In a recent interview with Korea Times, Gi-Wook Shin, director of APARC, said "only a drastic measure [by North Korea] can resolve the current stalemate." Shin also urged Moon administration to rework its North Korea policy.

Read the full interview in Korean language here.

A version of this article appeared in China Newsweek (Chinese). Questions from Li Jing of China Newsweek in conversation with Siegfried Hecker (Interview from October 2018).

Recently, the leaders of the two Koreas met again, and they signed a joint declaration which they said would bring peace to the Peninsula. How do you like the meeting and the declaration? Do you think it helpful to the denuclearizing? If so, how will it help?

The meeting was very positive. It helped to bring the two Koreas closer together and moved them in the direction of bringing peace to the Peninsula. The declaration was also positive, but somewhat vague. It offered the promise of denuclearization, but the difficult work remains to be done. The agreement on military cooperation is a big step in helping to reduce tensions between the two Koreas.

According to your assessment, what kind of nuclear capability does the North Korea have? Is it a de facto nuclear power?

There are many uncertainties about North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. However, based on what we know about its nuclear complex and the six nuclear tests it conducted, North Korea may have sufficient nuclear material, that is, plutonium and highly enriched uranium, for approximately 20 to 60 nuclear weapons, with 30 being the most likely number.

North Korea has a wide array of missile capabilities. It is quite likely that North Korea has miniaturized nuclear warheads to fit on the short-range SCUD missiles and medium-range Nodong missiles and therefore may be able to reach all of South Korea and most of Japan. North Korea has demonstrated that it can launch ICBM’s (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles), but it has done so only on high flight trajectories rather than normal trajectories. That means it must do more missile tests before it has a reliable ICBM. It has also not demonstrated that it can make a nuclear warhead sufficiently small, light, and robust to survive an ICBM flight.

I do not consider North Korea to be a nuclear weapon state, but it is a state with nuclear weapons, which does make it a de facto nuclear power.

Do you think the North Korea positive measures, including dismantling the Punggye-ri site, bears any substantial significance in terms of denuclearization? Were these measures reversible?

Stopping nuclear testing and ICBM testing were important positive steps. Closing the Punggye-ri nuclear testing tunnels was also an important step. Yes, these can be reversed, but a resumption of nuclear testing will now require much time and will be easily visible.

Since this year, the situation of the Peninsula issue has been improving very fast. Did you feel surprised by such a turn of the Peninsula situation?

The Year 2017 was very dangerous because of the technical advances that North Korea made with its nuclear programs, namely the big nuclear test in September and the ICBM missile tests. In addition, the political rhetoric was extremely dangerous. However, many positive things happened in 2018. The most important is that politically, we stepped away from the precipice of war, and that is good news, and somewhat unexpected.

It is reported that a second summit between the US and the DPRK may take place. If it is true, what fruit do you think the summit can yield? Do you think the first summit between President Trump and Kim Jung-un has opened the door to the denuclearization?

Yes, the Singapore Summit definitely opened the door to a resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis and the possibility of the denuclearization of the Peninsula. The summit was made possible by President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong-un taking important steps toward reconciliation. And, President Trump welcomed the opening and met with Chairman Kim. The Singapore declaration was very basic focusing on the overall objective of normalization and denuclearization. It left the difficult work for the future. A second summit should now agree on specific steps toward denuclearization and normalization.

The US insists on no relief of sanctions before complete denuclearization, but the DPRK seems expecting a step-to-step model. The positions of the two sides are very far apart. Do you think the two sides can find some space to make compromise in order to press ahead with the denuclearization?

I believe a step-by-step approach will be necessary, but on the North Korean side the steps will have to significantly reduce the risks its nuclear program poses. On the American side, the steps will have to make progress on normalization. These kind of steps for each side should be on the agenda for the second summit.

It has been reported that after the Singapore summit, the US has asked the DPRK to provide a list of its nuclear capabilities, which was rejected and regarded as confrontational by the DPRK. How much knowledge do the outside world have about the DPRK nuclear capability? Will a list mean a total surrender to the US?

From my perspective, what is more important is to first take concrete steps to reduce the nuclear risks. Two such steps, namely, no nuclear testing and no ICBM missile tests have already been taken by the DPRK. Next in importance is to stop plutonium production. That means to dismantle the 5 MW-electric reactor in Yongbyon and not start the Experimental Light Water Reactor under construction.

It may be appropriate to ask North Korea for a list of the Yongbyon facilities early in the negotiation process, but I believe a full declaration is not yet possible. The level of trust required for such a declaration does not yet exist. Eventually, North Korea will, of course, have to provide full declaration and agree to a strict verification regime.

Do you think the six party talks will still be significant after the DPRK and the US are holding bilateral talks?

It is not clear to me whether or not the six-party talks will be useful. However, it is very important that the other parties, namely, China, Russia and Japan, each play a supportive role in the denuclearization and normalization process. Those roles and that of the UN Security Council are yet to be defined.

You have predicted in a report that the DPRK will not abandon its nuclear capability at least in the coming 15 years. What are the major hindrances to a complete denuclearization of the DPRK? Is there any possibility for the related parties to persuade and press the country to start the denuclearization in the near future?

My Stanford University colleagues, Robert Carlin and Elliot Serbin, and I have published a comprehensive history of the North Korean nuclear program. Based on that history we developed a 10-year roadmap for denuclearization, rather than the 15 years quoted in the news media. Actually, it is better to call this a “framework,” because the real roadmap will have to be determined through negotiations.

It recommends three phases toward denuclearization. The first is to “halt” – that is, don’t make it worse. Second, take specific steps to “roll back”, reduce the threat - so no nuclear testing, no missile testing, no more plutonium. The uranium facilities will also have to be addressed, but that will take more time because only the Yongbyon centrifuge facility is known. North Korea has more centrifuge facilities that will eventually have to be addressed. The third phase is to “eliminate” all weapons and facilities that support the nuclear weapon program. Those facilities that would support only a civilian program will have to be addressed during negotiations. Our framework indicated that the first phase could take up to one year, the second would take possibly four more, and the third would be completed by the tenth year.

This process could be accelerated if sufficient trust can be developed between the DPRK and the United States. One possible way to build trust and speed up the process is to have the US and South Korea tell Chairman Kim that they are willing to help him convert his military nuclear and missile programs to civilian nuclear and space programs. Having American and South Korean technical specialists working side-by-side with DPRK specialists at their nuclear and space facilities would provide the best approach to verification of denuclearization.

And, let me also say, there is a potential role here for China as well as for Russia. China can help the DPRK with nuclear reactors for electricity and Russia could provide launch services for DPRK satellites.

Based on the current advancement of the DPRK’s denuclearization and the possibility of a fruitful second Trump-Kim summit, do you think the DPRK’s process of denuclearization goes in a way as reflected by the three-phase approach in the ten-year roadmap put forward by you? Which one of the three phases is the most important and which one is the most difficult?

So far, North Korea has begun the first phase of our ten-year roadmap, namely to begin to halt nuclear development. Pyongyang has stopped nuclear testing and stopped long-range missile testing and has promised to dismantle facilities at the Dongchang-ri Satellite Launching Station. The next important step is to stop reactor operations so as not to produce more plutonium. The Trump administration is pressing for a declaration of North Korea’s nuclear inventory as the next step in the process. While a declaration at some point would be consistent with the three-phrase approach, right now it would not be as valuable as halting operations at Yongbyon and may in fact be counterproductive. I hope that the next Trump-Kim summit will start the second phase, that is to seriously roll back the nuclear and missile programs. The most difficult step will be the last one – that is, to eliminate all military nuclear and missile programs. That will require the development of trust between the two parties and help from the other parties such as South Korea, China and Russia.

When the DPRK allegedly dismantled the Punggye Ri nuclear test site, there was no international technical personnel present on the spot to witness. Based only on media reports, do you think it is possible to confirm the site has been substantially dismantled?

During the 7 October Kim-Pompeo meeting, Chairman Kim apparently agreed to allow international inspectors to the test site. This is a very important step to build confidence that North Korea is taking serious actions to halt their nuclear program. The inspectors should be able to assess how complete the destruction of the tunnels is and what would be required to re-activate them. For North Korea to give up nuclear testing is one of the most important steps in denuclearization.

How does the international community effectively monitor the denuclearization measures such as suspension of nuclear tests and launch of missiles, suspension of uranium enrichment? Are these measures reversible? If they resume such activities, will it take a long time and be visible to the outside world?

Monitoring an end to nuclear testing and long-range missile launches is easy. It can be done with great confidence. Monitoring the operation of the plutonium-producing reactors is also very effective using commercial satellite imagery. There is no way to monitor uranium enrichment facility operation without cooperation from North Korea. Of course, most operations are reversible. However, resuming nuclear testing will be difficult if the tunnels are effectively destroyed. To make plutonium production irreversible, the reactors would have to be incapacitated (poisoned or destroyed). There is not much that can be done to confirm the suspension or prevent the resumption of uranium enrichment because no one outside of North Korea knows where all the facilities are.

How should the US compensate for the DPRK’s real denuclearization? What incentives can the international community provide to the DPRK in terms of creating a more beneficial environment?

I would not look at this as compensation – we should not be viewed as paying off the North Koreans to give up their nuclear weapon program. Besides, I believe that what they want most is security guarantees. For this, one has to ask the North Koreans what they require. Since Chairman Kim appears very serious about improving North Korea’s economy, I believe he will ask for relief of sanctions so they can develop their economy. The US should be prepared to match North Korea’s denuclearization actions with steps toward political normalization and sanctions relief.

Based on the interactions of different parties this year, especially the negotiations between the US and the DPRK, how probably do you think the DPRK leader Kim Jung-un will be committed to a complete denuclearization? Compared with his father, is he more confident and more steadfast in embarking on the road of focusing on economic development?

The history of negotiations is long and complicated. No one outside of North Korea really knows what Kim Jung-un is prepared to do. However, he has taken important and encouraging steps toward denuclearization and expressed his deep commitment to economic development. Since the actions taken by Kim Jung-un, President Moon Jae-in and President Trump in 2018 have moved us away from the brink of war, I think it is time to test just how far Chairman Kim is willing to go toward denuclearization and normalization. Time will tell.

Rountable participants and Ambassador Cho at Shorenstein APARC. Photo: Thom Holme.

This article originally appeared on 38 North.

My reply to the frequently asked question if Kim Jong Un will ever give up North Korea’s nuclear weapons is, “I don’t know, and most likely he doesn’t know either. But it is time to find out.” However, insisting that Kim Jong Un give a full declaration of his nuclear program up front will not work. It will breed more suspicion instead of building the trust necessary for the North to denuclearize, a process that will extend beyond the 2020 US presidential election.

However, the time it will take to get to the endpoint should not obscure the progress that has already been made. Since this spring, Kim Jong Un has taken significant steps to reduce the nuclear threat North Korea poses. He has declared an end to nuclear testing and closed the nuclear test tunnels by setting off explosive charges inside the test tunnel complex. He also declared an end to testing intermediate- and long-range missiles including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). I consider these as two of the most important steps toward reducing the threat North Korea poses and as significant steps on the path to denuclearization.

Whereas the North still poses a nuclear threat to Japan and South Korea as well as US military forces and citizens in the region, the threat to the United States has been markedly reduced. In my opinion, North Korea needs more nuclear and ICBM tests to be able to reach the United States with a nuclear-tipped missile. Freezing the sophistication of the program is a necessary precursor to rolling it back in a step-by-step process.

At the September 2018 inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang, Kim also told President Moon that he would commit to dismantling the Yongbyon nuclear complex if the US takes commensurate measures—unspecified, at least in public. The Yongbyon complex is the heart of North Korea’s nuclear program. Shutting it down and dismantling it would be a very big deal because it would stop plutonium and tritium production (for hydrogen bombs) and significantly disrupt highly enriched uranium production.

Yet, Kim’s actions have been widely dismissed as insignificant or insincere by both the left and the right of the American political spectrum. In many of these quarters, the sincerity of Kim’s denuclearization promise is judged by whether or not he is willing to provide a full and complete declaration and to agree on adequate verification measures. But Kim’s willingness to provide a full declaration at this early stage tells us little about his willingness to denuclearize. Moreover, I maintain that insisting on this approach is a dead end, certainly as long as Washington continues to apply “maximum pressure” instead of moving to implement the steps on normalizing relations that President Trump agreed to in the June Singapore statement.

A full declaration is a dead end because it is tantamount to surrender, and Kim has not surrendered, nor will he. A complete account of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, materials, and facilities would, in Kim’s view, likely be far too risky in that it would essentially provide a targeting list for US military planners and seal the inevitable end of the nuclear program and possibly his regime.

Furthermore, a declaration must be accompanied by a robust verification protocol. That, in turn, must allow inspections and a full accounting of all past activities such as production and procurement records as well as export activities. And, once all these activities are complete, an inspection protocol must provide assurances that activities that could support a weapons program are not being reconstituted. This would be a contentious and drawn-out affair.

It is inconceivable that the North would declare all of its nuclear weapons, their location, and allow inspections of the weapons or of their disassembly up front. But in addition to the weapons themselves, a nuclear weapon program consists of three interlocking elements: 1) the nuclear bomb fuel, which depending on the type of bomb includes plutonium, highly enriched uranium (HEU), and forms of heavy hydrogen—deuterium and tritium; 2) weaponization—that is, designing, building and testing weapons, and; 3) delivery systems, which in the case of North Korea appear to be missiles, although airplane or ship delivery cannot be ruled out. Each of these elements involves dozens of sites, hundreds of buildings, and several thousand people.

Let me give an example of what is involved just for verification of plutonium inventories and means of production. Plutonium is produced in reactors by the fission of uranium fuel. We estimate that most of the North’s plutonium has been produced in its 5 MWe (electric) gas-graphite reactor at the Yongbyon complex. A complete declaration must provide for the entire operations history (along with its design and operational characteristics) going back to its initial operation in 1986 to correctly estimate how much plutonium was produced.

In addition, North Korea has operated the Soviet-supplied IRT-2000 research reactor at the Yongbyon site since 1967. Although little plutonium has likely been produced there, this would have to be verified by providing the complete operating history along with performance characteristics since its initial operation. North Korea has also constructed an experimental light water reactor (ELWR) that is likely not yet operational. Its status would have to be checked to see if it was configured to favor weapon-grade plutonium production. Finally, North Korea began to build but never completed 50 MWe and 200 MWe gas-graphite reactors, whose construction operations were stopped by the Agreed Framework in 1994. Their status would have to be verified.

The 5 MWe reactor fuel consists of natural uranium metal alloy fuel elements. Tracking the entire history of fuel fabrication would be an important verification step for plutonium production. It starts with uranium ore mining, milling and conversion to uranium oxide. This is followed by a few additional steps to produce the uranium metal that is formed into fuel elements for the reactor to produce plutonium. Some of these same steps would also be used, but then complemented by turning the uranium into a compound that serves as the precursor gas (uranium hexafluoride) for centrifuge enrichment to produce low enriched uranium for light water reactors or highly enriched uranium for bombs.

A complete and accurate accounting of fuel produced would also likely show a discrepancy that indicates that more fuel was produced at Yongbyon than was consumed. The difference could be accounted for by the fuel that North Korea produced for the gas-graphite reactor it built in Syria, a project that was terminated by Israel’s air raid on the Al Kibar site in September 2007. North Korea is unlikely to acknowledge the illicit construction of the Syrian reactor as part of its own plutonium declaration.

Once produced in the reactor, plutonium has to be extracted from the used or spent fuel after a sufficient period of time that allows the spent fuel to cool thermally and radioactively. The extraction or separations process is accomplished in a reprocessing facility using mechanical and chemical methods. The North’s reprocessing facility became operational in the early 1990s. All of its operations records would have to be examined and verified. In addition, it is likely that some small amount of plutonium that may have been produced in the IRT-2000 reactor was separated in the hot cell facilities in that complex. Its records would have to be examined and verified.

After plutonium is separated, it must be purified, alloyed, cast and machined into final bomb components. Each of these steps generates residue and waste streams that must be monitored and assessed for their plutonium content. Based on my visits to Yongbyon and discussions with the North’s technical staff, I believe that the steps beginning with delivery of yellowcake to Yongbyon (from the uranium mining and milling sites), plus all steps for fuel fabrication, reactor production of plutonium, spent fuel cooling, reprocessing, plutonium purification and alloying into metal ingots are conducted at Yongbyon.

During my visits to Yongbyon, I was told that the plutonium ingots are then taken off site (of an undeclared location) in which the plutonium is cast into bomb components—which would then be followed by machining and assembling into pits, the plutonium cores of the weapons. In 2010, I was also told that all plutonium residues and wastes from reprocessing and plutonium metal preparation were still stored at Yongbyon (under questionable safety conditions). Very little had been done to prepare the spent fuel waste for final disposition. This is likely still the case and, hence, most of the reprocessing facility must remain operational after the rest of Yongbyon is shut down in order to prepare the hazardous waste for safe, long-term disposition. This will also complicate the plutonium inventory verification.

A complete declaration must also include how much plutonium was used during underground testing. In addition to the six known tests at Punggye-ri, North Korea also claims to have conducted “subcritical” experiments (stopping just short of a nuclear detonation), which I consider to be unlikely. If it did, however, North Korea would have to declare the amount of plutonium used and its current state, particularly since such experiments could leave plutonium in a usable form unlike the case for nuclear detonations. To verify the nuclear test history of plutonium, as well as for highly enriched uranium, it would be necessary to provide information or allow drill-back inspections into the test tunnels at Punggye-ri to ascertain the type and amount of nuclear material used in the test.

To complicate matters even further, if one or more of the North’s test devices failed to produce a nuclear explosion, then plutonium (or HEU) could still be resident in the tunnels. Both the United States and Russia experienced such test failures. This is also possibly the case for North Korea because there is still some uncertainty as to whether or not a nuclear test was conducted in May 2010 when a faint seismic signal was observed from the test area. For the most part, the jury is still out on that event, but the North would now have to allow inspections and verification.

It should be apparent that the declaration plus commensurate verification of the amount of plutonium North Korea possesses, which I believe is only between 20 and 40 kilograms, will be an enormous job. I cannot see it being accomplished in the current adversarial environment and certainly not within the timeframe that has been specified by the US government.

A similar sequence of declarations, inspections, and verification measures would have to be developed for the other bomb fuels, namely HEU and the hydrogen isotopes, deuterium and tritium. Verification of HEU inventories and means of production will be particularly contentious because very little is known about the centrifuge facility at the Yongbyon site. As far as we know, my Stanford colleagues and I are the only foreigners to have seen that facility, and then only in a hurried walk-through in 2010. In addition, there exists at least one other covert centrifuge site.

The situation is even more problematic for the second element of the North’s nuclear program, that of weaponization, which includes bomb design, production, and testing because we know nothing about these activities or where they are performed. Although we have some information regarding the nuclear test site at which six nuclear tests were conducted, we do not know if there are other tunnel complexes that have been prepared for testing.

The third element includes all of the North’s missiles and its production, storage and launch sites and complexes. These will also represent a major challenge for complete and correct declarations, inspections and verification.

Once all of the elements have been declared and the dismantling begins, then the focus will have to change to verifying the dismantlement and assessing the potential reversibility of these actions—a challenge that is not only difficult, but one that must be ongoing.

Verification was one of the sticking points during the 2007-2008 diplomatic initiative pursued late in the George W. Bush administration. In 2008, the North turned over copies of 18,000 pages of operating records of the reactor and reprocessing facilities in Yongbyon. The veracity of that disclosure has never been established because diplomatic efforts fell apart when the United States insisted on more declarations up front and North Korea accused Washington of having moved the goal posts. That declaration constituted only a small part of what I outlined above as being necessary for a full accounting of plutonium, not to mention the other components of North Korea’s nuclear program. That was 10 years ago, and much has happened since to make future declarations and verification much more problematic.

At this time, the level of trust between Pyongyang and Washington required for North Korea to agree to a full, verifiable declaration up front does not exist. Hence, my colleagues Robert Carlin and Elliot Serbin and I have suggested a different approach. Negotiations should begin with an agreed end state: North Korea without nuclear weapons or a nuclear weapon program. Civilian nuclear and space programs would remain open for negotiation and possible cooperation. But all facilities and activities that have direct nuclear weapons applicability must eventually be eliminated.

Rather than insisting on a full declaration up front, the two sides should first agree to have the North take significant steps that reduce the nuclear threat it poses in return for commensurate movements toward normalization—the details of which would have to be worked out during negotiations. A good next step for the North would be the destruction of the 5 MWe plutonium production reactor, which would be part of the package that Kim proposed to Moon at the Pyongyang Summit. If these actions are matched by US steps toward normalization as pledged in the Singapore statement, they will serve to build the trust required for the North to initiate a phased declaration process that initially covers operations in Yongbyon and eventually includes the entire nuclear program discussed above.

Unfortunately, the strategic opening created by the Singapore and North-South summits has not been followed by such tactical steps to get the negotiation process off the ground. The North and the South are ready to create a commonly acceptable path forward, but we have the worst of environments in Washington. The Trump team claims progress is being made but insists on maintaining maximum pressure. The North’s Foreign Ministry has pointed outthat the “improvement of relations and sanctions are incompatible.” Also, most US North Korea watchers are either wedded to old think that you can’t negotiate with Pyongyang or they are determined to prove President Trump’s claims on North Korea wrong.

With nuclear tensions on the Korean Peninsula dramatically reduced, it is time to find out if Kim’s drive to improve the economy will eventually lead to denuclearization. He may determine that his nuclear arsenal poses a significant hindrance to economic development that outweighs the putative benefits it confers. Washington and Seoul should work together to encourage rather than inhibit this potential shift.

Shorenstein APARC's annual overview of the Center's 2017-18 activities  is now available to download. 

Feature sections look at the Center's seminars, conferences, and other activities in response to the North Korean crisis, research and events related to China's past, present, and future, and several Center research initiatives focused on technology and the changing workforce.

The overview highlights recent and ongoing Center research on Japan's economic policies, innovation in Asia, population aging and chronic disease in Asia, and talent flows in the knowledge economy, plus news about Shorenstein APARC's education and policy activities, publications, and more.