Indonesia’s “New Order,” the authoritarian military regime led by General Suharto from 1966-1998, originated following the kidnapping and killing of six Army generals on September 30th-October 1, 1965. The conventional narrative often depicts this regime change as a sudden event, but historian Norman Joshua, APARC's 2023-24 Shorenstein postdoctoral fellow on contemporary Asia, challenges this view.  Joshua’s research explains why the civil-military relationships and social militarization that emerged in Indonesia from the period under Dutch colonial rule in the preceding decade allowed the New Order to solidify power in 1965.

In a recent seminar hosted by APARC’s Southeast Asia Program, “Militarization Overlooked: Rethinking the Origins of Indonesia’s New Order, 1950-1965,” Joshua shared his insights into the complex phenomenon of militarization within Indonesian society, spanning from the tumultuous post-independence era to the present day. Through a historian's lens, he traces the origins of militarization and its far-reaching impacts on political, social, and cultural dynamics in Indonesia.

An Environment Conducive to Militarization

At the heart of this narrative lies the period following Indonesia's revolutionary struggle and independence from Dutch colonial rule. Scholars have portrayed the 1950s favorably as a time when Indonesia embarked on an experiment with liberal and constitutional democracy. Joshua, however, argues that, instead of heralding an era of stability and democratic governance, “the post-revolutionary landscape was fraught with underdevelopment, persistent conflict, and political instability.” This environment provided fertile ground for the gradual militarization of Indonesian society, as the military sought to quell armed groups and revolutionary violence.

"In essence, my current project is an endeavor to write a social and cultural history of Indonesian authoritarianism," Joshua explains. He frames this process as militarization, wherein civil society organizes itself for the production of violence.

Joshua's scholarly curiosity about Indonesian authoritarianism stems from his deep-seated interest in the country's post-revolutionary period. He is particularly drawn to the oft-overlooked years of the 1950s and 1960s, which he deems pivotal in comprehending Indonesia's authoritarian trajectory. He was also drawn to the topic by a family member’s involvement in the revolutionary and Communist movements, leading to their exile from Indonesia after the 1965 massacres, “which sparked my interest in studying ‘those who were on the wrong side of history,' so to speak.”

Joshua sheds light on the role of armed revolutionary factions like the Gerombolan, whose lingering presence posed a challenge to the nascent Indonesian government's efforts to establish control and maintain order, even bearing responsibility for the murder of Yale professor Raymond Kennedy and Time-Life reporter Robert Doyle.

"Militarization produced a militarized society that was regimented and conditioned towards the use of violence," Joshua asserts. His analysis reveals how militarization permeated various facets of Indonesian society, from the adoption of military symbolism to the normalization of violence in everyday life.

An Enduring Legacy of Militarization

Joshua cites the continuing role of the military and police in post-1998 Indonesian society. The Army—and the Police, which is in many ways a constabulary force—have retained their territorial organization, and former and active-duty military and police often participate in non-security affairs. He also highlights the important role of security forces in facing domestic challenges such as the ongoing insurgency in Papua.

Joshua considers militarization from a cultural standpoint, including the fetishization of uniforms, marches, and militia-like organizations. Militarization, he notes, is often manifested in slogans, songs, ceremonies, and indoctrination programs. For example, the slogan "Ganyang Malaysia," originating from Sukarno's call to "crush" Malaysia, became emblematic of Indonesian nationalism and militarism.

Challenges for Democracy

Despite the downfall of the New Order regime, Joshua underscores the implications of the enduring legacy of militarization in contemporary Indonesia. Just two months ago, Indonesian voters elected Prabowo Subianto, a former special forces commander with a controversial history, as their next president. Expressing apprehensions about the potential for further militarization, Joshua points to the ascendancy of leaders like Prabowo. "Militarization under Prabowo would be evident in two ways," he cautions, citing increased military budgets and an expanded role for the military in non-security affairs. “While we have yet to hear about the shape of Prabowo’s cabinet, I believe that we will see an increasing role for the military and police—whether active-duty or retired—in non-military affairs,” he said.

“This trend started during the Jokowi administration and will continue under Prabowo, and has invited concerns from civil rights organizations and human rights groups. Ultimately, I think Prabowo’s election is a test for Indonesia’s democratic values and how resilient the civil society is.”

Assessing the health of Indonesian democracy, Joshua notes fluctuations that warrant concern. "Indonesian democracy is still working well, especially compared to neighboring countries," he observes. “I think the election of Prabowo shows the robustness of Indonesian democratic procedures, as the 2024 Presidential Election was conducted peacefully and with relatively minor complaints of voting fraud or irregularities.” However, he highlights potential challenges ahead. “It appears that Indonesian democracy will face a great challenge in the next four years, and we will see if the guardrails of democratic procedure will hold or not.”

An Interdisciplinary Scholar Community

As a Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellow, Joshua connected with APARC scholars to further his research. “I work mostly with Southeast Asia Program Director Don Emmerson and am glad to be connected with APARC faculty Stephen Kotkin, who I found as an inspiration for my work,” he notes. Engaging with Lee Kong Chian Fellow on Southeast Asia Soksamphoas Im, who works on authoritarian politics in Cambodia, with fellow scholar Yuya Ouchi, and Visiting Scholar Gita Wirjawan, who is an expert practitioner of Indonesian politics, has also been an enriching experience, Joshua says. conversations with .”

Delving into the Hoover Institution archives, Joshua examined the papers of Guy Pauker, an Indonesianist and “Cold Warrior” in the 1960s, and his engagement with Indonesian poet, writer, and scholar Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana, who was a fellow at Stanford’s Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.

“I am grateful to have spent my postdoctoral fellowship at APARC, as it allows me to spend more time working on my dissertation toward transforming it into a monograph,” said Joshua.

“The interdisciplinary nature of APARC is particularly helpful for a young scholar like me and helped the process of refining my arguments, especially in terms of engaging with people outside of my field and academic discipline."

After his time at APARC, Joshua will serve as the Hoover History Lab’s Research and Teaching Fellow at the Hoover Institution under Condoleezza Rice and Stephen Kotkin.

Joshua’s research provides a comprehensive exploration of the nature of civil-military relations within Indonesian society. By tracing its historical roots and examining its contemporary manifestations, he provides valuable insights into how militarization has shaped Indonesia's political, social, and cultural milieu.

His analysis of the militarizing process offers scholars insights into an understudied period in Indonesian history and helps us better understand the origins of authoritarian military regimes worldwide. As Indonesia continues to navigate its path forward, grappling with the legacies of its militarized past will undoubtedly remain a complex and pressing challenge.

“I believe that history serves as more than just a chronicle of the past,” Joshua reflects. “It serves as a vital lens through which we can comprehend and contextualize the events that are still unfolding in our contemporary world.”
 

This essay originally appeared in The Diplomat.

With major crises in Gaza and Ukraine, the Biden administration might be tempted to overlook the importance of Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s mid-November visit to Washington. That would be a mistake. Indonesia is an important country that is heading into crucial presidential elections in early 2024, and the results of Jokowi’s visit could go a long way to shaping the next Indonesian government’s attitudes toward its relations with the United States.

Although U.S.-Indonesian security cooperation is good and trade has grown, by all accounts Jokowi and his team are heading to Washington feeling less than satisfied on several fronts. First, Indonesians remain upset by President Joe Biden’s decision to skip the recent Indonesia-hosted East Asia Summit, which they took as a serious snub. Biden invited Jokowi in part to make up for that absence, but the White House might have underestimated the extent to which Indonesians remain upset over the initial affront. The protocol-conscious government no doubt will also contrast their modest White House schedule with the lavish welcome recently received by Australian Prime Minster Anthony Albanese.

Indonesian authorities also remain unhappy with what they see as Washington’s failure to deliver on the high-profile Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP), under which the U.S. committed to lead G-7-plus efforts to mobilize $20 billion to support Indonesia’s accelerated transition from coal to cleaner energy. Indonesian officials have complained publicly for months that the U.S. has pressed them to take difficult steps while offering little in the way of concessional financing to pay for it. The reality is more complicated, but the perception in Jakarta that Washington “sold them a bill of goods” is real. Some Indonesian officials have contrasted that with substantial Chinese funding on priority infrastructure initiatives, highlighting the regional perception of U.S. weakness vis-à-vis China as a reliable economic partner. (The Indonesians have largely ignored the fact that the U.S. is their second-largest export market and has risen rapidly to be their fourth-largest source of foreign direct investment.)

Jokowi also is looking for Biden to move forward on a proposed limited free trade agreement under which Indonesian critical minerals (namely nickel and processed nickel) would meet the criteria for inclusion in the electric vehicle tax credits provided for in the Inflation Reduction Act. The Biden administration reportedly is interested in such a deal, which by promoting diversification of both suppliers for the U.S. and markets for Indonesia would be in the U.S. national interest. It has, however, hesitated to proceed due to concerns about the congressional reaction, environmental and labor issues, and heavy Chinese investment in Indonesian nickel mining.

Finally, one has to assume that the Gaza crisis will be at the top of Jokowi’s agenda (if not Biden’s) when the two presidents meet. Indonesia, home to the world’s largest Muslim population, has long supported the Palestinian cause and has vigorously pursued diplomatic efforts to achieve an immediate ceasefire. While working hard to keep the issue from blowing up domestically, there is no question but that Indonesian public opinion (and genuinely held beliefs among top officials) has put the two governments at odds over the crisis.

At this late date, there is little prospect of major initiatives coming out of the Biden-Jokowi meeting that would ease Indonesian concerns or generate significant positive momentum. There is, however, still time to make some small investments that could result in Jokowi and his team leaving Washington feeling more positive about the relationship.

First, on Gaza, the meeting will not resolve the two countries’ differences, but it is important that Biden listen to and engage with Jokowi seriously on the issue and that he highlights his efforts to encourage Israel to show restraint and to promote a humanitarian pause. Jokowi’s post-meeting public comments about this discussion likely will have a significant influence on the Indonesian public and media perceptions of the U.S. role, so it is critical that Biden do all he can to ensure those comments are positive.

Second, it is important that Biden understand that Jokowi and many Indonesians are still upset over the president’s decision to skip the recent Jakarta summit. Biden cannot undo that, but he can and should acknowledge it in his discussion with Jokowi and emphasize that he appreciates how important Indonesia is.

Even such moves will only go so far without some movement on JETP and the critical minerals trade question. On the former, there isn’t time to achieve major progress before the meeting, but President Biden should instruct his team to redouble their efforts to mobilize funding and get the initiative moving. This goes beyond Indonesian concerns and gets to the heart of regional wariness about Washington being able to put meat on the bones of its various economic initiatives.

On critical minerals, Biden should agree to send trade officials to Jakarta to discuss the outlines of a possible agreement, though he will have to be careful not to overcommit absent confidence he will be able to deliver. Indonesia, for its part, needs to stop rotating ambassadors through Washington so quickly and install an envoy who can effectively make the case for a limited trade deal to Congress and others.

Some serious, last-minute work needs to be done to ensure that next week’s meeting between the leaders of the world’s second and third-largest democracies does more than highlight the differences and problems in the relationship.

In February 1986, Scot Marciel was driving home after midnight and went past what he assumed was just another protest near military facilities in downtown Manila. The gathering, less than a year into his first overseas assignment with the Foreign Service, turned out to be the early days of the Philippine People Power revolution, leading to the end of the Ferdinand Marcos regime. This was just one of several times during his 35-year career in the State Department that Marciel would find himself witnessing historic moments in Southeast Asia and in the U.S. relationship with the countries of the region.

That illustrious career includes being the first U.S. diplomat to work in Hanoi since the end of the Vietnam War and serving as the first U.S. ambassador for ASEAN Affairs and as U.S. ambassador to Indonesia and Myanmar.

Marciel, Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at FSI and affiliated with APARC, has distilled his experiences and observations into his new book, Imperfect Partners: The United States and Southeast Asia (Shorenstein APARC/ Rowman & Littlefield, 2023). In it, he offers his on-the-ground account of the ups and downs of critical U.S. relationships in the region — focusing on the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Indonesia — and examines the role of ASEAN and China’s influence in Southeast Asia.

To mark the book’s release, we talked with Marciel about recent events in the region and his views on how the United States should approach Southeast Asian countries in the context of China’s efforts to sow closer ties with them. Watch the conversation:

A Return to the Philippines

The Philippines under President Ferdinand “Bong Bong” Marcos, Jr. is now allowing U.S. forces expanded access to four of its bases. Marciel, who first met Marcos, Jr. as the provincial governor of Ilocos Norte in 1985, expressed some surprise at the Philippine president’s rapid shift to strengthen the country’s alliance with the United States. He noted, however, that even in the last year of the Duterte presidency, which frequently was at odds with the United States, there was some recognition in the Philippines that the relationship with China wasn’t bearing the fruit that had been anticipated. Marciel also pointed out that the deal with the United States does not mean Marcos has abandoned China: he is still working on keeping the relationship with Beijing healthy and visiting Japan, another important partner.

Although there is some Philippine civil opposition to the renewed presence of U.S. forces, Marciel believes that the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) will provide an opportunity for a “more modern and equal partnership,” and hopefully one that can supplant memories of the U.S. colonial history in the Philippines.

Southeast Asian Charm Competition?

As concern continues to rise about a possible invasion of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China, some have questioned the effectiveness of the U.S. capability to compete with China, particularly in terms of a diplomatic offensive. Marciel responded to a recent New York Times article on U.S. and Chinese efforts to “woo” Indonesia. As China continues to seal trade deals in Southeast Asia, some of which are part of its Belt and Road Initiative, we asked whether the United States can compete with China’s free-flowing cash.

Marciel, taking a step back, cautions that “Indonesia is not a prize to be won,” and that we should not be “scoring diplomatic relations like a sporting event” when we look at improving ties with the countries of Southeast Asia. Indonesia, for example, has a long history with the Non-Aligned Movement, so while it attempts to attract foreign investment, it will resist aligning with any one major power. China tends to offer attractive investment packages with minimal conditions, but “you can’t always count on those investments to happen,” notes Marciel, and even when they do, there can be issues with corruption, as well as social and environmental consequences. The United States tries to put together investments that consider issues like labor and the environment, but Marciel believes that “sometimes we aim a little high” and the conditions make U.S. offerings less attractive.

The Continuing Crisis in Myanmar

We spoke with Marciel just after the second anniversary of the 2021 coup in Myanmar. He began his term as U.S. ambassador to that country in 2016, just before Aung Sang Suu Kyi’s new government was about to take office. As he puts it, it was a time of “euphoria,” not only in Myanmar but also in terms of U.S. hopes for democracy there. It turned out to be a difficult four years for Myanmar and Marciel, as the Rohingya crisis repeatedly erupted and the Myanmar military reacted with violent operations that drove hundreds of thousands of Rohingya out of Myanmar. As Marciel relates in his book, he soon found that even using the word “Rohingya” in U.S. embassy statements could create a diplomatic crisis.

Even with the horrific Rohingya genocide, Marciel cautiously notes that by 2020, when he left the country, most people in Myanmar had more opportunity and freedom under four years of a democratically elected government—the Rohingya themselves being the obvious exception. But in 2021, the “military coup basically eliminated that hope and opportunity.”

Marciel doesn’t hold much hope for an end to the coup anytime soon, but he does see at least one “positive development” over the last two years. During the worst of the Rohingya crisis, many in the majority Bamar community did not believe the reports of massacres, or even worse, did not care. But now, after two years of military rule, “more and more Myanmar people are explicitly recognizing the legitimate grievances and the suffering of many of the ethnic minority populations, including the Rohingya, over the past years, and [there is] some recognition that they were fed a lot of propaganda for a long time about what was really happening.”

Establishing Relations with Vietnam

One of Marciel’s great success stories is the normalization of U.S. ties with Vietnam. It was an improbable success with any number of obstacles likely to prevent it from happening, not the least being the debate about the fate of U.S. prisoners of war and servicemen reported as missing in action. Saigon fell in 1975, and yet in 1995, just 20 years later, diplomatic relations were restored and the U.S. embassy opened in Hanoi.

According to Marciel, it took patience, pragmatism, but also the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. No longer able to rely on Soviet help for their economy, the Vietnamese became more open to work with the United States, particularly on POW-MIA issues, allowing Vietnamese imprisoned in re-education camps to flee the country, and withdrawing Vietnamese forces from Cambodia.

Marciel sees the U.S.-Vietnam relationship today as a “good-news story” that shows the degree of progress that can be attained when two countries are willing to be rational and work together. The United States still has significant concerns about human rights in Vietnam yet “both sides have agreed to talk about that issue, but not let it define or limit the relationship excessively.”

How the United States Can Improve Relations in Southeast Asia

When pressed for a prescription on what the United States can do to further improve its relationships with the countries in the region, Marciel said, “In brief, show up and engage consistently, with humility, and with a focus on the countries that we’re talking to, not on China, because what they’re looking for, for the most part is, ‘Can we count on the United States being a long-term partner?’”

By ensuring the reliability of the partnership, countries in Southeast Asia have more freedom of maneuver, and they can, if necessary, be more capable to “make decisions China might not like.” The flip side of that—the failure to show up at presidential and high governmental levels, like what happened during the Trump administration—means “you’ve undone all the good that you had done in previous years by investing in those relationships.” The price of isolationism, of neglecting U.S. diplomatic relations in Southeast Asia, is that those countries lose confidence in the United States as a reliable partner. 

Reza Idria is an Assistant Professor in Social Anthropology at the Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN) Ar-Raniry (Ar-Raniry State Islamic University) in Banda Aceh, Indonesia. He holds an MA and Ph.D. in Social Anthropology from Harvard University as well as an MA in Islamic Studies from Leiden University, The Netherlands. Born and raised in Aceh, the only province adopting Sharia Law in Indonesia, Reza’s research interests are at the intersection of legal anthropology and Islamic law. 

Idria is the Lee Kong Chian NUS-Stanford Fellow on Contemporary Southeast Asia at APARC for the 2023 winter quarter. The fellowship, which is hosted jointly by APARC’s Southeast Asia Program (SeAP) and the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at the National University of Singapore, raises the visibility, extent, and quality of scholarship on contemporary Southeast Asia.

During his LKC NUS-Stanford fellowship, he will turn his doctoral dissertation, “Tales of the Unexpected: Contesting Syari’ah Law in Aceh, Indonesia,” into a book manuscript. This work is an anthropological study that examines a wide range of social and political responses that have emerged with the state implementation of Islamic law. The empirical data for this research project has been gathered in Aceh, the only Indonesian province that has adopted Sharia. Dr. Idria is also embarking on a new research project that focuses on the legal and socio-economic consequences of the local regulation on Islamic banking.

This interview originally appeared on the website of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at the National University of Singapore.

What sparked your interest in studying the social and political responses to the state implementation of Sharia law in Aceh, Indonesia?

There are some puzzling conditions in Aceh that sparked my interest to conduct this study. I grew up immersed in Acehnese Muslim culture and have lived through the historical and political transformation of the region since the period of armed conflict. In my view, the government’s efforts to translate Sharia into positive law in Aceh was motivated largely by political needs, rather than the religious ones. Islam has indeed a pronounced role in Aceh society since pre-colonial time, and the province is often called “Verandah of Mecca”, but it was only in 1999 the central government decided to impose Sharia law in the province in an attempt to quell the Free Aceh Movement rebellion.

In fact, it was the tsunami of 2004 that actually helped stop the war and led to the signing of peace agreement. However, it did not prevent the government to apply more aggressive Sharia law in the post-conflict and post-tsunami Aceh. While many Acehnese appeared supportive to the implementation of Sharia, I was also troubled with the impression created by many media outlets that all Acehnese accept Sharia law without question. Despite the aggressive enforcement directed by the state, my study found some elements of Acehnese society have passionately contested and challenged the official understanding of Sharia.

What challenges did you encounter when carrying out your fieldwork in Aceh for your upcoming monograph, Tales of the Unexpected: Contesting Syari’ah Law in Aceh, Indonesia?

I began gathering considerable data for this study in 2011 when I was involved in a joint research project on the Indonesian experience of Islam and politics after the fall of Suharto. Given the sensitivity of this topic conducting fieldwork was challenging. Some people were suspicious of my academic inquiry. People were mostly reluctant to speak on anything related to Sharia Law. Even those who have engaged in activism against Sharia law did not want to be seen as openly antagonistic to it. Many would say that they are not resisting Sharia as such, rather seeking to rescue Sharia from associations with fundamentalism. I think it is because the Acehnese perceived that their identity is deeply entwined with Islam, therefore critical voices to the state-led Sharia implementation are often subdued due to the fear of being labeled anti-Islam. It’s a dangerous stigma and I think no one could survive in Aceh with that stigma. Such condition contributes to people’s ambiguous and ambivalent reactions toward Sharia. To me this also explains why resistance to Sharia has eventually taken many forms and is often performed in unconventional manners. Sometimes so subtle that they might not seem like resistance at all.

How have the diverse range of local groups who have engaged in activism against Sharia law enforcement in Aceh cooperated with each other?

There was some cooperation and mutual support among local groups who share dissenting views concerning the state interpretations of Sharia. For example, in responding to the provisions of Islamic Criminal Code of 2009 (referred locally as Qanun Jinayah), intellectuals from several local universities, cultural activists, and dozens of civil society organizations worked together to criticize many controversial aspects of the proposed law. They formed an advocacy network called Jaringan Masyarakat Sipil Peduli Syariat (the Civil Society’s Network concerning Sharia). JMSPS activists used various strategies, from lobbying to organizing a series of demonstrations. They went to the Aceh Parliament condemning members of the parliament and the governor of Aceh had they not stopped proposing the law. The movement was relatively successful as the Sharia Criminal Code of 2009 was postponed because Governor Irwandi Yusuf eventually refused to sign it. However, conditions have changed in the following years, especially after Irwandi lost the gubernatorial election in 2012. His successor signed the Qanun draft and passed the Sharia criminal law in 2014.

How has Komunitas Tikar Pandan, the cultural organization you co-founded in Aceh in 2002, played a role in the responses to Sharia law implementation?

Komunitas Tikar Pandan continues to organize various culturally oriented activities such as creating writing workshops, painting exhibitions, film screenings and discussions. The organization’s mission from the very beginning is to generate critical awareness, especially for the young, about the dangers of cultural hegemony and structural oppression in the name of identity politics and religion. One example, in responding to the absence of public cinema in Banda Aceh which has been considered by Aceh’s Ulama Council incompatible to the spirit of Sharia, Komunitas Tikar Pandan provides a mini-cinema and hosts a series of film screenings and discussions as a rebuke. Tikar Pandan’s office occasionally became sanctuary for some members of marginalized groups in Banda Aceh.

How do activist groups based outside of Aceh provide assistance to local Aceh activists whose resistance to Sharia law enforcement has met with opposition from local authorities?

For some cases such as the anti-punk crackdown in 2011 and the persecution of Aceh queers in 2018, support and assistance from people outside Aceh were helpful and forceful imposing pressure upon the Sharia authorities to evaluate their actions. Legal Aid Foundation (LBH) from Jakarta offered legal assistance to release the arrested punks. International expressions support for Aceh’s punks also took place across the globe, from Moscow to San Francisco, under the slogan “Punk is Not Crime” condemning the crackdown. Some international human rights organizations also provided aid advocacy and financial support to LGBTQ activists in Aceh.

How has local public opinion of Sharia law changed since it was implemented in Aceh, and what factors have been most influential in shaping this change?

At the beginning, there was a tremendous hope that the Sharia law would restore justice in the region affected by decades of bloody armed conflict. The conflict period was the period of profound lawlessness for the Acehnese. They were killed, tortured, and raped but no perpetrators had been brought to trial. That’s why I think people in Aceh were enthusiasts when the central government offered Sharia law to the province in 1999. Gradually the implementation has given rise to its own issues and resulted in the creation of multiple injustice and many forms of violence too. I think there are two factors that have been most influential in shaping and creating the negative image of the current Sharia implementation in the province, first morality policing through the special unit known as Sharia police. Second, the enactment of spectacle punishment, namely hukum cambuk (public caning). While Sharia promises to be a comprehensive guidance in all aspects of life, the Aceh government has been criticized by many ordinary Acehnese to focus merely on symbolic aspects of Islam, while neglecting what they viewed as more “substantial” concerns.

What developments do you anticipate happening in Aceh’s political and social scene in the near future that could affect the enforcement of Sharia law?

Aceh has been the poorest province in Sumatra within the last five years according to official survey. Despite receiving tremendous financial assistances from international agencies during the tsunami recovery and from the central government (so far more than $7.9 billion) Aceh’s economic growth continues to be the lowest in Sumatra. Following the Helsinki peace accord, the Aceh province is entitled to receive special autonomy funds from its central government for twenty years, from 2008 to 2027. So, it is only a few years left and with the rampant corruption and lack of interest from investors it is hard to imagine any changes for a better condition will occur in Aceh. I think poor and disempowered Acehnese Muslims will likely continue to see more perplexing regulations in the region promulgated in the name of Sharia.