Perspective-getting and correcting misconceptions are common interventions to promote inclusion toward outgroups. However, each strategy has limitations. Information corrections yield ambiguous effects, and empathy-based interventions may reproduce the biases they are meant to alleviate. We develop a theoretical framework that clarifies the strengths and weaknesses of each strategy, and offer a design to identify the conditions under which they are most effective. Using three studies on refugee inclusion with nearly 15,000 Americans over three years, we find that information and perspective-getting affect different outcomes. Perspective-getting affects warmth, policy preferences, and behavior, while information leads to factual updating only. We show that combining both interventions produces an additive effect on all outcomes, that neither strategy enhances the other, but that bundling the strategies may prevent backfire effects of information. Our results underscore the promise and limits of information and perspective-getting for promoting inclusion, highlighting the benefits of integrating the two strategies.
ABOUT THE SPEAKER
Claire Adida is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies at UC San Diego. She is also a faculty affiliate with the UCSD Policy Design and Evaluation Lab, the UCSD Future of Democracy Initiative, the Stanford Immigration Policy Lab, the Evidence in Governance and Politics Groups, and the Center for Effective Global Action (CEGA). Professor Adida uses quantitative methods to study how countries manage new and existing forms of diversity. Her work has appeared in the American Political Science Review, the Quarterly Journal of Political Science, the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Comparative Political Studies, the Journal of Experimental Political Science, Public Opinion Quarterly, PLoS ONE, and several other very prestigious outlets. She has written two books on immigrant exclusion, her 2010 Cambridge University Press book on Immigrant Exclusion and Insecurity in Africa and her 2016 Harvard University Press co-authored book on Why Muslim Integration Fails in Christian-Heritage Societies. Professor Adida’s work has been funded by the National Science Foundation, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Hellman Foundation, and the Evidence in Governance and Politics Group. Professor Adida serves on the editorial board of the American Political Science Review and is an Associate Editor at the Journal of Experimental Political Science. She received her PhD in political science from Stanford University in 2010.
Open to Stanford-affiliates only
In April 2023, New America, the Center for Ballot Freedom, Protect Democracy, Lyceum Labs, and Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law convened a conference at Stanford University on the future of political parties in the United States. The conference, titled “More Parties, Better Parties,” focused on the idea that U.S. democracy would benefit from stronger and more representative parties and that essential to that vision was opportunity for more parties beyond the current party duopoly to emerge. The essays in this collection, derived from papers prepared for the conference, trace the following argument: Parties are essential institutions in a democracy; there is an unjustified hostility to parties in much American political discourse; and fluid and overlapping coalitions of a multiparty system can improve governance and confidence. We then look at the promise of fusion voting, a practice once widespread and now prohibited in most states, which could allow new parties to gain a foothold by cross-endorsing candidates from established parties.
Essay within "The Realistic Promise of Multiparty Democracy in the United States," a political reform report from New America.
In partnership with the Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies, the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL) at Stanford University presented the inaugural event in a new annual roundtable series, where experts diagnosed the current state of democracy, its threats, and possible prescriptions for democratic prosperity. This series, titled “Sustainable Democracy Roundtable,” aims to create a necessary platform and opportunity for scholars of various disciplines and ranks to identify core issues and propose unique solutions to globally pertinent policy issues.
The roundtable series is part of SNAPL's Democratic Crisis and Reform research track.
The inaugural roundtable was made possible thanks to the generous support and partnership with the Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies (KFAS).
This report summarizes the discussions held at the roundtable using a modified version of the Chatham House Rule, only identifying speakers by their country of origin.
In an era marked by profound societal transformations, identity, democracy, and justice have become central to the discourse on shaping fair and inclusive societies. Recognizing the imperative to delve into these complex issues, political scientist Hakeem Jefferson is launching a new research initiative at Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law. The Program on Identity, Democracy, and Justice (IDJ) serves as a nexus for researchers committed to unraveling the multifaceted dimensions of identity and informing tangible steps toward a more equitable future.
Against the backdrop of diverse topics such as racial and ethnic identity, gender and sexuality, religion, class, and citizenship, the IDJ program emerges as a hub for interdisciplinary collaboration. Its reach extends beyond academic circles, bringing together researchers and organizations who are thinking about how to build fairer, more inclusive societies.
“Hakeem's work on race and politics in America is an important part of the Center's expanding work on the quality of American democracy,” shared Kathryn Stoner, Mosbacher Director of CDDRL. “We are thrilled to launch this new program on such a crucial issue at CDDRL.”
"This program is the embodiment of years of hard work by Hakeem Jefferson in building an innovative research agenda and a vibrant scholarly community attentive to pressing questions on struggles for recognition, inclusion, and social justice,” added Hesham Sallam, the Center’s Associate Director for Research. “I look forward to seeing the program flourish and grow while contributing to intellectual life at CDDRL and Stanford at large."
On January 11, 2024, IDJ will host its inaugural event, titled Multiracial Democracy and its Future in the United States, with Harvard University professors Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt. Levitsky and Ziblatt are the New York Times best-selling authors of How Democracies Die and will discuss their newest book, Tyranny of the Minority: Why American Democracy Reached the Breaking Point (Crown, 2023). In a moderated conversation with Professors Hakeem Jefferson and Jake Grumbach (UC Berkeley) and an audience Q&A, Levitsky and Ziblatt will offer a framework for understanding the current crisis in America's democracy. You can learn more about the event and register to attend here.
In the following Q&A, Hakeem Jefferson, an assistant professor of political science in the School of Humanities and Sciences, shares more about the motivations and objectives of the new IDJ program and the transformative potential of identity-focused research.
As a scholar of race and politics, it has always been clear to me that we cannot understand threats to democracy or the promise of democracy without engaging issues of race and identity more broadly. I am excited to launch this program at CDDRL because I think we have a real opportunity to bring together scholars, practitioners, and community members concerned with creating a society of political and social equals. At IDJ, we hope to expand people’s understanding of what it means to care about democracy and what the study of democracy looks like. For us, these questions necessitate a focus on difference, a focus on inequality, and a concern with democracy beyond the ballot box. To be sure, we will engage questions related to elections and the health of electoral democracy, but we also want to make the strong case in the research we platform and in the conversations and workshops we convene that being concerned with democracy means thinking quite carefully about how societies are stratified, how power is distributed, and how justice is achieved.
I want to invite folks who study the program themes to be in community with one another. The hope is that these interactions will lead to more thoughtful scholarship and initiatives. We want people to share early-stage ideas, make connections with like-minded collaborators, sharpen later-stage research, and broaden their aims and interests through consuming the work hosted by the program. We want to keep researchers aware of practitioners, especially at the local level, who are working to promote democratic principles and, in parallel, keep those organizations abreast of findings relevant to our shared interest in a healthier democracy.
IDJ is ideas first. Different backgrounds, training, and scholarly dispositions mean that we think about identity-related questions in different ways. IDJ seeks to bring our attention to how we are engaging the same objective — equitable democracies — whether we are concerned with different identities, different contexts, or different sorts of evidence. By pursuing common insights, IDJ aims to produce work that is interesting to a broad audience.
Throughout my career — and since I was a young boy in South Carolina — I have engaged in public conversations about issues of justice. In recent years, I have written extensively for public audiences about topics ranging from the January 6 insurrection and whiteness to the crisis facing multiracial democracy in the United States. As I launch the IDJ program, this commitment to public engagement remains at the heart of what we plan to do. From writing Op-Eds to engaging directly with those working on the ground to safeguard democracy, we hope to be a public-facing program whose stakeholders include those far beyond our Stanford community.
Led by Professor Hakeem Jefferson, the program housed at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law will advance innovative research on the multifaceted dimensions of identity and their role in democratic development, struggles for recognition, social justice, and inclusion.
Epic wildfire. Devastating drought. Cataclysmic flooding. Extreme weather in the wake of climate change threatens to turn the American West into a region hostile to human habitation—a “Great American Desert,” as early US explorers once mislabeled it. As Bruce E. Cain suggests in this timely book, the unique complex of politics, technology, and logistics that once won the West must be rethought and reconfigured to win it anew in the face of a widespread accelerating threat.
The challenges posed by increasingly extreme weather in the West are complicated by the region’s history, the deliberate fractiousness of the American political system, and the idiosyncrasies of human behavior—all of which Cain considers, separately and together, in Under Fire and Under Water. He analyzes how, in spite of coastal flooding and spreading wildfires, people continue to move into, and even rebuild in, risky areas; how local communities are slow to take protective measures; and how individual beliefs, past adaptation practices and infrastructure, and complex governing arrangements across jurisdictions combine to flout real progress. Driving Cain’s analysis is the conviction that understanding the habits and politics that lead to procrastination and obstruction is critical to finding solutions and making necessary adaptations to the changing climate.
As a detailed look at the rising stakes and urgency of the various interconnected issues, this book is an important first step toward that understanding—and consequently toward the rethinking and reengineering that will allow people to live sustainably in the American West under the conditions of future global warming.
Bruce E. Cain is Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and Director of the Bill Lane Center for the American West. He is the author of Democracy More or Less: America’s Political Reform Quandary and coauthor of Ethnic Context, Race Relations, and California Politics.
Wildfire, Flooding, and the Fight for Climate Resilience in the American West
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Senem is the acting Program Manager, Leadership Academy for Developmentat the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law. She has over a decade of experience in fundraising and project management in non-profit organizations in Istanbul, Turkey. Before coming to Stanford, she served as a Development Associate at the School of Music and Arts in the Bay Area.
Senem holds a Bachelor of Arts in Communication and Design from Bilkent University. She has a passion for the arts and enjoys baking and traveling with her family in her free time.
If you had five minutes to speak with the president of the United States, what would you say? That’s the question Michael McFaul, director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, posed to FSI scholars at a Stanford 2023 Reunion Homecoming event.
The discussion, “Global Threats Today: What's At Stake and What We Can Do About It,” centered around five major challenges currently facing the world: political dissatisfaction and disillusionment at home, tensions between China and Taiwan, the consequences of climate change, the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, and the conflict between Hamas and Israel.
Speaking to each of these areas of concern and how they overlap, FSI scholars Didi Kuo, Larry Diamond, Marshall Burke, Michael McFaul, and Amichai Magen offered their perspectives on what can be done. You can listen to their full conversation on the World Class podcast and browse highlights from their policy ideas below.
Follow the link for a full transcript of "Global Threats: What's at Stake and What We Can Do About It."
One of the major problems people feel right now in American politics is that their voices aren’t heard. We live in what my colleague Francis Fukuyama calls a "vetocracy," meaning there are a lot of veto points in our system.
In a lot of other democratic institutional configurations, you have rule by the majority. But in the United States, we have an institutional configuration that allows a very small group — for example, 15 people in the House of Representatives — to hold up government in various ways. We see this in dramatic examples on the national level, but it also trickles down to the local level where you see it in issues like permitting hold-ups.
Reforming the Electoral College would be a very direct way of changing that vetocracy. The United States is one of the only advanced democracies that has this indirect system of elections. If all the votes counted equally and all the presidential candidates had to treat all of us the same and respond to us equally in all 50 states, it would do a lot to show the power of the popular vote and realign us more closely to the principle of majoritarianism that we should seek in our institutions.
My recommendation is deterrence, deterrence, deterrence. It is not inevitable that the People's Republic of China is going to launch an all-out military assault on Taiwan. But if the United States does not do more to make that a costly decision, the likelihood it will happen are exponentially higher.
Deterrence works. The United States deterred the Soviet Union from moving against West Berlin and much of Europe for decades. But it only works if you have a superior force.
To that end, the United States needs to pre-position more military force in the region. There's now a $12 billion backlog of weapons that Taiwan has ordered and paid for but hasn't received yet. That’s because the American defense production system is completely broken. This is the same reason why we can’t get weapons to Ukraine at the pace we need there.
This issue could be fixed, at least in part, if we licensed the production of some of these weapon systems directly to Taiwan. Their ability to build plants and produce these systems is much more agile than our own, and so licensing the rights to production would dramatically increase the deterrence factor against China, in addition to deepening our cooperation with allies throughout the region.
There are three things we can do in response to climate change: we can mitigate, we can adapt, or we can suffer. We’re off to a good start, but we have decades of long slog ahead of us to get that right. And it's not just us; even if we do a good job, we depend on other countries to also do a good job. The Biden administration has already been engaged on some of that front, but there’s more work to do there.
And even with our best efforts, we are not going to be able to move as fast as we want or mitigate our greenhouse gas emissions as quickly as we need to avoid climate change. So, we're going to have to live with some climate change, which means adaptation. And if we can't adapt, then we're going to suffer.
The key point is that we are very poorly adapted to today's climate, much less the climate we're going to have 30 or 50 years from now. The West Coast and California are prime examples of this. There have been monumental wildfire seasons there the last few years, and there are significant negative health impacts from smoke exposure. I see it in my own home, even as someone who studies this and should know better and do more to reduce those risks.
The point is, we're really poorly adapted to the current climate, and things are going to get a lot worse. We need to focus on mitigation; it’s still really important and we need to get it done. But at the same time, we need to figure out how to adapt and live with the changing climate that we're going to experience.
When I was in Kyiv this September, I had a chance to meet with President Zelenskyy, and he pointed out an absolutely crazy reality. Companies in the United States and Europe are still making tens of thousands of dollars in profits from selling various technologies that ultimately end up in Russia. It’s getting in through places like Hong Kong and Kazakhstan and Belarus and Georgia, and it allows Russia to keep waging its horrific war.
At the same time, the United States is spending millions of dollars to arm Ukraine with systems to shoot down the Russian rockets that were built using the components they got from the West. That’s completely illogical, bad policy. I know it’s hard to control technology, but we have to find a better way than what we’re doing right now. If you're an American taxpayer, that is your money being wasted.
That means more and better weapons for Ukraine, faster. And that means more and better sanctions on Russia, faster. That is the way to speed the end of this war.
Just a few short years ago, we were all talking about the decline of the United States. I think that is far from inevitable. People speak about the 20th century as the “American Century.” The 21st century can also be the American Century. It's in our hands.
Be bullish on America. Be confident in America. Rediscover the spirit of America for adaptation and innovation and entrepreneurship. We need to wake up from the break we’ve taken from history in the post-Cold War era and rally once again in our spirit, our research, and our intellect.
We need to find new solution structures to the great challenges of our era: environmental challenges, AI, biotechnological challenges, nuclear challenges. And we can do it. China is on the verge of demographic decline and economic decline. Russia is a very dangerous international actor, but it is not a global superpower. We must reinvent the institutions and the alliances that we need for the 21st century in order to make sure that we continue a journey towards greater peace and prosperity for all of mankind.
The entire discussion, including the audience Q&A, is available to watch on FSI's YouTube channel. To stay up to date on our content, be sure to like, subscribe, and turn on notifications.
FSI scholars offer their thoughts on what can be done to address political polarization in the United States, tensions between Taiwan and China, climate change, the war in Ukraine, and the Israel-Hamas war.
This essay originally appeared in The Diplomat.
With major crises in Gaza and Ukraine, the Biden administration might be tempted to overlook the importance of Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s mid-November visit to Washington. That would be a mistake. Indonesia is an important country that is heading into crucial presidential elections in early 2024, and the results of Jokowi’s visit could go a long way to shaping the next Indonesian government’s attitudes toward its relations with the United States.
Although U.S.-Indonesian security cooperation is good and trade has grown, by all accounts Jokowi and his team are heading to Washington feeling less than satisfied on several fronts. First, Indonesians remain upset by President Joe Biden’s decision to skip the recent Indonesia-hosted East Asia Summit, which they took as a serious snub. Biden invited Jokowi in part to make up for that absence, but the White House might have underestimated the extent to which Indonesians remain upset over the initial affront. The protocol-conscious government no doubt will also contrast their modest White House schedule with the lavish welcome recently received by Australian Prime Minster Anthony Albanese.
Indonesian authorities also remain unhappy with what they see as Washington’s failure to deliver on the high-profile Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP), under which the U.S. committed to lead G-7-plus efforts to mobilize $20 billion to support Indonesia’s accelerated transition from coal to cleaner energy. Indonesian officials have complained publicly for months that the U.S. has pressed them to take difficult steps while offering little in the way of concessional financing to pay for it. The reality is more complicated, but the perception in Jakarta that Washington “sold them a bill of goods” is real. Some Indonesian officials have contrasted that with substantial Chinese funding on priority infrastructure initiatives, highlighting the regional perception of U.S. weakness vis-à-vis China as a reliable economic partner. (The Indonesians have largely ignored the fact that the U.S. is their second-largest export market and has risen rapidly to be their fourth-largest source of foreign direct investment.)
Jokowi also is looking for Biden to move forward on a proposed limited free trade agreement under which Indonesian critical minerals (namely nickel and processed nickel) would meet the criteria for inclusion in the electric vehicle tax credits provided for in the Inflation Reduction Act. The Biden administration reportedly is interested in such a deal, which by promoting diversification of both suppliers for the U.S. and markets for Indonesia would be in the U.S. national interest. It has, however, hesitated to proceed due to concerns about the congressional reaction, environmental and labor issues, and heavy Chinese investment in Indonesian nickel mining.
Finally, one has to assume that the Gaza crisis will be at the top of Jokowi’s agenda (if not Biden’s) when the two presidents meet. Indonesia, home to the world’s largest Muslim population, has long supported the Palestinian cause and has vigorously pursued diplomatic efforts to achieve an immediate ceasefire. While working hard to keep the issue from blowing up domestically, there is no question but that Indonesian public opinion (and genuinely held beliefs among top officials) has put the two governments at odds over the crisis.
At this late date, there is little prospect of major initiatives coming out of the Biden-Jokowi meeting that would ease Indonesian concerns or generate significant positive momentum. There is, however, still time to make some small investments that could result in Jokowi and his team leaving Washington feeling more positive about the relationship.
First, on Gaza, the meeting will not resolve the two countries’ differences, but it is important that Biden listen to and engage with Jokowi seriously on the issue and that he highlights his efforts to encourage Israel to show restraint and to promote a humanitarian pause. Jokowi’s post-meeting public comments about this discussion likely will have a significant influence on the Indonesian public and media perceptions of the U.S. role, so it is critical that Biden do all he can to ensure those comments are positive.
Second, it is important that Biden understand that Jokowi and many Indonesians are still upset over the president’s decision to skip the recent Jakarta summit. Biden cannot undo that, but he can and should acknowledge it in his discussion with Jokowi and emphasize that he appreciates how important Indonesia is.
Even such moves will only go so far without some movement on JETP and the critical minerals trade question. On the former, there isn’t time to achieve major progress before the meeting, but President Biden should instruct his team to redouble their efforts to mobilize funding and get the initiative moving. This goes beyond Indonesian concerns and gets to the heart of regional wariness about Washington being able to put meat on the bones of its various economic initiatives.
On critical minerals, Biden should agree to send trade officials to Jakarta to discuss the outlines of a possible agreement, though he will have to be careful not to overcommit absent confidence he will be able to deliver. Indonesia, for its part, needs to stop rotating ambassadors through Washington so quickly and install an envoy who can effectively make the case for a limited trade deal to Congress and others.
Some serious, last-minute work needs to be done to ensure that next week’s meeting between the leaders of the world’s second and third-largest democracies does more than highlight the differences and problems in the relationship.
President Joko Widodo and his team arrive in Washington at an uncertain time in U.S.-Indonesia relations.
Today’s geopolitical climate has created new and dangerous challenges for America’s defense and the support of democracy and freedom worldwide. These challenges demand a reexamination of the U.S. defense budget to ensure that America’s forces retain the capabilities to defend the nation and deter aggression abroad. The expert authors of the new volume Defense Budgeting for a Safer World (Hoover Institution Press) review the significant areas of debate in the U.S. defense budget and provide recommendations for aligning it with new global realities. Chief among these new realities are China’s modernized military and the nation’s objectives in the South China Sea and for reunification with Taiwan, testing U.S. dominance in the world order and raising questions about allies’ security and the U.S. ability to counter threats from the People’s Liberation Army.
In her contribution to the new volume, in a chapter titled “The Military Challenge of the People’s Republic of China,” Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro reviews the last quarter-century of developments in China’s strategy for reunification with Taiwan. Mastro explains that the original shape of that strategy, strengthening ties with Taiwan to persuade the population, “has failed” and now takes the form of belligerent air and sea incursions, increasingly sophisticated military exercises, and official Chinese rhetoric about the inevitability of reunification and the impossibility of Taiwan’s independence has intensified.
Mastro notes that “China’s military modernization has focused on the ability to prevent a decisive U.S. response, referred to as its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy." The United States, as a non-resident power in the Asia-Pacific, depends on its aircraft carriers to project power in the South China Sea, but these carriers are vulnerable to Chinese ballistic systems. Because it will likely have to operate outside the first island chain — that is, the “barrier” extending from Japan, past Taiwan and the Philippines, to maritime and peninsular Southeast Asia — the U.S. military depends on “enablers” to accomplish its missions, like aerial refueling and satellites for cyber capabilities. These assets are likewise vulnerable to Chinese disruption/attack, as are U.S. forward bases in Asia, such as Okinawa.
Mastro’s recommendations to mitigate current U.S. weaknesses to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan include "more access, basing, and overflight," "more mass on targets," and "leveraging partners." While Chinese military power has not surpassed that of the United States, Mastro warns that if U.S. deterrence is not maintained and improved, Chinese leadership may become confident enough to move against Taiwan, resulting in a war with the United States. On the other hand, she assesses that the needed deterrence is possible if the proper steps are taken now.
With contributions from military, government, and academic experts, a new volume explores what changes will be necessary in the U.S. military budget to keep the nation secure in a new geopolitical environment. A chapter by Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro focuses on how to update military spending to enhance U.S. capability to deter Chinese ambitions in Taiwan and beyond.
