The Instructor of the Reischauer Scholars Program (RSP) is Naomi Funahashi.

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When Tai Young Whang, an ambitious high school graduate from Pyongyang, stepped onto the dock in Tokyo in 1933 to attend Hitotsubashi University, he never could have imagined that his personal dream of building economic bridges between Korea and Japan would fuel his great-grandson’s desire to follow in his footsteps almost a century later.

***

At the end of my first year of middle school, I chose to study the Japanese language for the first time. What started out as a curiosity of the language and some of Japan’s popular cultural exports (such as Pokémon games) gradually blossomed into a deeper passion for Japan’s culture and history. During my eighth-grade world history class, I turned my focus to researching the intricate sankin kōtai system and skilled political maneuverings underlying the Tokugawa shogunate’s iron grip on power during the 17th century. I even found myself at Eiheiji Temple in Fukui Prefecture that May meditating towards a blank wooden wall at four in the morning. Yet, I was not satisfied. These brief historical vignettes, like still frames in the film reel of humanity, remained fragments of a larger narrative that I was increasingly eager to discover.

As my school did not offer courses in East Asian or Japanese history, I was excited to apply during my sophomore year to Stanford’s Reischauer Scholars Program (RSP), an online program on Japan offered to high school students across the United States. By providing its students with the ability to comprehensively explore Japanese history, economics, society, and more, the program presents a unique opportunity to delve into these topics alongside similarly motivated peers. While the course taught me a lot about Japan proper, I also gained a much deeper understanding of the U.S.–Japanese relationship.

During the course of the 20-week program, we spent the first 14 weeks on a series of in-depth readings and comprehensive seminars led by government officials, business leaders, and scholars. As actual practitioners of the fields we were studying, these visiting experts brought their worldviews and inspiring insights to life. During one of the virtual seminars, for example, we had the opportunity to meet Rachel Brunette-Chen, the then-Principal Officer for the U.S. Consulate General in Sapporo, and learn about both the U.S.–Japan Security Alliance and her own foreign service experience bolstering the ties that connect the two countries. Hearing from an actual foreign service officer provided a tangible sense of the dedication and importance of those who work to link American and Japanese interests on the ground.

Starting from week one, we unpacked what we had learned from our readings and virtual classrooms through weekly discussion boards. These online forums continued throughout the week, often filled with thought-provoking perspectives, respectful rebuttals, and witty banter. We debated the efficiency of Abenomics, the impact of textbook revisions on Japanese history education, and the societal strains of modernization on early 20th century Japan, among other topics. Each new post became another thread weaving our different ideas together into a tapestry of cross-cultural connections that we all grew to treasure. Even today, many of us remain connected both online and by our shared experience.

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In 1956, Tai Young Whang founded the first private commercial television broadcasting company in South Korea, based on the knowledge he had gained from working in Japan. Like my great-grandfather 88 years ago, I’ve come to appreciate the intercultural bonds that tie us all together. Truly, learning from others builds empathy and understanding. I am grateful to the RSP for providing such a comprehensive learning experience and strengthening my own aspiration to pursue further studies and contribute positively to the U.S.–Japanese relationship.

Stanford e-Japan is an online course that teaches Japanese high school students about U.S. society and culture and U.S.–Japan relations. The course introduces students to both U.S. and Japanese perspectives on many historical and contemporary issues. It is offered biannually by the Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education (SPICE). Stanford e-Japan is currently supported by the Yanai Tadashi Foundation.

In Summer 2021, top students of the Spring 2020 and the Fall 2020 Stanford e-Japan courses will be honored through an event at Stanford University.

The three Spring 2020 honorees—Minami Matsushima (Senri & Osaka International Schools of Kwansei Gakuin), Yuna Naoi (Tokyo Metropolitan Hibiya High School), and Kenta Yoshii (Shukutoku Junior and Senior High School)—will be recognized for their coursework and exceptional research essays that focused respectively on “The Price We Pay for Men to be Men: Toxic Masculinity in the United States,” “Online Secondary School Education in Japan and the U.S. Amid the COVID-19 Crisis,” and “In Search of a Realistic Substitute for U.S. Extended Deterrence for Japan.”

Risako Nomura (Yokohama Senior High School of International Studies) received an Honorable Mention for her research paper on “How Untranslatability Between Japanese and English Fosters the U.S.–Japan Relationship.”

The three Fall 2020 honorees—Coco Kawaguchi (Keio Girls Senior High School), Sotaro Kunieda (Suwa Seiryo High School), and Yun-Tzu (Allison) Lin (Canadian Academy)—will be recognized for their coursework and exceptional research essays that focused respectively on “To Infinity and Beyond! National Survival in the Era of Venture Space Development,” “Fostering Social Enterprises in Japan: Lessons from the United States,” and “Nuclear Deterrence Theory: An Evaluation of Its Effectiveness in Preventing Future Deployment of Nuclear Weapons.”

Satoru Uchida (Tokyo Metropolitan High School) received an Honorable Mention for his coursework and research paper on “What the Japanese Government Should Do Immediately to Protect Children’s Human Rights.”

In the Spring 2020 session of Stanford e-Japan, students from the following schools completed the course: Aoba Japan International School (Tokyo); Clark Memorial International High School (Osaka); Hiroshima Jogakuin Senior High School (Hiroshima); Hiroshima Prefectural Junior/Senior High School (Hiroshima); Kaijo High School (Tokyo); Kamakura Gakuen High School (Kamakura); Katoh Gakuen Gyoshu Senior High School (Shizuoka); Keio Girls Senior High School (Tokyo); Kurume University Senior High School (Fukuoka); Meikei High School (Ibaraki); Municipal Urawa High School (Saitama); Musashino University Chiyoda High School (Tokyo); Nirayama High School (Shizuoka); Okayama Prefectural Okayama Asahi High School (Okayama); Seigakuin High School (Tokyo); Senior High School at Komaba, University of Tsukuba (Tokyo); Senior High School at Otsuka, University of Tsukuba (Tokyo); Senri & Osaka International Schools of Kwansei Gakuin (Osaka); Shibuya Makuhari Senior High School (Chiba); Shukutoku Junior and Senior High School (Tokyo); Tokyo Gakugei University International Secondary School (Tokyo); Tokyo Metropolitan Hibiya High School (Tokyo); Tokyo Metropolitan Ryogoku High School (Tokyo); Urawa Minami High School (Saitama); Waseda University Senior High School (Tokyo); Yokohama Senior High School of International Studies (Kanagawa); Yonezawa Kojokan High School (Yamagata); and Zero High School (Fukushima).

In the Fall 2020 session of Stanford e-Japan, students from the following schools completed the course: Canadian Academy (Hyogo), Doshisha International High School (Kyoto), Fukushima Prefectural High School (Fukushima), Hamamatsu Nishi High School (Shizuoka), Hiroo Gakuen High School (Tokyo), Hiroshima Prefectural Hiroshima Senior High School (Hiroshima), Fukuoka Prefectural Kaho High School (Fukuoka), Kaichi Junior/Senior High School (Wakayama), Kamakura Jogakuin (Kanagawa), Keio Girls Senior High School (Tokyo), Kyoto Prefectural Rakuhoku Senior High School (Kyoto), Miyagi Prefectural Sendai Nika High School (Miyagi), Musashino University Chiyoda High School (Tokyo), N-High School (Okinawa), Otaru Choryo High School (Hokkaido), Seikei High School (Tokyo), Seisho High School (Nara), Senior High School at Otsuka, University of Tsukuba (Tokyo), Shibuya Makuhari Senior High School (Tokyo), Suwa Seiryo High School (Nagano), Takada Senior High School (Mie), Tokyo Gakugei University International Secondary School (Tokyo), Tokyo Metropolitan Hitotsubashi High School (Tokyo), Tokyo Metropolitan Ryogoku High School (Tokyo), Tsurumaru Senior High School (Kagoshima), and Waseda University Senior High School (Tokyo).

For more information about the Stanford e-Japan Program, please visit stanfordejapan.org.

To stay informed of news about Stanford e-Japan and SPICE’s other programs, join our email list and follow us on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.

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SPICE offers separate courses for U.S. high school students. For more information, please see the Reischauer Scholars Program (online course about Japan), Sejong Scholars Program (online course about Korea), and China Scholars Program (online course about China).

On March 26, 2021, a virtual award ceremony was held to honor SPICE’s Spring and Fall 2019 Stanford e-Japan honorees and 2020 Reischauer Scholars Program honorees. The honorees performed at the highest levels of their courses as determined by Stanford e-Japan Instructors Waka Brown and Meiko Kotani, Reischauer Scholars Program Instructor Naomi Funahashi, and research paper review committees.

Spring and Fall 2019 Stanford e-Japan Program Honorees

• Ayano Hirose (Okayama Sozan High School, Okayama)
• Rinko Kawamoto (UWC ISAK Japan, Nagano)
• Yuta Myojo (Rikkyo Ikebukuro High School, Tokyo), honorable mention
• Renee Ohnuki (Senior High School at Sakado, University of Tsukuba, Saitama)
• Chisaki Sano (Gunma Kokusai Academy, Gunma)
• Natsumi Shindo (Keio Girls Senior High School, Tokyo)
• Kota Watanabe (Waseda University Senior High School, Tokyo)
• Isshin Yunoki (Kaisei Academy, Tokyo), honorable mention
   

2020 Reischauer Scholars Program Honorees

• Brandon Cho (The Nueva School, California)
• Sara Fujimori (Menlo School, California)
• Noah Harrigan (Great Valley High School, Pennsylvania), honorable mention
• Kristie Moore (Irvine High School, California), honorable mention
• Tyler Vold (Kamiak High School, Washington), honorable mention
• Amy Joy Zhai (Richard Montgomery High School, Maryland)

The Honorable Toru Maeda, Consul General of Japan in San Francisco, made opening comments and underscored the students’ critical roles as future leaders in both countries and key players in the U.S.–Japan relationship. He noted, “By enrolling in and completing these programs, you have demonstrated initiative and determination to further your understanding of Japan and the United States. I strongly encourage you to continue your studies. I hope that this experience will inspire you to consider a career involving Japan and the United States… The continued strength of our government, business, and culture relations will be determined by the coming generations.” Consul General Maeda’s comments perfectly set the stage for the presentations by the honorees.

The honorees’ presentations focused on their course research projects that included U.S.–Japan relations in the areas of technology, security, and economics; Japanese education-related topics such as language learning for foreign students and cross-cultural understanding; identity issues and Zainichi Koreans; and topics that are regularly in the news such as Hollywood films, nuclear power and energy policy, and immigration. Their presentations were followed by the presentation of plaques by Brown, Kotani, and Funahashi.

Professor Rie Kijima (PhD, Stanford ’13) of the University of Toronto commented, “There is no doubt that the honorees of Stanford e-Japan and the RSP will use the experience they gained from participating in SPICE’s programs to engage in further research and activities that will bring greater awareness of and appreciation for the social, economic, political, and cultural contexts unique to the United States and Japan.” She continued, “What I am most impressed about the honorees of the Stanford e-Japan and the RSP programs are the quality of their research papers and their persuasiveness in conveying their main argument to a larger audience.” Brown, Kotani, and Funahashi hope that their students will have the opportunity to study with scholars like Kijima in their college years—scholars who would encourage them to explore careers involving Japan and the United States, a hope expressed by Consul General Maeda.

I was in touch with each of the honorees following the ceremony and they all expressed their gratitude to their instructors and the supporters of the courses. The Yanai Tadashi Foundation is the supporter of Stanford e-Japan, and Chikano Shiroma and Daisuke Kato represented the Yanai Tadashi Foundation during the ceremony. Naoaki and Yuka Mashita are the current supporters of the Reischauer Scholars Program. These courses and the ceremony would not have been possible with their support.

BERLIN — Over the past week, Russia has reinforced its military presence on the Crimean peninsula, moved military units close to the Russia-Ukraine border and announced military “readiness checks.” Most likely, this is just a ploy to unnerve the government in Kyiv and test the West’s reaction. 

But it could be something worse. If the Kremlin is weighing the costs and benefits of a military assault on Ukraine, Europe and the United States should ensure that Moscow does not miscalculate because it underestimates the costs. 

Read the rest at Politico

The agenda for nuclear arms control and related issues in the 2020s is a broad one. As the United States, Russia and others figure out how to maintain and enhance strategic stability in a multi-player, multi-domain world, Washington and Moscow will continue to have a central role, writes Steven Pifer, a fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy and a retired US Foreign Service officer.

The Biden administration sees arms control as a tool that can advance security and stability. It will seek to engage Russia on further nuclear arms reductions and other measures. Arms control in the 2020s will reflect continuity with earlier efforts—nuclear arms reductions will remain a bilateral matter between Washington and Moscow—but also contain new elements. That reflects the fact that strategic stability has become a more complex concept.

Start with Strategic Stability

Donald Trump was the first American president in 50 years to reach no agreement in the area of nuclear weapons. President Biden sees arms control as an important policy tool. On his first full day in office, he agreed to extend the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) for five years. His administration plans to do more. On February 3, Secretary of State Blinken said Washington would “pursue with the Russian Federation, in consultation with Congress and US allies and partners, arms control that addresses all of its nuclear weapons.”

This will not happen immediately. The administration needs to get its team in place. It will conduct a review of US programs and doctrine, which may be broader than the nuclear posture reviews conducted by past administrations.

The first serious US-Russian engagement on nuclear arms issues will likely occur in strategic stability talks. The classic definition of strategic stability is a situation in which neither side has an incentive, in a severe crisis or conventional conflict, to use nuclear weapons first. For five decades beginning in the 1960s, strategic stability was based largely on comparing US and Soviet strategic offensive nuclear forces. If each side had the ability, even after absorbing a massive first strike, to retaliate with devastating consequences, neither had an incentive to use nuclear weapons.

Today’s strategic stability model is more complex. Instead of a two-player model based just on strategic nuclear forces, today’s is multi-player and multi-domain. Third-country nuclear forces such as China need to be factored in. In addition to nuclear weapons, the model should take account of missile defense, precision-guided conventional strike, space and cyber developments.

US-Russian strategic stability talks should address all these factors. They should also address doctrine. Case in point: escalate-to-deescalate. Most Russian experts assert that this never became official Russian doctrine. However, the Pentagon believes it has, and that influenced the 2018 US nuclear posture review. At the least, each side appears to believe that the other has lowered the threshold for using nuclear weapons. That should leave no one comfortable.

Nuclear Arms

Formal nuclear arms negotiations will, for the foreseeable future, remain a bilateral US-Russian matter. That is due to the disparity in numbers. According to the Federation of American Scientists, the United States has about 3,600 nuclear warheads in its active stockpile, while Russia has about 4,300. No third country has more than about 300.

The Trump administration tried to bring China into a US-Russia negotiation, but it never articulated a plan for doing so. That is no surprise. Washington and Moscow would not agree to reduce to China’s level, nor would they agree to legitimize a Chinese build-up to their levels, and China would not accept unequal limits.

New START caps the United States and Russia each at no more than 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and nuclear-capable bombers and no more that 1,550 deployed strategic warheads. Those limits will remain in force until February 2026.

However, New START’s limits do not cover 60-65 percent of the active nuclear stockpiles of the two countries. Reserve (or non-deployed) strategic nuclear warheads, and non-strategic nuclear warheads—whether deployed or non-deployed—are unconstrained.

After the Cold War, the United States dramatically reduced its non-strategic nuclear weapons, eliminating all sea-based and land-based systems. Today, the only US non-strategic nuclear weapon is the B61 gravity bomb. Russia, on the other hand, maintains a large number and variety of non-strategic nuclear warheads—close to 2,000 for land-, sea- and air-based delivery as well as for defensive systems. This raises concern that Russia might be postured to use such weapons in a conflict.

The US military maintains more reserve strategic warheads. This reflects a desire to hedge against technical surprises or adverse geopolitical developments. The US military has implemented New START reductions in a manner that would allow it, should the treaty collapse, to add or “upload” warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs that now carry fewer than their capacity. As Russia modernizes its strategic ballistic missiles, it also is expanding its upload capacity.

The logical next step for the United States and Russia would entail negotiation of an agreement with an aggregate limit covering all their nuclear warheads. (Retired but not yet dismantled warheads could be dealt with separately.) An aggregate limit could offset reductions in Russia’s numerical advantage in non-strategic nuclear warheads with reductions in the US numerical advantage in non-deployed strategic warheads.

For a notional agreement, assume an aggregate limit of no more than 2,500 total nuclear warheads. Within that aggregate, there could be a sublimit of no more than 1,000 deployed strategic warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and any new kinds of strategic systems with deployed warheads—the weapons most readily launched. This approach would treat bomber weapons as non-deployed, since they are not maintained on board aircraft. Ideally, all nuclear weapons other than those on deployed strategic delivery systems would be kept in storage. A new agreement could also lower the New START limits on deployed delivery systems and deployed and non-deployed launchers.

This would be ambitious. That said, it would leave each nuclear superpower with eight times as many nuclear weapons as any third country. Even if the agreement did not entail such dramatic reductions, the structure would, for the first time, capture all US and Russian nuclear warheads.

Such an agreement could enable the United States and Russia to begin to deal with third-country nuclear weapons states, and here is where nuclear arms control in the 2020s might get into new territory. Washington and Moscow could ask China, Britain and France to undertake unilateral commitments not to increase their nuclear weapon numbers as long as the United States and Russia were reducing theirs and agree to limited transparency measures to provide confidence that they were abiding by those commitments.

This US-Russian agreement would require new verification measures to monitor numbers of nuclear weapons in storage. That likely will make both sides’ militaries uncomfortable. But both have adjusted to uncomfortable monitoring measures in the past.

Some arms control experts assess that an agreement limiting all nuclear weapons, particularly non-strategic nuclear arms, is too ambitious and have suggested alternative approaches. One would expand New START’s limits to capture systems such as intercontinental ground-launched boost-glide missiles and nuclear-powered torpedoes, ban other new kinds of strategic systems, and reduce the ratio of deployed strategic warheads to deployed strategic delivery systems, but would not attempt to constrain non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Another alternative would require that non-strategic nuclear weapons be relocated away from bases with associated delivery systems to a small number of storage sites, with monitoring activities designed to verify the absence of nuclear weapons at the bases housing delivery systems, not at confirming or monitoring the number of weapons in storage. While originally suggested for Europe only, it could be broadened to apply on a global basis.

A third alternative would simply seek to lower New START’s limits. Hopefully, however, the US and Russian governments will demonstrate greater ambition.

Other Possible Issues on the US-Russia Agenda

Arms control may enter new territory in the 2020s on issues and types of weapons that, while not nuclear arms, still affect strategic stability. They could be discussed in US-Russian strategic stability talks. If a mandate were agreed, they could be spun off into separate negotiations.

One set of issues concerns missile defense. The US ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) system is designed to defend against rogue states, such as North Korea, not against a Russian or Chinese ballistic missile attack. Russian officials in the past have nevertheless indicated an interest in constraining missile defenses. Whether they will insist on negotiating on missile defense in connection with a next round of nuclear arms negotiations remains to be seen.

US missile defenses now and for the foreseeable future pose no serious threat to Russian strategic ballistic missiles, a point Russian officials sometimes appear to acknowledge. (China, with a much smaller strategic force, has greater grounds for concern, though the performance of GMD system has not been particularly good.) On the other hand, it would not seem difficult to craft an agreement covering strategic missile defenses such as the GMD system and Moscow missile defense system that would apply constraints but still leave the United States room for capabilities to defend against a North Korean ICBM attack. What would prove difficult would be the Washington politics, where Republicans oppose any limits on missile defense.

Another issue is precision-guided conventional strike weapons. In some cases, these can fulfill missions that previously required nuclear weapons. Air- and sea-launched cruise missiles have been in the US inventory for decades and now in the Russian inventory. Both sides are developing hypersonic weapons. With the demise of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, there is the 9M729 ground-launched cruise missile and likely other future intermediate-range missiles. It would be difficult to devise an arrangement that constrained all such weapons, but US and Russian officials might consider whether a subset poses a particular threat to strategic stability and should be subject to negotiation.

One possibility would seek to ban nuclear-armed intermediate-range missiles. Another possibility, though it has drawbacks, would build on the Russian idea for a moratorium on the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, provided that it would mean relocation of 9M729 missile systems out of Europe.

Operations in space—used for early warning, command, control and communications and other purposes—also can affect strategic stability. A broad agreement banning the militarization of space is difficult to envisage. However, US and Russian officials might explore more limited measures, such as keep-out zones around certain declared satellites, a ban on anti-satellite tests that generate orbital debris and a ban on emplacing weapons in space designed to strike targets on the Earth.

As for the cyber domain, traditional arms control measures appear ill-suited. Washington and Moscow might pledge not to interfere in the other side’s nuclear command, control and communication systems, but neither could be certain the pledge was being observed.

In contrast to nuclear arms reductions, which will remain a US-Russia issue in the 2020s, some related issues might be considered on a broader basis. For example, China increasingly appears a peer competitor with the United States and Russia in space operations. Moreover, China has many intermediate-range missiles. It remains in the US interest to engage China in strategic stability talks. At some point, trilateral or multilateral discussions might be appropriate.

The agenda for nuclear arms control and related issues in the 2020s is a broad one. As the United States, Russia and others figure out how to maintain and enhance strategic stability in a multi-player, multi-domain world, Washington and Moscow will continue to have a central role. There is much that could be done to enhance stability and strengthen global security. Washington and Moscow will have to overcome the mistrust created by violations of earlier arms control agreements and take an innovative approach, even if certain problems prove insoluble, at least in the near term. But they have an opportunity, and an obligation, to try.

 

Originally for Valdai Discussion Club

Two weeks ago, President Joe Biden affirmatively responded to George Stephanopoulos’s question, “Vladimir Putin. You think he’s a killer?” Russian commentators voiced outrage, while some American observers foresee a new or intensified ice age in U.S.-Russia relations.

The Russian president is a big boy though. He surely did not like Biden’s answer, but it is difficult to imagine that he would refuse to engage when he sees doing so in his or Russia’s interest.

Biden could and should have used more diplomatic language in replying to Stephanopoulos: “Look, there is a tightly controlled system over there. Certain things do not happen without the approval of the guy at the top.” Still, was his assessment incorrect? 

Russia has carried out a conflict against Ukraine in eastern Donbas that has taken more than thirteen thousand lives and has no discernible motive other than to destabilize Kyiv. Putin-opponent Alexei Navalny was poisoned last summer, apparently by a special unit of the Russian Federal Security Service. In 2018, a Russian military intelligence hit team traveled to Britain, where it tried to poison Sergei Skripal, a busted double-agent who wound up in London after a spy swap.

Over twenty years, Putin has built a “power vertical” that concentrates authority in the Kremlin. It strains credulity to think the Donbas conflict or failed attacks on Navalny and Skripal would have occurred without his knowledge and consent.

It’s true that a comment like Biden’s is not usual between Washington and Moscow.  Recall, however, that Ronald Reagan called the Soviet Union an “evil empire” whose leaders “reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat.”  He poured Stinger missiles and other weapons into Afghanistan to drive out the Soviet army.  Mikhail Gorbachev nonetheless chose to deal with Reagan, and the two recorded major successes for relations between Washington and Moscow.

While Biden intends to push back against Russian overreach, his administration has also indicated readiness to cooperate where U.S. and Russian interests coincide.  On his first day in office, Biden agreed to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty until 2026, essentially accepting Putin’s offer from 2019.  His officials plan to talk to Russian officials on a range of strategic stability issues. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has a channel to his Russian counterpart. U.S. ambassador to Russia John Sullivan (no relation) is the rare Trump political appointee kept in place after Biden took office.  The Russians presumably noticed all this.

Dr. Julie Newton, an associate professor at the American University of Paris, recently expressed concern that Biden’s comment will fuel Russian grievances. Not to say that the deterioration in U.S.-Russia and West-Russia relations is solely the Kremlin’s fault, but Russian officials have a long list of grievances that often seem to boil down to “everyone is mad at us, what’s wrong with everyone?” They show no sign of having asked themselves whether invading neighboring states, cyber hacks against Western governmental and private institutions, and assassination attempts on the streets of European cities contribute to the problem.

Newton seems to believe Biden’s comment could make Putin less prepared to engage on issues that matter to Washington. Perhaps, but Putin calculates costs and benefits. Russia, like the United States, has an interest in keeping the nuclear arms competition bounded. While a nuclear Iran might pose a bigger problem for Washington, Moscow certainly would not welcome it. The Kremlin has an interest in a stable Afghanistan; if things go badly there, it’s much closer to Russia. Climate change poses challenges for Russia. Moscow and Washington can benefit from cooperation on these questions. Would Putin forgo that? Indeed, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov on March 29 listed a number of issues for U.S.-Russian engagement.

Additionally, Newton appears to suggest a double standard. She notes that Biden has not sanctioned Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman. That is not exactly true. The White House has indicated that Biden will deal with the Saudi king, not Mohammed bin Salman. Putin and the Saudi king, not MbS, have invitations to Biden’s virtual climate summit in April.

Biden’s comment shocked those in Moscow, where they had become used to Donald Trump. Trump rarely, if ever, criticized Putin or Russian misbehavior. He also did not produce a single positive achievement in U.S.-Russia relations. Under Biden, New START extension got done in two weeks. To be sure, that does not mean a reset for U.S.-Russia relations, but in contrast to his predecessor, Biden is a serious interlocutor. Putin may not like being called a killer—who would? However, when he sees engagement with Biden can advance his goals, he will engage.

Steven Pifer, a fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy and also affiliated with the Brookings Institution and Stanford University, is a retired Foreign Service officer. 

Originally for National Interest

The German government and many Germans breathed a sigh of relief when Joe Biden defeated Donald Trump in November.  Mr. Trump damaged U.S. relations with its trans-Atlantic allies, and he often targeted Germany and Chancellor Angela Merkel for particular ire.  Berlin has welcomed President Biden’s readiness to rebuild U.S.-German and U.S.-European ties.

All to the good, but rebuilding the U.S.-German relationship could well prove more difficult than it first appears.  Trump’s four years have left nagging questions in the German capital about the future of U.S. politics and Trumpism, and several issues will entail difficult exchanges between Washington and Berlin.

The Trump presidency meant a difficult time for Europe and the trans-Atlantic relationship.  He regarded the European Union as an economic adversary and questioned NATO’s value.  He held Germany in particularly low regard, criticizing its trade surpluses—telling his first NATO summit that “the Germans are very, very bad”—and decrying its defense spending levels, even suggesting that Berlin owes “vast sums of money” to the Alliance and America.  Trump had no personal chemistry with Merkel, reportedly referring to her as “stupid.”  In 2020, she publicly referred to “the limits of populism and denial of basic truths” without naming names.

In May 2020, Merkel declined, in the midst of the global COVID19 pandemic, to attend an in-person G7 summit at Camp David.  Shortly thereafter, Trump ordered the withdrawal of some 10,000 U.S. troops from Germany—a decision for which the Pentagon could offer no compelling strategic rationale (the Biden administration has suspended and ordered a review of the decision).

Berlin thus was delighted with Biden’s election, but Trump left much ground to make up.

What is the New “Normal” in America?

One senior German official privately observed that Trump had done real damage to German perceptions of the United States.  While welcoming Biden’s desire to rebuild relations with Germany and Europe and seeing his election as marking a return to “normalcy” in Washington, he wondered whether that “normalcy” was acceptable to the large segment of the American electorate that had voted for Trump.  Moreover, could Trump—or Trumpism—return to power?

In a separate discussion, another senior German official agreed that Trump had done significant damage to trans-Atlantic relations, noting that he had provided a boost to ideas such as strategic autonomy for Europe.  He pointed to the Conservative Political Action Conference held in late February as reminding Germans that Trump and Trumpism were not over.  What would the Republican Party look like in the future?

A third German official reiterated that Trump had caused many in Europe to contemplate how they might have to cope without strong U.S. leadership.  Germans had lost confidence in parts of the American political class.  It would be important that Biden define the level of U.S. leadership that his administration intended—and would be able—to provide.

Opinion surveys show that German citizens share these questions about America.  In a late 2020 poll commissioned by the European Council on Foreign Relations, 53 percent agreed or strongly agreed that “after voting for Trump in 2016, Americans cannot be trusted.”  The poll had 71 percent of Germans agreeing that the U.S. political system was somewhat or completely broken, though 48 percent believed that America could overcome its internal difficulties and contribute to solving global problems.  However, when asked whether they trusted in Europe or the United States, 53 percent opted for Europe compared to 4 percent for America.

Difficult Issues Loom

Early moves by Biden, such as rejoining the Paris Climate Agreement and World Health Organization, both of which Trump had quit, and reaffirming the U.S. commitment to NATO’s Article 5 (an attack on one shall be considered an attack on all) won plaudits in Berlin.  The Germans likewise welcomed Biden’s agreement to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia, as well as his administration’s readiness to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s nuclear program and reengage with the UN Human Rights Commission.  However, other issues that promise to figure prominently on the U.S.-German agenda could prove contentious between Washington and Berlin.

The Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline running under the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany tops the list.  The Biden administration, under pressure from Congress, has made clear its opposition to the pipeline, which is now about 95 percent finished.  Secretary of State Blinken issued a statement on March 18 reiterating the administration’s intent to comply with Congressional legislation calling for sanctions and warning that “any entity involved in the Nord Stream 2 pipeline risks U.S. sanctions and should immediately abandon work on the pipeline.”  On March 23, Blinken voiced U.S. opposition to the pipeline directly to German Foreign Minister Maas.

The German government, however, appears committed to finishing the pipeline, which has the support of the bulk of Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (and the allied Christian Socialist Union) and the Social Democratic Party, the parties that together make up the current governing coalition.  The German business community also supports the pipeline.  The CDU/CSU-SPD coalition, moreover, has an incentive to complete the pipeline prior to the German national election in September.  Polls indicate that, whatever coalition emerges following that election, the Greens Party will be part of it.  The Greens strongly oppose Nord Stream 2, both on ecological grounds and because of their concern about the human rights situation in Russia.  If the pipeline remains unfinished in September, this will be a major issue for the negotiation on forming a new governing coalition.

German officials note that stopping the pipeline now would be potentially costly; the German government could find itself on the hook for part or all of the nearly 10 billion Euros (about 12 billion dollars) already invested in the pipeline.  They note that U.S. sanctions on German or European companies would provoke a backlash in Germany.  Even those opposed to Nord Stream 2 caution against sanctions on German or European companies, which would go down badly with the pro-America CDU and could unite the European Union against the extra-territorial application of U.S. sanctions.  German politicians dismiss American charges that buying gas from Russia feeds the aggressive Moscow machine and point out the United States now imports billions of dollars’ worth of oil from Russia.

Creative thinking by U.S. and German officials might find a way by which Washington could acquiesce in the pipeline’s completion without applying U.S. sanctions against German companies.  That most likely will entail developing some benefits for Ukraine, which stands to lose the most if Nord Stream 2 is completed.  German officials acknowledge that the Biden administration needs something to show if it does not go forward with sanctions, but the mood in Washington appears to be hardening, and time to find a settlement is running short.

China poses a second issue that could prove difficult for U.S.-German relations.  As the Biden administration puts in place a policy to compete more effectively with Beijing, it will look to its European allies for support.  Berlin, however, pushed the European Union to complete an investment deal with Beijing without waiting to consult with the incoming Biden administration and does not share U.S. concern about the security considerations of allowing Huawei, the Chinese IT giant, to take part in providing the German 5G network.

German business interests on this issue matter—a lot, as China has become Germany’s largest trading partner.  While some in Berlin have become more wary of Beijing’s policy objectives and the means used to advance those goals, the German government does not want to have to choose sides between Washington and Beijing.  It may well have been China that Merkel had in mind when she told the (virtual) Munich Security Conference on February 19 that, while Europe and the United States should develop joint approaches, “that doesn’t mean that our interests will always converge.” 

That appears to have the backing of the German public.  Asked what Germany should do if there were a disagreement between Washington and Beijing, the European Council on Foreign Relations-commissioned poll showed 16 percent favoring support for the United States, while 8 percent favored support for China and 66 percent opted for neutrality.  (Worryingly for Washington’s effort to maintain a trans-Atlantic front against Russia, the poll showed identical numbers when substituting Russia for China.)

A third issue is German defense spending and the NATO-agreed goal that allies devote 2 percent of gross domestic product to defense by 2024.  Germany is now spending much more on its military than in 2014 but likely will fall short of the 2 percent target.  The Biden administration almost certainly will be more diplomatic than Trump on this issue.  Still, it will look to NATO allies in Europe to bear a larger share of the burden of deterring and defending against Russia as the United States shifts its military focus to the Asia-Pacific region. 

And a German Election

One complicating factor is that Germany will soon move into the campaign season for the national election in September.  As one German think-tank analyst put it, the issues that would help solidify U.S.-German relations—suspending construction of Nord Stream 2, adopting a tougher policy toward China, dramatically bolstering defense spending, and moving forward to procure a nuclear-capable fighter to replace the aging Tornado and sustain Germany’s nuclear-sharing role in NATO—are not positions that will attract votes.  Quite the opposite, too close an embrace of Washington’s views on these questions could drive ballots to other parties.

The September election, moreover, will mean an end to Merkel’s long run as chancellor.  Most expect her replacement to come from the CDU or CSU, though prognostications are less certain after the lackluster showing by the CDU in March 14 state elections in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Rhineland-Pflaz.  Regardless, a new chancellor will need time to get up to speed, and that could affect how quickly he or she might engage and decide on issues of interest to Washington.

This does not mean that the U.S.-German relationship is headed for trouble.  The good news is that both Washington and Berlin clearly want to restore the comity that was lost during the Trump administration.  However, building that relationship back, and not letting things get derailed by difficult issues that could divide the two allies, will require flexible diplomacy and that each take some account of the other’s interests and domestic pressures.

* * * * *

CISAC affiliate Steven Pifer is spending the first part of 2021 on a fellowship with the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin.

The China Program at Shorenstein APARC had the privilege of hosting Jude Blanchette, the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies​ (CSIS). The program, entitled "What’s ‘Communist’ about the Communist Party of China?," explored the goals and ideology of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as well as what they might mean for the future of China in the global community. Professor Jean Oi, William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics and director of the APARC China Program, moderated the event.

After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the goals of the CCP became less clear. As the country began to adopt market reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, CCP theorists were forced into contortions providing ideological justifications for policies that appeared overtly capitalist. Deng Xiaoping’s concept of “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” came to be seen as a theoretical fig leaf rather than a description of an egalitarian economic system, and by the 2000s, a consensus emerged that the CCP had completely abandoned any pretense of pursuing the Marxist vision it purported to hold. With the rise of Xi Jinping, however, the Party talks with renewed vigor about Marxism-Leninism and the goal of achieving actual, existing socialism. Has the CCP re-discovered communism?  In his talk, Blanchette discussed the abandoned and existing legacies of Mao Zedong, Marxism-Leninism, and the CCP’s vision of socialism. Watch now: 

On February 24, 2021, the China Program at Shorenstein APARC hosted Dr. Thomas Wright, director of the Center on the United States and Europe and a senior fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings Institution. Professor Jean Oi, William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics and director of the APARC China Program, moderated the event.

The program, entitled "U.S.-China Relations in the Biden Era," explored the future of US-China relations based on experience from past administrations. Under former President Trump, U.S. relations with China evolved into outright rivalry. In his talk, Dr. Wright discussed whether this rivalry will continue and evolve during a Biden administration by analyzing the roots of strategic competition between the two countries and various strands of thinking within the Biden team. According to Wright, the most likely outcome is that the competition between the two countries will evolve into a clash of governance systems and the emergence of two interdependent blocs where ideological differences become a significant driver of geopolitics. Cooperation is possible but it will be significantly shaped by conditions of rivalry. Watch now: