What's next for Korean democracy? How can Korea advance to the next stage of its development? APARC and Korea Program Director Gi-Wook Shin addresses these and other questions in his new book, The Adventure of Democracy: How to Cross the Era of Conflict and Division. According to Shin, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, a professor of Sociology, and the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea, democracy develops through steady adventures. He considers its evolution in Korea, reflects on Korean politics of division and confrontation and their sources, and seeks alternatives.

The book, which has been released in Korea, is a compilation of Shin's recent series of essays, “Shin's Reflections on Korea,” published by Sindonga (New East Asia), Korea’s oldest monthly magazine. In these essays, Shin explores “Next Korea”— Korea’s vision for the future — and outlines a roadmap for achieving it across the realms of politics, economics, society, culture, and foreign policy. He offers an outside perspective that allows him to see the “forest” of Korea’s path toward the future.

By any measure, Korea has made remarkable achievements in a short time, Shin writes. “It has overcome war, division, and authoritarian rule to become a country with the 10th largest economy in the world in only seven decades. Its soft power is sweeping across the globe, and Korea has world-class talent in every field. This is truly a miracle, and Koreans have every reason to be proud.”

Korea, however, stands at a critical crossroads, according to Shin. Populism and polarization pose challenges to the country’s democracy at a time of leadership crisis, Korean society is remarkably divided, and its aging population presents formidable obstacles to economic growth. Inter-Korean relations are in dire straits, and Seoul confronts a delicate regional balancing act amid intensified Sino-U.S. tensions. Will it settle for the status quo or progress to become a global leader?

Selected coverage of Shin's book in Korean media:

The Korea Times
The Korea Daily
Yonhap News
Busan Ilbo
Chosun
TV Chosun News
Donga Ilbo
Hankook Ilbo
Kookmin Ilbo
Kyosu Shinmun
Kyunghyang Shinmun
Metro Seoul
Munhwa Ilbo
SBS News
Shindonga Magazine (interview) 
Shindona Magazine (book review)

Background

The need to reform the parliamentary election system has received unanimous approval across political parties. During the 2022 presidential election, all candidates pledged to change the parliamentary electoral reform. To change the current system, the 21st National Assembly, elected in 2020, formed the Special Committee for Electoral Reform (Special Committee). Last April, the Special Committee came up with three agendas to be discussed in a Whole House Committee Meeting (Whole House Meeting) where 100 legislators can speak at length. However, the Whole House Meeting could not arrive at an agreed conclusion. On the last day of the three-day-long Whole House Meeting, the Special Committee announced that it designated the consortium comprised of Hankook Research and Seoul National University’s Institute for Social Development as the organizers of the Deliberative Polling to gather informed public opinion.

About the Deliberative Poll

Hankook Research recruited a national stratified random sample of the country’s voters to deliberate on parts of two weekends. 469 participants completed the deliberations. The sample was stratified by region, gender, age, and opinions on the issue (measured in a separate survey).

The participants answered some key questions in time for the concluding broadcast and then followed by completing a more detailed questionnaire. The National Assembly has members selected both from single-member districts and by proportional representation. Support for changing the election rules rose from 77% to 84% with deliberation. Support for small single-member districts (rather than multi-member districts) rose from 43% to 56%. Support for raising the proportion of the members selected by Proportional Representation (PR) went from 27% to 70%, a surprising 43-point gain. These results were presented on the broadcast, and more details about the deliberations and the results will be released soon.

Learn More

A playlist of highlights from the broadcast can be viewed below:

For more information on this project, please contact Chun-Seok Kim or Jung-Seok Park of Hankook Research, or Professor James Fishkin of Stanford’s Deliberative Democracy Lab. 

This essay originally appeared in Korean on March 4 in Sindonga (New East Asia), Korea’s oldest monthly magazine (established 1931), as part of a monthly column, "Shin’s Reflections on Korea." Translated by Raymond Ha. A PDF version of this essay is also available to download. 

In early January, I spoke with my colleague Francis Fukuyama about a range of global issues in an exclusive interview for the Munhwa Ilbo, a major Korean newspaper. Looking back on 2022, he said it was “a very good year.”¹ I was rather surprised by this assessment, given the ongoing political turmoil at home and abroad.

Elaborating on his answer, Fukuyama explained that “the Russians got completely bogged down” in Ukraine. Moreover, “China experienced mass protests, and there were protests also in Iran.” In the United States, “pro-Trump forces failed to make gains” in the November midterms. Fukuyama concluded that we may “look back on 2022 as the year when this democratic recession that has been going on for over 15 years finally bottomed out.”²

Though I agree that the democratic recession has bottomed out, it is too early to tell whether we will see a recovery. History tells us that we could remain stalled in the status quo for a while. Even after Hitler, Stalin, and Mao disappeared from the scene, Nazism, Stalinism, and Maoism remained. Juan Perón (Little Hitler), Nicolae Ceaușescu (Little Stalin), and Pol Pot (Little Mao) emerged in different parts of the world. Trumpism could remain a potent political force despite Trump’s loss in 2020. Politicians may continue to model themselves after Trump. A democratic recovery will be a long and arduous process, requiring a great deal of attention and effort.

Whither Korea’s Democracy?

Just as the United States turned the tide on democratic backsliding with Biden’s victory, Yoon Suk-Yeol’s election halted Korea’s democratic decline. The Yoon administration entered office trumpeting liberal democratic values and calling for a politics of common sense and fairness. However, it failed to live up to its rhetoric during its first year. Anti-pluralism pervades Korean politics, and polarization only continues to worsen. The ruling and opposition parties are locked in a vicious cycle of mutual hostility. This begs the question of whether Korea’s democracy can set itself on a path to recovery.

I first raised concerns about Korea’s democratic decline in an essay in the May 2020 edition of Sindonga magazine, entitled “Korean Democracy is Sinking under the Guise of the Rule of Law.”³ The Moon Jae-In administration was in its third year at the time.

In that essay, I noted that the Moon administration, intoxicated by a sense of moral superiority, regarded the opposition as a great evil with which there could be no compromise. It showed no qualms about deploying populist tactics, regarding itself as the champion of the ordinary citizen in a pitched battle against the establishment elite. Moreover, it politicized the courts and undermined the separation of powers. It was weakening Korea’s democracy “under the guise of the rule of law.” If political actors recklessly violated democratic norms and ideals, no amount of procedural legitimacy would be enough to sustain Korea’s liberal democracy. I warned that Korea’s democracy could gradually erode, just as one could “become soaked by a drizzle without noticing.”⁴ The essay was an earnest plea to prevent an unsettling tragedy—that a generation of politicians could dismantle the democracy that they had passionately fought for as pro-democracy activists in their youth.

This diagnosis formed the basis for South Korea’s Democracy in Crisis (2022), which I co-edited with Ho-Ki Kim, a professor of sociology at Yonsei University.⁵ This edited volume includes essays by progressive and conservative academics from Korea and the United States. It explains how and why Korea’s hard-won democracy entered a state of crisis, and it points to illiberalism, populism, and polarization as the main reasons. As we approach the first anniversary of President Yoon’s inauguration and look toward the future, it is timely to reassess the current state of Korea’s democracy along those three dimensions.

Let us begin with illiberalism. The Moon administration, which wielded a Manichean logic of good and evil and stoked chauvinistic anti-Japanese nationalism, is no longer in power. As if in reaction to these trends, President Yoon repeatedly stressed the importance of freedom. In his inaugural address, he put forth a vision of value-based diplomacy centered on solidarity between liberal democracies.⁶ However, he has failed to move beyond rhetorical gestures. Korea’s citizens are still waiting to see what an emphasis on liberal democratic values looks like in practice.

Moreover, the logic of political tribalism continues to overwhelm liberalism. Article 46(2) of Korea’s constitution declares that “members of the National Assembly . . . shall perform their duties in accordance with conscience.”⁷ However, many members are afraid to speak their minds for fear of angering their own side. Government officials are still indicted for “abuse of authority” over decisions they made while implementing policy measures. The core democratic norm of forbearance remains a distant prospect. There are serious concerns that wide-ranging prosecutorial investigations against Moon administration officials are descending into yet another campaign to “eradicate deep-rooted evils,” which was one of the Moon administration’s political priorities.⁸

Next is populism. In its 21st-century form, populism does not simply appeal to popular sentiment. It has two defining characteristics: anti-elitism and anti-pluralism. The former takes aim at the elite establishment, while the latter rejects coexistence with different groups. Anti-elitism manifests itself as hostility toward party politics, and anti-pluralism provokes a hatred of opposing political forces. Furthermore, technological advances and the dissemination of social media platforms enable populist leaders to communicate directly with their supporters. This form of direct interaction is another key characteristic of contemporary populism. In Korea, there are populist forces on both the left (Moon-ppa, gae-ddal) and the right (Taegukgi brigade).⁹

Ideological attacks against the elite have subsided since Yoon entered office. However, the administration’s policy against the so-called “new” establishment, including labor unions, runs the risk of veering toward populism. It is necessary to address corruption in labor unions and correct imprudent practices, such as the emergence of a “labor aristocracy.” While doing so, the Yoon administration should refrain from taking a politically motivated approach that appeals to conservative voters.

Populist leadership is also a problem. In the weeks leading up to the People Power Party’s (PPP) national convention in March, where the ruling party elected its new leader, President Yoon and his office showed a heavy-handed approach by openly throwing their weight behind Kim Gi-Hyeon. On the other side of the aisle, Lee Jae-Myung, the leader of the opposition Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), is currently the subject of ongoing prosecutorial investigations. Lee’s response to these investigations has not been befitting of a political leader in a pluralist democracy. Both Yoon and Lee hew closer to a “strongman” style of leadership that values boldness and the ability to achieve results, even at the cost of democratic norms such as compromise and mutual understanding through communication. Though they represent opposing political parties, Yoon and Lee share a similar political style that, in turn, reinforces mutual hostility between the two sides.

Last is political polarization. After the impeachment of President Park Geun-Hye and the election of Moon Jae-In, political polarization in Korea has further deteriorated due to the economic repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic and widening socioeconomic inequalities. Even outside the political sphere, there is growing mutual distrust between individuals and between communities. There is no space for moderation or nuance. Instead of agreeing to disagree, as would be the norm in a pluralist society, everyone is compelled to choose a side. As political fandoms come to the fore and politicians amplify gender issues to “divide and conquer” the electorate, Korean politics has degenerated into a raw struggle for power between warring tribes. It no longer fulfills its most basic function—to gather a wide range of differing opinions and to seek compromise.

Mutual toleration, coexistence, and compromise are becoming increasingly rare in Korean politics, which is defined by a winner-take-all electoral system and a powerful presidency. The extremely narrow margin of victory for Yoon Suk-Yeol over Lee Jae-Myung—a mere 0.73 percentage points—is a sobering portrait of just how polarized Korea has become. Since the DPK still holds a legislative majority in the National Assembly, cooperation across the aisle is a lost cause. The Yoon administration and the PPP are pressuring the opposition with prosecutorial investigations. In response, the DPK has called for the appointment of a special, independent prosecutor to investigate allegations surrounding not only Lee, but also Yoon and First Lady Kim Keon-Hee. The DPK appears to be opposing only for the sake of opposing.

The National Assembly has abdicated its most basic responsibility of passing laws to improve the lives of Korea’s citizens. According to the National Assembly’s Secretariat, 13,198 pieces of legislation were pending review across 17 standing committees at the end of 2022. This is an average of approximately 776 per committee. This figure is significantly higher than 8,957 (527 per committee) in 2021, and only 4,023 (237 per committee) at the end of 2020. Political polarization has worsened since the transfer of power to the PPP last year. Unfortunately, the future of Korea’s democracy is anything but bright.

Based on the three metrics of illiberalism, populism, and polarization, Korea’s democracy is unlikely to return to a path of recovery for the foreseeable future. The transfer of power to the conservatives may have prevented a further decline, but Korea’s democracy is stuck in a quagmire with no exit in sight. There is also a growing mistrust in politics among the Korean people.

In my column in the May 2022 edition of Sindonga, I reviewed the five years of the Moon administration and outlined my hopes and expectations for the incoming Yoon administration. I noted that Korea’s democracy had been “drenched in a heavy downpour over the course of this year’s presidential election.” I was one of many who resolved to “keep a close eye to see whether Yoon Suk-Yeol will be able to save South Korea’s democracy from the impending thunderstorm.”¹⁰ As the Yoon administration approaches the end of its first year, it is time for a clear-headed assessment of where Korea’s democracy stands. The downpour has stopped, but the skies are still overcast. There is no telling when we might see sunshine again.

The End of Strongmen—or Not

I have argued that Korea’s democratic decline must be understood as part of a global phenomenon. Democratic backsliding remains a topic of great concern among Western intellectuals. According to Freedom House, the proportion of democracies in the world surpassed 50% in the mid-1990s as a result of the “third wave” of democratization that began in the 1970s. After reaching a peak of 62% in 2006, this figure has declined for 15 consecutive years. It has now fallen below 50%. This trend is reminiscent of the 1930s and 40s. Back then, the United States and the United Kingdom defended democracy from fascism and communism in World War II and the Cold War. During the past decade, however, even these two countries have experienced a crisis of democracy.

As noted above in Fukuyama’s assessment, there are signs that the global decline in democracy has indeed bottomed out. Putin is mired in a crisis, and Xi is also facing an uphill battle. Because the two leading authoritarian powers are facing difficulties, the political landscape has become more favorable for democracies. At the outset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many anticipated that Putin would win an easy victory. However, the war has become a global proxy war between democracies and authoritarian powers. Russia’s military is floundering, and some analysts even argue that this war could lead to Putin’s downfall. Xi has consolidated power to secure a third term as president, but public discontent is building over COVID-19 policies and economic stagnation. Researchers at Cambridge University have reported that, in general, the power of authoritarian leaders has weakened over the course of the pandemic.

Most of the political leaders highlighted in Gideon Rachman’s The Age of the Strongman—Donald Trump, Boris Johnson, Rodrigo Duterte, and Jair Bolsonaro—have exited center stage in their respective countries. Erdoğan’s leadership in Turkey has also taken a hit due to the recent earthquake. In his book, Rachman warns that the emergence of strongmen since the 2000s posed a threat to democracy across the world. It is thus an encouraging sign that their political influence appears to be largely waning. One of the reasons why pro-Trump forces failed to gain ground in last November’s midterms is that American voters chose to defend and restore democracy.¹¹

Even so, it is unclear whether we are in the midst of a “fourth wave” of democratization. Illiberalism and populism continue to cast a shadow in many parts of the world. The underlying socioeconomic conditions that gave rise to illiberalism and populism have not improved, with inflation and income inequality creating serious difficulties. Moreover, political polarization shows no sign of improvement. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s democracy index, the global average barely changed from 2021 (5.28) to 2022 (5.29).¹² In the United States, while Trump’s political clout has shrunk, he is still a major contender for the 2024 presidential race. Trumpism is alive and well. Many pro-Trump politicians who claim that the 2020 election was stolen have been elected to Congress.

Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt observe in How Democracies Die that democratic decline in the 21st century has often occurred as a result of elected leaders gradually dismantling democratic institutions. Military dictators or communist revolutionaries forcibly toppled democracies in the past, but democracies are now under attack from politicians who entered office through free and fair elections. Since the democratic recession is a global phenomenon, a democratic recovery will also require international cooperation.

How Korea’s Democracy Can Recover

Korea is not immune to global trends. While these trends will determine the prevailing winds, there are steps that Korea can take on its own. To set itself on the path to a robust recovery, Korea’s democracy must undergo major surgery in multiple areas. It is necessary to reform institutions and establish a different political culture. There must be a new style of political leadership, and there must be a concerted effort to address underlying socioeconomic conditions.

Institutional reform can wait no longer. There is broad agreement that the institutions created by the 1987 constitution, referred to as the “1987 regime,” have outlived their historical purpose. Political calculations, however, continue to stymie efforts to overhaul these institutions. The 1987 constitution created an extremely powerful presidency with a one-term limit, giving rise to a host of negative repercussions. All but 47 of the 300 seats in the National Assembly are filled through winner-take-all elections in single-member districts. Constitutional reform is required to address the former, and electoral reform is needed to fix the latter.¹³ Anonymous voting should be eliminated to protect the autonomy of each legislator, while also holding them accountable for their decisions. Although the details must be negotiated between the ruling and opposition parties, the overall objective should be to facilitate compromise and alleviate political polarization.

Korea’s political culture also needs to change. Politicians must learn to tolerate different opinions, and political parties should openly communicate with one another to find solutions. Demonizing the other side is unacceptable. It is only natural for there to be a wide variety of opinions in a pluralistic, democratic society. Those who hold different views should be able to respectfully engage in dialogue with one another, as long as these views align with the fundamental values outlined in Korea’s constitution. Divisive identity politics and insular political fandoms have no place in a healthy democracy.

Political parties must also change their internal culture. During the recent race to elect its new leader, the PPP was overtaken by a controversy about who truly qualified as a “pro-Yoon” politician. This show of allegiance is more reminiscent of an authoritarian regime than a democracy. There are also problems on the other side of the aisle. In late February, the National Assembly narrowly rejected a motion to allow the arrest of Lee Jae-Myung over corruption charges.¹⁴ Because the votes were cast anonymously, some DPK supporters vowed to hunt down “traitors” who did not vote against the motion. Once again, such actions have no place in a healthy democracy.

Moreover, it is impossible to reduce political polarization without addressing the underlying socioeconomic factors. It is vital to work toward economic recovery and to rebuild a robust middle class. The pandemic, Sino-U.S. tensions, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have brought about inflation and economic turmoil. This has worsened economic inequality, thereby fueling the fire of political polarization. Political reforms alone will not solve the problem. In this vein, the Yoon administration should address labor unions from the perspective of labor policy, not as an ideological issue.

Above all, it is necessary to establish a style of political leadership befitting of a liberal democracy. Authoritarian leadership is built on charisma, patriarchal authority, a strict vertical hierarchy, unity of purpose, and efficiency. In contrast, leadership in a liberal democracy consists of open communication, horizontal relationships, respect for diversity, and forbearance. Korea’s democracy will move one step forward when it moves beyond strongmen to embrace a style of leadership that shows respect for democratic norms and values.

Joseph Nye was an early advocate of the importance of soft power in international politics. “Soft power” refers to the ability to persuade through attraction instead of force or coercion. In The Powers to Lead, Nye argues that successful leaders require two “hard power” skills and three soft power skills. The former refers to managerial skills and political acumen, while the latter includes communication, vision, and emotional intelligence.

By this standard, President Yoon took positive steps in terms of his leadership style upon entering office. He put forth a clear and timely vision that stressed fairness, common sense, and the restoration of liberal democratic values. By moving the presidential office to Yongsan and directly engaging with reporters every morning, he showed a desire to improve communication and respond to public sentiment. Mistakes were made, but he was initially headed in the right direction. Credit should be given where it is due.

Freedom, Fairness, and Common Sense

Since then, however, Yoon appears to have returned to a strongman style of leadership. There are fewer efforts to communicate with the opposition and empathize with public sentiment. Instead of relying on political acumen, his administration is wielding the law as a political tool. It bears repeating that the rule of law is not sufficient to guarantee a liberal democracy. We witnessed all too clearly how the Moon administration eroded Korea’s democracy while ostensibly appealing to the rule of law. A liberal democracy ultimately rests on respect for democratic norms and values. It cannot be sustained without a vigilant effort to safeguard these norms and values. To protect freedom, which President Yoon repeatedly mentioned in his inaugural address, it is crucial to tolerate the other side and demonstrate forbearance. Prosecutorial authority must be exercised with great caution, and his administration must show patience in persuading the opposition and the people.

The failures of the Moon administration stemmed from its heavy reliance on a tight-knit network of former pro-democracy activists. It did not keep its eyes and ears open to public sentiment. There were no checks and balances to detect and correct mistakes. Similarly, there are now serious concerns that the Yoon administration could follow the same path by exclusively relying on a super-network of prosecutors. Consider, for example, the failure to appropriately vet Chung Sun-Sin, a former prosecutor, before he was appointed as the head of the National Office of Investigation in February. Chung, who previously worked under Yoon at the Prosecutor’s Office, resigned after reports emerged that his son had bullied a high school roommate. When he resigned from his role as prosecutor general to enter politics, Yoon vowed to restore fairness and common sense in the face of injustice. He should remain true to that vow. The Korean people elected him to the highest office in the land, and he has a responsibility to uphold democratic norms and values.

International cooperation is also vital on the path to a global democratic recovery. Recall how the free world, led by the United States and the United Kingdom, joined forces in the struggle against Nazism and communism. Recognizing the importance of multilateral cooperation, the Biden administration has organized the Summit for Democracy. The second summit, held in late March, was co-hosted in Korea, Costa Rica, the Netherlands, the United States, and Zambia. In effect, Korea represented Asia. At this summit, it was announced that Korea would host the third summit.¹⁵ These events are opportunities for the Yoon administration to present a detailed strategy for how Korea can play a leading role in the resurgence of democracy across the world.

One possibility would be to create and support an international forum to discuss relevant issues. In the United States, the National Endowment for Democracy, funded primarily by Congress, supports a wide range of activities across the world to promote democracy. Shorenstein APARC is currently in discussions with the Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies to host an annual dialogue, called the “Sustainable Democracy Roundtable,” for Korean and American experts and practitioners to explore the topic of democratic recovery. This dialogue will also involve young scholars and students, with the aim of nurturing future democratic leaders. Through convening similar international forums, Korea could play a leading role in promoting international solidarity among liberal democracies by fostering connections between private citizens as well as governments. 

Next Korea: Beyond a Zero-Sum Society

As I thought about how to conclude this series of essays, I was reminded of The Zero-Sum Society (1980) by Lester Thurow, which I read during my time in graduate school. In a zero-sum society, one person’s gain is another’s loss. The overall sum of gains and losses adds up to zero. Thurow used this concept to explain why it was difficult for American society to address environmental and energy issues in the 1970s as it faced economic stagnation. The clashing interests of different groups in society impeded problem-solving.

The most serious problem of a zero-sum society is that any kind of reform or change will meet heavy resistance. Close-knit interest groups will fiercely protect their own interests. This helps explain why social conflict is intensifying in Korea today, and why it is so difficult to bring about change. Political leadership is needed to transform a zero-sum society into a positive-sum society, in which the sum of gains and losses is greater than zero.

Consider the two predominant forces in Korean politics: those who achieved economic development through industrialization, and those who fought for democratization. These two groups must cease their zero-sum struggle. They must resist the temptation to demonize each other as “descendants of dictators” or a “pro-North Korean fifth column” respectively. It is time to honestly reflect upon each side’s successes and shortcomings, so that they can work together toward a positive-sum future for Korea. There is no time to lose. Inter-Korean relations are in dire straits, and Sino-U.S. tensions are intensifying by the day. Korea’s aging society presents formidable obstacles to economic growth. As the late Professor Park Se-Il of Seoul National University argued, Korea must move beyond industrialization and democratization to become a global leader.

Over the past year, I explored “Next Korea”—Korea’s vision for the future—and sought to outline a roadmap for how it might be achieved. This series of essays, which addressed politics, economics, society, culture, and foreign policy, was intended to convey my thoughts and reflections on how Korea could advance to the next stage of its development. I felt that having an outside perspective allowed me to see the “forest” of Korea’s path toward the future, even if I cannot see the trees in great detail.

By any measure, Korea has made remarkable achievements in a short period of time. It has overcome war, division, and authoritarian rule to become a country with the 10th largest economy in the world in only seven decades. Its soft power is sweeping across the globe, and Korea has world-class talent in every field. This is truly a miracle, and Koreans have every reason to be proud. The challenge now is to take the next step. Korea stands at a critical crossroads. Will it settle for the status quo, or could it leap into the top five?

Steve Jobs closed his famous 2005 commencement address at Stanford with two words: “Stay hungry.” This was at once a call to action for the ambitious Stanford graduates in the audience and a reminder to himself to keep moving forward. Korea must also “stay hungry” if it is to move higher and leap toward the future. I will be watching with great hope and anticipation to see how Korea will flourish in the years to come.

¹ Kim Namseok, “A Resurgence of Democracy? A Conversation with Francis Fukuyama on the Challenges of a Changing Global Order,” Freeman Spogli Institute, January 12, 2023.↩

² Namseok, “Resurgence of Democracy?”↩

³ Gi-Wook Shin, “Korean Democracy is Sinking under the Guise of the Rule of Law,” Shorenstein APARC, April 1, 2020.↩

⁴ Shin, “Korean Democracy is Sinking.”↩

⁵ For more details about the book, see “South Korea’s Democracy in Crisis,” Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.↩

⁶ “Inaugural Address by President Yoon Suk Yeol,” Korea.net, May 10, 2022. ↩

⁷ Ministry of Government Legislation, “Constitution of the Republic of Korea.”↩

⁸ Shin, “Korean Democracy is Sinking.”↩

⁹ For a more detailed discussion of these political groups, see Gi-Wook Shin, “In Troubled Waters: South Korea’s Democracy in Crisis,” Shorenstein APARC, May 3, 2022.

↩

¹⁰ Shin, “In Troubled Waters: South Korea’s Democracy in Crisis.”↩

¹¹ For example, see Josh Boak and Hannah Fingerhut, “VoteCast: Inflation Top Concern, but Democracy a Worry Too,” Associated Press, November 8, 2022, and Zack Beauchamp, “The Midterms Showed American Democracy Won’t Go Down Without a Fight,” Vox, November 9, 2022.↩

¹² Economist Intelligence Unit, “Democracy Index 2022,” accessed April 17, 2023.↩

¹³ One proposed solution is to create multi-member districts. It will also be necessary to prohibit “satellite” parties that defeat the purpose of the mixed-member proportional system that was created during the Moon administration. For a more detailed discussion, see Shin, “Korean Democracy is Sinking.”↩

¹⁴ Sitting National Assembly members cannot be arrested without a consenting vote of the National Assembly.↩

¹⁵ “South Korea to Host Third ‘Summit for Democracy’ – Joint Statement,” Reuters, March 29, 2023.↩

This essay originally appeared in Korean on March 4 in Sindonga (New East Asia), Korea’s oldest monthly magazine (established 1931), as part of a monthly column, "Shin’s Reflections on Korea." Translated by Raymond Ha. A PDF version of this essay is also available to download. 

This winter, Koreans struggled with the bitter cold amidst a surge in heating costs. It has already been said many times, but climate change and the energy crisis are no longer abstract issues to be dealt with in the future. Northern California, where I live, was drenched and battered by intense storms this winter. The Midwest and the East Coast experienced brutal cold waves and heavy snow. Mount Washington in New Hampshire, close to the Canadian border, “recorded the coldest wind chill in the history of the United States” in early February at -108.4ºF.¹ Europe was spared the worst due to an unusually warm winter, but the energy crisis sparked by the Russia-Ukraine War still poses a vexing challenge.

As the world emerges from the worst of the COVID-19 pandemic, it faces a series of interrelated challenges—climate change, wars, the energy crisis, inflation, Sino-U.S. tensions, a crisis of democracy, and a crisis of political leadership. Each one of these problems is formidable on its own, but they are inextricably bound together like a Gordian knot. It is hard to know where to begin. Untangling this knot will require not only cooperation between Washington and Beijing, but also broader multilateral coordination. Simply severing the knot is not a feasible solution. Reflecting this complex state of affairs, the theme of this year’s World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland was “Cooperation in a Fragmented World.”

Korea cannot afford to remain a bystander to climate change. Energy security is a critical issue for Seoul, as Korea is highly dependent on energy imports. Climate change and energy security are also at the heart of the United Nations’ emphasis on sustainability, and addressing them will require international cooperation based on coherent, consistent policies at the national level. It is encouraging to note that the Yoon Suk-Yeol administration has proclaimed carbon neutrality as a policy goal while also emphasizing Korea’s energy security. These issues transcend ideological divides and party lines. They are a matter of national survival. The Yoon administration has put forth a vision of values-based diplomacy based on partnerships with liberal democracies, but it must also be more proactive in facilitating international cooperation on climate change and energy issues. There is no time to lose, and Korea’s international stature demands that it play a greater role.

When It Rains on Greenland’s Glaciers

During a recent visit to a winery in Napa Valley, I asked the owner for his thoughts about the most serious threat or challenge that the winery would face in the next 20 to 30 years. I assumed he would mention fire, given the devastating fires the region has experienced in the past few years. Without any hesitation, however, he said it was climate change. Even a one-degree Celsius increase in the temperature would necessitate a substantial change in the variety of grapes he could grow. If current trends persist, he added, Oregon or Washington will become the center of wine production on the West Coast.

There are similar changes occurring in Europe. Grape-harvesting regions are gradually moving north, with one study concluding that the United Kingdom could have the best climate for grape production in 20 years.² The UK currently has lower average temperatures and shorter summers than France or southern Europe, but this could change by 2040. According to Debbie Inglis, the director of the Cool Climate Oenology and Viticulture Institute in Canada, “a 2ºC global increase in temperature could remove 55% of wine growing regions worldwide and 4ºC could remove over 70% of these regions from production.”³

Coffee—beloved by many Koreans—will also be affected by climate change. A recent study by researchers at the University of Zürich reported that the regions suitable for coffee production “could be cut in half by 2050.”⁴ A study published by the National Academy of Sciences concluded that an increase in surface-level temperatures of 2ºC or greater could reduce coffee production in Latin America by up to 88%.⁵ In addition, the International Coffee Organization found that 70% of the land suitable for coffee production in Southeast Asia will disappear by 2050. Coffee beans, the most commonly traded item after oil, are presently cultivated in over 60 countries. If coffee production falls as a result of climate change, we may soon witness coffee rationing and even international disputes over coffee.

Climate change will disrupt every aspect of our daily lives, and the pace and intensity of this disruption only continues to grow. Fort Smith in Canada is located north of the 60th parallel and usually remains cool during the summer, but it reached nearly 104ºF in 2021, breaking an 80-year record.⁶ The Summit Station, located at the highest point of Greenland’s glaciers, saw rain for the first time in recorded history in August 2021.⁷ There were 97 tropical storms last year, including typhoons and hurricanes. Headlines about record flooding, unprecedented droughts, and extreme heatwaves are becoming a regular occurrence.

An annual global climate report published by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) last year noted that atmospheric carbon dioxide levels in 2021 had reached the highest level “in at least the last million years.” Global surface temperatures were 0.21–0.28ºC higher than the 1991–2020 average, making 2021 one of the six warmest years since observation began in the 19th century. Moreover, 2015 to 2021 marked “the seven warmest years on record.”⁸ The latest research, utilizing artificial intelligence, concludes that temperatures will rise 1.5ºC above pre-industrial levels within the next 10 years even if action is taken to reduce emissions.⁹

In 2021, NOAA Administrator Rick Spinrad said at COP26 in Glasgow that the climate crisis “is not a challenge for future generations, but one we must confront today.”¹⁰ A few months later, he warned that “if we hope to have a prosperous society and economy tomorrow, it must begin with climate action and adaptation plans made today.”¹¹ In his opening remarks to COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh last November, UN Secretary-General António Guterres did not hold back. “We are on a highway to climate hell with our foot still on the accelerator,” he said, observing that “the deadly impacts of climate change are here and now.”¹²

A Global Energy Crisis

The energy problem is closely tied to climate change. Around 3 billion people, or 40% of the global population, still rely on wood, coal, charcoal, and animal waste for their energy needs. These materials are some of the main culprits of climate change, as they are responsible for approximately 60% of global greenhouse gas emissions. When the United Nations announced 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs) in 2015, the question of energy was discussed extensively. For instance, goal 7, “Affordable and clean energy,” notes that increasing the use of renewable energy and reducing greenhouse gas emissions will help address climate change and foster inclusive and sustainable communities.

Despite such efforts, realizing this goal remains a distant prospect. International cooperation on clean and renewable energy is vital, but the Ukraine-Russia War has demonstrated how energy supplies can be weaponized for political purposes. This has exacerbated the energy crisis across the world. According to data from the European Commission, for instance, “in 2019 Europe relied on Russia for 41.1 percent of its gas imports, 46.7 percent of its solid fuels imports, and 26.9 percent of its crude oil imports.”¹³

In an October 2022 interview, Fatih Birol, the executive director of the International Energy Agency (IEA), noted that “in the 1970s, we had an oil crisis, but it was only oil. Now we have oil, natural gas, coal, [and] electricity.”¹⁴ The IEA was founded in 1974 by major energy consumers, including the United States, in response to price manipulation by oil producers in the Middle East. Its chief is now sounding the alarm about a wide-ranging energy crisis more serious than that of the 1970s.

Green Growth: The Lee Administration’s Lost Legacy

Korea experienced significant difficulties during the 1970s oil shock, even resorting to oil rationing. To this day, Korea’s economy suffers from a major vulnerability—it is completely dependent on oil and natural gas imports for its energy needs. Those in Korea should heed Birol’s warning. This summer, Koreans may have to deal with intense heat waves and a surge in electricity prices. If a conflict were to break out in East Asia, it could block the commercial sea lanes that are the lifeline of Korea’s economy. In such a scenario, Korea would be much more vulnerable than the EU is today following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It is vital to think ahead about how Korea can meet its energy requirements even if there is a geopolitical crisis in the region.

The Lee Myung-Bak administration (2008–13) was perhaps the first government to pay serious attention to climate change and the importance of the energy issue. Every administration has its successes and failures, but the Lee administration has not received due credit for its “green growth” agenda and its “resource diplomacy.” Worthy policy initiatives can run into errors as they are implemented, and such mistakes should be rectified. It is a great shame that the Lee administration’s policy vision on climate change and energy issues was not upheld by its successors. The Moon Jae-in administration even regarded resource diplomacy as a political target during its campaign to eradicate “deep-rooted evils.”¹⁵ In a welcome development, the current Yoon administration seems to be receptive to restoring the green growth agenda and resource diplomacy. That said, the question remains whether Korea could have done more on these issues in the past 10 years.

Green growth was at the heart of the Lee administration’s climate change policy. This is a concept that links and encompasses two issues: the green transition and economic growth. If a country seeks to achieve economic growth in a more environmentally friendly manner, this will give rise to new industries and technologies that are related to the environment and to the energy sector. To create jobs and find new sources of economic growth, the Lee administration sought to identify new industries and technologies with great economic potential and fuse them with existing industries. The Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth was enacted in January 2010 as part of this effort.¹⁶ This law, commonly referred to as the “Green Growth Act,” was the first Korean law to address climate change. It provided the legal basis for setting emission reduction targets, and it catalyzed the Korean government’s response to climate change.

Furthermore, the Lee administration spurred international cooperation on these issues. For example, the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) was formed as a non-profit organization in Korea in June 2010. GGGI was then officially recognized as an international organization two years later, at the UN Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro. This institute, which has its headquarters in Seoul, is the first international organization that was created under Korea’s leadership. At COP21 in 2015, GGGI announced “the launch of the Inclusive Green Growth Partnership, a new collaboration with top multilateral development banks and United Nations regional economic and social commissions.”¹⁷ This partnership aimed to achieve “shared prosperity and equitable growth that creates employment and raises the income of the world’s poorest,” and “assist multilateral development banks and funds in identifying green growth opportunities and investments.”¹⁸ Major development banks, including the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the African Development Bank, participated in this initiative.

Korea as a Resource-Poor Country

The Lee administration also expended great time and effort toward resource diplomacy. Korea is a resource-poor country, and its dependence on resource imports is the highest among OECD countries. Although it is a manufacturing powerhouse, Korea’s economy takes a hit whenever there is a spike in commodity prices. This is why the Lee administration—and its predecessors—sought to secure foreign resources. The Kim Dae-Jung administration (1998–2003) established a basic plan for developing overseas resources, and the Roh Moo-Hyun administration (2003–08) sought to grow Korea’s stake in mines in Mongolia and across Africa.¹⁹ However, the Lee administration was by far the most proactive on these issues. It worked through public sector companies to invest in and develop resources overseas. Recall, for example, that China has waged an aggressive campaign of its own to secure resources in Africa and Southern America.

Korea’s resource diplomacy fell behind in the 10 years following the Lee administration. According to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE), there were 219 projects related to developing overseas mines in 2012. This number shrank to 94 in 2021.²⁰ In many cases, the government’s stake in overseas mines was sold at a giveaway price. As mentioned above, these projects became the target of a political campaign under the Moon administration. By its very nature, resource diplomacy is a high-risk endeavor that seeks to achieve long-term strategic goals. As a resource-poor country, Korea has no choice but to assume this risk.

To date, only the negative elements of the Lee administration’s resource diplomacy have been highlighted by the press. However, there have been major successes. The Prelude floating liquefied natural gas (LNG) platform off the Australian coast is a good example. In 2012, the Korea Gas Corporation acquired a 10% stake in this project with an investment of $1.5 billion. It began production in 2019 and was in the red until 2020, but it began to turn a profit in 2021. LNG prices have skyrocketed due to Russia’s weaponization of fossil fuels, and Korea stands to benefit greatly from this investment.²¹

Resource nationalism is emerging once again around the globe. Korea must remember its position as a resource-poor country. Although investment in overseas resources should be spearheaded by the private sector, the government should do what it can to support these initiatives with an eye toward achieving energy security. It is vital to maintain a long-term perspective, assuming appropriate risks when necessary. Once again, this is not a political nor an ideological issue.

Why Nuclear Energy Matters

“Sustainable development” and “ESG” (Environmental, Social, and Governance) are now widely known among the general public. The 70th Session of the UN General Assembly in 2015 adopted a resolution to achieve the SDGs by 2030. The SDGs articulate common goals for humanity as it seeks to achieve sustainable development for all. Under the slogan of “leave no one behind” and its five overarching themes of people, planet, prosperity, peace, and partnerships, the SDGs put forth 17 goals and 169 specific targets.²² Although the SDGs address broad issues, including poverty, food security, education, gender equality, socioeconomic inequality, and housing, they also propose specific goals for addressing these issues.

While stressing the need for highly developed countries, developing countries, and low-income countries to promote prosperity for all, the SDGs also call upon countries to protect the environment. To strengthen international cooperation on climate change, UN member states adopted the Paris Agreement at COP21 in December 2015. This agreement went into effect in November 2016. Under this accord, countries agreed to “substantially reduce global greenhouse gas emissions to limit the global temperature increase in this century to 2 degrees Celsius.”²³ The Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the agreement represented a setback. However, by April 2018, 175 countries had signed the agreement and ten developing countries had submitted their national adaptation plans for responding to climate change. COP27, held at Sharm El-Sheikh in 2022, added the question of “loss and damage” to its official agenda. There was also an agreement to “establish new funding arrangements, as well as a dedicated fund, to assist developing countries in responding to” damages resulting from climate disasters.²⁴

Korea has been taking steps to align itself with these international developments. Though it was already far too late, Korea announced in October 2020 that it would achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. On September 24, 2021, it enacted the Framework Act on Carbon Neutrality and Green Growth for Coping with Climate Crisis.²⁵ This act codified the goal of carbon neutrality by 2050 into law. Furthermore, it established the legal procedures for setting forth a national strategy, specifying medium- to long-term emission reduction targets, and formulating and monitoring the implementation of basic plans on addressing climate change. Specifically, the law codifies Korea’s nationally determined contribution (NDC) for greenhouse gas emission reduction as 35 percent relative to 2018 levels. This law went into effect on March 25, 2022, making Korea the 14th country to codify the goal of carbon neutrality by 2050 and establish a legal framework for relevant policy implementation. It took Korea 12 years to enact an enhanced version of the Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth, which went into effect in April 2010.

There is an important consideration on Korea’s journey toward carbon neutrality: nuclear energy. Although Korea should eventually phase out its nuclear power plants, carbon neutrality is virtually impossible without reliance on nuclear energy. Due to geographic factors, Korea cannot generate enough energy from renewable energy sources. Instead of phasing out nuclear power, Korea has to substantially increase its use of nuclear energy if it hopes to attain carbon neutrality.

Nonetheless, the Moon Jae-In administration abruptly pursued a nuclear phase-out policy for most of its term. It halted construction on nuclear power plants and prematurely shut down an operational power plant that had passed safety inspections. At the same time, it provided substantial subsidies for solar power installations. Shortly before leaving office, however, Moon stated on February 25, 2022, that Korea must “sufficiently utilize nuclear power plants as a major source of energy for the next 60 years.” He also urged relevant agencies to “take all necessary steps to hasten the operation” of four nuclear power plants whose construction had been delayed.²⁶ In the end, Korea lost precious time due to incoherent and ill-advised policies.

The Yoon administration is right to proclaim carbon neutrality as a policy objective and emphasize the importance of energy security. It appears that the Russia-Ukraine War and global supply chain disruptions have influenced the administration’s thinking. At a June 2022 public hearing on the new administration’s energy policies, Director-General Cheon Yeong-Gil, the MOTIE official responsible for energy transition policy, stated that “it is becoming increasingly important to pursue both carbon neutrality and energy security, as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is becoming protracted.”²⁷ The United States, the United Kingdom, and other advanced economies are reconsidering the specifics of their energy policy, while maintaining the overarching goal of carbon neutrality. Korea must formulate a comprehensive policy that accounts for environmental concerns and energy security.

Fostering Scholarship and Leadership

Climate change and the energy crisis cannot and should not be addressed by governments alone. Academia and the private sector have important roles to play in convening groups of experts, calling upon citizens to act, and fostering international cooperation. Universities in the United States, Japan, and China are beginning to establish institutions that address climate change and energy issues. Prominent examples include Stanford’s Doerr School of Sustainability, which opened its doors last September; Tokyo University’s Center for Climate Solutions; and Tsinghua University’s Institute for Sustainable Development Goals. Several Korean universities, including Ewha Womans University and KAIST, have also taken steps in this direction. The government and the private sector should do everything they can to support these initiatives. Such institutions will prepare today’s youth to respond to the challenges posed by climate change and the energy crisis.

Korea’s companies must take a farsighted view in supporting institutions that discuss and address issues of global importance. Think tanks such as the Asan Institute for Policy Studies and the Chey Institute, both established with private support, are playing an active role in policy discussions. However, their budgets are relatively small, and they do not comprehensively engage with fundamental issues of global importance. It is hard to find Korean equivalents of the Gates Foundation or the Zuckerberg Initiative, in which a company’s founder donates a large part of their wealth toward addressing global issues—poverty, public health, education, climate change, and energy. While Samsung operates Samsung Global Research, it must do more to support research on long-term global issues in a way befitting of its status as a global company.

Moreover, Korea has Ban Ki-Moon, who oversaw the establishment of the SDGs during his tenure as UN secretary-general. He continues to actively engage with a variety of global issues abroad, but his experience and expertise are underappreciated at home. Korea can do more to play a leadership role on international issues, and climate change and energy issues present a valuable opportunity. Ban could play a meaningful role in advising, facilitating, or overseeing such efforts.

Last October, the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center partnered with the Ban Ki-Moon Foundation to launch the Trans-Pacific Sustainability Dialogue. This forum seeks to convene scientists, experts, and policy practitioners from across the Asia-Pacific for an annual discussion to identify avenues for cooperation and foster a new generation of leaders. The inaugural dialogue addressed climate change, and this year’s dialogue will be held in Seoul on the topic of energy security. It is my hope that Korea will host many such international conferences in the years to come, as a way for Korea to exercise leadership on the international stage.

Just Look Up!

A comet several miles wide is hurtling toward Earth. If nothing is done, humanity will go extinct. However, most people question or deny the existence of this comet. As the comet finally becomes visible in the sky, some begin to cry “just look up!” Anyone can look up and see the truth for themselves. Even so, others refuse to recognize this reality. They claim that this object is not a comet, and they shout “don’t look up” instead. This is the plot of the movie "Don’t Look Up," released in 2021.

The Earth will be destroyed in less than six months, but the wealthy collude with the powerful to profit from the impending extinction of humanity. They claim that the comet is full of valuable raw materials. Later on, they detonate the moon in an unsuccessful attempt to block the comet. As a means of last resort, they escape Earth to reach a faraway planet, where they die at the hands of the alien population. The vast majority of people on Earth have no choice but to hold each other’s hands and pray as they await their fate.

It cannot be emphasized enough: climate change and the energy crisis are beginning to disrupt our everyday lives in tangible ways. The truth is in front of our eyes, but we should question if we are telling ourselves to not look up. In addition, the movie reminds us of the dire consequences when politicians and the wealthy collude to pursue their narrow self-interest. There is not much time left to confront and respond to the crises that are unfolding in plain sight. Perhaps no one can undo the Gordian knot overnight, but we should—at the very least—just look up.

¹ Amanda Pitts and Michael Bartiromo, “Mt. Washington Records Coldest Wind Chill in US History,” The Hill, February 6, 2023. ↩

² Alistair Nesbitt et al., “Climate Change Projections for UK Viticulture to 2040: A Focus on Improving Suitability for Pinot Noir,” OENO One 56, no. 3 (2022). ↩

³ Clarissa Wei, “The Arctic Circle: A New Frontier for Sustainable Wine,” BBC Travel, September 1, 2022. ↩

⁴ Roman Grüter, Tim Trachsel, Patrick Laube, and Isabel Jaisli, “Expected Global Suitability of Coffee, Cashew and Avocado Due to Climate Change,” PLOS ONE, January 26, 2022. ↩

⁵ Justin Worland, “Your Morning Cup of Coffee Is in Danger. Can the Industry Adapt in Time?,” TIME, June 21, 2018. ↩

⁶ Walter Strong, “Fort Smith Had Its Hottest Day in 80 Years: Preliminary Data,” CBC News, June 30, 2021.↩

⁷ Kasha Patel, “Rain Falls at the Summit of Greenland Ice Sheet for First Time on Record,” Washington Post, August 19, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2021/08/19/greenland-melt-august….↩

⁸ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “BAMS Report: Record-High Greenhouse Gases, Sea Levels in 2021,” August 31, 2022. ↩

⁹ Josie Garthwaite, “Earth Likely to Cross Critical Climate Thresholds Even if Emissions Decline, Stanford Study Finds,” Stanford University, January 30, 2023. ↩

¹⁰ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “Dr. Rick Spinrad on COP26: Climate Crisis Not a Challenge for Future, but ‘One We Must Confront Today’,” November 1, 2021. ↩

¹¹ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “Statement from NOAA Administrator Dr. Rick Spinrad on the IPCC Climate Change 2022 Impacts Report,” February 28, 2022. ↩

¹² United Nations, “Secretary-General’s Remarks to High-Level Opening of COP27,” November 7, 2022. ↩

¹³ Giulia Carbonaro, “EU has Paid Russia $16 Billion for Fossil Fuels Since Ukraine War Started,” Newsweek, March 18, 2022. ↩

¹⁴ Sandor Zsiros and Jorge Liboreiro, “‘Russia Will Lose the Energy Battle,’ Says IEA Chief Fatih Birol,” Euronews, October 29, 2022. ↩

¹⁵ Gi-Wook Shin, “In Troubled Waters: South Korea’s Democracy in Crisis,” Shorenstein APARC, May 3, 2022. ↩

¹⁶ An English translation of the law by the Korea Legislation Research Institute is available at “Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth,” Korea Law Translation Center. ↩

¹⁷ Global Green Growth Institute, “New Global Initiative Launches at COP21 to Boost Green Growth Financing,” December 7, 2015. ↩

¹⁸ Global Green Growth Institute, “New Global Initiative Launches.” ↩

¹⁹ Kim Boo-Mi, “As the Global Resource Wars Resume, Will Korea Resume Resource Diplomacy?” [in Korean], Elec Times, February 19, 2022. ↩

²⁰ Jeong Ui-Jin, “The Government is Selling Overseas Mines” [in Korean], Korea Economic Daily, January 17, 2022. ↩

²¹ Jeon Joon-Beom, “The Lee Administration’s Investment Pays Off Amidst LNG Crisis” [in Korean], Chosun BIZ, August 24, 2022. ↩

²² A detailed overview of the SDGs can be found at “The 17 Goals,” United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs, Sustainable Development. ↩

²³ United Nations, “The Paris Agreement.” ↩

²⁴ United Nations Climate Change, “COP27 Reaches Breakthrough Agreement on New ‘Loss and Damage’ Fund for Vulnerable Countries,” November 20, 2022. ↩

²⁵ For an English translation of the law by the Korea Legislation Research Institute, see “Framework Act on Carbon Neutrality and Green Growth for Coping With Climate Crisis,” Korea Law Translation Center. ↩

²⁶ Im Hyung-Seop, “President Moon Convenes Meeting on Energy Supply” [in Korean], Yonhap News, February 25, 2022.↩

²⁷ Jeong Sang-Pil, “New Administration’s Energy Policy to Focus on Security and Carbon Neutrality” [in Korean], Energy Platform News, June 21, 2022. ↩

On April 26, 2023, in recognition of the 70th anniversary of the U.S.-Korea alliance, President Joe Biden will host President Yoon Suk Yeol for a State Visit to the United States. According to Ambassador Jung-Seung Shin, the fact that Yoon received the second such invitation of the Biden administration is a testimony to the centrality of the Korea-U.S. alliance to the peace and stability of the East Asian regions, especially at a time when the frayed U.S.-China relationship continues to degrade into a new Cold War, with a potential Taiwan contingency looming on the horizon. 

Shin, former South Korea's ambassador to China and former director general of the Asia Pacific Affairs Bureau at the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, is the Winter 2023 Payne Distinguished Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and a visiting scholar at APARC. He headlined this quarter’s Payne Lecture, speaking to an audience that gathered on March 1 for a timely discussion titled Sino-U.S. Relations and South Korea, co-hosted by APARC and FSI.

The Payne Lectureship at FSI, named for Frank E. Payne and Arthur W. Payne, aims to raise public understanding of the complex policy issues facing the global community and advance international cooperation. The lectureship brings to Stanford internationally esteemed leaders from academia and the policy world who combine visionary thinking and a broad, practical grasp of their fields with the capacity to provide insights into pressing challenges of global concern. Throughout the 2022-23 academic year, the Payne Lectureship hosts experts from Asia who examine crucial questions in U.S.-China relations.

Ambassador Shin is uniquely qualified to offer insight into South Korea's response to the pressures created by the U.S.-China rivalry, said APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin, who chaired the event that included a discussion with Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro, an expert on Chinese military and Asia security.

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China’s Dreams

Painting a picture of Chinese ambitions, Ambassador Shin enumerated China’s goals and the steps it has taken to achieve them. “The Chinese dream,” he said, “is to regain the colonial behavior of the Qing Dynasty, when China was a great power with about one-third of the global GDP.” To achieve this dream, China's leaders have pushed for its continued economic development while arousing patriotism and nationalism domestically. Through its military modernization campaign, China has rapidly shown its ambition to become the top-rated global military power by 2049, the centennial of the establishment of the People's Republic of China, he noted.

Ambassador Shin indicated that China has prepared for a long-term competition with the U.S. in the economic arena, as Xi Jinping introduced the dual circulation economic policy, which aims to reorient the country's economy by prioritizing domestic consumption while remaining open to international trade and investment. This policy, Shin argues, “is designed, in part, to make the [Chinese] economy less affected by external factors including the supply chain reset of the U.S.” As such, China has stressed the importance of innovation and has made massive investments in science and technology to reduce its reliance on Western economies. Moreover, China has promoted the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to expand its political and economic influence.

“China became the second largest economic power and began to show assertiveness in its foreign policy, particularly by emphasizing the safeguarding of Chinese interests, namely, sovereignty and territorial integrity, state security and development interest,” stated Shin. To achieve these goals, “Chinese diplomats have voiced their arguments in an abrasive style, ‘Wolf Warrior diplomacy’ as it is called by Westerners.” This form of proactive engagement with the rest of the world has resulted in an intensifying strategic competition between the U.S. and China, which has made it increasingly difficult for South Korea to maintain simultaneous ties with both great powers.

No Longer on the Fence

Shin noted that “The strategic distrust and intensifying rivalry between the U.S. and China have put substantial pressure on South Korea…and South Korea's long-term policy to make a Korea-U.S. alliance compatible with its partnership with China is becoming more difficult.” In recent years, South Korea has moved even closer to the U.S.

The joint communique issued when President Moon Jae-in visited Washington two years ago, already showed South Korea’s tilt toward the U.S. At the time, heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula by the North Korean nuclear and missile provocation necessitated the alliance. Now, an ascendant China, “together with the lessons of Ukraine, have made South Korean people pay close attention to the importance of the Korea-U.S. alliance,” stated Shin, noting that both nations openly stress the importance of freedom, democracy, and rule-based order. South Korea has become enthusiastic about tripartite cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, in tune with American policies. 

On the other hand, China warned South Korea to respect China's core interests while expressing its concerns on several strategic issues. Shin stated that “China began to demand the Yoon government to continue the three policy positions of the previous government, namely, no more deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), no participation in the American missile defense system, and no military alliance among Korea, Japan, and the U.S.” However, the current Foreign Minister Park Jin made it clear to the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang that the policy positions of the previous government do not bind the new government, Shin indicated.
 

The Taiwan Contingency

Shin indicated the precarious nature of the contingency, stating, “South Korea has no intention of challenging the One China claim. However, the peace and stability of Taiwan Strait are also very important for South Korea, as the security situation of the Taiwan Strait is connected to the Korean peninsula.” Indeed, a military collision in the Taiwan Strait would be impossible to contain locally. “The U.S. and Japan are supposed to immediately help Taiwan to repel China’s military attack, and American bases are located in South Korea and Japan, including Okinawa,” he said.

Therefore, military conflict in the Taiwan Strait is likely to escalate to Northeast Asia, and a certain portion of American forces in South Korea could move to the Taiwan Strait in the contingency according to the strategic flexibility of forces, “which might induce North Korea's misjudgment to invade South Korea,” Shin predicted.
 

Looking to National Identity

The Cost of Deterrence

Preventing Overextension

Overextension represents one of the largest limits on U.S. power projection. According to Mastro, one of the primary reasons that the Biden administration has not been talking about North Korea significantly, is the fact that the U.S. cannot fight a war on the Korean Peninsula and compete effectively with China.

Thus, Mastro proposes that the South Koreans play a greater role in their defense, a topic that comes up with NATO partners and allies in Europe as well. More specifically, Mastro suggests that the U.S. transfer operational command to South Korean forces, and that the South Korean military should allow the U.S. to practice greater strategic flexibility, to use its forces on the Korean Peninsula for operations or contingencies that are off the peninsula. Up until this point, that permission has been denied, but Mastro contends that it would be useful and could enhance deterrence. 

“If the South Koreans, along with their statements about wanting a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, also explicitly allowed for that strategic flexibility to take place to say that they understand that the role of U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula is primarily to deter and defend South Korea against North Korea, that could also play a potential role in wider contingencies,” she said.

Furthermore, Mastro believes that South Korea must play a greater role in the production and provision of certain types of munitions. “This is an area where the U.S. has struggled with its own manufacturing base that is considering licensing production and potentially doing it elsewhere. So the question is whether the U.S. could count on South Korea for some critical supplies during a conflict that could reduce the U.S. logistical burden,” she speculated.

South Korea is a small country, and it has limited resources, but it also has the second-largest reserve force and paramilitary force in the world, and the eighth-largest active duty force in the world. According to Mastro, “The South Korean military is technically 20 times larger than that of Japan's…it has punched above its own weight, like the Australian military has.”

It remains to be seen whether the U.S.-South Korea alliance will need to be tested in the coming years, but tensions with China will likely continue to define the two nation’s foreign policies. A potential Taiwan contingency remains one of the largest looming threats to the status quo and the most probable pathway to regional escalation, which, in Shin’s view, could draw North Korea and its nuclear arsenal into the fold.

The Payne Lectureship will return in the spring quarter, continuing with the theme of Asian perspectives on the U.S.-China relationship. We will be joined by Kokubun Ryosei, professor emeritus at Keio University and adjunct adviser at the Fujitsu Future Studies Center.

Do increases in medical spending improve health outcomes? To answer this question, analysts need to quantify the net value of medical spending and measure the productivity of medical care with the output of improvement in survival and quality of life, thereby deducing for what medical conditions the “bang for the buck” is greatest and for what conditions spending outstrips gains in health improvement.

This condition-specific, quality-adjusted net value approach to health spending is known as a “satellite account for health” because it “orbits around” the national income and product accounts that include aggregate health spending to provide a clearer picture of productivity in the health sector. Thus far, researchers have applied this account to the U.S. health sector only, but it would be highly beneficial for many economies. One notable beneficiary would be South Korea, one of the most rapidly aging societies globally. Now new research by Karen Eggleston, the director of APARC’s Asia Health Policy Program, studies the link between medical spending and health outcomes in South Korea, providing evidence on the productivity of medical spending over recent decades.

The research, published by the East-West Center, develops an estimate of the net value of Korean medical spending, which has outpaced most other countries in recent decades. To generate this estimate, Eggleston compares the gains in life expectancy at birth to the increases in medical spending for 2000–2019. Data comes from Korean lifetables and medical expenditures per capita, available from the Korean Statistical Information Services.

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Eggleston shows that, even with the most conservative assumptions ($50,000 per life-year and only 10 percent of health gains due to medical care), the net value of Korean medical spending is positive and substantial. Korean life expectancy at birth increased from 76 in 2000 to 83.3 in 2019, while lifetime medical spending increased by over $19,000. The value of 7.3 additional years of life far outweighs even this rapid increase in spending, implying substantial productivity growth in Korea’s health sector.

Moreover, evidence on condition-specific spending changes and health improvements suggests that Korea’s rapid spending increases yield significant net value. Eggleston’s research indicates that improvements in survival for key conditions afflicting Koreans, such as stroke and cancer, point to productivity gains. “Korea could be a pioneer in developing a national health account that accurately measures net value by medical condition,” she writes.

Condition-specific metrics of health gain per won spent on treatment can help to guide the allocation of investments to promote longer, healthier lives. In the future, analysts could also link condition-specific improvements in survival and morbidity to earnings. Such linkage would particularly benefit South Korea, where focusing on the productivity of older adult employment is crucial given its high labor force participation and relatively low income of older Koreans.

Eggleston advocates for the Korean government to develop a national satellite account for health that can provide valuable evidence for prioritizing investments to address the country’s most pressing health challenges so that productivity improvement will contribute to longer, healthier lives. “By linking National Health Insurance and health outcome data, Korea could develop an accurate measure of medical productivity and a more accurate measure of overall economic productivity, while pioneering development of ‘health satellite accounts’ for overall populations,” Eggleston argues.

This essay originally appeared in Korean on January 27 in Sindonga (New East Asia), Korea’s oldest monthly magazine (established 1931), as part of a monthly column, "Shin’s Reflections on Korea." Translated by Raymond Ha. A PDF version of this essay is also available to download.

During the Moon Jae-In administration, many of my American friends and colleagues were puzzled and disappointed by a strange contradiction. The former pro-democracy activists—who had fought for democracy and human rights in South Korea—had entered the Blue House, only to turn a blind eye to serious human rights abuses in the North. In particular, the Moon administration punished activists who sent leaflet balloons across the border and forcibly repatriated two North Korean fishermen who had been detained in South Korean waters. It not only cut the budget for providing resettlement assistance to North Korean escapees, but also stopped co-sponsoring United Nations (UN) resolutions that expressed concern about the human rights situation in North Korea. My friends, including individuals who had supported South Korea’s pro-democracy movement decades ago, asked me to explain this perplexing state of affairs. I had no clear answer.

A Gross Overstepping of Authority

On April 15, 2021, the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission held a congressional hearing on “civil and political rights in the Republic of Korea.”[1] The speakers expressed their concern about worrying trends in South Korea’s democracy. In his opening remarks, Rep. Chris Smith, the co-chair of the commission, stated that “the power that had been given [to] the Moon Administration, including a supermajority in the National Assembly, has led to a gross overstepping of authority.” He observed that “in addition to passing laws which restrict freedom of expression, we have seen politicization of prosecutorial powers. . . and the harassment of civil society organizations, particularly those engaged on North Korea issues.”[2] Expressing his disappointment at the Moon administration’s North Korea policy, Smith twice referred to my 2020 analysis of South Korea’s “democratic decay” published in the Journal of Democracy.[3]

Rep. James McGovern, the other co-chair of the Tom Lantos Commission, noted in his remarks that “international human rights law provides guidance on what is and is not acceptable when it comes to restricting freedom of expression for security reasons.”[4] This hearing had echoes of U.S. congressional hearings in the 1970s, when there was criticism of South Korea’s authoritarian practices.

South Korea’s progressives, including those who served in the Moon administration, may respond that criticizing North Korea for its human rights practices infringes upon Pyongyang’s sovereignty. They may argue that emphasizing human rights will worsen inter-Korean relations and make it even more difficult to address the security threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles. This argument may appear to have some face validity, since Pyongyang has responded to criticisms of its human rights record with fiercely hostile rhetoric. The same progressives, however, did not regard it as an encroachment upon South Korea’s sovereignty when the U.S. government and American civil society criticized Seoul for its human rights violations during the 1970s and 80s. In fact, they sought support from various actors in America and welcomed external pressure upon South Korea’s authoritarian governments during their fight for democracy.

We must ask ourselves whether the Moon administration achieved durable progress in inter-Korean relations or on denuclearizing North Korea by sidelining human rights. There is no empirical evidence to support the assertion that raising human rights will damage inter-Korean relations or complicate negotiations surrounding North Korea’s nuclear program. While there are valid concerns about how Pyongyang may react, it is also true that past efforts have failed to achieve progress on nuclear weapons or human rights. Both the Moon and Trump administrations sidelined human rights in their summit diplomacy with Kim Jong-Un, and their efforts came to naught. They compromised their principles, but to what end?

This is not to say that raising human rights issues would certainly have yielded tangible progress in improving inter-Korean relations or dismantling Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons. Rather, I like to point out that there is no reason or evidence to believe that there is an obvious link between raising human rights in a sustained, principled manner and the success or failure of diplomatic engagements with Pyongyang. The arguments given by South Korea’s progressives are not sufficient to justify neglecting human rights concerns when addressing North Korea. Furthermore, criticizing another country’s human rights practices is not seen as an unacceptable violation of state sovereignty. The international community regards such discussions on human rights as a legitimate form of diplomatic engagement.

The Error of Zero-Sum Thinking

The abject state of human rights in North Korea is not a matter of debate. In addition to the operation of political prison camps and the imposition of draconian restrictions on the freedoms of thought, expression, and movement, the country suffers from a severe food crisis. The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s September 2022 International Food Security Assessment estimated that close to 70% of the country’s population was “food insecure.”[5] The border closure imposed due to the COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in a sharp decline in trade with China, which plays a vital role in North Korea’s economy. By all indications, the people of North Korea are likely to be in dire straits. James Heenan, the head of the UN Human Rights Office in Seoul, stated in December 2022 that the human rights situation in North Korea is a “black box” due to difficulties in obtaining information as a result of COVID-19 border controls.[6] Freedom House’s 2022 report gave North Korea 0 points out of 40 in political rights, and 3 out of 60 in civil liberties, resulting in a total score of 3 out of 100. Only South Sudan, Syria, and Turkmenistan have lower scores.[7]

Nonetheless, Pyongyang continues to pour an enormous amount of resources into developing nuclear weapons and advanced missile capabilities. According to South Korean government estimates, North Korea spent over $2 million on launching 71 missiles in 2022. This was enough to buy over 500,000 tons of rice, which could provide sufficient food for North Korea’s population for 46 days. The same amount would also have made up for over 60% of North Korea’s estimated food shortfall of 800,000 tons in 2023.[8] In its single-minded pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, the North Korean regime has shown utter disregard for the human rights of its population.

The details of North Korea’s human rights record are available for anyone to see in the reports of the UN Special Rapporteur on North Korean human rights, as well as the U.S. State Department’s annual country reports on human rights practices.[9] In particular, a 2014 report published by the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) on North Korean human rights found that “systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations have been and are being committed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, its institutions and officials.” Moreover, the COI concluded that “in many instances, the violations of human rights found by the commission constitute crimes against humanity.”[10]

North Korea’s headlong pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles is inextricably tied the human rights situation in the country. When allocating available resources, Pyongyang prioritizes the strengthening of its military capabilities. The health, well-being, and human rights of the population are of peripheral concern. An array of international sanctions imposed against the regime may constrain its budget, but it will pass on the cost to the population, further worsening their suffering. In addition, there can be no meaningful solution to security issues without improving the human rights situation. A government that values military strength over the welfare of its people will not hesitate to use force against other countries.

The North Korean nuclear problem, inter-Korean relations, and human rights issues are closely intertwined, which necessitates a comprehensive approach to North Korea policy. Ignoring human rights does not make it easier to achieve progress on security issues. Victor Cha refers to this as the “error of zero-sum thinking about human rights and U.S. denuclearization policy.”[11] There is an urgent need to formulate a holistic approach that can foster mutually beneficial engagements between Pyongyang, Seoul, and Washington. Reflecting upon the shortcomings of past U.S. policy toward North Korea, Cha notes that marginalizing human rights has not yielded any meaningful progress on the nuclear problem. He argues that it is first necessary to craft a comprehensive strategy that fosters positive-sum dynamics between security issues and human rights. This strategy will then provide a road map for future negotiations by specifying the standards and principles that should be observed.

Avoiding Demonization and Politicization

To generate positive-sum dynamics between human rights and security issues, it is important to refrain from demonizing North Korea. Taking a moralistic approach along the lines of the Bush administration’s “axis of evil” will do little to improve the human rights situation in North Korea. The purpose of raising human rights issues must not be to tarnish the North Korean leader’s reputation or to weaken the regime. As Ambassador Robert King, the former U.S. special envoy on North Korean human rights issues, stressed during a recent interview with Sindonga, human rights should not be weaponized for political purposes.[12] The world must call upon North Korea to improve its human rights record as a responsible member of the international community. If Pyongyang shows a willingness to engage, other countries should be ready to assist.

North Korea usually responds with aggressive rhetoric to criticisms of its human rights record, but it has taken tangible steps to engage on certain occasions. Even as it denounced the February 2014 report of the UN COI, North Korea sent its foreign minister to speak at the UN General Assembly in September for the first time in 15 years. In October, Jang Il-Hun, North Korea’s deputy permanent representative to the UN in New York, participated in a seminar at the Council on Foreign Relations to discuss North Korean human rights.[13] Even though it forcefully denies the international community’s criticism, North Korea appears to have realized that it cannot simply sweep the issue under the rug. Some argue that North Korea’s limited engagements on human rights are empty political gestures to divert attention. Nonetheless, North Korea also understands that it must improve its human rights record if it hopes to establish diplomatic relations with the United States.

Instead of using human rights as a cudgel to demonize North Korea, it is vital to identify specific issues where it may be willing to cooperate. So far, it has refused to engage on issues that could undermine regime stability, such as closing political prison camps, ending torture, and guaranteeing freedom of the press. On the other hand, it has shown an interest in discussing issues that do not pose an immediate political threat, such as improving the situations of women, children, and persons with disabilities. By seeking avenues for dialogue and cooperation, the international community can try to achieve slow but tangible progress on improving the human rights situation in North Korea.

We must also avoid the temptation to politicize human rights. Recall, for instance, the early days of the Trump administration. As tensions with North Korea flared, the Trump administration used human rights as a political tool to amplify negative attitudes toward Pyongyang. In addition to inviting North Korean escapees to the White House, Trump spent over 10% of his 2018 State of the Union address discussing North Korea, focusing specifically on human rights. He said that “no regime has oppressed its own citizens more totally or brutally than the cruel dictatorship in North Korea.”[14] However, as he began to hold summit meetings with Kim Jong-un to discuss the nuclear issue, human rights disappeared from the agenda. The Trump administration used human rights as a means to a political end, while the summit meetings in Singapore and Hanoi were all show and no results.

The Moon administration made the same mistake, only in a different form. As noted above, it ignored the human rights issue out of political considerations. It sought to improve inter-Korean relations above all else, despite concerns that it was neglecting human rights in doing so. It criminalized the act of sending leaflet balloons across the demilitarized zone (DMZ), and it forcibly repatriated two North Korean fishermen through the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom. The latter decision, which continues to generate controversy in South Korea, would have remained secret if reporters had not taken a picture of a text message sent to a National Security Council official.[15] The two fishermen were not given the right to legal representation and were denied due process. Moreover, the decision violated South Korea’s Constitution, which recognizes North Korean escapees as citizens. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states in article 2 that “everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind.” It adds that “no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs.”[16] However, the Moon administration was driven by its political goals in deciding to forcibly repatriate the two individuals.

A Universal Issue that Demands Bipartisan Support

North Korea’s human rights situation may be especially dire, but human rights violations are certainly not confined to its borders. They took place under South Korea’s authoritarian regimes in the past, and serious violations are committed today in countries such as China, Russia, and Myanmar. Liberal democracies, including the United States and the United Kingdom, also have shortcomings in their human rights record. In its preamble, the UDHR proclaims that “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”[17]

Human rights is a universal issue. The Yoon Suk-Yeol administration has declared its support for liberal democratic values, and it should approach the North Korean human rights issue as part of its value-based diplomacy. Moreover, it should not set preconditions for humanitarian assistance. As stipulated in article 8 of South Korea’s North Korean Human Rights Act, enacted in 2016, humanitarian assistance to North Korea must “be delivered transparently in accordance with internationally recognized delivery standards,” and it must “be provided preferentially for vulnerable social groups, such as pregnant women and infants.”[18]

Even in an era of extreme polarization in American politics, there is a robust and genuine bipartisan consensus on North Korean human rights. As noted above, the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission is co-chaired by a Democrat and a Republican. The U.S. North Korean Human Rights Act, enacted in 2004, was last reauthorized in 2018 with unanimous support in the House and the Senate. This law generated momentum for Japan (2006) and South Korea (2016) to pass their own legislation on North Korean human rights.

In South Korea, however, the issue continues to be heavily politicized and polarized. Progressives tend to minimize the issue or neglect it altogether, while conservatives are usually vocal about drawing attention to the human rights situation in North Korea. Instead of approaching the issue from the standpoint of universal values, discussions about North Korean human rights are mired in partisan political divisions. Working toward a bipartisan consensus on North Korean human rights would be a worthy goal. Furthermore, there must be greater efforts to listen to and incorporate the voices and opinions of North Korean escapees who have resettled in South Korea.

The Yoon administration has taken encouraging steps. Last summer, President Yoon appointed Professor Lee Shin-wha of Korea University as the ambassador-at-large for North Korean human rights, a position that had been vacant since September 2017. South Korea has also resumed its co-sponsorship of UN resolutions on the state of human rights in North Korea. However, the North Korean Human Rights Foundation, which was supposed to have been created pursuant to the 2016 North Korean Human Rights Act, remains stuck on the ground.[19] This foundation should be launched as soon as possible, and the government should also enhance resettlement assistance to North Korean escapees.

Lastly, it goes without saying that there should be bipartisan cooperation to secure the release of six South Korean citizens who are currently detained in North Korea. On February 7, Jung Pak, the deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, met with family members of the detained citizens in Seoul in a joint meeting with Ambassador Lee Shin-wha.[20] South Korea’s National Assembly should also play its part to draw attention to the issue.

Multilateral and Bilateral Approaches

South Korea should fully utilize the institutions of the UN in addressing North Korean human rights. Pyongyang is highly sensitive to human rights criticisms issued by individual countries, but it has shown some willingness to engage with the UN’s human rights mechanisms. This is because it wants to be recognized as a legitimate member of the international community. North Korea has participated in the Universal Periodic Review, in which all UN member states are subject to a review of their human rights record every four and a half years. In 2017, it permitted a visit by the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities. Most recently, in 2021, it submitted its Voluntary National Review, which assesses its progress in implementing the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals.[21] By working with and through international institutions, South Korea can increase the effectiveness and legitimacy of its efforts to address the human rights situation in North Korea. It can also sidestep direct criticism from Pyongyang.

Cooperation with the United States is also vital. During its first two years, the Biden administration did not take significant steps to draw attention to North Korea’s human rights. This stood in sharp contrast to the administration’s vocal condemnation of human rights violations in China, as well as Russia’s atrocities in Ukraine. On January 23, the White House finally appointed Julie Turner—the director of the Office of East Asia and the Pacific in the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor—as the nominee for the special envoy on North Korean human rights. This position, created by the U.S. North Korean Human Rights Act, had remained vacant since Ambassador King stepped down in January 2017. This could indicate that the Biden administration is moving toward a more proactive approach on human rights issues in North Korea.

I have previously characterized the Biden administration’s North Korea policy as one of “strategic neglect.” North Korea is seen as a hot potato, and there is a prevailing tendency in Washington to avoid touching the problem altogether.[22] Ambassador Sung Kim is serving as the U.S. ambassador to Indonesia, and he is serving as the U.S. special representative for North Korea in essentially a part-time capacity. Jung Pak has been coordinating relevant policy issues in the State Department, but there has not been a visible shift in North Korea policy, with the exception of her recent visit to Seoul to meet with family members of South Korean citizens detained in North Korea. There are many high-level officials in the Biden administration’s foreign policy and national security team with prior experience of North Korea issues, and they understand that diplomatic engagements with Pyongyang are unlikely to yield meaningful results. North Korea’s barrage of missile tests is intended, in part, to draw the attention of the United States, but the response from Washington has been lukewarm.

In line with Victor Cha’s recommendations, Seoul should work closely with Washington to craft a comprehensive strategy that fosters positive-sum dynamics between human rights and nuclear issues. Last month, there were reports that Seoul was “pushing for the resumption of bilateral consultations with the United States on the North Korean human rights problem.”[23] Ambassador Lee Shin-wha is a highly capable expert with a deep understanding of both the UN and the United States, and she will be able to play an important role in these efforts. Congress should move quickly to confirm Julie Turner as her counterpart, so that they can formulate and implement a bilateral strategy to address human rights issues in North Korea.

Lastly, Seoul should work with Beijing on these issues. China has serious human rights issues of its own, including the situation in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. It is also directly implicated in North Korean human rights issues. Despite requests from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Beijing continues to forcibly repatriate North Korean escapees who are arrested in China. Available testimony suggests that many escapees who are returned in this manner end up being imprisoned in political prison camps or executed. In his memoir, Patterns of Impunity, Ambassador Robert King notes that he urged Chinese officials on multiple occasions to recognize North Korean escapees as refugees. This would enable their safe passage to South Korea. His requests were denied, however.

As a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, China is obligated under international law to not forcibly repatriate individuals with “a well-founded fear of being persecuted” upon return.[24] Despite this obligation, China claims that North Korean escapees are economic migrants and continues to forcibly repatriate them. Traffickers in the Sino-North Korean border area abuse this fear of repatriation to coerce female North Korean escapees into forced marriages with Chinese men in rural villages, or to sell them into prostitution. Beijing has turned a blind eye to these criminal activities. In its 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report, the U.S. State Department classified both China and North Korea as Tier 3 countries. This means that they have failed to meet basic standards for combating human trafficking, and have not made meaningful efforts to improve their policies.[25]

Highlighting China’s complicity in human rights abuses in North Korea will draw diplomatic protests from Beijing, but it could be an effective strategy for Seoul to redirect Washington’s attention to North Korea. Although the response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has taken up much of Washington’s bandwidth, China remains at the top of the Biden administration’s foreign policy agenda. In doing so, however, South Korea must take care to avoid politicizing the issue.

A Korean Problem, Neglected in Korea

During my time at UCLA in the mid-1990s, a friend put me in touch with the North American Coalition for Human Rights in Korea. This group had worked to promote human rights and democracy in South Korea for nearly two decades since 1975, at the height of the autocratic Yusin Era under Park Chung-Hee.[26] Now that South Korea had become a democracy, the group had decided to conclude its activities.

I was asked if I might be able to put their archive of internal documents to good use, and I immediately agreed. As a Korean who had lived through this era, I felt a sense of responsibility to preserve these documents. Furthermore, as a researcher of social movements, I was excited by the prospect of obtaining these materials. The materials arrived in 34 large boxes, and I had the chance to view the contents of every box before the library staff began to organize them. Because of their historic importance, these materials were compiled into a special collection—the Archival Collection on Democracy and Unification in Korea. I have advised doctoral students who analyzed these materials in their dissertations.

As I sifted through the documents, I found letters that were sent to the White House, calling upon the United States to play its part in improving the human rights situation in South Korea. I came across crumpled pieces of paper that had been smuggled out of Gwangju in May 1980, with urgent handwritten notes that sought to tell the outside world about what was happening to the pro-democracy protests in that city. These were living, breathing documents that vividly told the story of South Korea’s pro-democracy movement in the 1970s and 80s.

I am deeply ashamed to admit that I had been unaware until then of just how many Americans had worked tirelessly for the cause of human rights and democracy in South Korea. Many Koreans believed that the United States had unflinchingly supported South Korea’s authoritarian governments, and I too had been influenced by that current of thought. In those boxes, I also discovered letters from pro-democracy activists in South Korea, expressing their gratitude for the support of American citizens and civic groups. It is perhaps the memories of reading such letters that heightened my discomfort and disappointment at witnessing how South Korea’s progressives neglect North Korean human rights.

Last October, I met Representative Chris Smith at a conference in Washington. He told me that if he had the opportunity to visit North Korea and meet Kim Jong-Un, he would not hesitate to bring up human rights. He also brought up human rights during a meeting with Premier Li Peng in Beijing, though he will no longer have the opportunity to do so, as Smith has been sanctioned by the Chinese government and barred from entering China ever again. I was deeply moved by his steadfast and sincere commitment to human rights.

There is much interest in North Korean human rights among college students in the United States. Student groups, including those at Stanford, hold regular events and conferences to raise awareness of what is happening in North Korea and to call for action. I have heard students ask why K-pop artists are silent on North Korean human rights, even as K-pop fans are raising their voices in support of causes like the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar. This is the unfortunate reality of North Korean human rights today. There is great concern and interest in the rest of the world, but it is politicized or ignored in South Korea.

A Historic Responsibility for Koreans

In an essay comparing East Germany and North Korea that he contributed to the book The North Korean Conundrum, Sean King argues that South Korea should take a principled position even if policies to improve the human rights situation in North Korea are unlikely to achieve tangible results. “South Korea can nonetheless stand on principle so as to at least help make even a few North Koreans’ lives better,” he writes, “and to also lay down a marker for other governments as to how they should approach Pyongyang.” Moreover, “when reunification comes, hopefully under Seoul’s rule,” he stresses that “North Koreans will know that they were not forgotten when the country was divided.”[27]

Just as South Koreans expressed their gratitude to Americans who fought for their human rights, I have no doubt that the North Korean people feel the same way toward South Korea and the international community’s efforts to promote their human rights, even if they cannot—at present—write letters to the outside world. The late Reverend Yoon Hyun, who founded the Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights in 1996 after spending decades fighting for human rights and democracy in South Korea, said he was driven by a haunting question. “What will we say when, after reunification, 200,000 political prisoners and their families ask us: what did you do as we were dying?”[28]

As North Korea will likely continue its provocative missile launches, most attention will be focused on security issues. Nevertheless, the Yoon administration must persevere in its efforts to improve the human rights of the North Korean people, and the Democratic Party of Korea should not repeat its past mistakes by politicizing or neglecting the issue. North Korean human rights is more than just a political problem or a national security objective. The citizens of the Republic of Korea have a historic responsibility and a collective moral obligation to address the suffering of their brethren in the North.

[1] Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, “Civil and Political Rights in the Republic of Korea: Implications for Human Rights on the Peninsula,” April 15, 2021, https://humanrightscommission.house.gov/events/hearings/civil-and-political-rights-republic-korea-implications-human-rights-peninsula-0

[2] Rep. Christopher H. Smith, “Opening Remarks,” April 15, 2021, https://humanrightscommission.house.gov/sites/humanrightscommission.house.gov/files/documents/Opening%20Remarks_SKorea_CHS_Final.pdf.

[3] Gi-Wook Shin, “South Korea’s Democratic Decay,” Journal of Democracy 31, no. 3 (2020): 100–14, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/south-koreas-democratic-decay/.

[4] This comment was made in relation to the so-called anti-leaflet law that was passed by the ruling Democratic Party of Korea during the Moon administration. One of the primary justifications for the law given by its proponents was that launching leaflet balloons across the border could prompt an armed response from North Korea, thereby endangering the security of South Koreans living near the border. See Rep. James P. McGovern, “Opening Remarks,” https://humanrightscommission.house.gov/sites/humanrightscommission.house.gov/files/documents/Opening%20Remarks_SKorea_JPM_Final.pdf.

[5] Yacob A. Zereyesus et al., International Food Security Assessment, 2022-32 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service, 2022), 56, https://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/pub-details/?pubid=104707.

[6] This office, established pursuant to a recommendation by the UN Commission of Inquiry on North Korean human rights, monitors human rights in North Korea. For further details on Heenan’s remarks, see “U.N. Agency Head Says N. Korea’s Human Rights Situation in ‘Black Box’,” Yonhap News, December 6, 2022, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20221206008700325.

[7] Freedom in the World 2022: The Global Expansion of Authoritarian Rule (Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, 2022), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world.

[8] Park Soo-Yoon, “North Korea Spent 46 Days’ Worth of Food on Firing Missiles, With Reports of Starvation Deaths in Hamgyong Province” [in Korean], Yonhap News, December 19, 2022, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20221219095700504.

[9] For the UN reports, see “Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,” UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-dprk; for country reports, see “2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: North Korea,” U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/north-korea/.

[10] United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/63 (2014), para. 80, https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/co-idprk/commission-inquiryon-h-rin-dprk

[11] Victor Cha, “The Error of Zero-Sum Thinking about Human Rights and U.S. Denuclearization Policy,” in The North Korean Conundrum: Balancing Human Rights and Nuclear Security, eds. Robert R. King and Gi-Wook Shin (Stanford: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2022), 157–78.

[12] Soo-Kyung Kim, “An Interview with Former Special Envoy Robert King” [in Korean], Sindonga, December 30, 2022, https://shindonga.donga.com/3/home/13/3842527/1.

[13] “Ambassador Jang Il Hun on Human Rights in North Korea,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 20, 2014, https://www.cfr.org/event/ambassador-jang-il-hun-human-rights-north-korea.

[14] Robert R. King, “North Korean Human Rights in the 2018 and 2019 State of the Union Addresses—What a Difference a Year Makes,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 7, 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/north-korean-human-rights-2018-and-2019-state-union-addresses-what-difference-year-makes.

[15] Kim Joon-Young, “Ministry of Unification Issues Statement on Forcible Repatriation after Text Message is Caught on Camera” [in Korean], JoongAng Ilbo, November 8, 2019, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/23627798.

[16] United Nations, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights

[17] United Nations, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”

[18] Korea Law Information Center, “North Korean Human Rights Act,” https://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=181623&viewCls=engLsInfoR#0000.

[19] The Democratic Party of Korea has persistently failed to appoint its allocated quota of five individuals to the foundation’s board of directors, and the Ministry of Unification has spent nearly $2 million on office rent and personnel costs to no avail. See Oh Soo-Jeong, “North Korean Human Rights Foundation Idle for Six Years, Nearly $2 million Spent on Rent Alone” [in Korean], NoCut News, October 6, 2022, https://www.nocutnews.co.kr/news/5828493.

[20] “U.S. to Continue Efforts to Free S. Koreans Detained by N. Korea: Washington Official,” Yonhap News, February 7, 2023, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230207009400325.

[21] Government of the People’s Republic of North Korea, “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Voluntary National Review On the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda,” https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/282482021_VNR_Report_DPRK.pdf.

[22] Kim Namseok, “A Resurgence of Democracy? A Conversation with Francis Fukuyama on the Challenges of a Changing Global Order,” trans. Raymond Ha, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, January 12, 2023, https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/resurgence-democracy.

[23] “S. Korea Seeks Formal Consultations with U.S., EU on NK Human Rights,” Yonhap News, January 15, 2023, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230115001200325.

[24] Roberta Cohen, “Legal Grounds for Protection of North Korean Refugees,” Brookings Institution, September 13, 2010, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/legal-grounds-for-protection-of-north-korean-refugees/.

[25] U.S. Department of State, 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report, https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-trafficking-in-persons-report/.

[26] This era is named after the Yusin Constitution, which went into force in 1972 and codified authoritarian rule under Park Chung-Hee. It marked some of the most oppressive years of dictatorial rule in South Korea.

[27] Sean King, “Germany’s Lessons for Korea,” in The North Korean Conundrum: Balancing Human Rights and Nuclear Security, eds. Robert R. King and Gi-Wook Shin (Stanford: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2022), 203.

[28] “About the Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights” [in Korean], Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, https://www.nkhr.or.kr/nkhr-소개/북한인권시민연합-소개/?ckattempt=1.

This essay originally appeared in Korean on January 3 in Sindonga (New East Asia), Korea’s oldest monthly magazine (established 1931), as part of a monthly column, "Shin’s Reflections on Korea." Translated by Raymond Ha. A PDF version of this essay is also available to download. 

The Indian diaspora has made its presence felt beyond the economic sector. Numerous graduates of the All India Institutes of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) practice medicine in the United States, and renowned scholars of Indian heritage serve on the faculty of elite American universities. For instance, Stanford selected Dr. Arun Majumdar to serve as the inaugural dean of the Doerr School of Sustainability, which opened its doors in the fall of 2022. Majumdar completed his undergraduate studies at IIT Bombay and obtained his PhD from UC Berkeley in 1989. His career has spanned the public and private sectors, and he now spearheads Stanford’s first new school in 70 years—an ambitious effort to “tackle urgent climate and sustainability challenges facing people and ecosystems worldwide.”[2] It would not be an exaggeration to say that the Indian diaspora now has greater influence and impact in Silicon Valley than the Chinese diaspora.

Moreover, India plays a central role in Washington’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, which has become the focal point of American foreign policy. New Delhi was the leader of the non-aligned movement during the Cold War, but it is now building closer ties with liberal democracies around the world. Unlike China, India is not locked in a strategic competition with the West. High English proficiency among Indians also facilitates relations and exchanges at all levels. It is also worth noting that there are now influential politicians of Indian heritage in major countries, including Kamala Harris in the United States and Rishi Sunak in the United Kingdom. India prides itself on being the most populous democracy in the world, and its stature in the international community is only likely to grow in the coming decades.

Despite these developments, Korean public sentiment toward India is largely negative. There is broad awareness of the legacy of historical figures like Mahatma Gandhi and cultural achievements such as the Taj Mahal. However, many Koreans still perceive India as a poor and chaotic country with rigid and obsolete customs, including the caste system. There are substantial cultural, social, and historical differences between Korea and India, but it is time for Korea to cast aside any prejudices and take a clear-eyed view of India. It is encouraging to see the Yoon Suk-Yeol administration stress in its recently announced Indo-Pacific Strategy that Korea “will advance [its] special strategic partnership with India, a leading regional partner with shared values.” The document also rightly notes the importance of “enhanced economic cooperation” between the two countries.[3]

In this context, it is especially vital for Korea to pay attention to the rise of the Indian diaspora in the United States and beyond. They are a force to be reckoned with in the global market. Unlike the state-driven development models of East Asia, India has pursued a market-driven policy since liberalizing its economy in 1991. The country’s overseas diaspora also plays a unique role in catalyzing economic growth. Korea should learn from the successes of India’s diaspora and build closer ties with such networks.

The Rise of Japan, China, and India

Japan was the undisputed leader of the Asia-Pacific in the 1980s, and China has taken on this mantle since the dawn of the 21st century. As China closes its doors amidst its intensifying strategic competition with the United States, India is emerging as the new regional leader. A close examination of the rise of these three countries reveals crucial differences. The contributions of the overseas diaspora to economic development, as noted above, are a distinguishing factor.

Let us begin with Japan. Relying on a well-educated workforce and meticulous training within companies, Japan built upon proprietary technology from the West to achieve incremental innovation. Sony’s worldwide success in consumer electronics, for example, can be attributed to sophisticated engineering and attention to detail in product design, not to significant advancements in the underlying technologies. Furthermore, Japan took great advantage of short-term overseas training programs to learn and utilize advanced technologies to further its own economy. This strategy enabled Japan to increase its economic heft without suffering a “brain drain,” to the point of challenging U.S. dominance over the global economy in the 1980s. There were, however, disputes with the United States over intellectual property rights (IPR).

Throughout this process, Japan’s diaspora did not play a visible role. Many Japanese abroad had already assimilated into their countries of residence, and the few that contributed only provided low-skilled labor. Japanese Americans, for example, have largely assimilated into American society despite the traumatic experience of forced internment during World War II. Contact with their home country was fairly limited. Some Japanese immigrants who settled in South America later returned to Japan, but most of these returnees were low-skilled laborers. After experiencing hardships and discrimination, however, they went back to South America once again after the 2008 global financial crisis.

China took a different path. The Chinese diaspora has a long history centered on Southeast Asia, and its role in enabling China’s reform and opening by providing much-needed capital is well known. In the 1980s, China adopted an “open door” policy and enabled large numbers of students to study abroad. It also proactively pursued a policy of “brain circulation” by inviting these students to return to China and contribute their talents to the country’s development. No country has sent more students abroad than China. With rapid economic growth in the 2000s, over 80% of these students returned. These individuals are called haigui (sea turtles) in China.[4] In Beijing’s Zhongguancun, China’s Silicon Valley, there are a plethora of programs and facilities tailored to haigui. They have not only spearheaded China’s technological innovation, but also made important contributions to the economy, scientific research, and higher education.

China’s pursuit of “brain circulation” has seen some success, but it also created friction with the United States. After studying and gaining work experience in the United States, Chinese talent returned home and directed their know-how toward accelerating China’s rise. However, U.S. authorities began to suspect that China’s talent policy was being misused for industrial espionage, especially in advanced technologies. For example, the Pentagon stated in 2018 that China’s Thousand Talents Program was a “toolkit for foreign technology acquisition.” U.S. intelligence officials added that the program was “a key part of multi-pronged efforts to transfer, replicate and eventually overtake U.S. military and commercial technology.”[5]

India has taken yet another path, although it resembles China’s experience in some respects. Like China, India experienced an enormous brain drain. It is second only to China in the number of overseas students. In terms of highly skilled emigration, it has seen the largest outflow of any country. Unlike Chinese talent, Indian immigrants tended to settle down in host countries, where they have built successful careers. During the 1980s, over a third (37.5%) of IIT Bombay graduates went abroad, and 82% of these individuals stayed abroad.[6] Between 2004 and 2016, 30% of grantees in Optional Practical Training (OPT), a temporary employment visa for F-1 students in the United States, were students from India.[7] Many of these students arrived in America after receiving a rigorous education in STEM or medicine in India. Their native fluency in English is also an important asset. Since India itself is extremely diverse in terms of religion, ethnicity, and culture, prior experience with diverse settings also gives Indian students an advantage for studying and living in America.

Even if Indian talent mostly stays abroad, they create “brain linkages” through extensive interaction with their home country. They bring young talent from India to overseas universities and companies, support start-up entrepreneurs in India, and connect global companies to India’s low-cost, high-quality workforce.

Immigrants from India make up the bulk of H-1B visa recipients in the United States. In fiscal year 2021, 74% consisted of Indian nationals.[8] Unicorn companies formed with diaspora support are appearing left and right in Bangalore, the hub for India’s high-tech industry. The total investment in Bangalore’s tech sector has jumped from $550 million in 2010 to $2 billion in 2017, spread across 6,000 start-ups.[9] This amount is projected to reach $30 billion by 2025.[10] Furthermore, unlike China, India is not currently engaged in disputes with the United States or other major economies over talent policy or IPR in advanced technologies.

Modi’s Visit to Silicon Valley

In 2015, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke to a crowd of 20,000 at the Shark Tank in San Jose. Many in the diaspora community gathered for the occasion. Modi asserted that “what looks like brain drain is actually a brain deposit.”[11] He also met with leaders of the Indian diaspora during his visit, including Sundar Pichai (Google) and Satya Nadella (Microsoft), and secured support for the government’s “Digital India” initiative.[12] Naren Gupta, a member of India’s diaspora and the co-founder of Nexus Venture Partners, played an instrumental role in planning the visit. Modi’s tour of Silicon Valley encapsulated the power and influence of the Indian diaspora in America. It also revealed the strength of the brain linkages that the community had built with its home country.

The Indian diaspora is a force to be reckoned with in Silicon Valley. Of all engineering and tech start-ups formed in America by immigrants between 2006 and 2012, 33.2% were created by individuals of Indian origin.[13]This exceeds the total number of companies created by entrepreneurs from China, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Israel, Russia, and Korea combined. Indian immigrants are also filling executive-level positions in major American IT companies. Those of Indian origin make up “just about 1% of the U.S. population and 6% of Silicon Valley’s workforce.”[14] However, they have an outsized impact. Immigrants from India to the United States tend to be highly educated, with over 70% possessing at least a bachelor’s degree.[15] This is markedly higher than the corresponding proportion for the U.S. population, which reached 37.9% in 2021.[16] Various factors help explain the Indian diaspora’s success in the United States: high levels of technical competence, a robust professional network, and strong communication skills based on native English fluency and familiarity with Western culture.

Moreover, Indian immigrants are very much willing to acquire citizenship in their host countries. In recent years, the number of Indian nationals who acquired U.S. citizenship through naturalization has been almost twice the number of Chinese nationals who were naturalized.[17] Indians reportedly do not have qualms about renouncing their Indian citizenship. Modi’s 2015 speech in San Jose, referenced above, clearly reflects how those in India view the overseas diaspora. Regardless of one’s citizenship or place of residence, there is a prevailing mentality of “once an Indian, always an Indian.” Leaders in India’s modern history, including Nehru and Gandhi, were also members of the diaspora. The tightly knit diaspora community gives rise to robust and mutually supportive professional networks, which helps elevate the presence of Indian immigrants in host countries. This is certainly the case in the United States.

Unlike China, India does not have a government-led policy to attract talent. Nevertheless, members of the overseas diaspora can temporarily return to India and engage in various activities with relative ease. There are also institutions that facilitate such endeavors. One is the legal status of “non-resident Indians” that is given to Indians who reside overseas for over 183 days in a given year. This status accords short-term diaspora visitors with legal and economic rights similar to that of resident citizens.

Since 2003, the Indian government has also officially recognized Non-Resident Indian Day (Pravasi Bharatiya Divas) on January 9, which commemorates the day of Gandhi’s return from South Africa to Mumbai in 1915. To mark the occasion, the Indian government presents an award to individuals in the diaspora community who have made significant achievements in their respective fields. Past recipients include Satya Nadella and Kalpana Chawla, an Indian American astronaut who posthumously received the award as the first person of Indian origin to go to space. By taking such steps, the Indian government promotes and strengthens solidarity between India and its diaspora, no matter where its members reside.

The New Argonauts

Members of the Indian diaspora are actively building ties to their home country. In 2021, they sent $87 billion in remittances to India. China’s diaspora came second with $53 billion.[18] This includes money earned by Indian immigrants in the United States, China, and other countries. Overseas Indians in the business sector not only invest in start-ups and real estate in India, but also give policy recommendations to their home government and provide support for higher education. They also organized charity fundraisers to assist COVID-19 response and recovery efforts, responding to the devastation that the pandemic wreaked across the country. According to my own analysis, 42% of 97 major Indian diaspora organizations in the United States maintain close ties with India. As a whole, they are even more active than Chinese diaspora organizations.

The IndUS Entrepreneurs (TiE), founded in Silicon Valley, is one of the best examples. It was established in 1992 with the goal of facilitating networking between entrepreneurs from South Asia, providing mentoring for the next generation, and incubating and investing in start-ups. As of 2020, TiE had 61 branches across 14 countries, with 20 offices in the United States and 23 in India, and boasted a membership of 15,000. To date, it has supported around 10,000 start-ups founded by entrepreneurs of Indian origin. The total valuation of these start-ups is approximately $200 billion. With offices in Mumbai, Bangalore, and Chennai, TiE has acted as a conduit for successful Indian businesspeople in Silicon Valley to interact with their home country. These individuals emphasized the importance of entrepreneurship to youth in India. They acted as role models, mentors, and investors at a time when there was little support to be found elsewhere. TiE continues to serve as a vital link between Silicon Valley and India.

The American Association of Physicians of Indian Origin (AAPI), founded in 1982, plays an essential role in creating brain linkages in the field of medicine. AAPI has 80,000 doctors and 40,000 students, residents, and fellows as members. It fosters closer ties between its members and pursues opportunities for cooperation with Indian medical schools. Since 2007, it has hosted an annual global healthcare summit in India. AAPI also operates 19 clinics across India and established a charitable foundation to provide medical relief. During the height of COVID-19, AAPI sent medical supplies and held various activities to help India overcome the pandemic. It is said that those in the diaspora community view such actions as a responsibility, not just as a charitable activity.

Furthermore, the Indian diaspora is heavily engaged in supporting higher education back home. Consider IIT Kharagpur, which opened its doors in 1951. Vinod Gupta graduated from this school, found success in the United States, and helped launch the Vinod Gupta School of Management at his alma mater in 1993. Arjun Malhotra, another IIT Kharagpur graduate, was involved in the creation of the G. S. Sanyal School of Telecommunications and the M. N. Faruqui Innovation Centre. In another example, leaders from the diaspora community joined forces in 2014 to establish Ashoka University, a private school modeled after American liberal arts colleges, a rarity in a higher education landscape dominated by public universities. Ashok Trivedi, one of the school’s founders, earned his bachelor’s and master’s at the University of Delhi before pursuing an MBA at Ohio University and subsequently co-founding IGATE, an IT services company. As these cases illustrate, leaders in the Indian diaspora community donate to their alma maters and even create new schools altogether. They also facilitate academic exchanges between prominent U.S. and Indian universities, including student exchange programs.

AnnaLee Saxenian, a professor at UC Berkeley’s School of Information, has referred to these immigrant entrepreneurs who maintain ties with their home country after building successful careers overseas as the “new argonauts.” Just like the Argonauts of Greek mythology who set sail across the Mediterranean in search of the Golden Fleece, these individuals have crossed oceans aboard their own Argo to seek success in the 21st century. Kanwal Rekhi emphasized to me that “the diaspora led India’s independence movement in the past, but now it is playing an important role for India’s economy.”

Will India Surpass China?

In a previous essay in this series, I argued that “China will not surpass the United States in our time.”[19] We could ask, in a similar fashion, whether India could overtake China in the future. While there are significant challenges on the road ahead, India could become a formidable competitor for China if current trends continue. At present, India lags far behind China in terms of overall national power. India has a much younger population, however, and its rate of economic growth will likely exceed China’s for the foreseeable future. India is the only country where the supply of highly skilled labor in the technology sector exceeds domestic demand. In addition to IITs and AIIMS, there are excellent engineering and medical schools across all regions of India. These institutions are an important source of talent for the global economy.

China is gradually closing its doors as the Sino-U.S. competition intensifies. In terms of its economy and trade relations, it is at risk of falling into a quagmire similar to Japan’s “Two Lost Decades.” Beijing must also contend with strong anti-China sentiment, especially among developed countries, and it must overcome the challenges that come with diplomatic isolation. India does not face the same geopolitical risks. As one of the four corners of the Quad, New Delhi is pursuing a foreign policy that includes various forms of cooperation with countries across the Indo-Pacific region in both economic and security issues. At the same time, the power and influence of the Indian diaspora only continues to grow. In an October 2022 op-ed on the subject, Tyler Cowen notes that Rishi Sunak is only one example of a much wider phenomenon. “It is now impossible to deny what has been evident for some while,” he says. “Indian talent is revolutionizing the Western world far more than had been expected 10 or 15 years ago.”[20]

To be sure, India faces a complex set of challenges at home. Poverty remains widespread, along with ethnic and religious conflicts. The Modi government has taken an authoritarian turn in its pursuit of Hindu nationalism, and there are serious governance challenges associated with corruption in both government and the private sector. Ajantha Subramanian, a professor of anthropology at Harvard, has pointed out that successful members of the Indian diaspora in Silicon Valley largely come from the upper castes. Some criticize these individuals for amplifying caste-based inequality overseas through their exclusive professional networks in ways that are no longer as prevalent in India. While accounting for such criticism and taking an honest look at India’s domestic issues, it would also be unwise for Korea to discount the importance of India and its diaspora in the coming decades.

To Become Asia’s Small Giant

A few years ago, I gave a lecture on Korea’s development at a leading university in New Delhi. I was deeply impressed by the passion and enthusiasm of the students who came to listen. There is growing interest in India about the story of Korea’s remarkable economic development, as well as K-pop and Korean dramas. Unfortunately, this has not always been reciprocated. In 2017, a bar in Itaewon, an area of Seoul famous for its multicultural atmosphere, drew controversy when it denied entry to a student from India.[21] In 2009, in another incident, an Indian research professor and a female Korean companion were harassed by a fellow bus passenger.[22] Such inexcusable acts of discrimination are ultimately rooted in prejudices and negative stereotypes about India in Korea.

I once had the opportunity to speak to Indian engineers who work in Korea. They told me that while they enjoyed working for Korean companies such as Samsung or SK, prejudice among Koreans toward India often made life difficult.[23] Building closer ties with India is a foreign policy imperative under the Yoon administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, but high-level policies alone will not be enough. It is vital for civil society to enhance mutual understanding between Korea and India by expanding cultural exchanges and strengthening people-to-people ties. The private sector also has an important role to play, as they can augment efforts by government-run Korean cultural centers and public entities such as the Korea Foundation.[24]

Indian talent could play an important role in Korea’s economic future. Korea will soon face significant labor shortages due to “a crisis on three fronts: a plummeting birth rate, an aging population, and a serious brain drain.”[25]On the other hand, India has a relatively young population and a large, highly skilled workforce. According to one estimate, “India is projected to have a skilled-labour surplus of around 245.3 million workers by 2030.”[26] There is also a natural synergy between the two economies. India excels in software, whereas Korea’s strength lies in hardware. If China provided opportunities for Korean manufacturers to export intermediate goods, India could provide the talent that Korea’s economy will increasingly rely on in the coming years.

Cowen argues that “India is by far the world’s most significant source of undiscovered and undervalued talent.” Anyone who is concerned about “the future of their own nation” in today’s world, he adds, “really should be focusing on India.”[27] Korea would do well to heed his advice.

While seeking ways to strengthen cooperation with India, Korea should also strive to build closer ties with the Indian diaspora and its networks. East Asian countries, including Korea, adopted a state-centered model of economic development. India took a different path, and its overseas diaspora has played a unique role in driving India’s economic growth. The ever-increasing influence of India’s new argonauts extends beyond Silicon Valley. Australia and Germany have sought to attract Indian talents and draw on their professional networks. The same goes for countries in the Middle East, including the United Arab Emirates. Korea could form closer partnerships with the extensive global networks of India’s diaspora community as it seeks to attract Indian talent and pursue new economic opportunities.

During the Cold War, Korea looked east toward the United States and Japan. As the Iron Curtain fell in the 1980s, Korea pursued Nordpolitik by normalizing ties with Moscow and Beijing. It is now time for Korea to look south. Even as Southeast Asia grows in importance, Korea must keep its eyes fixed on India. If Korea aims to become Asia’s small giant in this turbulent era, it would be wise for Seoul to use prevailing geopolitical currents to its favor.

[1]This essay draws on ongoing research by the author, which will be published in an upcoming book tentatively titled Talent Giants in the Asia-Pacific Century: A Comparative Analysis of Japan, Australia, China, and India.

[2] Amy Adams and Anneke Cole, “Stanford Doerr School of Sustainability, University’s First New School in 70 Years, Will Accelerate Solutions to Global Climate Crisis,” Stanford University, May 4, 2022, https://news.stanford.edu/2022/05/04/stanford-doerr-school-sustainability-universitys-first-new-school-70-years-will-accelerate-solutions-global-climate-crisis/.

[3] Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region, December 28, 2022, 17, https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322133.

[4] The terms “sea turtle” (海龟) and “return from overseas” (海归) are homophones for each other.

[5] Anthony Capaccio, “U.S. Faces ‘Unprecedented Threat’ from China on Tech Takeover,” Bloomberg, June 22, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-22/china-s-thousand-talents-called-key-in-seizing-u-s-expertise.

[6] S. P. Sukhatme and I. Mahadevan, Pilot Study on Magnitude and Nature of the Brain-Drain of Graduates of the Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay (Bombay: Indian Institute of Technology, 1987).

[7] Neil G. Ruiz and Abby Budiman, “Number of Foreign College Students Staying and Working in U.S. After Graduation Surges,” Pew Research Center, May 10, 2018, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/05/10/number-of-foreign-college-students-staying-and-working-in-u-s-after-graduation-surges/.

[8] Lubna Kably, “Indians Bagged 3.01 Lakh H-1B Visas During Fiscal 2021–74% of the Total,” Times of India, April 14, 2022, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/indians-bagged-3-01-lakh-h-1b-visas-during-fiscal-2021-74-of-the-total/articleshow/90845244.cms.

[9] Indian Tech Start-Up Ecosystem: Approaching Escape Velocity (Noida: NASSCOM-Zinnov, 2018), 6; Manish Singh, “Indian Tech Startups Raised a Record$14.5B in 2019,” TechCrunch, December 30, 2019, https://techcrunch.com/2019/12/29/indian-tech-startups-funding-amount-2019/.

[10] “HNIs to Invest $30 Billion in Indian Tech Startups By 2025: Report,” Economic Times, June 17, 2021, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/startups/hnis-to-invest-30-billion-in-indian-tech-startups-by-2025-report/articleshow/83607846.cms.

[11] “Narendra Modi’s Speech at the Shark Tank, Silicon Valley As It Happened,” Wall Street Journal, September 27, 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-IRTB-30506.

[12] Chidanand Rajghatta, “Silicon Valley Stars Sign on to PM Modi’s ‘Digital India’ Vision,” Times of India, September 27, 2015, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech-news/silicon-valley-stars-sign-on-to-pm-modis-digital-india-vision/articleshow/49129060.cms.

[13] Vivek Wadhwa, AnnaLee Saxenian, and F. Daniel Siciliano, Then and Now: America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs, Part VII (Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, 2012), 3, https://www.kauffman.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Then_and_now_americas_new_immigrant_entrepreneurs.pdf.

[14] Nikhil Inamdar and Aparna Alluri, “Parag Agrawal: Why Indian-born CEOs dominate Silicon Valley,” BBC News, December 4, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-59457015.

[15] Jens Manuel Krogstad and Jynnah Radford, “Education Levels of U.S. Immigrants Are on the Rise,” Pew Research Center, September 14, 2018, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/09/14/education-levels-of-u-s-immigrants-are-on-the-rise/.

[16] United States Census Bureau, “Census Bureau Releases New Education Attainment Data,” February 24, 2022, https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2022/educational-attainment.html.

[17] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2020 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2022), 53–54, https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2020.

[18] “With $87 Billion, India Top Remittance Recipient in 2021: UN Report,” Economic Times, July 20, 2022, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/nri/invest/with-87-billion-india-top-remittance-recipient-in-2021-un-report/articleshow/93012012.cms.

[19] Gi-Wook Shin, “Walking a Tightrope,” Shorenstein APARC, November 16, 2022, https://aparc.fsi.stanford.edu/korea/news/walking-tightrope.

[20] Tyler Cowen, “Rishi Sunak Shows the Growing Influence of Indian Talent in the West,” Bloomberg, October 28, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-10-28/rishi-sunak-shows-growing-influence-of-indian-talent-in-west.

[21] Ock Hyun-ju, “Itaewon Bar Accused of Discriminating Against Indian,” Korean Herald, June 7, 2017, https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20170607000796.

[22] Park Si-soo, “Indian Accuses Korean of Racial Discrimination,” Korea Times, August 3, 2009, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/08/117_49537.html; Paul Kerry and Matthew Lamers, “Setting a Precedent on Racism,” Korea Herald, March 30, 2010, https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20091106000044.

[23] Gi-Wook Shin and Joon Nak Choi, Global Talent: Skilled Labor as Social Capital in Korea (Stanford University Press, 2015).

[24] For more information about the Korea Foundation, see the organization’s “About Us” page at https://www.kf.or.kr/kfEng/cm/cntnts/cntntsView2.do?mi=2126.

[25] Gi-Wook Shin, “Demographic Headwinds,” Shorenstein APARC, December 15, 2022, https://aparc.fsi.stanford.edu/news/demographic-headwinds.

[26] “India to Have Talent Surplus of 245 Million Workers by 2030: Study,” Economic Times, May 7, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/indicators/india-to-have-talent-surplus-of-245-million-workers-by-2030-study/articleshow/64064096.cms.

[27] Cowen, “Rishi Sunak Shows the Growing Influence of Indian Talent in the West.”