalculating and overplaying their hand.

When an earlier surge of migrants swept into Europe beginning in 2015, EU member states divided over what to do.  Germany heroically accepted one million, while Poland resettled virtually none, and its ruling party’s leader blamed Berlin for the influx.  This time, EU members are of a single mind.  The German government offered to send German border guards and place them under Polish command to manage the situation on the border with Belarus.  The European Union has begun preparing a list of new sanctions to apply against Minsk.  The greater their impact, the more that Lukashenko will turn to Moscow for financial assistance—something that should hold little appeal for Putin.

Russia over the past 30 years has a history of using the energy weapon against post-Soviet states, such as Ukraine and Georgia, and others in what was once termed “eastern Europe.”  Moscow sought, however, to maintain a reputation as a reliable energy supplier to countries such as Germany, Austria, Italy and the Netherlands.  The current situation puts that reputation in doubt, and European capitals may have begun to realize the vulnerability created by dependence on Russian energy.  In Germany, where the eco-friendly Greens party will enter the new government, it could spur a faster transition away from carbon energy.  As Putin well knows, oil and gas are Russia’s two most lucrative exports.  Is it in Russia’s interest to encourage Europe to intensify its search for alternative sources and accelerate its move away from carbon energy? 

As for Ukraine, a Russian military attack would trigger a string of costs.  U.S. and European officials have already begun to develop a list of possible new sanctions against Moscow.  Following Putin’s summit with President Joe Biden, several U.S.-Russian communications channels were restored, and both sides reported constructive exchanges in their strategic stability dialogue.  Nothing would kill those small positive steps more quickly than a Russian attack.  The largest potential cost for Moscow looms in Ukraine; its military is greatly improved and, while it might not be able to defeat a Russian incursion, it would make the invaders pay a heavy price.  More sanctions, a deep freeze with Washington and the West, and Russian soldiers coming home in body bags hardly seem in Moscow’s interest.

Each of these crises could develop in ways inimical to Russia’s—and Putin’s—interest, at least as those interests are perceived from the West.  Putin, however, does not follow Western logic.  As noted in a recent article, he does not always make decisions rationally and sometimes tends to act emotionally, especially when it comes to Ukraine.  (Indeed, Kremlin aggression the past seven years has done more than anything to drive Ukraine away from Russia and to the West.)

Deepening these crises could well lead to negative outcomes for Russia if Putin miscalculates.  Still, the West should not overly discount the possibility that he just might do it.

* * * * *

Click here for a transcript of "Understanding the Global Rise of Authoritarianism."

On the inspiration for the book:

I wanted to investigate this trend of nationalist authoritarianism through the prism of people, particularly [people] in opposition who are living it. I ended up looking at Hungary, Russia, China, and the U.S., all of which I think are representative of a kind of a different flavor of the same authoritarian trend that we're getting. That's really what the whole book is: me pulling on this thread of what is the interconnection between why this is happening, and how are people thinking about it? How can I approach it not as just pure analysis, but through the stories of these human beings?

On why nationalism and authoritarianism is spreading globally:

The first was the excess of globalization, the excess of capitalism, and the creation of exploding inequality happening at the same time that globalization is kind of encroaching on people's national identity or tribal identity

Another trend through line was the post-9/11 securitization of the American superpower. When we turn our national purpose into this war on terror, not only do we militarize our engagement with the world, which I think was generally bad for democracy, but we also provide a template and a justification for autocrats to expropriate that for their own purposes.

Then lastly, technology is big difference maker in the sense that these platforms that at first were connecting people became the perfect vehicles for disinformation and surveillance

On China:

China may look different [from regimes like Russia or Hungary], but I don't think they're nearly as different as people think. Right? You have to look at Xi Jinping, first and foremost, as a nationalist Chinese leader, not a communist Chinese leader. And in his brand of nationalism, he's very similar to Putin, and Orban, and Trump, and all the other leaders I could have done in this book.

How did [the Chinese Communist Party] survive post-Tiananmen? They reestablished who they were as a Chinese Nationalist Party. They had been a revolutionary communist party, then they give up a big chunk of the communism to move to capitalism

On authoritarianism in America:

In this country, you have a major political party, that has completely gone off the deep end. They're literally setting up a playbook where they can overturn the results of an election through the laws they’re are passing at the state level. And if Trump does come back, which is a 50-50 proposition, he's clearly going to run and it will be another 50-50 election, right? And even if he loses, maybe they'll succeed this time overturning the result. They will start from such a more advanced authoritarian position than even in 2016 when he was elected.

On the future:

There's a lot of reason to be concerned that the overall trajectory of society globally is still moving in the wrong direction. What makes me optimistic, though, is that I don't believe that that's how most people want to live. And I also find, in most places – not all places, but most places – generationally, there's an overwhelming preference to not live like that. If we can hold the line and weather the storm for the next few years, and begin to figure out some structural things like, I do think we can come through in the backend to a place where the pendulum starts swinging pretty hard in the other direction.