Stanford University

Special Lecture with Professor Hui Qin: Misalignment in the Exchange of Ideas between China and the West

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A Special Lecture with Professor Hui Qin
 

中西思想交流中的"问题错位"
Misalignment in the Exchange of Ideas between China and the West


Tuesday, November 7, 2023 | 3:00 pm - 5:00 pm Pacific Time
William J. Perry Room C231, Encina Hall Central, 616 Jane Stanford Way

Please join us for a conversation with Professor Hui Qin. The lecture will be held primarily in Chinese, translation services will not be available. 


About the Speaker 
 

Hui Qin headshot.

Professor Qin Hui (秦晖) is an economic historian best known for his work on peasant studies and an influential public intellectual.  He retired as Professor of History, Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, Tsinghua University, in 2017 and then served as a Visiting Professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Qin’s academic research is focused on land ownership and peasant wars and, in the last two decades, he has written on many different aspects of China’s rural economy. As a leading figure in rural studies, Qin’s acerbic comments on a wide range of social issues, particularly those concerning  China’s rural population and migrant workers, have earned him many fans. He is a sought-after media commentator in print, on TV and online.


Questions? Contact Alexis Medina at amedina5@stanford.edu
 

William J. Perry Room C231, Encina Hall

Hui Qin, Professor of History, Emeritus, Tsinghua University
Seminars

Xiaoying Liao

Encina Hall East, 5th Floor
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 

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Social Science Researcher, Rural Education Action Program
xiaoying_liao.jpeg
Ph.D.

Xiaoying Liao is a social science researcher and a freelance writer. Her interest is to write nonfictional books and essays on education, environment, public life, and history. She is the author of tree books in Chinese : Gongqing yangyu: He qingchunqi de haizi yiqi chengzhang (Empathic Parenting: Growing up with adolescents), Beijing: China Friendship Publishing Corporation, 2022; Zhongxue haineng zheyang shang: Jianada jiaoyu de jingshen yu xijie (The Middle School That Is Different: The spirit and details of Canada’s middle school education), Ningbo: Ningbo Publishing House, 2015; Xiaoxue haineng zheyang shang: Zhongguo mama yanzhong de Jianada xiaoxue jiaoyu (The Elementary School That Is Different: Canada’s elementary education in a Chinese mother’s eyes), Ningbo: Ningbo Publishing House, 2011. She received a Ph.D. in Mass communication (1995) and a D.E.A. (Diplôme d’Etudes Approfondies) in Mass communication(1991) from the Paris University Panthéon-Assas (Paris, France), a MA in journalism/press law from the Graduate School of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Beijing, China,1987), a B.A. in French Language and Literature, Beijing Foreign Studies University (1984). She was a Research Fellow at the Institute of Journalism and Mass Communication of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Beijing, China), 1987-1990, and taught the French and Chinese languages at the Baptist University of Hong Kong, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and the University of Victoria( Canada).

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Debt Trap Diplomacy: BRI’s Ultimate Aim? Or an Unfortunate Media Fabrication?

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Flyer for the seminar "Debt Trap Diplomacy: BRI’s Ultimate Aim? Or an Unfortunate Media Fabrication?"
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Within the discourse surrounding the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the concept of debt trap diplomacy has garnered significant attention. Critics argue that the BRI is a cunning strategy to ensnare nations in debt and exert control, while proponents maintain that such claims are distorted by media sensationalism. In this session, we dissect the origins, evidence, and consequences of debt trap diplomacy allegations, aiming to uncover whether they reflect a genuine strategy or an exaggerated narrative. Join us for a nuanced exploration of this pivotal aspect of the BRI conversation.


Dr. Deborah Brautigam is the Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of Political Economy and Director of the China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Her most recent books include The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (OUP, 2010) and Will Africa Feed China? (OUP, 2015). Before joining SAIS in 2012, she taught at Columbia University and American University. Dr. Bräutigam’s teaching and research focus on international development strategies, governance, and foreign aid. She has twice won the Fulbright research award and is a recipient of fellowships from the Council on Foreign Relations, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and research grants from the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the UK Centre for Economic Policy and Research (CEPR). She has served as a consultant for Transparency International, the United Nations, the World Bank, DFID, GIZ, DANIDA, the African Development Bank, and USAID, and has provided commentary to the Financial Times, the New York Times, the Guardian, CNN, NPR, Al-Jazeera, VOA, CCTV, and MSNBC. Dr. Bräutigam has been a visiting scholar at the World Bank, a senior research fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), and advised more than a dozen governments on China-Africa relations. Her PhD is from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and a faculty member of FSI's Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). He is also Director of Stanford's Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy, and a professor (by courtesy) of Political Science. Dr. Fukuyama has written widely on issues in development and international politics. His 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man, has appeared in over twenty foreign editions. His most recent book, Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, was published in Sept. 2018. His latest book, Liberalism and Its Discontents, was published in May 2022. Francis Fukuyama received his B.A. from Cornell University in classics, and his Ph.D. from Harvard in Political Science. He was a member of the Political Science Department of the RAND Corporation, and of the Policy Planning Staff of the US Department of State. From 1996-2000 he was Omer L. and Nancy Hirst Professor of Public Policy at the School of Public Policy at George Mason University, and from 2001-2010 he was Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He served as a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics from 2001-2004. Dr. Fukuyama holds honorary doctorates from Connecticut College, Doane College, Doshisha University (Japan), Kansai University (Japan), Aarhus University (Denmark), and the Pardee Rand Graduate School. He is a non-resident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and at the Center for Global Development. He is also a member of the Board of Trustees of the Rand Corporation, the Board of Governors of the Pardee Rand Graduate School and the Volcker Alliance, and a member of the American Political Science Association and the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Fukuyama is married to Laura Holmgren and has three children.

Michael Bennon is a Research Scholar at CDDRL for the Global Infrastructure Policy Research Initiative. Michael's research interests include infrastructure policy, project finance, public-private partnerships and institutional design in the infrastructure sector. Michael also teaches Global Project Finance to graduate students at Stanford. Prior to Stanford, Michael served as a Captain in the US Army and US Army Corps of Engineers for five years, leading Engineer units, managing projects, and planning for infrastructure development in the United States, Iraq, Afghanistan and Thailand.
 

Moderator:

Jean C. Oi is the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics in the Department of Political Science and a Senior Fellow of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University. A Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Michigan, she directs the China Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and is the Lee Shau Kee Director of the Stanford Center at Peking University. She also is the current President of the Association for Asian Studies.

Jean Oi, William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics at Stanford University

Philippines Room, Encina Hall 3rd floor, Room C330
616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305

Dr. Deborah Brautigam, Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of Political Economy and Director of the China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)
Francis Fukuyama, Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow, FSI; Director, Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy
Michael Bennon, Research Scholar & Program Manager, Global Infrastructure Policy Research Initiative (CDDRL)
Panel Discussions

AIIB’s Place in the BRI: Myths and Realities

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AIIB's Place in the BRI: Myths and Realities
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As the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) continues to shape global connectivity, the role of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) within this expansive framework often sparks debate. In this session, we delve into a comprehensive analysis of the AIIB's actual contributions, dispelling myths and shedding light on its genuine impact within the context of the BRI.

Speakers:

Maria Adele Carrai is an Assistant Professor of Global China Studies at NYU Shanghai. Her research explores the history of international law in East Asia and investigates how China’s rise as a global power shapes norms and redefines the international distribution of power. She co-leads the Research Initiative 'Mapping Global China,' and is the author of Sovereignty in China: A Geneology of a Concept since 1840 (CUP 2019) and co-editor of The China Questions 2 - Critical Insights into US-China Relations (HUP 2022). Before joining NYU-Shanghai, she was a recipient of a three-year Marie-Curie fellowship at KU Leuven. She was also a Fellow at the Italian Academy of Columbia University, Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program, Max Weber Program of the European University Institute of Florence, and New York University Law School.

Rodrigo Salvado is a Director General at the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Salvado manages the Operational Partnership Department, which administers AIIB’s Special Funds resources. He also manages AIIB’s engagement with global and regional coordination mechanisms and partners to build relationships and mobilize additional resources for the Bank’s investment operations. Before joining AIIB in August 2022, he was Deputy Director, International Development Finance for the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, where he was in charge of building strategic partnerships and setting up innovative financing mechanisms to mobilize public and private resources toward the Sustainable Development Goals. Previously, he worked for the African Development Bank Group where he was in charge of the Performance Based Allocation System of the African Development Fund and the coordination of the Annual Country Policy and Institutional Assessment. He also worked as a policy analyst for the Center for International Development at Harvard University and as a senior financial officer at the Central American Bank for Economic Integration in Honduras. Rodrigo holds a master’s degree in public administration in International Development from Harvard Kennedy School of Government, a master’s degree in economics from the Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros in Madrid, and a bachelor’s degree of Science in Economics from the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella in Argentina. He is from Italy and Argentina.

Moderator:

Jean C. Oi is the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics in the Department of Political Science and a Senior Fellow of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University. A Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Michigan, she directs the China Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and is the Lee Shau Kee Director of the Stanford Center at Peking University. She also is the current President of the Association for Asian Studies.

Jean Oi, William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics at Stanford University

Philippines Room, Encina Hall 3rd floor, Room C330
616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305

Maria Adele Carrai, Assistant Professor of Global China Studies, New York University - Shanghai
Rodrigo Salvado, Director General, Operational Partnership Department, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
Panel Discussions

This Is What America Is Getting Wrong About China and Taiwan

Authors
Oriana Skylar Mastro
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Commentary
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This commentary originally appeared in The New York Times.

For a half-century, America has avoided war with China over Taiwan largely through a delicate balance of deterrence and reassurance.

That equilibrium has been upset. China is building up and flexing its military power; hostile rhetoric emanates from both Beijing and Washington. War seems likelier each day.

It’s not too late to restore the kind of balance that helped to keep the peace for decades, but it will require taking steps to ease China’s concerns. This will be difficult because of Chinese intransigence and the overheated atmosphere prevailing in Washington. But it is worth the political risk if it prevents war.

Deterrence came in the form of the implied use of U.S. military force to thwart a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Reassurance was provided by the understanding that the United States would not intrude on decisions regarding Taiwan’s eventual political status.

The United States and its regional allies must continue to create a robust military deterrence. But U.S. leaders and politicians also need to keep in mind the power of reassurance, try to understand China’s deep sensitivities about Taiwan and should recommit — clearly and unequivocally — to the idea that only China and Taiwan can work out their political differences, a stance that remains official U.S. policy.

During the Cold War, Beijing and Washington signed a series of communiqués related to Taiwan. One of them said the United States “reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.” This and other wording was deliberately ambiguous, but it was accepted by all sides as a commitment to avoid rocking the boat. China still views this arrangement as binding.

To be clear, it was China that began rocking the boat first.

Since 2016, when Tsai Ing-wen of the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party was elected president of Taiwan (succeeding a more China-friendly administration), Xi Jinping has repeatedly brandished China’s military power with large-scale military exercises and other pressure tactics apparently meant to discourage independence sentiment on Taiwan.

U.S. political figures have rightly responded with rhetorical support for democratic Taiwan, by supplying it with weapons and by strengthening the U.S. military presence in the region. But the American reaction is also pouring fuel on the fire.

Beijing is far less concerned with U.S. efforts to enhance its military posture in the region — the deterrence side of the equation — than with the political rhetoric, which is seen in China as proof that the United States is moving away from past ambiguity
Oriana Skylar Mastro
Center Fellow

I have worked on U.S. defense strategy in various military roles for more than a decade. I recently traveled to Beijing, where I met with Chinese government and military officials, leading academics and experts from Communist Party-affiliated think tanks. During these talks it was clear that Beijing is far less concerned with U.S. efforts to enhance its military posture in the region — the deterrence side of the equation — than with the political rhetoric, which is seen in China as proof that the United States is moving away from past ambiguity and toward supporting Taiwan’s de facto independence.

They have plenty of evidence to point to.

In December 2016, Donald Trump became the first U.S. president or president-elect since the normalization of China-U.S. relations in 1979 to speak directly with a Taiwanese leader, when Ms. Tsai called to congratulate him on his election victory. President Biden has, on four occasions, contradicted the U.S. policy of ambiguity by saying we would support Taiwan militarily if China attacked. The number of U.S. Congress members visiting Taiwan — which China views as overt support for the island’s independence — reached a decade high last year, including an August 2022 trip by Nancy Pelosi, the speaker of the House at the time and the highest-ranking U.S. official travel to Taiwan since the 1990s. That has continued this year: In June a nine-member congressional delegation, the largest in years, arrived in Taipei.

Provocative legislation has not helped. Last year the Taiwan Policy Act, which articulated support for Taiwan’s role in international organizations, was introduced in the Senate, and in July of this year the House passed a similar act. House Republicans introduced a motion in January to recognize Taiwan as an independent country.

For now, lingering doubts over Chinese military capabilities and the specter of U.S. and allied retaliation are enough to restrain Mr. Xi
Oriana Skylar Mastro
Center Fellow

Actions like these put great pressure on Mr. Xi, who won’t tolerate going down in history as the Chinese leader to have lost Taiwan. That would be seen in Beijing as an existential threat, potentially fueling separatist sentiment in restive regions like Tibet and Xinjiang.

For now, lingering doubts over Chinese military capabilities and the specter of U.S. and allied retaliation are enough to restrain Mr. Xi. But if he concludes that the United States has broken, once and for all, from its previous position on Taiwan and is bent on thwarting unification, he may feel that he must act militarily. The United States might be able to build the necessary military power in the region to deter a Chinese war of choice. But the level of dominance needed to stop Mr. Xi from launching a war he sees as necessary might be impossible to achieve.

Reassuring China would require Mr. Biden to reiterate that the United States does not support Taiwanese independence or oppose the island’s peaceful unification with China and that, ultimately, Taiwan’s fate is up to Taipei and Beijing. It would mean moving away from attempts to create international space for Taiwan and chastising Beijing when it pulls away Taipei’s diplomatic partners. The White House would also need to use what leverage it has to discourage members of Congress from visiting Taiwan and threaten to veto provocative legislation.

There would doubtless be blowback in Washington and Taipei, and Mr. Xi may already have made up his mind to seize Taiwan, regardless of the U.S. stance. But a politically neutral position on Taiwan is what the United States has followed for decades. Presidents Bill Clinton, Barack Obama and George H.W. and George W. Bush advocated peaceful dialogue between Taipei and Beijing to resolve their differences.

There also are longer-term repercussions to consider: If the combination of deterrence and reassurance fails and China attacks Taiwan, it will set a precedent in which Chinese leaders kill and destroy to achieve their goals. But if a pathway remains for China to eventually convince Taiwan’s people — through inducements or pressure — that it is in their interest to peacefully unify, then that may be a China that we can live with.

In the best-case scenario, the United States and China would reach a high-level agreement, a new communiqué, in which Washington reiterates its longstanding political neutrality and China commits to dialing back its military threats. This would avert war while giving China political space to work toward peaceful unification. That might mean using its clout to isolate Taiwan and eventually convince the island’s people that it should strike a deal with Beijing. But it isn’t Washington’s place to prevent the unification of the two sides — only to ensure that doesn’t happen through military force or coercion.

A war between the United States and China over Taiwan could be the most brutal since World War II. As politically difficult as it may be, U.S. leaders have a duty to try to prevent conflict, and that means speaking more softly but carrying a big stick.

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For a half-century, America has avoided war with China over Taiwan largely through a delicate balance of deterrence and reassurance.

CDDRL Affiliated Scholars Build the World’s Largest Autocratic Propaganda Dataset

Authors
Rachel Owens
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

As part of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law’s Fall 2023 Research Seminar series, University of Southern California Political Scientists, Hoover Fellows, and CDDRL affiliated scholars Erin Baggot Carter and Brett Carter presented findings from their latest book Propaganda in Autocracies: Institutions, Information, and the Politics of Belief (Cambridge University Press, 2023). The book offers unique insight into how and why autocratic regimes use propaganda.

Under authoritarian regimes with “non-binding electoral constraints,” the authors explained, the goal of propaganda is to intimidate citizens and convey the idea that the regime can survive without their support. Propaganda in this context also makes the consequences of dissent common knowledge, thereby saving the regime the cost of actual repression. 

As for regimes with binding electoral constraints, their use of propaganda is often aimed at creating a semblance of credibility with a view to enhancing the functioning of future messaging. This involves mixing fact and fiction by exploiting the infrequent provision of public goods and occasionally conceding policy failures. The latter can sometimes prove damaging to the regime since it may contribute to future protests and unrest. 

The data compiled and analyzed by the Carters in this book constitute the world’s largest dataset on propaganda in autocracies, comprising 80 newspapers from 70 countries. Based on extensive coding and computational linguistics techniques, the authors used the coverage of about 8 million articles to build several measures of pro-regime propaganda.

Book on table
Propaganda in Autocracies: Institutions, Information, and the Politics of Belief (Cambridge University Press, 2023). | Rachel Cody Owens

Propaganda in Autocracies is full of novel findings on how repressive governments approach propaganda. For example, the book challenges conventional wisdom that the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) propaganda is actually persuasive to its citizens. Using an innovative list experiment, they found no evidence that citizens’ beliefs were swayed by propaganda, although exposure to propaganda can reduce people’s propensity to protest by cueing fear. 

By analyzing propaganda trends over time, the book brings to light the CCP’s strategies of control during anniversaries of pro-democracy events. For most such anniversaries, regime propaganda remained the same. Yet, for salient anniversaries, like that of the Tiananmen Square massacre, the regime propped up its propaganda messaging. The authors found that repression against the ethnic Uygurs is often more heavily broadcasted, possibly to showcase the regime’s repressive power.

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Erin Baggot Carter and Brett Carter discuss their new book in the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law’s weekly research seminar.

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Lessons of History: The Rise and Fall of Technology in Chinese History

Authors
Heather Rahimi
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

On September 28, 2023 Yasheng Huang, International Program Professor in Chinese Economy and Business and Professor of Global Economics and Management at the MIT Sloan School of Management, joined SCCEI and Stanford Libraries as the guest lecturer for the 2023 Dr. Sam-Chung Hsieh Memorial Lecture. After introductions from Julie Sweetkind-Singer, Associate University Librarian, and Jennifer Choo, Strategic Policy Advisor at SCCEI, Professor Huang began his lecture speaking on the rise and fall of technology in Chinese history.

Professor Huang shared insights from his empirical study on inventiveness in Chinese history and its implications for today’s China. Using data from the Chinese Historical Invention Dataset (CHID), Huang identified three eras of technological inventiveness in China:

  1. The peak era: 4th century BCE to 6th century (1,000 years)
  2. The first decline: 6th century to 13th century (700 years)
  3. The second decline: 13th century to 20th century (700 years).


His findings support the storyline that China was once the most technologically advanced civilization in the world. China led Europe in metallurgy, ship construction, navigation techniques, and many other fields, often by several centuries. But China’s technological development stalled, stagnated, and eventually collapsed and its early technological leadership did not set the country on a modernization path. Huang devoted the rest of the lecture to looking at the reason for the peak and major decline of inventiveness in China.

Huang highlights the correlation between the political ideology and economic development during each era and the coordinating degree of inventiveness. His overarching argument is that, “China had vibrant technological development when China was more free, when there was more competition – ideological competition and political competition.” He found that Chinese technological decline was correlated, and potentially causally linked with, the rise of empires, political unitariness, and ideological conformity. Huang suggests that from the sixth century to present day, China has continued down a path of political unitariness and ideological conformity, thus hindering technological advancements in present day China.

China had vibrant technological development when China was more free, when there was more competition – ideological competition and political competition.
Yasheng Huang

Huang concluded his talk with some lessons from history. He proclaimed that economic and technological successes require both scale and scope. Scale being uniformity, such as government support, and scope being diversity and heterogeneity, such as competition and ideological freedom. China in history and today is most successful when both conditions are present. 
 


Watch the Recorded Lecture

If you are interested in  learning more from Professor Yasheng Huang and his study on technological achievements in China, read his book The Rise and Fall of the East and stay tuned for his forthcoming book focusing more specifically on technology in China. 

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2023 China Business Conference: Washington’s View of China

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2023 China Business Conference: Washington’s View of China
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MIT Professor Yasheng Huang joined SCCEI and Stanford Libraries to deliver a talk examining the factors behind the rise and the fall of Chinese historical technology and lessons for today’s China.

What Chinese Nuclear Modernization Means for U.S. Deterrence Strategy

Authors
George Krompacky
News Type
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Amidst evolving geopolitical shifts, the foundation of U.S. nuclear deterrence, forged in the crucible of the Cold War, faces a new set of challenges. The principle of mutually assured destruction (MAD), once the bedrock of deterrence, is now being tested by Russia's aggressive posturing and China's strategic advancements. In the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and signals of a willingness to employ tactical nuclear weapons, questions arise about the efficacy of traditional deterrence strategies. Concurrently, China's expanding nuclear arsenal adds complexity to the equation. Do these developments mean America needs to rethink its deterrence strategy? 

In a new paper, “China’s Nuclear Enterprise: Trends, Developments, and Implications for the United States and Its Allies,” FSI Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro focuses on the Chinese perspective of the equation and examines recent trends in Chinese military doctrine and their implications for U.S. deterrence strategy. Mastro’s contribution is part of a new report, Project Atom 2023: A Competitive Strategies Approach for U.S. Nuclear Posture through 2035, produced by the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues.

A fundamental premise underlying Mastro’s analysis is that China merits distinct scrutiny differently from Russia, and that the two countries should not be considered  “nuclear peers.” Although China is indeed engaging in nuclear force modernization, Mastro contends that the nation is still adhering to its fundamental nuclear policy: minimal retaliation capability and a no-use-first pledge.

While some have been troubled by China’s turn to regional nuclear options like the DF-26, an intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads, Mastro asserts that this is because “they are regional weapons lower on the escalation ladder.” Rather than trying to achieve parity with the United States, she contends that Beijing’s objective is to preserve a credible second-strike capability, which is essential to the concept of deterrence.

Instead of prescribing specific alterations to U.S. force posture or nuclear modernization, Mastro suggests that any changes in U.S. defense strategies carefully consider the impact on Chinese nuclear strategy. The key is to preserve China’s minimal retaliation capability and its pledge to refrain from initiating nuclear warfare: “the most important goal for U.S. deterrence policy should be to ensure it does not encourage a change in China’s nuclear policy and in posture.”

Other steps the United States should take, according to Castro, include preventing the “co-mingling” of nuclear and conventional weapons on vessels apart from ballistic missile submarines. This precaution aims to eliminate ambiguity and mitigate the risk of possible conflict escalation. She also believes that there may be “more costs than benefits” in the proliferation of nuclear weapons among Asian allies — South Korea, Japan, and Australia. These threaten the non-proliferation regime and increase the possibility of accidents. The answer, Mastro holds, is not deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on foreign soil, but rather increased consultations and joint planning with allies. Such collaborative efforts could reassure allies and partners of U.S. intentions even as they have minimal impact on Chinese contingency planning. 
 

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China’s Economy and Asia’s Rise with Albert Park

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Albert Park: China’s Economy and Asia’s Rise

Date & Time: Wednesday, November 15, 2023     |    4:30 - 6:00 PM PT
Location: John A. and Cynthia Fry Gunn Building, 366 Galvez Street, Stanford, CA


Join us on Wednesday, November 15, as SIEPR, SCCEI, and the King Center co-host a discussion with Dr. Albert Park. Dr. Park will assess the cyclical and structural factors affecting China’s growth prospects and how China is impacting economic dynamism in the region. Topics include the implications of China’s recent property sector downturn, how geopolitical fragmentation is affecting China’s trade and investment relationships and growth prospects in the region, and the potential for China to contribute positively to the development of other countries through its Belt and Road Initiative and by leading on climate change action.

Park’s presentation begins at 5:00 pm on Wednesday, November 15th, followed by a Q&A moderated by SIEPR Director Mark Duggan. You’re invited to a welcome reception at 4:30 pm.


Watch the Recored Event


About the Speaker
 

Headshot of Dr. Albert Park.

Albert F. Park is Chief Economist of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Director General of its Economic Research and Development Impact Department. He is chief spokesperson on economic and development trends and leads the production of ADB’s flagship knowledge products and support for regional cooperation fora. Mr. Park has more than 2 decades of experience as a development economist. A well-known expert on the economy of the People’s Republic of China, he has directed a number of large-scale research projects in the country. He has also served as an international consultant for the World Bank and a member of the steering committee for the Asia -Pacific Research Universities’ Population Ageing Hub. Mr. Park has worked on a broad range of development issues including poverty and inequality, intergenerational mobility, microfinance, migration and labor markets, the future of work, and foreign investment. Mr. Park is Chair Professor of Economics and Director of the Center for Economic Policy at HKUST (on leave). Previously, he served as a founding director of HKUST’s Institute for Emerging Market Studies, professor at the University of Oxford, and associate professor at the University of Michigan. He has also held editorial positions at a number of leading economic journals. A national of the United States, he received his bachelor’s degree in economics from Harvard University and his doctorate in applied economics from Stanford University.

This is an invitation-only event. 

Questions? Contact aleen@stanford.edu

John A. and Cynthia Fry Gunn Building

Albert Park, Chief Economist of the Asian Development Bank
Lectures

Tianli Feng

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Visiting Scholar, Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions
Associate Professor, School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China
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PhD

Tianli (Tilly) Feng is an associate professor in management and economics. She was the founder and vice director of the Center for Philanthropy and Social Enterprise(CPSE). Tilly’s research interests include philanthropy, social innovation, sustainability, ESG, social impact evaluation. She has published papers in Stanford Social Innovation Review, Management and Organizational Review, Journal of comparative International Management and Management World. Tilly has research experience as the principal investigator of projects granted from National Nature Science Foundation of China. Tilly believes business could be the force for social good, she is quite active in helping practitioners and involved in promoting policy change in social innovation.

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