The Arab and Muslim world is indeed in crisis. This crisis, however, may give us a new opportunity to reclaim our fate from foreign powers, local autocrats, and religious fanatics. To do so, we can benefit from recuperating the best elements from our great tradition of Arab nationalism.

Under the banner of "Arab nationalism," we have had many moments of bravery, unity, and triumph. Arab nationalism ended colonialism and forged connections among emerging states, making an indelible mark on the history. This nationalism was not perfect, but it was crucial in our struggles for self-determination, and provided a unifying vision--a project for a future beyond sectarian or even national interests. It is a vision that we need more than ever today. 

This vision is still alive among the peoples of the Middle East and North Africa. We can see it, for example, in the constant demonstrations of support for the Palestinian cause. It also underlies the appeal of various forms of fundamentalism.  As much as they discomfit the West and secular Arabs, these currents embody precisely that yearning for a unified community. The umma may have replaced the Arab nation, and Islamism may have taken up the banner of resistance from Arab nationalism for many Muslims, but forms of Islamism have always been with us, and nationalist and Islamic currents have always been intertwined

Arab nationalism itself aimed to be a pan-Arab "supra-nationalism." Even while fighting for national independence, it maintained a vision of the transnational community and a respect for the shared Islamic character of peoples and cultures. The secular nationalist Michel Aflaq saw the strong connections between Islam and Arab nationalism, and prophesized that "A day will come when the nationalists will find themselves the only defenders of Islam.

Thus, Arab nationalism always shared a number of themes with Islamist movements:  the search for a unified collective consciousness, the desire for a renaissance of Arab language and culture and, of course, anti-imperialism. Resurgent political Islamism, in turn, has absorbed many positions and lessons from its secular nationalist cousin.  

It has become commonplace to remark how Islamism has taken up the banner of resistance to Western domination, and of cultural and even national independence.  For decades, however, it was the West and "moderate" Arab governments which sought to exploit the conservative Islamist currents against the radical nationalists. Our "dirty little secret" - Islamists and secular nationalists included - is that no one has been immune to the opportunistic lure of complicity with foreign powers bent on regional hegemony for their own purposes. We must get past this deadly mutual instrumentalism. It has corrupted great nationalist movements and turned Islam into a doctrine of division and - at the extremes -- armed fanaticism. 

The attempt to set the Arab world against Iran is the latest instance of this futile strategy.  A generalized Sunni-Shiite conflict would destroy pan-Islamism as surely as national selfishness destroyed pan-Arabism. Regimes and populations have resisted this strategy. Arabs states have insisted that concerns about Iran be addressed in the context of the region as a whole.  During the latest Gaza crisis, populations throughout the Arab world kept in check the opportunistic tendencies of certain regimes, and expressed trans-confessional solidarity with the Palestinian resistance. At moments like these, we see that the spirit of pan-Arab nationalism and pan-Islamic solidarity lives.

A revival of this spirit will not come from governments, but from the region-wide popular movements that form in the abyss between regimes and people. A revival of this spirit will not come from governments, but from the region-wide popular movements that form in the abyss between regimes and people. There, we see the yearning for a new form of "nationalism without a nation" that can provide justice, unity and true independence throughout the Arab world. Islamic movements are not the true fulfillment of the nationalist promise, but they have infused it with a renewed spirit of resistance and collective energy. If the self-perpetuating authoritarian regimes, built by nationalist parties, helped to bury Arab nationalism, the new resistance movements, often led by Islamists, are helping to revive it.

A new form of pan-nationalism is arising - generally secular, while still assertive of Arab and Islamic identity, and proud of being involved with the other cultures and languages of the world. This form of consciousness is embedded in new means of international communication, in new networks that have been created among the diaspora and indigenous communities, and in new, creative and profane uses of culture and language that have developed. It detests authoritarianism and corruption, and yearns for democracy and the rule of law, while firmly rejecting foreign military intervention and refusing Western condescension. Where traditional nationalism and Islamism want to be restrictive and controlling, it wants to be capacious and daring, opening our imaginations to new cultural and social possibilities.

This incipient form of transantionalist, pan-Arab consciousness still lacks political effectiveness. It gets squeezed between politically adept forces that speak for state authority or preach sharia. Societies remain divided between an ossified "patriotic" nationalism (wataniya) and a powerful but politically amorphous yearning for transnational solidarity (qawniya). The result is a kind of three-way divorce à l'italienne, with the three parties - the state and its clients, secular and progressive constituencies, and Islamic currents - living uncomfortably separate lives under the same national roof. 

The present economic crisis may provide new opportunities for those with a secular and democratic perspective to shape the debate. In the face of worsening social conditions, Islamists do not have a particularly attractive economic agenda. Their substitute, sharia, has some popular appeal as a means of reducing crime and corruption, but their notion of social justice is caritative, not political; it seeks to alleviate the plight of the poor through alms, rather than to reduce poverty through structural change. 

Thus, it was independent activists who mobilized thousands of Egyptians against the reversal of popular Nasserite land reforms, and organized strikes and demonstrations in the Nile delta during the spring of 2008, while Islamists either hesitated or fully adopted the defense of state policies. Islamists are generally uncomfortable with these kinds of movements, which engender a discourse of popular empowerment that slips beyond their control. As these movements spread, they will offer progressive forces new opportunities to shape the agenda with a discourse of justice based on social rights.

We must be wary of false optimism, however. These mobilizations remain rare, and regimes use every tool to prevent such social movements from coalescing with each other or, especially, with Islamist movements. Regimes have become adept at co-opting discourses of cultural or national identity, defending putatively Islamic values against demands for social and human rights, characterized as Western intrusions. This helps to reproduce the division between Islamists and progressives, pushing the latter into a culturalist "identity trap."

Of course, we cannot ignore the fundamental disparity between progressive and Islamist perspectives. On a theoretical level, these two notions are irreconcilable. Still, there will be significant opportunities for alliances that can be tactically advantageous to both currents and substantively important to the people of our region. And the principles that will enable effective, unified action will be the same principles that motivated our historic nationalist movements: a passion for national and regional independence, a commitment to regional cooperation, an insistence on equal and consistent treatment in international affairs. Across ethnic and confessional groups, the people of the region share a vision of a polity that provides political freedom and the rule of law for all citizens, while improving the economic and social lives of our populations. Whether they call themselves secular or Islamist, the most successful movements in our region will be the ones which can most credibly claim to advance these principles.

We do not wish to underestimate the difficulties we face. Neither nationalism nor Islamism is necessarily about democracy. It is understandable, given the arrogant and hypocritical foreign discourses in which they are embedded, that many of our people view the concepts of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law with suspicion. The interventions of the West create a lot of trouble, but also introduce new strategies and ideas - ideas that we can use to create new openings for ourselves. We can see how, in places like Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine, the promotion of "democracy" has, however unintentionally, opened new possibilities that have been exploited by local forces to strengthen their credibility and independence.

We must use all opportunities to reawaken the progressive spirit of nationalism, to transform the best of our past into something real and new, creating spaces of unity, democracy and pluralism. We must use all opportunities to reawaken the progressive spirit of nationalism, to transform the best of our past into something real and new, creating spaces of unity, democracy, and pluralism. In doing that, we cannot afford to ignore any of the lessons of our history, or of the rest of the world. We must insist on incorporating the new and powerful lessons of the last 60 years. To paraphrase Michel Aflaq again, democracy, political and intellectual freedom, a respect for human rights, and the rule of law are, we find, the only effective defenders of nationalism and Islam. The day has come.

Jim Castle is a friend of mine. I have known him since we were graduate students in Indonesia in the late 1960s. While I labored in academe he went on to found and grow CastleAsia into what is arguably the most highly regarded private-sector consultancy for informing and interfacing expatriate and domestic investors and managers in Indonesia. Friday mornings he hosts a breakfast gathering of business executives at his favorite hotel, the JW Marriott in the Kuningan district of Jakarta.

Or he did, until the morning of July 17, 2009. On that Friday, shortly before 8am, a man pulling a suitcase on wheels strolled into the Marriott's Lobby Lounge, where Jim and his colleagues were meeting, and detonated the contents of his luggage. We know that the bomber was at least outwardly calm from the surveillance videotape of his relaxed walk across the lobby to the restaurant.

He wore a business suit, presumably to deflect attention before he blew himself up. Almost simultaneously, in the Airlangga restaurant at the Ritz Carlton hotel across the street, a confederate destroyed himself, killing or wounding a second set of victims. As of this writing, the toll stands at nine dead (including the killers) and more than 50 injured.

On learning that Jim had been at the meeting in the Marriott, I became frantic to find out if he were still alive. A mere 16 hours later, to my immense relief, he answered my e-mail. He was out of hospital, having sustained what he called "trivial injuries", including a temporary loss of hearing. Of the nearly 20 people at the roundtable meeting, however, four died and others were badly hurt. Jim's number two at CastleAsia lost part of a leg.

The same Marriott had been bombed before, in 2003. That explosion killed 12 people. Eight of them were Indonesian citizens, who also made up the great majority of the roughly 150 people wounded in that attack - and most of these Indonesian victims were Muslims. This distribution undercut the claim of the country's small jihadi fringe to be defending Islam's local adherents against foreign infidels.

But if last Friday's killers hoped to gain the sympathy of Indonesians this time around by attacking Jim and his expatriate colleagues and thereby lowering the proportion of domestic casualties, they failed. Of the 37 victims whose names and nationalities were known as of Monday, 60% were Indonesians, and that figure was almost certain to rise as more bodies were identified. The selective public acceptance of slaughter to which the targeting of infidel foreigners might have catered is, of course, grotesquely inhumane.

Since Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was first elected president in 2004, Indonesia's real gross domestic product has averaged around 6% annual growth. In 2008 only four of East Asia's 19 economies achieved rates higher than Indonesia's 6.1% (Vietnam, Mongolia, China and Macau). In the first quarter of 2009, measured year-on-year, while the recession-hit economies of Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand all shrank, Indonesia's grew 4.4%. In the first half of 2009, the Jakarta Stock Exchange soared.

The economy is hardly all roses. Poverty and corruption remain pervasive. Unemployment and underemployment persist. The country's infrastructure badly needs repair. And the economy's performance in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) has been sub-par: The US$2 billion in FDI that went to Indonesia in 2008 was less than a third of the $7 billion inflow enjoyed by Thailand's far smaller economy, notwithstanding Indonesia's far more stable politics.

Nevertheless, all things considered, the macro-economy in Yudhoyono's first term did reasonably well. We may never know whether the killer at the Marriott aimed to maximize economic harm. According to another expat consultant in Jakarta, Kevin O'Rourke, the day's victims included 10 of the top 50 business leaders in the city. "It could have been a coincidence," he said, or the bombers could have "known just what they were doing".

Imputing rationality to savagery is tricky business. But the attackers probably did hope to damage the Indonesian economy, notably foreign tourism and investment. In that context, the American provenance and patronage of the two hotels would have heightened their appeal as targets. Although the terrorists may not have known these details, the Ritz-Carlton Hotel Company is an independently operated division of Marriott International, Inc, which owns the JW Marriott brand, and both firms are headquartered on the outskirts of Washington DC.

Second-round revenge against the Marriott may also have played a role - assaulting a place that had rebuilt and recovered so quickly after being attacked in 2003. Spiteful retribution may have influenced the decision to re-attack the Kuta tourist area in Bali in 2005 after that neighborhood's recovery from the bomb carnage of 2002. Arguable, too, is the notion that 9/11 in 2001 was meant to finish the job started with the first bombing of the Twin Towers in 1993. And in all of these instances, the economy - Indonesian or American - suffered the consequences.

Panic buttons are not being pushed, however. Indonesian stock analyst Haryajid Ramelan's expectation seems plausible: that confidence in the economy will return if those who plotted the blasts are soon found and punished, and if investors can be convinced that these were "purely terrorist attacks" unrelated to domestic politics.

Sympathy for terrorism in Indonesia is far too sparse for Friday's explosions to destabilize the country. But they occurred merely nine days after Yudhoyono's landslide re-election as president on July 8, with three months still to go before the anticipated inauguration of his new administration on October 20. That timing ensured that some would speculate that the killers wanted to deprive the president of his second five-year term.

The president himself fed this speculation at his press conference on July 18, the day after the attacks. He brandished photographs of unnamed shooters with handguns using his picture for target practice. He reported the discovery of a plan to seize the headquarters of the election commission and thereby prevent his democratic victory from being announced. "There was a statement that there would be a revolution if SBY wins," he said, referring to himself by his initials.

"This is an intelligence report," he continued, "not rumors, nor gossip. Other statements said they wished to turn Indonesia into [a country like] Iran. And the last statement said that no matter what, SBY should not and would not be inaugurated." Barring information to the contrary, one may assume that these reports of threats were real, whether or not the threats themselves were. But why share them with the public?

Perhaps the president was defending his decision not to inspect the bomb damage in person - a gesture that would have shown sympathy for the victims while reassuring the population. He had wanted to go, he said, "But the chief of police and others suggested I should wait, since the area was not yet secure. And danger could come at any time, especially with all of the threats I have shown you. Physical threats."

Had Yudhoyono lost the election, or had he won it by only a thin and hotly contested margin, his remarks might have been read as an effort to garner sympathy and deflect attention from his unpopularity. The presidential candidates who lost to his landslide, Megawati Sukarnoputri and Jusuf Kalla, have indeed criticized how the July 8 polling was handled. And there were shortcomings. But even without them, Yudhoyono would still have won. In this context, speaking as he did from a position of personal popularity and political strength, the net effect of his comments was probably to encourage public support for stopping terrorism.

One may also note the calculated vagueness of his references to those - "they” - who wished him and the country harm. Not once in his speech did he refer to Jemaah Islamiyah, the network that is the culprit of choice for most analysts of the twin hotel attacks. Had he directly fingered that violently jihadi group, ambitious Islamist politicians such as Din Syamsuddin - head of Muhammadiyah, the country's second-largest Muslim organization - would have charged him with defaming Islam because Jemaah Islamiyah literally means "the Islamic group" or "the Islamic community".

One may hope that Din's ability to turn his Islamist supporters against jihadi terrorism and in favor of religious freedom and liberal democracy will someday catch up to his energy in policing language. Yet Yudhoyono was right not to mention Jemaah Islamiyah. Doing so would have complicated unnecessarily the president's relations with Muslim politicians whose support he may need when it comes to getting the legislature to turn his proposals into laws. Nor is it even clear that Jemaah Islamiyah is still an entity coherent enough to have, in fact, masterminded last Friday's attacks.

Peering into the future, one may reasonably conclude that the bombings' repercussions will neither annul Yudhoyono's landslide victory nor derail the inauguration of his next administration. Nor will they do more than temporary damage to the Indonesian economy. As for the personal aspect of what happened Friday, while mourning the dead, I am grateful that Jim and others, foreign and Indonesian, are still alive.

Donald K Emmerson heads the Southeast Asia Forum at Stanford University. He is a co-author of Islamism: Contested Perspectives on Political Islam (Stanford University Press, November 2009) and Hard Choices: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Stanford/ISEAS, 2008).

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