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In 1961, at the height of the Berlin crisis, the United States and Great Britain simultaneously struggled to adopt effective policies toward the first meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Belgrade. While the John F. Kennedy administration initially adopted a policy of standoffishness toward the conference, the government of Harold Macmillan engaged in a campaign of quietly encouraging moderate attendance. Moderate British expectations led to sound policy, whereas the Kennedy administration's inability to develop a coherent outlook and response cost it a priceless opportunity to understand the emerging phenomenon of nonalignment.

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Cold War History
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Montek Singh Ahluwalia is an economist who trained at Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar. He spent several years at the World Bank before returning to India to serve as the Economic Advisor to the Finance Minister. The Government of India then appointed him to several senior positions, including Secretary of Commerce and Secretary in the Department of Economic Affairs at the Ministry of Finance. In 1998, he was appointed as a Member of the Planning Commission and Advisory Council to the Prime Minister of India. In 2001, he became the Director of Independent Evaluation Office at the International Monetary Fund, resigning this position in 2004 to become the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission.

He has written widely about India and the world economy, co-authoring Redistribution with Growth: An Approach to Policy, and editing Macroeconomics and Monetary Policy: Issues for Reforming the Global Financial Architecture with Y.V. Reddy and S.S. Tarapore.

The Payne Distinguished Lectureship is named for Frank and Arthur Payne, brothers who gained an appreciation for global problems through their international business operations. This lectureship, hosted by the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, brings speakers with an international reputation for leadership and visionary thinking to Stanford to deliver a major public lecture. 

This event is carried out in partnership with the Stanford Center for International Development (SCID).

A public reception will follow the lecture.

Montek Singh Ahluwalia Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission 2004-2014, Government of India Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission 2004-2014, Government of India
Lectures
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Nuclear weapons are so central to the history of the Cold War that it can be difficult to disentangle the two. Did nuclear weapons cause the Cold War? Did they contribute to its escalation? Did they help to keep the Cold War “cold”? We should also ask how the Cold War shaped the development of atomic energy. Was the nuclear-arms race a product of Cold War tension rather than its cause?

The atomic bomb and the origins of the Cold War:

The nuclear age began before the Cold War. During World War II, three countries decided to build the atomic bomb: Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Britain put its own work aside and joined the Manhattan Project as a junior partner in 1943. The Soviet effort was small before August 1945. The British and American projects were driven by the fear of a German atomic bomb, but Germany decided in 1942 not to make a serious effort to build the bomb. In an extraordinary display of scientific and industrial might, the United States made two bombs ready for use by August 1945. Germany was defeated by then, but President Harry S. Truman decided to use the bomb against Japan.

The decision to use the atomic bomb has been a matter of intense controversy. Did Truman decide to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order, as he claimed, to end the war with Japan without further loss of American lives? Or did he drop the bombs in order to intimidate the Soviet Union, without really needing them to bring the war to an end? His primary purpose was surely to force Japan to surrender, but he also believed that the bomb would help him in his dealings with Iosif V. Stalin. That latter consideration was secondary, but it confirmed his decision. Whatever Truman’s motives, Stalin regarded the use of the bomb as an anti-Soviet move, designed to deprive the Soviet Union of strategic gains in the Far East and more generally to give the United States the upper hand in defining the postwar settlement. On August 20, 1945, two weeks to the day after Hiroshima, Stalin signed a decree setting up a Special Committee on the Atomic Bomb, under the chairmanship of Lavrentii P. Beriia. The Soviet project was now a crash program.

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Cambridge University Press
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David Holloway

"Rabbit-Proof Fence" is a 2002 film based on the book Follow the Rabbit-Proof Fence by Doris Pilkington Garimara. It concerns the author's mother, and two other young mixed-race Aboriginal girls, who ran away from the Moore River Native Settlement, north of Perth, in order to return to their Aboriginal families, after being placed there in 1931. The film follows the girls as they trek/walk for nine weeks along 1,500 miles of the Australian rabbit-proof fence to return to their community at Jigalong while being tracked by a white authority figure and a black tracker.

The film will be moderated by The Europe Center faculty affiliate Krish Seetah, Assistant Professor of Anthropology and Director of the ‘Mauritian Archaeology and Cultural Heritage’ (MACH) project, which studies European Imperialism and colonial activity.

"Rabbit-Proof Fence" is the last film in the annual SGS Summer Film Festival running from June 17th to August 26th.  This year's festival features films from around the world that focus on the topic of “Imagining Empire: A Global Retrospective” and offers a flexible lens with which to look at both historical and contemporary geopolitical and socioeconomic contexts.  For more information on the film festival, please visit: https://sgs.stanford.edu/sgs.stanford.edu/2015-film-festival.

The Geology Corner (Bldg. 320), Room 105
450 Serra Mall

Assistant Professor of Anthropology Moderator
Film Screenings
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"North Korean Human Rights: A Long Journey with Little Progress" examines human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) and the approaches that the European Union has taken to address the situation. In this paper, Mike Cowin provides perspective on EU-DPRK engagement; the two sides officially established diplomatic relations in May 2001. The EU and its members have continued to raise the human rights issue during bilateral meetings. But, North Korea says it will continue to refuse dialogue if the EU continues to sponsor resolutions against North Korea at the UN Human Rights Commission/Council. The EU has rejected this as a precondition. "The EU has had no incentive or justifiable reason to take the initiative to break out of this chicken-and-egg dilemma...The DPRK has also maintained its position. The gap between the two sides has therefore widened," he writes. Cowin suggests the EU could take additional steps to restart EU-DPRK engagement.

Mike Cowin is the 2014-15 Pantech Fellow in the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. Before coming to Stanford, he served as the deputy head of mission at the British Embassy in Pyongyang, North Korea. He has also served in the British embassies in Seoul from 2003 to 2007, and in Tokyo from 1992 to 1997.

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Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
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Mike Cowin
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The human rights situation in North Korea has gained considerable attention lately, due in part to an official report released by the United Nations last year. The landmark report condemned North Korea for systematic and widespread human rights violations.

Now for three weeks in March, the UN human rights council meets in Geneva for its regular session. North Korea’s human rights situation is a top agenda item, marked by a rare appearance by North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Su Young. In Dec. 2014, the UN General Assembly urged the Security Council to take up the situation of North Korea, including a possible referral of those responsible for prosecution in the International Criminal Court.

Looking beyond UN – U.S. – North Korea engagement, the European Union and its members have long-raised similar concerns. In a new policy brief “North Korean Human Rights: A Long Journey with Little Progress,” Mike Cowin details the human rights situation and institutions involved from a British perspective.

“The DPRK will need to make considerable efforts if it is to undermine more than a handful of the hundreds of testimonies of abuse that have been collected and brought to the world’s attention,” writes Cowin, a former deputy chief of mission at the British Embassy in Pyongyang.

Cowin is the Pantech Fellow in the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. Before coming to Stanford, he also served in the embassies in Seoul from 2003 to 2007, and in Tokyo from 1992 to 1997.

The EU and North Korea have held seemingly incompatible positions for the past 11 years, and the March council meetings are unlikely to change that impasse. However, Cowin suggests that the EU should seek ways to have more impact.

“Perhaps the EU, which has often led the world on human rights, could find some way to talk with the DPRK, establishing a mutually acceptable way to restart engagement,” he writes.

Cowin says restarting engagement may take the form of quiet, long-term confidence building.

The Korea Program has published additional works focused on human rights in North Korea, including a paper that looks at living with disabilities in North Korea by Katharina Zellweger and an op-ed by Gi-Wook Shin calling for international consensus on the North Korea problem. Engaging North Korea is also a research focus of the Korea Program, which last year produced a policy paper on North-South Korean relations and the prospect for unification.

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Abstract: Chevaline was the codename given to a highly-secret program begun in 1970 to improve the performance of the UK's force of Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles in order to give them the capability to overcome Soviet ABM defenses deployed around Moscow. After much technical difficulty, delays in project timescale and cost escalation the new system was finally introduced in 1982, but it had already attracted major criticism for the expenditure involved, claims of project mismanagement, the rationale that underpinned its development, and its concealment from proper parliamentary scrutiny. This lecture will explore the background to the program, why it ran into so many problems, and how it became one of the most controversial episodes in post-war British defense policy. An understanding of the problems confronted by the attempt to improve Polaris illuminates a number of key themes and issues that are of relevance to policymakers concerned with strategic weapons programs and project management.

About the Speaker: Matthew Jones’ current research focuses on British nuclear history during the Cold War. He has also written on many different aspects of US and British foreign and defense policy in the 20th century, and has a long-standing interest in empire and decolonization in South East Asia. Jones’ first book, Britain, the United States and the Mediterranean War, 1942-44 (Macmillan, 1996), examined strains in the Anglo-American relationship by strategic issues and command problems in the Mediterranean theater. His book, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961-1965: Britain, the United States, Indonesia, and the Creation of Malaysia (Cambridge University Press, 2002), looks at the federation of Malaysia during British decolonization in the early 1960s. After Hiroshima: The United States, Race, and Nuclear Weapons in Asia, 1945-1965 (Cambridge University Press, 2010) addresses US nuclear policies in Asia in the period of the Korean War, confrontation with China, and early engagement in Vietnam. His current project on UK nuclear policy encompasses the development of nuclear strategy within NATO, the Anglo-American nuclear relationship, and European responses to strategic arms control. In 2008, Jones was appointed by the Prime Minister to become the Cabinet Office official historian of the UK strategic nuclear deterrent and the Chevaline program, a commission that will lead to the publication of a two-volume official history exploring British nuclear policy between 1945 and 1982. Jones’s journal articles have appeared in Diplomatic History, Historical Journal, Journal of Cold War Studies, and English Historical Review. He gained his DPhil in Modern History at St. Antony’s College, Oxford, in 1992.

Encina Hall (2nd floor)

Matthew Jones Professor of International History Speaker London School of Economics and Political Science
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Abstract: With the development of cyber capabilities by an increasing number of states, policymakers as well as scholars have been calling for the negotiation of a new international treaty to regulate cyber warfare. This paper provides an account and analysis of relevant debates in the United Nations with a focus on the position of four states – Russia, China, the US and the UK. Discussions have been concentrated in the First Committee of the General Assembly which has been seized with the issue since 1998 when the Russian Federation submitted a proposal for an international convention to govern the use of information and communication technologies for military purposes. While these efforts towards a wholesale international treaty have not materialized, Russia and China continue to advocate a change in the legal status through the promulgation of additional norms. In contrast, the US and the UK have been firm supporters of applying current legal regimes, including the UN Charter and the Geneva Conventions, to the use of cyber capabilities by states. In advancing these positions, two powerful narratives have emerged each emphasizing different aspects of the cybersecurity debate.

 

About the Speaker: Elaine Korzak is a postdoctoral cybersecurity fellow at CISAC. She earned her Ph.D from the Department of War Studies at King´s College London in 2014. Her thesis examined the applicability and adequacy of international legal frameworks to the emerging phenomenon of cyber attacks. Her analysis focused on two legal areas in particular: international law on the use of force and international humanitarian law. Elaine holds both an MA in International Peace and Security from King´s College London and an LL.M in Public International Law from the LSE. Her professional experience includes various governmental and non-governmental institutions, including NATO´s Cyber Defence Section as well as the European Commission´s Directorate-General on Information Society and Media.

 


Encina Hall (2nd floor)

Elaine Korzak Cybersecurity Fellow Speaker CISAC
Seminars
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