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Carol Atkinson (speaker) retired as a lieutenant colonel from the U.S. Air Force in 2005. While in the military she served in a wide variety of management and operational positions in the fields of intelligence, targeting, and combat assessment. During the Cold War she flew on the Strategic Air Command's nuclear airborne command post as a target analyst. During Operation Desert Storm (1991) she worked on the intelligence staff in Riyadh, and, subsequently, on the contingency planning staff in Dhahran/Khobar, Saudi Arabia. While in the military, she taught at the Air Force Academy and the Air Force's Command and Staff College.

Atkinson holds a PhD in international relations from Duke University, an MA in geography from Indiana University, and a BS from the United States Air Force Academy (5th class with women). She is currently a post-doctoral research fellow at the Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California. Atkinson's primary research focuses on U.S. military-to-military contacts as channels of international norm diffusion. She is also working on a project examining the influence of educational exchange programs on democratization and a project on the social construction of the biological warfare threat in the United States.

Jessica Weeks (respondent) is a doctoral candidate in the Stanford Department of Political Science. Her research interests include foreign policy decision-making in non-democratic regimes, the settlement of military crises, and the effects of foreign military interventions on target states. She will be a pre-doctoral fellow at CISAC during 2007-2008. Jessica received her BA in political science from The Ohio State University, and an MA in international history and politics from the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Carol Atkinston Postdoctoral Fellow, Center for International Studies Speaker University of Southern California
Jessica Weeks Doctoral Candidate, Department of Political Science Commentator Stanford University
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Dr. Joshua Teitelbaum is a Senior Research Fellow at Tel Aviv University's Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, where he studies the politics and history of Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf countries, as well as Palestinian issues. He is the author of two acclaimed books: Holier Than Thou: Saudi Arabia's Islamic Opposition (Washington Institute for Near East Policy), and The Rise and Fall of the Hashemite Kingdom of Arabia (New York University Press), a study of the early modern history of Saudi Arabia. He has published numerous scholarly articles on the modern Middle East and his work has also appeared in The New Republic and The Jerusalem Report. He has been a visiting professor in Cornell University's Department of Near Eastern Studies and at the Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, and a Visiting Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He is currently Schusterman Visiting Associate Professor at CDDRL.

Dr. Teitelbaum is an Associate of the Proteus Management Group, US Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership, under the sponsorship of the Office of the Director, National Intelligence.

Dr. Teitelbaum is a native of the San Francisco Bay Area. He received his B.A. in Near Eastern Studies at UCLA and his M.A. and Ph.D. in Middle Eastern History at Tel Aviv University.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

CDDRL
Encina Hall
616 Serra Street
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

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Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Tel Aviv University
JoshuaTeitelbaum082007.jpg
PhD
A native of the San Francisco Bay Area, Dr. Joshua Teitelbaum took his B.A. in Near Eastern Studies at UCLA and his M.A. and Ph.D. in Middle Eastern History at Tel Aviv University. He is the author of two acclaimed books: Holier Than Thou: Saudi Arabia's Islamic Opposition (Washington Institute for Near East Policy), and The Rise and Fall of the Hashemite Kingdom of Arabia (New York University Press), a study of the early modern history of Saudi Arabia. His edited volume - for which he has written the introduction - Political Liberalization in the Persian Gulf is forthcoming from Columbia University Press. He has published numerous scholarly articles on the modern Middle East and his work has also appeared in The New Republic and The Jerusalem Report. Dr. Teitelbaum is a Senior Research Fellow at Tel Aviv University's Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, where he studies the politics and history of Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf countries, as well as Palestinian issues. He is CDDRL Rosenbloom Visiting Associate Professor for the Spring quarter of 2008.

Teitelbaum was a legislative aide to Congressman Paul N. McCloskey, Jr., of California's 12th District.

He has been a visiting professor in Cornell University's Department of Near Eastern Studies and at the Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, and a Visiting Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He has spoken at the Council on Foreign Relations, San Francisco's Commonwealth Club, the Middle East Institute, the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, the US Naval Postgraduate School, the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the US Army War College, the Italian Ministry of Defense, Israel's National Security Council, the Israeli Foreign Ministry, and most major university Middle East centers in the US and Canada. His comments and expertise have been sought by the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the Los Angeles Times, Reuters, the Associated Press, the Baltimore Sun, the Jerusalem Post, Ha'aretz, Ma'ariv, Yediot Aharonot, the Straits Times and the Voice of America. He regularly reviews scholarly manuscripts for Cambridge University Press, Oxford University Press, New York University Press, Palgrave, and C. Hurst & Co.

Dr. Teitelbaum is an Associate of the Proteus Management Group, US Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership, under the sponsorship of the Office of the Director, National Intelligence.

CDDRL Visiting Associate Professor, Spring Quarters 2007, 2008 & 2009
Joshua Teitelbaum Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Tel Aviv University; CDDRL Schusterman Visiting Associate Professor, Spring 2007 Speaker
Seminars

CDDRL
Encina Hall
616 Serra Street
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

0
Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Tel Aviv University
JoshuaTeitelbaum082007.jpg
PhD
A native of the San Francisco Bay Area, Dr. Joshua Teitelbaum took his B.A. in Near Eastern Studies at UCLA and his M.A. and Ph.D. in Middle Eastern History at Tel Aviv University. He is the author of two acclaimed books: Holier Than Thou: Saudi Arabia's Islamic Opposition (Washington Institute for Near East Policy), and The Rise and Fall of the Hashemite Kingdom of Arabia (New York University Press), a study of the early modern history of Saudi Arabia. His edited volume - for which he has written the introduction - Political Liberalization in the Persian Gulf is forthcoming from Columbia University Press. He has published numerous scholarly articles on the modern Middle East and his work has also appeared in The New Republic and The Jerusalem Report. Dr. Teitelbaum is a Senior Research Fellow at Tel Aviv University's Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, where he studies the politics and history of Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf countries, as well as Palestinian issues. He is CDDRL Rosenbloom Visiting Associate Professor for the Spring quarter of 2008.

Teitelbaum was a legislative aide to Congressman Paul N. McCloskey, Jr., of California's 12th District.

He has been a visiting professor in Cornell University's Department of Near Eastern Studies and at the Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, and a Visiting Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He has spoken at the Council on Foreign Relations, San Francisco's Commonwealth Club, the Middle East Institute, the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, the US Naval Postgraduate School, the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the US Army War College, the Italian Ministry of Defense, Israel's National Security Council, the Israeli Foreign Ministry, and most major university Middle East centers in the US and Canada. His comments and expertise have been sought by the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the Los Angeles Times, Reuters, the Associated Press, the Baltimore Sun, the Jerusalem Post, Ha'aretz, Ma'ariv, Yediot Aharonot, the Straits Times and the Voice of America. He regularly reviews scholarly manuscripts for Cambridge University Press, Oxford University Press, New York University Press, Palgrave, and C. Hurst & Co.

Dr. Teitelbaum is an Associate of the Proteus Management Group, US Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership, under the sponsorship of the Office of the Director, National Intelligence.

CDDRL Visiting Associate Professor, Spring Quarters 2007, 2008 & 2009
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The speaker will describe his experiences over ten years of developing a comprehensive program to engage the formerly top secret Soviet biological weapons complex through joint scientific research and disease surveillance. He will also discuss how lessons learned can be applied to potential new efforts to reduce global threats of bioterrorism and potential pandemics.

Andrew Weber is the adviser for cooperative threat reduction policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. His responsibilities include developing and overseeing CTR biological threat reduction programs in the former Soviet Union, and nuclear and chemical weapons threat reduction projects in Central Asia. Before coming to the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 1996, Weber served as a U.S. Foreign Service officer in Saudi Arabia, Germany, Kazakhstan, and Hong Kong. Weber holds an MSFS degree from Georgetown University and a BA from Cornell University. He speaks Russian. Weber is an adjunct professor at the Georgetown University Graduate School of Foreign Service.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Andrew Weber Senior Adviser for Cooperative Threat Reduction Policy Speaker Office of the Secretary of Defense
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The current trend toward suicide bombings began in Lebanon in the early 1980s. The practice soon spread to civil conflicts in Sri Lanka, the Kurdish areas of Turkey, and Chechnya. Palestinian attacks on Israeli civilians in the 1990s and during the Al Aqsa intifada further highlighted the threat. Al Qaeda's adoption of the tactic brought a transnational dimension. Interest in the phenomenon then surged after the shock of the 2001 attacks, which involved an unprecedented number of both perpetrators and casualties. Since then, suicide bombings have expanded in number and geographical range, reaching extraordinary levels in the Iraq War and spreading around the world to countries such as Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Tunisia, Kenya, Indonesia, Turkey, Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, Egypt, Jordan, Bangladesh, and Britain.

This review covers thirteen of the books published on the subject since 2002. Three analyze the Palestinian case and four others focus on Islamist violence. The other six, including two edited collections, intend to be comprehensive. This review also refers to a few selected publications that discuss the arguments presented in the works reviewed. It aims to give readers a glimpse of the content of the different volumes as well as offer a critique.

The essay reviews these works:

  • Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).
  • Joyce M. Davis, Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance and Despair in the Middle East (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
  • Diego Gambetta, ed., Making Sense of Suicide Missions (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
  • Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006).
  • Raphael Israeli, Islamikaze: Manifestations of Islamic Martyrology (London: Frank Cass, 2003).
  • Farhad Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers: Allah's New Martyrs, translated from the French by David Macey (London: Pluto Press, 2005).
  • Anne Marie Oliver and Paul F. Steinberg, The Road to Martyrs' Square: A Journey into the World of the Suicide Bomber (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
  • Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005).
  • Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005).
  • Ami Pedahzur, ed., Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom (London and New York: Routledge, 2006).
  • Christoph Reuter, My Life is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing, translated from the German by Helena Ragg-Kirkby (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
  • Shaul Shay, The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2004).
  • Barbara Victor, Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers (Emmaus Pa.: Rodale [distributed by St. Martin's Press] 2003).
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Michael M. May, Michael A. McFaul, Scott D. Sagan, David G. Victor, and John P. Weyant talk to Stanford magazine for the November/December cover story on energy security. It's not our oil dependence that's the problem, say these scholars - it's our vulnerability to oil producers who use revenues for political purposes that work against our own. In this discussion, these five FSI scholars talk about the dynamics of an energy security threat that's more serious than supply disruption, the risks of isolationist solution-seeking instead of collective action, and why we need to come up with good economic incentives for alternative-energy research.

Every day, the United States burns through 20.7 million barrels of oil. China, the world's second largest consumer, uses about 6.9 million barrels a day. Although the United States is the third leading oil producer in the world (behind Saudi Arabia and Russia), its appetite is so enormous that it overwhelms the country's production capacity. Its known reserves, about 21 billion barrels, would supply only enough to keep the country running at full speed for about three years.

So when STANFORD gathered five faculty members to talk about the implications of U.S. dependency on foreign oil, we expected grave declarations of alarm. But their concern did not square with the growing chorus of citizens and elected officials about why reducing this dependency is so important.

On the next five pages, faculty from political science, economics, law and engineering explain why the debate about energy security is missing the point, and what they think needs to be done.

STANFORD: How would you frame the issue of dependency on foreign oil? What should we be concerned about?

David Victor: The problem is not dependence per se. In fact, dependence on a world market produces enormous benefits, such as lower prices. Nor is the problem that energy's essential role in the economy means that dependence must be avoided. The real problem is that energy - oil, especially - doesn't operate according to normal market principles. Something like 75 percent of the reserves of oil and gas are controlled by companies that are either wholly owned or in effect controlled by governments, and there's enormous variation in how those companies perform. Some of them are just a disaster, like [Mexico's state-owned oil company] Pemex, and others can work at world standards, like Saudi Aramco or Brazils Petrobrás. Some of these governments, such as Venezuela, use oil revenues for political purposes that undermine U.S. influence. High prices do not automatically generate new supply or conservation, partly because suppliers can drop prices to undercut commercial investment in alternatives. Second, we have what has become known as "the resource curse." There'sa lot of evidence that the presence of huge windfalls in poorly governed places makes governance even worse. Revenue that accrues to oil-exporting governments is particularly prone to being misspent, often in ways that work against U.S. interests.

Scott Sagan: I agree that calling the problem "energy dependence" and therefore seeking energy independence is the wrong way to think about this problem. Talking about energy independence feeds the xenophobic impulse that occurs all too easily in American politics. And it suggests to other countries that they should seek independence rather than a more cooperative approach. I see very negative consequences politically in the signal that attitude sends. Think about the current nuclear crisis with Iran. Iran claims that it needs independent uranium enrichment capabilities to have "energy sovereignty." Such uranium enrichment production could be used, however, for civilian nuclear power or for making a bomb, creating enormous nuclear weapons proliferation problems. We're feeding into that kind of thinking when we use the same language about independence when referring to oil. And it produces uncooperative effects elsewhere. The Chinese, for example, cut a deal with Sudan as a means of creating energy security for themselves. It inhibits efforts of the international community to encourage that government to behave responsibly.

John Weyant: There is a distinction between dependence, meaning how much of the oil the United States consumes is imported, and vulnerability, meaning how at risk our economy and our social order are to oil-supply disruptions. That vulnerability is defined by how much of the total supply of oil in the world market comes from unreliable sources. So you have to look at oil supply on a global scale, not just in the United States. It's the instability of the supply that affects price.

Victor: I like John's term "vulnerability," and it leads us to various kinds of actions to reduce our vulnerability to the market rather than trying to make us completely independent. One of them has been around since the '70s - building and coordinating strategic stockpiles so that they are supplied into a single world market. Traditionally that could be done by the major Western countries because they were the major oil consumers. One of the big challenges for policy makers today is how to get India and China to think about the operation of this world market in the same market-based way that we think about it, and to get them to build up those stockpiles and coordinate them with our own. There's some evidence that that kind of coordination can reduce our vulnerability.

Weyant: There's this fallacy among the public that if we don't import so much oil, other oil-exporting countries are going to be hurt and we will be unaffected if oil supplies are cut off. But these countries are sometimes major trading partners of allies, and asking those allies to take a hit on our behalf just leads to other economic problems. If the economies in China and Europe and Japan, who are all major trading partners, go down, it affects how much they can buy from us. It's another reason we can't be xenophobic and just look inward on an issue like this. You get these international trade flows outside the energy sector that could be pretty devastating.

STANFORD: Last summer we saw crude oil prices hit $70 a barrel and gas prices went well above $3 per gallon nationwide. That momentarily changed consumer behavior, and reduced demand. Are high prices a good thing?

Michael May: The key factor in normalizing market conditions is assuring the market that high prices are here to stay. Major oil companies like Exxon and bp have been putting their money to other uses than exploration. They have been buying back shares and increasing returns to stockholders because that's the way Wall Street drives them. That might change if prices stayed high. It probably won't be $70 a barrel, but even $50 a barrel as a base price is almost twice the historic average. The extent to which investors become convinced that that's going to be the future average will have some bearing as to how much money they spend on exploration. Toyota and General Motors and others can make hybrids or much more efficient cars, but it takes billons of dollars of investment, and if the price of gasoline goes down, they have less incentive. When gas is cheap, driving an SUV is not such a big deal.

Victor: The reason some of these companies are buying back the shares is not just because of Wall Street but because they don't have a lot of truly attractive opportunities for investing in new production. Most of the oil reserves are either legally off limits for the Western oil companies or international oil companies generally, or they're de facto off limits because they're in places where it's so hard to do business. Although the public is seized by the high price of energy, the major energy companies are seized by concerns that prices are going to decline sharply. If there is a recession, which would dampen demand for energy, or the capacity to produce oil around the world improves, then prices will decline. It has happened in the past. That fear really retards a lot of investment because these investments have a very long capital lifetime, and you need to protect them against low prices over an incredibly long time horizon.

Michael McFaul: It's very important to understand that oil companies owned and operated by governments are not necessarily profit-maximization entities. Take Gazprom, the gas company of Russia. It is closely aligned with state interests, so profit isn't its only motivation. It will use its money for strategic purposes as defined by Vladimir Putin, not as defined by the shareholders of Gazprom. For instance, early in 2006, Gazprom cut off gas supplies to Ukraine, mostly for geopolitical reasons. Why is Hezbollah so well armed? Because of Iran, which uses oil revenue for strategic purposes; it is not used for investing in a company or investing in the market per se. This is part of the problem of the "resource curse" David referred to. If oil is discovered in a country before democratic institutions are in place, the probability of that country becoming democratic is very low. In countries where the state does not rely on the taxation of its citizens for its revenues, it doesn't have to listen to what its citizens want to do with that money. So instead of building roads or schools or doing things that taxpayers would demand of them, they use their money in ways that threaten the security of other countries, and, ultimately, their own.

Victor: It's important that we not overstate the extent to which users of energy are going to respond automatically to high prices, and the personal vehicle is a great example. Fuel accounts for about 20 percent of the total cost of operating a vehicle. Traditionally it's only been 10 or 15 percent, but we are much wealthier today than we were three decades ago when we had the [first OPEC oil embargo]. I think that helps explain a lot of the sluggishness in response in the marketplace. People are buying smaller, more fuel-efficient cars, but that trend will only go so far because there are other factors that determine what kinds of vehicles people purchase. In the United States and most advanced industrialized countries, most oil is used for transportation, where oil products have no rival. It is hard to switch. In most of the rest of the world, oil gets used for a variety of other purposes, including generating electricity. Those markets are probably going to be more responsive to the high price of oil because they're going to have opportunities to switch to other fuels. The United States used a lot of oil to generate electricity in the early 1970s and when that first oil shock came along, essentially all of that disappeared from our market. That's part of the reason why the U.S. energy system responded fairly quickly to the first oil shock, and why changes in behavior are harder to discern in the current crisis. There is no easy substitute for gasoline.

May: If we generally agree that high oil prices, on the whole, are a good thing because they cause investment in more production and more efficient uses of oil, then it would follow that the rapid growth in consumption in China is also a good thing and we should welcome it, right?

Victor: I disagree with that. In effect what we have right now is a "tax" that's been applied to the oil market due to the various dysfunctions of the way it operates and to unexpectedly high demand in the United States and China. The revenue from that tax is accruing to the producers, and if we think about how to get out of the mess here, then what we want to do is in effect apply a tax to the oil products. If we raise the price of these products to reflect the real total cost of our vulnerability to the world oil market, those companies have an incentive to go off and look for alternatives.

May: So you're saying the same thing: that high oil prices, whether from this tax or otherwise, are a good thing.

Weyant: It depends significantly on who is collecting the tax.

McFaul: Yes, the fundamental question is how the money is being spent. If I had high confidence that the money was going to reinvestment, then I could agree that high prices are good, but that's not what is happening. The Soviet Union's most dangerous adventures in the Third World correlated with the high oil prices in the 1970s. You can see the direct effect. And when the prices came down, the Soviet Union collapsed. The same is true with Iran today. They are being very aggressive in the region - in Iraq, in Lebanon, in Afghanistan - trying to become the Middle East hegemon. This would not be happening if they didn't have all these clients - Hezbollah, Hamas, their friends in Iraq - that they can support with millions of dollars. Going back a few decades, where did Osama bin Laden come from? Where did support for the Taliban come from? It came from this tax that David is talking about. If we're talking about security issues and oil, this is much more serious than supply disruption to the United States.

Victor: I agree with Mike 100 percent. If you look at where the revenues are going from Iran, Venezuela and so on, there's a long list of folks who are doing things that are contrary to our interests with the money that ultimately is coming out of the pockets of American consumers. Dealing with that is job one.

STANFORD: So how would you counsel American policy makers? What needs to happen to reduce our vulnerability over the long term?

Sagan: The vulnerabilities we have today should provide an incentive to make some critical investments and to change our thinking, but we're not really doing that. I was quite surprised at how much I agreed with one aspect of the second Bush inaugural address. [He said] let's start talking about our addiction to oil and all the problems associated with that, but I've been completely disappointed with the lack of follow-through. And part of the problem is this notion of energy independence. We need diversity in our research and development spending across the board, on a variety of technologies. We're going to produce energy security to a large degree by finding cooperative solutions that are efficient and secure for many countries working together. We need to see our national security as being very dependent on others and that's not entirely a bad thing.

Victor: There is one cluster of technology that's going to be exceptionally important - electric vehicles. The all-electric vehicle has been kind of a disaster. We tried to do that in California without much success at all. The new set of pluggable hybrid vehicles, which you plug in at night and charge up, are more promising. If such technologies make it feasible to reduce some of the transportation dependence on oil, then markets will be forced to become more "normal" and more responsive. Electric cars and other technologies can help to keep prices lower and ultimately help make the transition completely away from oil over a period of 30 or 50 years.

Weyant: We only think about energy as a nation when prices are high, and so there's a short attention span on the issue. That makes it really hard to sustain a policy that would be rational over the long term. If we're going to have a big R&D program, for example, you need to invest in technologies and sustain the investment over a long time horizon. If you couple this short attention span with our aversion to taxes, at least historically, you end up with policies that are almost designed from the outset to fail. The political tide is turning a little bit so a well-designed tax might be possible. Maybe you don't raise taxes now but you assure that the price of a [hybrid] car won't go below a certain level and that'll help create a little more confidence with the marketplace. If you just focus on research and development without getting the economic incentives right, you come up with all kinds of great gizmos that no one will actually make or use.

McFaul: We've been talking mostly about how to manipulate the market to change people's behavior and I think that's quite right. I can't tell you how many people I saw come out of a Palo Alto theater after seeing Al Gore's movie [An Inconvenient Truth] and jump into their gas-guzzling machines. I would like to tax those machines; use economic tools to change people's behavior in a way the movie didn't. This has to become a public policy issue. It's not right now. Think about the way the market for cigarettes worked in this country 50 years ago, and think of how it is structured now. We have not just taxes but regulation - they can't be advertised on television - and a national campaign trying to educate people about the health concerns. We need a similar effort on this issue.

Sagan: When you watch the Super Bowl you don't see advertisements for cigarettes, but you do for Hummers. There's no attempt at all to educate people about the relationship between these longer-term problems and what you do individually. And that takes decades.

Victor: One of the acid tests for whether the nation is pursuing a coherent energy policy is our policy on ethanol. Ethanol is important because it is a partial substitute for oil-based gasoline. In this country, almost all of the ethanol that is delivered to the marketplace is made from corn, which is economically inefficient. But we do that because the corn grows in the heartland, such as Iowa - an important state electorally. There have been lots of proposals to, for example, erase the tariff on imported ethanol. Brazil produces ethanol from sugar cane and it's much cheaper and more efficient. But the farm lobby always intervenes and these proposals languish, with the result that the U.S. ethanol industry never faces the rigors of world competition. So long as energy is bouncing around lower on the list of priorities, it will be difficult to have a coherent policy.

Weyant: It would be far better if people were willing to bite the bullet and say this is a problem and it's not going to be painless to solve it, but if we play our cards right it's not going to reduce our standard of living much. Convincing the public is really one thing that might be worth some more effort. It's a cacophony to them.

STANFORD: What is your greatest hope and your worst fear with regard to demand for oil?

Victor: My greatest hope is that inside the Chinese government and inside the Indian government people know that this independence view of the world energy market is completely wrongheaded. Maybe that will create an opportunity for the United States and India and China along with other major oil consumers to collectively manage this issue, and the consequences of doing that will spill over onto other areas of cooperation. My greatest fear, in addition to the things we've already discussed, is that the United States will use the oil issue to beat up on the Chinese and the Indians, and that our relationship with those countries, which is already fragile, will make it harder to work together on other things that also matter.

May: My greatest hope is that the United States, China, India and other major countries work together towards a more hopeful future, including improving the global environment, providing a counterbalance to mischief in the Middle East, and promoting a transition to modernization and away from extremism. My greatest fear is that the little termites who are nibbling at what is currently a somewhat sensible Chinese policy will have their way, either because the country's economy slows down - which it will inevitably - or for some other reason, and we'll wind up fighting each other or destroying each other's capabilities.

McFaul: My greatest sense of optimism comes from this discussion, and about what my colleagues in this discussion said about China, because from the surface it looks like there's a much more pernicious policy of China going its own way. I've learned today that in fact there are very reasonable voices within the Chinese government, and I hope that there will be in my own government. My greatest fear is that there will continue to be politicians who control oil revenues who do things that do not serve international security, and I'm speaking not only of Iran. My nightmarish scenario is that 10 years from now Iran, Iraq and, God forbid, Saudi Arabia are controlled by hostile governments that want to use the revenues that we pay them for their oil to harm us. I give that a low probability, but in terms of things that worry me about our security, it's the instability of those oil-exporting regimes.

Sagan: The hope is that this current crisis will provide the right set of incentives to encourage investment in a diverse set of energy R&D programs across the board, and will encourage cooperation between countries in energy research and development. That would help educate and change the culture of the United States away from a gas-guzzling, governor-in-the-Hummer culture. The fear is that this will become yet one more excuse to move to a more xenophobic policy that discourages cooperative international policies.

Weyant: Remember David Stockman, the erstwhile head of the Office of Management and Budget? I ran into him in Washington and he literally said to me, "Don't worry about oil security and disruptions or any of that stuff. We've got battleships to take care of this problem." That shocked me to no end, and my response was "Do you really want to be in that position, where that's your only option?" Your whole response is "We're best in the battleship field and you shouldn't mess with us?" This type of attitude is what worries me the most.

Sagan: We were earlier talking about the resource curse, and this strikes me as an example of the hegemon's curse. To not take the necessary steps on economic policies or energy policies because you think you've got a military backup solution. If our military strength causes us to be passive or uncooperative on the economic or energy front, it will have a boomerang effect that will really hurt us.

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Christopher Hitchens is a columnist for Vanity Fair. His most recent book is Thomas Jefferson: Author of America. His most recent collection of essays is titled Love, Poverty, and War. Mr. Hitchens, longtime contributor to The Nation, wrote a wide-ranging, biweekly column for the magazine from 1982 to 2002. With trademark savage wit, he flattens hypocrisy inside the Beltway and around the world, laying bare the "permanent government" of entrenched powers and interests. Mr. Hitchens has been Washington editor of Harper's and book critic for Newsday, and regularly contributes to such publications as Granta, The London Review of Books, Vogue, New Left Review, Dissent and the Times Literary Supplement.

Born in 1949 in Portsmouth, England, Mr. Hitchens received a degree in philosophy, politics and economics from Balliol College, Oxford, in 1970.

 

Event Synopsis:

In this presentation Mr. Hitchens presents a "balance sheet" from point of view of those, like him, who advocated regime change in Iraq and hoped that it would have positive effects in Saudi Arabia and Iran as well. He presents areas where progress has not materialized, such as attempts to revive Iraq's badly damaged oil industry. However, he points out political progress made by Kurds in the north of Iraq, and growing pressure on the regimes of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya. Attempts to "dry up the swamp" where terrorism breeds have not eliminated but have isolated Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. He urges the international community to "make friends" with moderate forces in Muslim countries which reject terrorism, and to pursue policies that continue to isolate extremist groups.

 A discussion period following the talk raised such questions as: Is there a secular democratic alternative to Hamas? In light of difficulties encountered in establishing democratic governance in Iraq, shouldn't there be a reassessment of the belief system that led to the Iraqi operation? What evidence can be found that Iraq was on the verge of collapse prior to the recent military intervention? How do the happenings in the Middle East translate into a policy regarding North Korea, which is vocal about acquiring weapons of mass destruction? With Saddam Hussein gone, can Iraq remain one country? Is there a risk that intervention in places like Iraq has a galvanizing effect on other enemy groups?

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Christopher Hitchens Author Speaker
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One century after America's Civil War, the descendants of slaves daily faced the twin terrors of homicide and arson. Yet only 15 years after the rise of the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., the back of segregation and neo-Confederate violence had been broken. Can Palestinians likewise mount a successful, nonviolent movement toward peaceful co-existence with their former adversaries? CISAC science fellow Jonathan Farley, writing in the San Francisco Chronicle, suggests they can.

Imagine a land where bombs explode almost daily and children are killed by terrorists without conscience. On one side we find a people who suffered through the horror of slave-labor death camps; on the other side a people who suffered through a terrible war -- which they began when what they felt was their property was seized from them -- a terrible defeat and (for them) a terrible occupation. Now imagine those same peoples 15 years later, living side by side, peacefully.

This sounds like a pipe dream: The Middle East could never be this way, we think. But we do not need to imagine this land.

We are living in it.

One century after America's Civil War, the descendants of slaves daily faced the twin terrors of homicide and arson. Yet only 15 years after the rise of the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., the back of segregation and neo-Confederate violence had been broken.

Can Palestinians likewise mount a successful, nonviolent movement toward peaceful co-existence with their former adversaries? In short, can history repeat itself?

How expensive would it be for us if it did not? America spends an estimated $3 billion a year in support of Israel. This support is justified because Israel is a democracy and our main ally in the region. Yet we also spend $2 billion supporting Israel's nondemocratic neighbor, Egypt. Billions more have been spent maintaining bases in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and now Iraq. We justify these expenditures by surrendering to the serpentine excuses of realpolitik: We need the support of key figures and families in the region, we say, and so we have to work with them. Just as we once said of the Dixiecrats and other segregationist politicians in the American South.

We can transform this paradigm, as we did then, and at little cost to ourselves. We can utilize the experience of the civil rights movement -- which Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice knows all too well (her childhood friend was killed by an improvised explosive device in segregated Birmingham) -- to assist Palestinians in their stride toward peace. What we need is a Muslim Martin Luther King.

Many believe that leaders are born, not made, but programs to cultivate leadership and promote good will among men have been used successfully for generations. Oxford's Rhodes Scholarship is one such example. Its idea is to bring the best and brightest from the British Commonwealth (and beyond) to build strong ties among English-speaking peoples, and stronger ties to England. Founder Cecil Rhodes, pirate though he was, wished for there to be "an understanding between the three great powers" -- America, Britain and Germany -- that "will render war impossible."

What we recommend is a sister program for the Middle East. One could hold a competition for the 30 best young orators in the Palestinian diaspora. (King first gained prominence at age 26, and the Rhodes Scholarship is only for men and women under that age.) Send them to an American institution such as Stanford University, where they could study for the doctorate under Professor Clayborne Carson, director of the Martin Luther King Jr. Papers Project and historian of the civil rights movement and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee. Then, after they have spent several years studying the African American experience with special courses and lecturers, focusing especially on the efficacy of nonviolent direct action, send them back to their native lands.

This is no program of indoctrination. Indeed, it would be detrimental if American spy organizations were to infiltrate or interfere with the King scholars in any way: the scholars would lose all credibility at home. Just as King spoke out against Southern injustice (and American injustice in Vietnam), the King scholars must be free to criticize America and, it is to be expected, the occupation. They would not be able to lead the Arab street otherwise.

By bringing young leaders from the region, we would avoid disasters like the U.S. Army's flirtation with mathematician Ahmed Chalabi, a man who had no real roots in Iraq, but whom America still wished to enthrone as a new shah. The Chalabi experiment blew up in America's face like a roadside bomb.

The King scholarship program might cost only $2 million per year -- an endowment of perhaps $20 million could put it on its feet indefinitely. And, coupled with the application of "soft power," the export of American culture -- notably, hip-hop music, which serves both as a mechanism for promoting intercultural understanding and as a nonviolent channel for youthful aggression -- one could reasonably expect to see the flower of peace bloom in the desert of despair.

Two specific aspects of the civil rights movement would be most effective in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: first, the proper utilization of legal instruments as a way to wage a nonviolent campaign; second, the utilization of mosques to mobilize a nonviolent grassroots struggle. Mosques in the West Bank and Gaza can be used to promote peace over violence and terrorism, and the African American experience can teach Palestinians how to do this.

In "The Trial" by Franz Kafka, at one point two men stand outside a gate. One seeks to enter; the other seeks to prevent him from entering. Both men wait there for their entire lives. Though one is guard and the other the one guarded, both men are prisoners.

In game theory, the branch of mathematics made famous by "A Beautiful Mind," there is a paradox called the Prisoners' Dilemma. Each of two prisoners may believe it is in his best interests to harm the other, but one can mathematically prove that both men would be better off if they cooperated. A King scholars program might help us resolve the prisoners' dilemma that is the Middle East.

This is a utopian dream, perhaps. But another man dreamed, once, and we all know what became of that man's dream.

We are living it.

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James D. Fearon
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Is civil war likely to break out in Iraq? It already has, according to CISAC's James D. Fearon, a political science professor who studies recent civil wars. Fearon is among four experts Time asked to comment on the current violence in Iraq.

Noah Feldman

In looking at the brewing civil war between the two groups in Iraq, it's easy to assume that the cause is ancient hatred. Nothing could be further from the truth. For the overwhelming majority of Iraqi history, Sunnis and Shi'ites have lived peacefully side by side, and numerous Iraqis are the children of mixed marriages. Instead we are witnessing in Iraq what occurs when government collapses and there is no state around capable of guaranteeing personal security.

What do you do when your family is in peril and you cannot turn to the government for protection? The answer is that you will take security wherever you can get it. You need to find some group that will be capable of keeping you safe, and that group had better be one that can count on your loyalty just as you can count on its protection. If you are a member of my ethnic, racial or religious group, then we share at least some basic bond, which may be enough to ensure our loyalty to one another. I need some assurance that you will have my back, and identity is better than nothing.

Sunnis and Shi'ites may find themselves joining militias or supporting denomination-based political parties even if they are not particularly pious and would much prefer not to. Something similar happened in the former Yugoslavia when its government collapsed with the fall of communism and nothing replaced it. Ethnic activists - call them identity entrepreneurs - will always form the core of the new militia. These radicals will emphasize symbols, like al-Askari mosque that was blown up last week in Iraq, and hope that followers will react by strengthening their commitments to the group itself.

Is it possible to break the cycle of violence that gets under way when identity groups move toward civil war? One answer is for an outside force to impose a solution. The killing did not stop in Bosnia or Kosovo until Western powers showed they were willing to bomb. But this approach is not viable in Iraq, where U.S. bombs came first and civil strife has followed. Instead the only way out of the violence is for Iraqis to realize that they have more to gain by negotiating a settlement between their groups than they do by allowing a full-blown brothers' war to break out.

Vali Nasr Author The Shia Revival (forthcoming)

What lies at the heart of the sectarian violence in Iraq is not so much religious dispute as it is a very secular competition for power and prominence in the new Iraq. Iraq is not all that different from Northern Ireland or Bosnia, where religion paraded as ethnicity and became a vehicle for communal rivalries. In the vacuum of power left by the fall of Saddam Hussein, the game of numbers has favored Shi'as, who are 60% of the population. It is for this reason that they wholeheartedly embraced democracy. Disgruntled Sunnis, on the other hand, vested their fortunes in boycott and violence, hoping that as spoilers, they would gain leverage in negotiating over the future.

Few in the West recognized the depth of either the Shi'a anger at the Saddam regime or the Sunni rage born of loss of power. There is a strong sense of Iraqi identity among both Shi'as and Sunnis, but as strong allegiance to sect and ethnicity in every election has shown, a shared notion of what Iraqi identity means and how each community sees the future of Iraq is fast disappearing. As happened in Bosnia, in Iraq mixed marriages and shared memory of coexistence will not be enough to stop internecine violence.

Shi'as embraced the political process that the U.S. set in place in 2003 in the hope that it would guarantee their security and serve their interests. There is indication now that many Shi'as are having second thoughts. Already overstretched in facing the Sunni insurgency, the U.S. can hardly afford losing the Shi'a as well. If tensions escalate to a full-blown civil war, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria may all join the war to protect their co-sectarians and to scramble for pieces of a failed Iraq.

Pulling Iraq back from the brink will be difficult. Building a strong central government and an effective security force will help. The challenge is to get them up and running before events on the ground pass a point of no return.

James D. Fearon

By any reasonable definition, there has been a civil war in progress in Iraq at least since the Coalition Provisional Authority formally handed over authority to the Iraqis in 2004. A civil war is a violent conflict within a country fought between organized groups seeking to compel a major change in government policies or to take control of the center or a region. The insurgents in Iraq target the U.S. military, but they are also fighting against the Shi'ite-dominated Iraqi government and killing large numbers of Iraqis. There is little reason to think that if the U.S. suddenly withdrew, the insurgents would not continue to fight to control or shape the government.

When we hear talk about incipient civil war in Iraq, the fear is of an escalation of the current insurgency into a much bigger war. Analysts may have in mind something like the U.S. Civil War, with Sunni and Shi'ite armies fighting each other across well-defined fronts. Or they may imagine a sudden spasm of massive communal conflict and ethnic cleansing along the lines of Bosnia or Rwanda. Neither scenario is all that likely, although bouts of violent ethnic cleansing are certainly possible in a few parts of the country, especially Kirkuk.

My guess would be that as the insurgency continues to create insecurity, sectarian militias will continue to grow in power and influence. They will increasingly supply local security, but in the form of protection rackets that extort as they protect. They will clash with each other over territory and control of revenue sources. Since the Sunnis remain highly disorganized, some of these local fights may initially be intra-Shi'ite. But in the absence of effective political incorporation and protection from national police and army units - which are heavily infiltrated by Shi'ite militias - Sunnis will gradually form a patchwork of militias. Neighborhood-by-neighborhood conflict and violence will increase. Think Lebanon.

Juan Cole

If you look at the ethnic conflicts and street demonstrations during Iraq's modern history, it is remarkable how few have involved Shi'ites fighting Sunnis. During the colonial era, Iraqis were united by their opposition to the British occupation. Sunni and Shi'ite tribes cooperated in rebelling against British rule, and were only put down with a bombing campaign in 1920 that killed 9,000. In 1941 mobs targeted Iraq's small Jewish population; Jews had been a valued part of the Iraqi national fabric but were accused, unfairly, of being pro-colonial. After World War II, much of the violence in Iraq was fueled by issues of class. In 1948 slum dwellers and railway and oil workers revolted against a government treaty with Britain. In 1959, Arab nationalists assassinated Communist Party members, while mobs in Mosul and Kirkuk attacked and killed rich businessmen and landowners.

Iraqi Muslims have not all along been severely divided by religious sect. There have been many instances of strong cooperation between Sunnis and Shi'ites. Other social divides have led to mob violence in the past, but Iraqis have overcome them to re-establish national unity. It remains to be seen whether they can accomplish this feat again.

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