Statement in Support of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR)

[The following statement was issued by a group of scholars and human rights advocates in support of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, which currently faces an escalating crackdown by authorities with the arrest of three of its senior personnel, including its executive director. If you wish to add your name to the statement, you can do so via the following link.]

We, the undersigned scholars and human rights advocates, express our deep concern at the escalating crackdown that Egyptian authorities have launched against civil society organizations in recent days. In an unprecedented move, on November 15 security forces arrested Mr. Mohamed Basheer, the administrative manager of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), one of the most prominent and reputable civil society organizations in Egypt. Despite strong international condemnation of that action, on November 18 authorities arrested Mr. Karim Ennarah, the director of the criminal justice unit at EIPR, while launching a vicious campaign against EIPR in state-owned media and leveling false accusations against its personnel. A day later, authorities arrested EIPR Executive Director Mr. Gasser Abdel-Razek. They also leveled terrorism-related charges against Mr. Ennarah and Mr. Basheer, adding their names to a legal case that includes numerous human rights advocates. 

Most concerning is that this escalation comes after EIPR hosted senior diplomats from 14 countries, including Canada, the UK, Norway, several European Union (EU) member states, as well as the EU delegation to discuss the implications of the outcome of the United States elections for the human rights situation in Egypt. We call on the Egyptian government to immediately release EIPR's personnel and halt all politically motivated investigations against civil society organizations in the country.

Signatories*

Nancy Okail, Stanford University

Joshua Stacher, Kent State University

Danny Postel, Northwestern University

Lisa Hajjar, University of California - Santa Barbara

Omar Dahi, Hampshire College

Robert Springborg, Naval Postgraduate School (ret)

Jillian Schwedler, Hunter College and the Graduate Center, CUNY

Jennifer Derr, University of California, Santa Cruz

Rochelle Davis, Georgetown University

Elliott Colla, Georgetown University

Joel Gordon, University of Arkansas

Joel Beinin, Stanford University

Marietje Schaake, Stanford University

Rim Naguib, EUME fellow, Forum Transregionale Studien, Berlin

Chris Toensing, International Crisis Group

Ted Swedenburg, University of Arkansas

Wendy Pearlman, Northwestern University

Larry J Diamond, Hoover Institution, Stanford University

Will Hanley, Florida State University

Amy Hawthorne, Project on Middle East Democracy

Fadi Awad Elsaid, University of Connecticut

Vickie Langohr , College of the Holy Cross

Ahmed Ezzat, University of Cambridge

Sherene R Seikaly, University of California, Santa Barbara

Iman Mersal, University of Alberta - Canada

Gennaro Gervasio, Roma Tre University, Rome

Enrico De Angelis, Independent Researcher

Kenza Rady    

Owain Lawson, Columbia University

Michele Dunne, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Atef Said, University of Illinois at Chicago

Omar Cheta, Bard College

Pascale Ghazaleh, The American University in Cairo

Hanny Megally, NYU

Nicola Melis, University of Cagliari, Sardinia

Paola Rivetti, Dublin City University

Brecht De Smet, Ghent University

Francesca Biancani, Bologna University

Seppe Malfait, Ghent University

Nicola Perugini, University of Edinburgh

Alessandra Marchi, Università Cagliari

Koenraad Bogaert, Ghent University

Lucia Sorbera, The University of Sydney, NSW

Patrizia Manduchi, University of Cagliari (Italy)

John T Chalcraft, LSE

Soraya El Kahlaoui, Ghent University

Khaled Fahmy, Cambridge University

Nejla Lyons, Independent human rights researcher

Mamdouh Habashi, Socialist People's Alliance Party

Daniela Pioppi, University of Naples 'L'Orientale'

Iain Chambers, University of Naples, 'Orientale'

Ray Bush, University of Leeds

Heba Youssef, University of Brighton

Nicola Pratt, University of Warwick, UK

Magda Adly, Nadim center for rehabilitation of victims of violence

Hussein Baoumi, Amnesty International

Suzan Abd El Moty Fayyad, El Nadim Center

Ibrahim Seyam           

Saerom Han, University of Aberdeen

Amel Fahmy, TADWEIN

Aziz Barkaoui, Amnesty-France

Mohamad Najem, SMEX

Nihad Aboud  

Samir Khattab, Researcher

Pinar E. Donmez, De Montfort University

Mohamed Mokhtar, Human rights defender ( ECRF)

Hassan Ali, متطوعون من أجل حقوق الإنسان

Steven Heydemann, Smith College

Sara Abughazal, Regional Coordinator

Agnieszka Paczynska, George Mason University

Asmaa Elmalky           

Lynn Darwich, University of Illinois at Chicago

Mohammad El Taher, Researcher and Technologist

Lorenzo Feltrin, University of Warwick

Gilbert Achcar, SOAS, University of London

Dina Matar, SOAS

Marco Lauri, Università di Macerata

Feyzi Ismail, SOAS University of London

Deniz Kandiyoti, School of Oriental and African Studies

Ziad Elmarsafy, King's College London

Barbara Pizziconi, SOAS, University of london

Dr Vanja Hamzić, SOAS University of London

Lynn Welchman, SOAS, University of London

Mohamed Noby, Lawyer

Bashir Abu-Manneh, University of Kent

Salwa Ismail, SOAS

Ramy Yaacoub, The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy

Veronica Ferreri, ZMO Berlin

Jens Lerche, SOAS, University of London

Rahul Rao, SOAS University of London

Andrea Teti, University of Aberdeen

John Faulkner, Administrator (retired)

Anne Alexander, University of Cambridge

Shreeta Lakhani, SOAS

Francesco De Lellis, Centro Studi sull'Africa Contemporanea - Università L'Orientale Napoli

Akansha Mehta, Goldsmiths, University of London

Cristina Flesher Fominaya, Loughborough University

Myrsini Manney-Kalogera, University of Arizona

Kim Rochette, Save the Children

Rima Majed, American University of Beirut

Aleksandra Zaytseva, Georgetown University

Ryota Jonen, World Movement for Democracy

Chiara Pagano, Università di Pavia

Paul Sedra, Simon Fraser University

Tarek Masoud, Private citizen

Christopher Hitchcock, ACRPS

Juan Cole, University of Michigan

Feyzi Ismail, SOAS University of London

Zachary Lockman, New York University

Yasmin Elsouda, SOAS University of London 

Dalia Ghanem, University of California, Davis

Charlie Lawrie, Johns Hopkins SAIS

Sophie Chamas, SOAS, University of London

Kerem Nisancioglu, SOAS University of London 

Jo Tomkinson, SOAS, University of London

Imran Jamal, SOAS

Saffo Papantonopoulou, University of Arizona

Suad Joseph, University of California, Davis

Fayrouz Yousfi, Gent University 

Abdulrahman El-Taliawi, University College London

Anthony Alessandrini, City University of New York

Yair Wallach, SOAS

Huseyin Silman, GLOPOL

Alfredo Saad Filho, King's College London

Sami Zemni, Ghent University 

Maher Hamoud, Ghent University

Omar Jabary Salamanca, ULB

Sharan Grewal, College of William & Mary

Michael Chamberlin, Human Rights Defender in Mexico

Mattia Giampaolo, CeSPI

Liliana Toledo Guzmán, University of Arizona

Keith Cook, University of Arizona

Ifigeneia Mourelatou, UCL

Katharina Grüneisl, Durham University

Zoe Basiouri, Aristotle University

Hani Sayed, American University in Cairo

Jason Brownlee, University of Texas at Austin

Charles W. Dunne, Arab Center Washington DC

Francis Fukuyama, Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University

Jessica Winegar, Northwestern University

Michael Michaelides, University of Florida 

Catherine Jenkins, SOAS, University of London

Muhammad Ebaid, The Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms (ECRF)

Aleś Łahviniec, European Humanities University, Lithuania-Belarus

Sarah Rifky, MIT

Aymen Zaghdoudi, ARTICLE 19

Tania Kaiser, SOAS

Chenjia Xu, SOAS

Miriam Gastélum, UCL

Lars Peter Laamann, SOAS, University of London

Alessandra Mezzadri, SOAS

Andrew Newsham, SOAS, University of London 

Myat Ko Ko, Yangon School of Political Science

Mayur Suresh, SOAS, University of London

Frances Grahl, SOAS

Sadek Hamid, Independent Academic

Andrea Cornwall, SOAS

Judith E. Tucker, Georgetown University

Georges Khalil, EUME, Forum Transregionale Studien Berlin

William Aceves, California Western School of Law

Karima Laachir, Australian National University 

Aida Seif El Dawla, El Nadim Center

Ruba Salih, SOAS 

Shereif Elroubi

Hadi Enayat, SOAS

Karen Rignall, University of Kentucky

Ahmed Gad, Amnesty International 

Taher Mokhtar, Medical Doctor 

Hassan Osman , University of Minya

Vivienne Matthies-Boon, University of Amsterdam

Sigrid Vertommen, Ghent University

Frances Grahl, SOAS

Rebeca Robertson, SOAS

Alla Kos, Responsible AI

Mahfouz Eltaweel       

Peter Hill, Northumbria University, Newcastle-upon-Tyne

Ahmed Naji, BMI

Ahmed Abbes, CNRS, Paris, France

Kholoud Saber Barakat, Catholic University of Louvain (UCLouvain)

Assaf Kfoury, Boston University

Reda Eldanbouki, Women's Center for Guidance and Legal Awareness 

Mona Hamed Imam, El Nadeem Center

Tania Tribe, SOAS

Sherif Azer, University of York, UK 

Omnia El Shakry, University of California, Davis

Manjeet Ramgotra, SOAS University of London

Boris Kilgarriff, SOAS

Mohamef Lotfy, Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms

Lorenzo Casini, University of Messina

Yousra Hassenien       

Christian Achrainer, Philipps University Marburg

Sara Mohani, Journalist

Michael McFaul, Stanford University

Abbas Milani, Stanford University

Karina Sarmiento

Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN)

Nathan Grubman, Stanford University

Azza Soliman, Lawyer

Jacqueline Charretier, Human rights defender

Mohammad Hossam Fadel, University of Toronto Faculty of Law

Necla Tschirgi, Kroc School of Peace Studies, University of San Diego

Elisa Massimino, Georgetown University Law Center

Stuart Schaar, Brooklyn College, CUNY

Alya Khemakhem, USC

Daniel Marwecki, University of Hong Kong

Brad Fox, The Graduate Center, CUNY

Karim Reda, ناشط سياسي و مدون مستقل

Dolores Soto

Irene Gendzier , Boston University (Prof. Emeritus)

Basma El Husseiny

Ahmed Ramy, Egyptian Pharmaceutical Syndicate

Sherif Gamal, IT Specialist 

Ahmed Melad, Lawyer

Khaled Mansour, Independent Consultant

Richard Falk, Queen Mary University London

Wagdy Abdel Aziz, مركز الجنوب لحقوق الانسان

Laila Soueif, Cairo University

Matt Gordner, University of Toronto

Emad Shahin, Academic 

Khalda Yassin, Egyptian citizen

Céline Cantat, Sciences Po Paris 

Ahmed Said, ECRF

Ismail Ammar, Student

Amr Tajuddin, Egyptian citizen 

Giovanni Piazzese, Freelance journalist and Ph.D. researcher 

Lamia Radi, Journalist 

Sameh Elbarky, Alaraby Aljadeed newspaper

Magda Boutros, Brown University

Céline Lebrun Shaath, Harvard Kennedy School of Government 

Riya Al'sanah, Who Profits Research Center 

Nesting Badawi, The American University in Cairo

Nadia Kamel    

Shaimaa El-Banna, Committee for Justice 

Zoé Carle, Université Paris 8

ahmed altigani, IRFC

Ali Hegazy, Royal College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists

Hakim Abdelnaeem, Artist

Khaled Sobhy

Tanya Monforte, McGill University

Emma Frampton, SOAS

Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron, Institut de Recherche pour le Développement

Jens Hanssen, University of Toronto

Manar Tantawie, استاذ بمعهد هندسي خاص

Dee Smythe, Centre for Law & Society, University of Cape Town

Manar Mohsen           

Ranjit Singh, University of Mary Washington

Vasuki Nesiah, New York University

Pascal Menoret, Brandeis University

Mona Khneisser, University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign 

Yasser Munif, Emerson College

Corinna Mullin , CUNY

Alice Finden, SOAS

Alfredo Ortiz Aragón, University of the Incarnate Word

Amira Abdelhamid, University of Sussex

Magdi El Gawhary       

Daniel Watson, University of Sussex

Maha Alaswad, Georgetown University 

Andrea Brock, University of Sussex

Hani Faris, University of British Columbia, Canada

Noam Chomsky, University of Arizona

Saghar Sara, Collaborative Social Change

Ziad Abu-Rish, Bard College

Sarah El-Kazaz, SOAS

Sara Kermanian, University of Sussex

Heather Allansdottir, University of Bifrost

Louiza Odysseos, University of Sussex

Adam Ramadan, University of Birmingham

Karem Yehia, Journalist freelance

M. Abbas Yongacoglu, University of Ottawa (Emeritus Professor)

Liliane Daoud, Journalist 

Rossella Merullo, Humboldt University

Juan M. Amaya-Castro, Universidad de los Andes (Bogotá - Colombia)

Beth Baron, CUNY

Dina Fergani, University of Toronto 

David Kramer, FIU

Ghayth Omar, Alnasser and Partners

Lori Allen, SOAS University of London

Azzah Ahmed, UCLA

Derek Ludovici , City University of New York

Farah Al Shami, Arab Reform Initiative

Rosemary Sayigh, American University of Beirut

Muhammad Ali Khalidi, City University of New York - Graduate Center

Mohammed Mostafa, Intersection Association for Rights and Freedoms 

Ali Ugurlu, Columbia University

Wafaa Hefny, Professor of English Literature

Lamis al Nakkash, Cairo University 

Nadje Al-Ali, Brown University

Yezid Sayigh, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center

Patrizia Manduchi, University of Cagliari

Daniela Potenza, Università degli studi di Napoli "L'Orientale"

Giulia Cimini, University of Bologna 

Brendan O’Duffy, Queen Mary University of London

Alessandro Buontempo, Università Statale di Milano

Tony Outang, SOAS 

Sophie Chapman, SOAS

Chiara Cascino, University of Naples "L'Orientale", Italy

Teodora Boanches, SOAS

Caterina Roggero, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca

Laura Vale, SOAS

Martina Biondi, University of Perugia

Felix Henson, SOAS

Caitlin Callies, SOAS

Fez Endalaust, SOAS, University of London

Charlotte Paule, SOAS 

Hanna Uihlein, SOAS University of London

Emily Bayliss, SOAS

Lauren Feechan, SOAS

Giuseppe Acconcia, Padova University

Matthew Holt

Faiz Sheikh, University of Sussex

James White, SOAS, University of London

Yusra Siddique

Lucy Roberts, SOAS

Leona Li, SOAS, University of London

Amory Lumumba, SOAS

Virginia Ruosi, SOAS

Amanda Kutch, SOAS 

Luisa Hausleithner, SOAS

Jack McGinn, London School of Economics

Alessandro Cane, SOAS

Ottilia Mackerle, SOAS

Ishrat Sanjida, SOAS

Flora Butler, SOAS

Max La Fosse, SOAS

Callum Cafferty, SOAS University of London

June Derz, SOAS

Doris Duhennois, SOAS

KP Sarvaiya, SOAS

Madhubanti Bhaduri, School of Oriental and African Studies 

Debora Del Pistoia, Amnesty International 

Sarah Zellner, University of Oxford 

Laura Janicka, SOAS

Liana Parry, SOAS

Ella Spencer, SOAS

Clara Kristola Truc, SOAS

Oliver Hampden, SOAS

Evangelin Dupret, SOAS

Sara Bertotti, SOAS University of London

Alada Taylor, SOAS

Aoife Delaney, SOAS

Hazel Ke, SOAS

Sophie Snook, SOAS

Alexander Curtis, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS)

Lachlan Kenneally, SOAS

Sara Birch, Brighton University, UK 

Gabrielle Nuttall, SOAS

Sascha Gill, SOAS, University of London

Filippo Angeli, SOAS

Renata Rouvinen, SOAS 

Ruth George    

Joseph Edwards, SOAS

Muhsin Chang, SOAS

Emmy Toulson , SOAS

Margot Chesne, SOAS 

Holly Haynes, SOAS

Georgia Jones, SOAS

Maliha Sohail, SOAS

Sascha Kröger, SOAS

Silvia Sanchez, SOAS

Joshua Young, SOAS

Anna Etter       

Rebekka Muth, SOAS

Chao Ping Yi, SOAS

Cristina Stanescu, SOAS

Raimond Christian Dasalla, SOAS

Daisy Webster-Kincaid, SOAS

Hisham Parchment, SOAS, University of London

Anthea Frank, SOAS

Martina Censi, Università di Bergamo

Lucy Mair, Garden Court North Chambers

Malina Mihaiu, SOAS

Olivia Smith, SOAS

Polina Volkova, SOAS University of London

Kay Zhang       

Julia Llaurado, SOAS

Yukari Ishii, SOAS 

Alessandro Gatti Bonati          

Lornelle Gayle-Harris, SOAS

Gaelle Poncelet, SOAS

Helena Buckley, SOAS

William Tod, SOAS

Mario Arulthas, SOAS

Taher Saad

Judith Heimbach, SOAS

Chelsea Krajcik, SOAS

Tanzidah Islam, SOAS

Ilyas Saliba, WZB Berlin Social Science Center 

John Peterson, SOAS

Lyna Belmekki, SOAS

Francesco Vacchiano, University Ca' Foscari, Venice

Aaron G. Jakes, The New School

Joshua Ong, SOAS 

Emmy Toulson, SOAS

Alex Schumann, SOAS

Caitlin Pether, SOAS 

Jamie Corson, SOAS

Noah Lepawsky           

Nayeema Rahman, SOAS

Katherine Saunders, SOAS, University of London 

Ioana Ille, SOAS

Taha Metwally, Founder, ANKH association

Nijmi Edres, Georg-Eckert-Institut für internationale Schulbuchforschung

Serena Tolino, University of Bern

Lutz Oette, Centre for Human Rights Law, SOAS, University of London

Samia Bano, SOAS University of London 

Laura Hammond, SOAS University of London

Sinan Antoon, New York University

Richard Alexander, SOAS University of London

Isabel Toledo Guzmán, Secretaría de Educación Pública SEP

Andrew Antoine, SOAS University

Michael Reinsborough, School of Oriental and African Studies

Jeffery Lin, PEN Hong Kong, Univ. of Hong Kong Cultural Leadership Youth Academy

Thabo Huntgeburth, SOAS

Nadine Wassef, Ain Shams University 

Ilyas Saliba, WZB Berlin Social Science Center 

Ceri Gibbons, Researcher

Dishan Abrahams, SOAS

Laura Bier, Georgia Tech

Veli Yadirgi, SOAS

Genevieve Ladd, SOAS

Daphne Muscat, SOAS, University of London

Hannah Abbott, SOAS University

Sasha Hubbard, SOAS

Zaeema Ali, SOAS

Shamita Ray, SOAS

Ilaria Bertocchini, SOAS

Alexandria Pilides, SOAS

Viktor da Silva, SOAS 

Alaina Hall, SOAS 

Tanja Tabbara, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung

Raffaele Cattedra, Università di Cagliari

Jingfei Zhang, SOAS

Clive Rosewarne, Latrobe University

Ugo GRAGNOLATI, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

Natasha Kaluzynski, SOAS

Naila Awwad, Women Against Violence

Rani Jana, SOAS University of London

Catriona Drew, School of Law, SOAS University of London 

Samuel Smith-Stanley, SOAS

Sarah Guennoun, SOAS

Maya Shukla, SOAS

Rosa Lynch-Northover, SOAS

Laurence Davis, University College Cork

Sarah Irving, Edge Hill University

Neve Gordon, Queen Mary University of London

Charles Melville, Pembroke College Cambridge

Sara Salem, LSE

Richard Tapper, SOAS University of London (Emeritus Professor)

Eugene Rogan, University of Oxford

Michael Mason, London School of Economics and Political Science

Hilary Kilpatrick, Independent scholar

Hendrik Kraetzschmar, University of Leeds

Catherine Cobham, University of St Andrews

Birgit Poopuu, Tallinn University

Lewis Turner, Newcastle University

Anthony Gorman, University of Edinburgh

Rayane Anser, University of Warwick- Department of Politics and International Studies

Alessia Carnevale, Sapienza University of Rome

Shelagh Weir, Former British Museum

Mona Baker, University of Manchester

Sharri Plonski, Queen Mary University of London

Jorgen Nielsen, University of Birmingham

Guy Burton, Vesalius College

Sherry Dawoud           

James Godfrey, Birkbeck, University of London

James Dickins, University of Leeds

Marilyn Booth, University of Oxford

Matthew Hedges, Durham University

Hoda Mohieldin, Cairo university 

Celestine Hanssens, SOAS

Mandy Turner, University of Manchester, UK

Wafaa Farhat, SOAS

Laure Guirguis, Aarhus University, Denmark

Cecilia Martinez, SOAS UNIVERSITY

Cıgdem Balım, Indiana University (Emerita)

Nadim Houry, Arab Reform Initiative

Jeremy Wildeman, uOttawa

Line Khatib, McGill

Irene Fernández-Molina, University of Exeter

Emmy Toulson, SOAS

Vicky Blake, UCU

Georgia Hunt, SOAS

Celia Kerslake, University of Oxford

Daniel Vitkus, University of California, San Diego

Miray Philips, University of Minnesota

Antonino Adamo, CNR

Antonio Pezzano, Università di Napoli "L'Orientale"

Eve Caplowe, SOAS

Gunvor Mejdell, University of Oslo

Lord John Alderdice, Harris Manchester College, University of Oxford

Noemie Bachellerie, SOAS

Sami Zubaida, Birkbeck, University of London

Mark Ayyash, Mount Royal University

David Wearing, University of Southampton

Nurcin Ileri, Forum Transregionale Studien, EUME Program

Bonnie Bates, Carleton University

Mariam Iskajyan, SOAS Development Studies

Marta Bellingreri, Independent researcher 

Nick Riemer, University of Sydney

Sandra Nicholls, SOAS

Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron, Institut de recherche pour le développement

Youssef Mohieldin, University Professor 

Jacob Høigilt, University of Oslo

Sana Tannoury-Karam, Forum Transregionale Studien

Anni Vendelin, SOAS

Kaoutar Ghilani, University of Oxford

Sophie Abramovici, SOAS

Karim El Taki, University of Cambridge

Leo Zeilig, University of London 

Maria Sussex, University of Sussex

Zoe Peppitt, SOAS

Jonathan Purkis, Independent academic and freelance consultant

Nicole Crisp, University of Arizona 

Loes Debuysere, Ghent University

Leila Schneps, CNRS France

Nachoua Azhari, Freelance translator. 

Kathleen Ryou             

Kelly McBride, IFRC Psychosocial Centre 

Sergey Shpectorov, University of Birmingham, UK

Frances S. Hasso, Duke University

Barry Simon, Caltech

Ophélie Mercier, Ghent University

Hesham Sabry, Qadreen Egypt

Dina El Henawy, Qadreen

Omar Sedky

Mehdi Labzaé, Maison des Sciences de l'Homme

Paul Grassin, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne 

Garth Frankland, Leeds Left Unity

Mathilde Zederman, Sciences Po Toulouse

Marianne Saddier, Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

Bjørn Olav Utvik, University of Oslo

Katerina Dalacoura, LSE

Dominique Maliesky, Sciences Po Rennes

Giuseppe Restifo, Independent Historian Researcher

Nils A. Butenschøn, Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, Faculty of Law, University of Oslo

Ece Onderoglu Bayazit, SOAS

Dubois Simon, IFPO

Karim Eid-Sabbagh, Independent Researcher

Owoh Henry, SOAS

Ben Radley, University of Bath

Genevieve Ladd, SOAS

Agnès Aubry, University of Lausanne

Adele Oliver, SOAS

Ricarda Ameling, FU Berlin

Elliot Shirnia, SOAS

Aderemi Medupin, CEE Coalition

Hyaah Chowdhury, SOAS Student 

Azzah Ahmed, UCLA

Laura Moreno Vela

 

*Institutional affiliations listed for identification purposes only

In a webinar dated June 8, 2020, American University in Cairo Scholar Amr Adly presented findings from his new book Cleft Capitalism: The Social Origins of Failed Market Making in Egypt (Stanford University Press, 2020). Egypt has undergone significant economic liberalization under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, USAID, and the European Commission. Yet after more than four decades of economic reform, the Egyptian economy still fails to meet popular expectations for inclusive growth, better standards of living, and high-quality employment. While many analysts point to cronyism and corruption, this study finds the root causes of this stagnation in the underlying social and political conditions of economic development. It offers a new explanation for why market-based development can fail to meet expectations: small businesses in Egypt are not growing into medium and larger businesses. The practical outcome of this missing middle syndrome is the continuous erosion of the economic and social privileges once enjoyed by the middle classes and unionized labor, without creating enough winners from market making. This in turn set the stage for alienation, discontent, and, finally, revolt. With this book, Adly uncovers both an institutional explanation for Egypt's failed market making, and sheds light on the key factors of arrested economic development across the Global South.

---

 

On March 11, 2020 Twitter shared with the Stanford Internet Observatory accounts and tweets associated with five distinct takedowns. These include:

• Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt: 5,350 accounts and 36,523,977 tweets. The removed accounts were linked both to a September 2019 takedown of accounts linked to DotDev, a digital marketing firm operating out of Egypt and the UAE, and a December 2019 takedown attributed to Smaat, a Saudi Arabian digital marketing firm. This takedown was a result of a tip the Stanford Internet Observatory shared with Twitter in December 2019. 
  • Facebook also shared with the Internet Observatory 55 Pages that are linked to this operation; these Pages were run out of Egypt. Facebook attributes these Pages to Maat, a social media marketing firm.
• Egypt (El Fagr newspaper): 2,541 accounts and 7,935,267 tweets. A takedown of accounts tied to the El Fagr newspaper, an Egyptian weekly tabloid. The removed accounts were linked to an October 2019 takedown of El Fagr’s activities by Facebook.
• Honduras: 3,104 accounts and 1,165,019 tweets. A takedown of accounts linked to a staffer of Honduran president Juan Orlando Hernández.  
• Serbia: 8,558 accounts and 43,067,074 tweets. A takedown of accounts linked to the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), the party of current President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić. These accounts engaged in inauthentic coordinated activity to promote SNS and Vučić, to attack their political opponents, and to amplify content from news outlets favorable to them.  
• Indonesia: 795 accounts and 2,700,296 tweets. 

In this post we summarize our analysis of the first four operations. We have also written in-depth whitepapers on the Saudi Arabia/UAE/Egypt, Honduras, Serbia, and Egypt and El Fagr operations, linked at the top of the page.

 

The Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt operation

[FULL REPORT]

In December 2019 the Stanford Internet Observatory alerted Twitter to the hashtag #السراج_خائن_ليبيا (Sarraj the traitor of Libya), a reference to the Libyan Prime Minister’s signing of a maritime agreement with Turkey that angered many regional actors. The hashtag had a suspicious distribution pattern, and was shared alongside infographics linked to an earlier Twitter takedown attributed to digital marketers DotDev. Twitter’s subsequent investigation of this hashtag revealed not just a link between this new network and DotDev, but also a link to Smaat, a Saudi Arabian digital marketing firm that Twitter suspended in December 2019 (SIO’s report on Smaat is here); Twitter believes multiple social media management firms created the accounts in this network. In April 2020 they removed 5,350 accounts, which are the subject of this assessment. 

Early appearances of the “Sarraj the Traitor of Libya” hashtag.

On March 25 Facebook shared 55 Pages linked to this network.

Key takeaways from the Saudia Arabia/UAE/Egypt datasets:

• Tweets supportive of Khalifa Haftar - a Libyan strongman who heads the self-styled Libyan National Army - began in 2013. This suggests Saudi Arabia/UAE/Egypt disinformation operations on Twitter targeting Libya began earlier than previously known.
• Accounts claimed to be located in a variety of Middle East and North African countries, with many claiming Sudan. They discussed domestic politics with an anti-Turkey, anti-Qatar, and anti-Iran slant. These countries are geopolitical rivals of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt. 
• Recent posts on the Facebook Pages leveraged the COVID-19 pandemic to push these narratives.
• Many of the accounts tweeted links from a set of domains that purport to be news sites for countries like Algeria and Iran; these sites were all created on the same day and publish content with a similar anti-Qatar, -Turkey, and -Iran slant.
• Prominent narratives included discrediting recent Libyan peace talks, criticizing the Syrian government, criticizing Iranian influence in Iraq, praising the Mauritanian government, and criticism of Huthi rebels in Yemen. (We discuss these in detail in our whitepaper) 
• There were several interesting behavioral tactics observed in this Twitter data set: 
  • Hashtag laundering: A geopolitically aligned news website and YouTube channel ran stories about the DotDev-initiated hashtag, with the intent of making it seem like Libyans were (for example) so hostile to Turkey that an anti-Turkey hashtag was trending in Libya. This coverage was grossly exaggerated; the hashtags did not go viral, and the accounts whose tweets they embedded in their articles were subsequently taken down by Twitter. 
  • Jingoistic personas: The accounts were exceedingly and passionately patriotic to the point of being comedic caricatures. Their profiles emphasized their pride in their purported country, saying things like (translated) “Emirati and Proud” or “Tunisia is my passion” or “I love you, Sudan.”

A March 24, 2020 post from the now-suspended facebook.com/GulfKnights1 criticizing Qatar in the context of COVID-19.
 

The Egypt operation

[FULL REPORT]

This takedown was attributed to actors linked to the El Fagr newspaper in Egypt. El Fagr has previously been associated with influence operations, possibly on behalf of the Egyptian government, on Facebook and Instagram, which took down a network related to their activity in October 2019. 

As with several past influence operations attributed to networks operating out of Egypt (and Saudi Arabia), the content consisted of a mix of auto-generated tweets from religious apps, commercial content, geopolitical news content, as well as subversive political astroturfing pushed by accounts that appear to be personas. The political astroturf identities were often made and deployed for a specific topic, created within a short time period and immediately deployed towards a particular topic with very little additional content. 

Key takeaways:

• The topics in this Egypt-attributed data set had high overlap with topics in past Egypt-attributed takedowns: negative content about regional rivals such as Qatar and Iran, positive tone towards the Egyptian government. 
• News properties were at the center of this network. Several appeared to be legitimate organizations, such as El Fagr itself, and other outlets based in UAE and Yemen. 
• Other handles that appeared to be news outlets were fabricated properties that had Twitter accounts with “news” in the name, but did not appear to be actual news outlets - there were no signs of original content. Additionally, a few used names that tried to create the perception that they were regional affiliates of legitimate news organizations (ie, @Foxnewseurope_f). 
• Fabricated personalities were created in batches, some serving as content creators, and others serving as content amplifiers. The creators would tweet “original” messages nearly simultaneously (3-6 accounts would put out the same text but not engage with each other), and then outer networks of “disseminators” would amplify them all. 
• There was significant amplification of El Fagr’s editor, @MustafaThabetM, with over a hundred thousand retweets - not only from the paper’s own twitter handle, but from a collection of persona accounts. The retweeted content often included sensational or highly political hashtags related to Qatar. 

 

An example of one of the many instances in which networks of accounts created in batches  were used to amplify El Fagr’s editor, Mostafa Thabet. 

 

The Honduras operation

[FULL REPORT]

This takedown of over 3,000 accounts was attributed to the administration of the Honduran President.  and is related to a July 25, 2019 Facebook takedown of 181 accounts and 1,488 Pages. Among the accounts pulled down were those of the Honduran government-owned television station Televisión Nacional de Honduras, several content creator accounts, accounts linked to several presidential initiatives, and some “like-for-likes” accounts likely in the follower-building stage. Much of the tweet behavior seems targeted at drowning out negative news about the Honduran president by promoting presidential initiatives and heavily retweeting the president and news outlets favorable to his administration. Interestingly, a subset of accounts in the dataset are related to self-identified artists, writers, feminists and intellectuals who largely posted tweets critical of the Honduran president Juan Orland Hernandez (‘JOH’).

Tweets by date. A coincides with the Honduran constitutional court permitting presidential re-election; B is the period immediately after the 2017 election; C occurs during the trial of Tony Hernández. 

Network graph of all retweets in the dataset. The purple cluster centers on the account of honduran president Juan Orlando Hernández; the turquoise cluster surrounds the account of the Honduran President’s communications office; in pink are news accounts, and green represents what we’re calling the “activista” cluster. 

Key Takeaways:

• The Honduras takedown consists of 3,104 accounts and 1,165,019 tweets. 553,211 tweets were original and 611,808 were retweets. Accounts dated as far back as 2008, but roughly two thirds were created in the last year. 
• The accounts created in the last year appear largely automated. Their activity overwhelmingly involved retweeting Honduran President @JuanOrlandoH. Approximately 37% of the tweets in the dataset mentioned @JuanOrlandoH.
• The largest removed account was that of Televisión Nacional de Honduras (TNH). The government-controlled TV station’s facebook page was also removed in July 2019. TNH has new social media presence on both platforms as of March 25, 2020.
• Some of the removed accounts are associated with known television and media personalities, one of whom, Chano Rivera, is also a political consultant and publicist.
• The frequency of hashtags including (in translation) #TheNewHonduras, #HondurasAdvances, #BetterLife, #HondurasActivates, #ISupportYouJOH, #LongLiveJOH and #HondurasIsProgressing shows widespread promotion of the president’s initiatives within the dataset. Minimal mention is made of some major news events, such as the criminal conviction of the president’s brother, Tony Hernandez, suggesting that the tweets sought to drown out negative press.
• A set of roughly a dozen accounts associated with self proclaimed writers, artists and feminists formed a distinct group in the dataset. These accounts were the only accounts heavily critical of the government. They also interacted less with the dominant media landscape and the president than other accounts in the dataset. There does appear to be evidence of coordinated activity across the cluster.

 

The Serbia operation

[FULL REPORT]

One of the takedowns announced on April 2, 2020 was a large cluster of Serbian accounts. These accounts were primarily engaged in cheerleading current Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and his allies, in attacking the Serbian opposition, and in artificially boosting the popularity of Vučić-aligned tweets and content. Among other things, the accounts appear to have focused on supporting Vučić’s run for president in 2017 and tamping down public support for the opposition-led protests known as “1 of 5 Million,” which began in late 2018.

One of the most popular accounts in the Serbia-related takedown, @belilav11, replying to a tweet from the Serbian Progressive Party, the party of current Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić: “The government belongs to the people, not to the yellow tycoons [i.e., the opposition] and their mentors from the west. The people decide in the election who will be in power.” Accounts like this one tweeted in support of Vučić and his allies and attacked the Serbian opposition.

Key takeaways

• The network consisted of approximately 8,558 accounts. While many of these accounts existed earlier, most of the network’s activity came in 2018 and 2019. The accounts sent more than 43 million tweets altogether. 
• The accounts served as a coordinated pro-Vučić brigade on Twitter. They tweeted constantly in support of Vučić—over 2 million tweets were sent with the hashtags #Vucic and #vucic—and derided his rivals and the “1 in 5 Million” protests. 
• The accounts worked steadily to direct Twitter users to pro-Vučić news sources. Among their tweets were over 8.5 million links to sns.org.rs, informer.rs, alor.rs, and pink.rs, the official site of Vučić’s party and three Vučić-aligned news sites, respectively.
• The accounts relied on a few core tactics to boost visibility and achieve their aims: 
  • Dogpiling onto opposition-related content. Tweets by opposition politicians and publications were swarmed by the accounts, which replied with critical or derisive comments to give the content the appearance of unpopularity.
  • Taking over opposition-related hashtags. When protesters popularized the hashtags #1od5miliona and #PočeloJe, the accounts attacked the originators and attempted to co-opt the hashtags with pro-Vučić content.
  • Retweeting Vučić-aligned accounts to boost their popularity. The accounts retweeted @avucic 1.7 million times, @sns_srbija (the official account for Vučić’s party) over 4.5 million times, and @InformerNovine (an SNS-aligned newspaper) over 1.8 million times. Many accounts were engaged solely in retweeting @avucic.

 

While a precise connection between this network and SNS has not been established, there can be no doubt, given the content these accounts shared and the time period in which they were active, that this network was aligned with Vučić’s efforts to entrench himself and his party in power.  

The broad spectrum of takedowns in the April 2020 collection serves as a reminder that coordinated inauthentic behavior manifests globally, comes from a range of actor types, is reliant on broadcast media as well as the social media ecosystem, and that determined manipulators regenerate networks and update tactics with regularity.

4/2/2020, 11:30AM PST: THIS POST WAS UPDATED TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM FACEBOOK

CDDRL’s Program on Arab Reform and Democracy held its annual conference at Stanford University on October 11 and 12, titled “The Struggle for Political Change in the Arab World.” The conference is an outgrowth of ARD’s efforts to support new research on the dynamics of political change in the countries of the Arab world. Scholars from across different disciplines sought to understand how social, economic, and political dynamics at the national level, as well as international and regional conflict and power rivalries, impact struggles for political and social change in the region.

Overview of Panels and Speakers

Following opening remarks by FSI Senior Fellow Larry Diamond, the first panel titled “The Boundaries of Authoritarianism post-Arab Uprisings” featured CDDRL Senior Research Scholar Amr Hamzawy. His paper examined how the regime of Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi has employed discursive strategies to discredit calls for democratic change in the country. Sean Yom, Associate Professor of Political Science at Temple University, outlined how the protest strategies of Jordanian youth have limited their effectiveness in advancing meaningful political change. University of California, Davis Scholar Samia Errazzouki discussed the failure of state-led political and economic reform in Morocco.

Chaired by Harvard University Fellow Hicham Alaoui, the second panel was titled “Popular Uprisings and Uncertain Transitions.” University of California, Santa Cruz Political Scientist Thomas Serres provided an overview of the economic disruptions that contributed to Algeria’s uprising. Lindsay Benstead, who is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Portland State University, analyzed the electoral successes of Tunisia’s Ennahda Party. Khalid Medani, Professor of Political Science at McGill University, explained how Sudanese protesters leveraged new strategies of contention to force Omar Al-Bashir out of power.

The third panel, titled “Politics, Succession and Sectarianism in the GCC States,” included Oxford University Fellow Toby Matthiesen, who discussed how Saudi Arabia and the GCC states have increasingly sought to protect their regimes by actively molding the politics of their autocratic patrons in the region, and by using new technologies to upgrade the effectiveness of their surveillance states. Georgia State University Political Scientist Michael Herb explained how the aging of the Saudi line of succession contributed to the political ascendancy of Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman and the decay of family rule in the country. Cal Poly Historian Farah Al-Nakib described how Kuwait’s royal family has used its sponsorship of large-scale development projects to sidestep the country’s political polarization, undermine the power of the parliament, and weaken public access to spaces of political contestation.

The fourth panel focused on “Social Strife and Proxy Conflict in the Middle East.” Chatham House Scholar Lina Khatib described Syria’s transformation during the civil war from a highly centralized security state to a transactional state in which the regime depends heavily on local powerbrokers. Stacey Philbrick Yadav, Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, discussed differences in how local communities in Yemen have been affected by the country’s conflict. David Patel, who serves as Associate Director for Research at the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University, argued that Iraq’s democratic institutions have been impressively robust to a series of existential challenges, but he also highlighted a widespread feeling among the Iraqi public that its parliamentary system is failing to deliver.

Finally, the fifth panel examined the topic of “International Forces in the Arab Political Arena.” Stanford University Political Scientist Lisa Blaydes suggested that China’s efforts to involve itself in the regional economy may improve its reputation among economically-frustrated Arab citizens, but that such efforts also spell trouble for democracy and human rights in the Middle East. Hamid & Christina Moghadam Director of Iranian Studies at Stanford University Abbas Milani argued that Iran’s ideological commitment to exporting the Islamic Revolution has been remarkably consistent for several decades. Colin Kahl, Co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at FSI, reviewed the strategies of US administrations toward the Middle East, and posited that President Trump’s approach of pursuing maximalist objectives with minimal commitments is particularly likely to heighten instability in the region. FSI Scholar Ayca Alemdaroglu emphasized that Turkey’s neo-Ottoman foreign policy has failed to achieve its objectives in the face of mounting regional upheaval.

Common Themes of Political Change and Continuity

Several themes emerged from conference presentations. First, across the panels, scholars discussed the lessons learned by autocrats and activists alike in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, and the ways in which these lessons have transformed regional politics. Hamzawy emphasized that the Sisi regime in Egypt has increasingly relied on intensive repression over cooptation to maintain stability, while at the same time refusing to grant even limited political openings as existed under Hosni Mubarak’s presidency. In part, this change appears to be rooted in the regime’s belief that relaxing the state’s authoritarian posture had contributed to the revolutionary upheaval of 2011. Likewise, Matthiesen suggested that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council States have learned to become more aggressive in strengthening their surveillance apparatus and policing popular discourse transnationally. By contrast, Serres discussed how the Algerian military and bureaucracy have responded to mass protests not by intensifying repression, but instead by attempting to coopt anti-corruption initiatives and democratic reforms to limit political and economic change. Similarly, regarding Kuwait, Al-Nakib illustrated how the restructuring of urban spaces has proved itself a subtle but successful strategy for the royal family to rehabilitate its reputation while limiting geographic focal points for popular politics.

Activists have also learned their own lessons from the aftermath of the Arab Spring. According to Yom, Jordanian activists continue to look to the leaderless revolutions of Tunisia and Egypt as a model to be emulated. As a result, they prioritize agility and horizontality in their protests, and they forgo the organization of formal political movements. This approach has succeeded in acquiring short-term concessions from the regime but has failed to generate broader structural changes. On the other hand, activists in Sudan appear to have been more successful at using lessons from the Arab Spring to push for systematic transformations of their political system. According to Medani, Sudanese protesters developed novel tactics to avoid the repression of the coercive apparatus, and they were effective at gradually forging a counterhegemonic discourse that clearly exposed the regime’s failures to the public. Following the overthrow of Omar Al-Bashir, activists in Sudan have also insisted on dismantling the political and economic might of the deep state to avoid following Egypt’s path.

Second, the conference discussion indicated widespread dissatisfaction with formal political institutions across the region. For instance, Hamzawy suggested that Sisi’s regime has been relatively successful at discrediting civilian political institutions, including the legislature and civilian-led ministries. Errazzouki highlighted widespread dissatisfaction in Morocco with existing political institutions. Likewise, Yom’s discussion of activists in Jordan emphasized their lack of interest in entering formal politics. In Kuwait, the royal court has found an opening to pursue urban development projects outside of normal institutions in part because of the public’s frustration with gridlock in the legislature. Patel speculated that frustration with the parliament and muhasasa system in Iraq may finally prompt major changes to the country’s political process.

Third, despite this disillusionment with formal politics, these political institutions have proved remarkably durable in countries across the region. For example, though current frustrations may finally prompt change in Iraq, Patel also highlighted the resilience of the parliamentary system in the face of a sectarian civil war, US troop withdrawal, the rise of ISIS, and a number of other major challenges. For both Algeria and Sudan, Serres and Medani stressed that militaries continue to exercise significant influence despite the popular uprisings. Meanwhile, for Egypt, Hamzawy noted the firm grip of the current military regime on power, and for Morocco, Errazzouki described the lack of systematic changes to the country’s ruling monarchy, even after years of popular pressure.

Fourth, this durability has not precluded a number of important shifts within existing political institutions. Regarding Syria, for instance, Khatib explained how the survival of Bashar al-Asad’s presidency has depended on moving state institutions away from a centralized security state to a transactional state reliant on local actors with a degree of independence from the regime. Herb described how the consensus-based family rule of the Saudi monarchy fell victim to deaths among the aging senior princes, which opened up opportunities for the king to appoint more officials in a manner that heightened his direct influence. Herb suggested that Mohammad Bin Salman recognized this change and knew that he would likely lose relevance upon his father’s death; as a result, he was motivated to gamble on consolidating his control while his father still held the power to issue royal decrees. In Algeria, the influence of the military and bureaucracy may remain paramount for now, but Serres also pointed out that protesters have succeeded in stripping away the civilian intermediaries who used to protect these institutions. Regarding the durability of local institutions, Yadav noted how pre-conflict and even pre-unification institutions in Yemen have continued to operate effectively in a number of local communities around the country.

Fifth, foreign interventions will continue to destabilize the region and impede prospects for democratization or post-conflict reconstructions in the coming years. Khatib noted that Russia has positioned itself as the agenda setter who can bring the Syrian state back to its feet, but also that Russia and Iran are competing to profit off the country’s reconstruction. For Yemen, Yadav argued that fragmentation at the local level has important implications for best practices in the international community’s reconstruction efforts, but that current actors are not well positioned to understand these trends. Kahl predicted that the Middle East strategy of the Trump administration would likely contribute to further destabilization of the region because of its emphasis on empowering allies to do what they want and go after Iran while the United States maintains its distance. Meanwhile, Blaydes’ presentation on China’s regional involvement, Milani’s discussion of Iran’s efforts to export the Islamic Revolution, and Matthiesen’s observations about the GCC States’ authoritarian coordination all illustrated how intervening states are reducing prospects for democratic political change.

Sixth, even as interventionist countries have contributed to the destabilization of the region, they have also confronted major obstacles themselves – and in some cases have failed outright to achieve their primary objectives. Khatib noted that Iran has faced backlash in Syria, while Abbas Milani and David Patel pointed to backlash against Iran in Iraq. Kahl emphasized that the Trump administration’s Middle East policy was unlikely to achieve its goals. Blaydes observed that China has not acquired greater salience in the Middle East despite its more active economic involvement, and individuals in many of the region’s countries – particularly those that are more developed – do not see China’s growth as a positive force. She also stressed the reputational risks China is taking in pursuing potentially unpopular investments through the Belt and Road Initiative. The GCC States are attempting to prop up strongmen in both Libya and Sudan, but this strategy has struggled in the face of local political dynamics; furthermore, the intervention in Yemen has been a disaster for Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Finally, Alemdaroglu stressed that Turkey’s ambitious “neo-Ottoman” foreign policy, which reflects a desire to revive Turkish influence in areas ruled by the Ottoman Empire, has largely failed. In particular, the architect of the policy, former foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu, lost his job; the country miscalculated badly in how it handled the aftermath of the Arab Spring; and Turkey’s relations with many of its neighbors have soured.

Russia’s global strategy for reasserting itself as a geopolitical superpower has led to an increased presence in Africa, where it has broadened efforts to shape the continent’s politics and pursue new economic opportunities to allay the effects of sanctions. While the presence of Russian military instructors and paramilitary groups in Libya and the Central African Republic is well documented, there is emerging evidence that Russian-linked companies are now active in the information space as well. Yevgeny Prigozhin, the oligarch perhaps best known for running the Internet Research Agency, is central to this expansion.

In this post we identify a Facebook operation attributed to entities tied to Prigozhin — including, it appears, the Wagner Group (Частная военная компания Вагнера), a Russian organization that has served as a private military contractor in several African countries. The first allusion to a social media influence operation tied to Prigozhin stemmed from Daily Beast reporting and a document shared with us by the Dossier Center that suggested the existence of a cluster of Facebook Pages tied to the Wagner Group. We identified an initial cluster of Pages which targeted Libya, and shared the find with the Facebook Threat Intel team. Facebook subsequently provided us with data on two related networks that they had been investigating previously. These networks have been targeting the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Sudan, and included “news” Pages and websites, and Pages purporting to belong to political parties as well as individual politicians. The part of the operation we analyzed included seven Instagram accounts and 73 Facebook Pages. In total 1.72 million accounts liked the Facebook Pages, though we note that some of these likes are possibly from the same account across multiple Pages. The Page managers were quite active; in October 2019 alone there were 8,900 posts. 

 

Wagner Group document shared by the Dossier Center. The document included an example post from a Page called ليبيا القذافي (Libya Gaddafi). The post was a photo of former president Muammar Gaddafi, overlaid on an outline of Libya. The document described the post as a “Patriotic post about the best time for the Motherland.” (High Resolution)

From our analysis of the social media activity, there are several key takeaways:

• The operation, conducted by Russia-linked organizations likely operating at least in part at the behest of a state actor, appears to have further relied on subcontractors who are native speakers and/or local to the region. This variety of nested obfuscation increases hurdles to attribution of disinformation campaigns. 

• In addition to well-known social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, the actors leveraged public WhatsApp and Telegram groups. Whether more private chat channels were also used is an area for further research. 

• The operation used social media engagement tactics designed to develop a close relationship with the audience, including Facebook Live videos, Google Forms for feedback, and a contest.

• The operation shared tactical similarities to Internet Research Agency activities; the operatives created several associated news sites (in one case staffed by reporters who appear to have spent time in Russia) as well as Facebook Pages that produced social-first content (memes, live videos). The attribution of such activity to non-IRA entities that nonetheless share an affiliation with Prigozhin leads to a significant unresolved question of what relationship, if any, exists between the IRA, Wagner, and Prigozhin’s other companies, and to what extent Russia is distributing its active-measures capabilities across a myriad of organizations to hinder detection and attribution.

The activity and strategies varied by country:

• Libya: Russian actors are supporting two potential future presidential candidates: the rebel General Khalifa Haftar and Muammar Gaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi. The Facebook operation began in December 2018, and the Pages were run by administrators in Egypt. Prior reporting has indicated that the Wagner Group has at least 100 mercenaries fighting with Haftar’s militias.

• Sudan: Facebook activity began in mid-2018, and has persisted since the April coup against Omar al-Bashir, transition to the Transitional Military Council, and transition to the Sovereign Council of Sudan. Content has been slightly supportive of whatever government is in power, and occasionally critical of protesters. Several of the Pages relate to two news websites, khartoumstar.com and sudandaily.org, the latter of which often re-posted Sputnik articles. There were additionally Facebook Pages purporting to be the official Pages of several political parties, along with “news” Pages for the Transitional Military Council and the Sovereign Council of Sudan. The former had the url facebook.com/transitionalmilitarycouncil, and at first glance appeared to be its official Page. Prigozhin-linked companies are known to have mining agreements in Sudan and have trained local military forces.

A Sudan Daily article, reposted from Sputnik, saying that Russian mercenaries in Sudan have no connection to the Russian government. (Link to full image) 

• Central African Republic: A network of Facebook Pages was created to publicize and praise the wide range of activities undertaken by the Russian government in the CAR, from military support to cultural events. These Pages, most of which had administrators in Madagascar, seem to have been intended to appear organic and give CAR audiences the impression of widespread domestic support for the administration of President Touadéra and its Russian partners.

• Madagascar: Russian actors created several Pages in 2018, but only began posting in February 2019, just after the new president was inaugurated. The Pages bolstered the government. One Page was created for a specific parliamentary candidate. 

• Mozambique: The Facebook operation began in September 2019, a few weeks before the country’s presidential and parliamentary elections. The Pages posted content to support the incumbent president, and damage the reputation of the opposition – in at least one instance, with a fake news story. 

A post from Onda da Frelimo (Wave of Frelimo) describing the results of a poll purportedly conducted by the International Anticrisis Center, a Russian organization. The publication of such polls is illegal in Mozambique. Frelimo is the ruling party in Mozambique. (High resolution)

• Democratic Republic of the Congo: Three Facebook Pages, created in 2019 after a contentious election, published content and memes mocking and criticizing key Congolese political figures, including the president. These Pages were not clearly aligned with the Russian government’s public strategy. 

The potential connection between the Libya operation and the Wagner Group is based on the leaked document obtained from the Dossier Center, which we cannot independently verify. We attribute these collective operations to actors tied to Yevgeny Prigozhin. Facebook’s attribution supports our conclusion. This investigation demonstrates a fundamental challenge of attributing information operations: disentangling activity by domestic interested parties, foreign actors working on behalf of domestic parties and foreign actors working in support of their own geopolitical or commercial interests. Our initial analysis of this content suggests a complex mix of motivations and our understanding of the African political disinformation ecosystem continues to evolve. Our full analysis of the materials, including images and figures, is in the linked whitepaper.