The United States and Russia have not signed a new nuclear arms control agreement in a decade and the New START Treaty is set to expire next year if not extended. The development of so-called disruptive nuclear weapons technologies, such as hypersonic and autonomous capabilities, not explicitly addressed under existing treaties further complicates bilateral negotiations to reach agreement on a future for nuclear arms control. In this paper, we develop a set of criteria to assess the disruptiveness of these technologies and evaluate their implications on potential arms control mechanisms. We review historic and theoretical motivations for pursuing bilateral arms control and analyze the U.S. and Russian nuclear postures through public government documents. We consider three potential mechanisms for future nuclear arms control agreements and argue in favor of a U.S.-Russia co-sponsored treaty in an international forum to constrain the deployment of those nuclear technologies assessed to be disruptive to strategic stability.

Due to its extreme climate and low population density, the Russian Arctic region remains largely infrastructurally undeveloped. Many settlements in the Arctic area are not connected to the Unified Energy System of Russia (UES) and employ various carbon-intensive sources for local electricity generation. Currently, the Russian government has drafted a strategic development plan for the region, specifically utilizing the region's vast supply of oil and natural gas reserves for electricity generation. The Arctic ecosystem is fragile, and constructing new oil, gas, or diesel power stations may not be sustainable for the region. Additionally, the utilization of fossil fuels would exclude the current technological advancements in electricity systems. This paper offers an improved and more sustainable approach to developing electricity generation in remote localities. Given unique regional ecological and sustainability concerns, Territories of Advanced Social and Economic Development (TASED) should be created in the Arctic regions of Yamal and Murmansk in order to integrate wind electricity generation on a small scale in these regions' most remote population centers. Not only would this protect the region's ecosystem from the negative effects of new fossil fuel power stations, but it would also present new opportunities for equitable development of the region's economy.

This study focuses on the mitigation of methane emissions from large-scale oil and gas infrastructure. It is built on two complementary cases of the Russian Federation and United States, who are two of the largest oil and natural gas producers, possess the most extensive oil and natural gas pipeline networks, and both deal with the emerging problem of high-level methane emissions. The paper attempts to identify differences and similarities between the countries' approaches in mitigating methane emissions. Analyzing open data on methane emissions, legislation, corporate standards, and reports of state agencies, this research seeks to answer the question of whether there is space for cooperation and exchange of experiences and best practices between the two countries in methane leak detection and repair (LDAR). Our analysis shows a considerable lack in corresponding regulation in both countries and identifies a dramatic misalignment between international, national, and corporate actions. However, we see the opportunity to significantly reduce the existing gaps in regulation and technological adaptation through international cooperation and exchange of best practices. The paper supports corresponding policy and practical implications that rely on bilateral and multilateral initiatives and a cooperative approach between oil and gas companies and the government.

In Tyumen, a Siberian city located some 1,000 miles east of Moscow, a radical experiment in Russian higher education is taking place. The School of Advanced Studies (SAS) is an institute that is attempting to bring multidisciplinary, liberal arts-influenced education to Russia. Founded in 2017, SAS operates as an autonomous institution within the state-funded University of Tyumen (UTMN). This article will analyze SAS's current educational model through data and interviews with faculty, administration, and students. It is divided into five parts. The first section offers background information. We explain how SAS was founded, its source of funding, and why liberal education is an outlier in Russia. The middle three sections take a deeper look at the institution from the perspectives of the administration, students, and faculty. We document their observations about the SAS experiment, highlighting their differing views on what they believe the institute's mission should be. These sections also analyze which elements of the SAS model are working so far and which ones need further development. The final section sums up our findings: how is SAS, a progressive, liberal experiment, able to exist in a traditional, generally inflexible Russian education system? So far, what are the institution's successes and failures? And finally, is SAS a fluke experiment, or is there potential to create similar institutions throughout Russia?

Our increasingly internet-connected world has yielded exponential demand for cybersecurity. However, protecting cyber infrastructure is technically complex, constantly changing, and expensive. Small organizations or corporations with legacy systems may struggle to implement best practices. To increase cybersecurity for organizations in Russia, we propose fostering a culture of ethical hacking by supporting bug bounty programs. To date, bug bounties have not had the same level of success or investment in Russia as in the United States; yet, we argue that bug bounty programs, when properly established, institutionalize a culture of ethical hacking by establishing trust between talented hackers and host organizations. This paper will first define ethical hacking and bug bounty programs. It will explore the current bug bounty landscape in Russia and the United States. Based on issues identified, we will proceed to offer a set of best practices for establishing a successful bug bounty program. Finally, we will discuss some considerations for setting up bug bounty programs in Russia.

White nationalism remains an often overlooked terror threat amongst the many national security risks facing the United States and Russian Federation. While typically grounded in domestic theaters, white nationalist groups have increased the frequency and scale of their armed activities by incorporating aspects of transnational cooperation that are tactics often used by larger terrorist networks. This trend has raised questions regarding the ways in which white nationalism represents a new type of international technology-enabled terror threat toward the United States and Russian Federation and how policy makers can best address this challenge. This research paper will explore how white nationalist groups in the United States and Russian Federation have sought cooperation with one another through wider ideological and strategic alignment. This paper will also explore the respective communication techniques of these groups, which have been enabled through the internet and new technologies. This paper will conclude with a reflection on potential avenues of cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation, drawing on previous examples of collaboration among government officials and non-state actors in combating terrorism.