In February 1986, Scot Marciel was driving home after midnight and went past what he assumed was just another protest near military facilities in downtown Manila. The gathering, less than a year into his first overseas assignment with the Foreign Service, turned out to be the early days of the Philippine People Power revolution, leading to the end of the Ferdinand Marcos regime. This was just one of several times during his 35-year career in the State Department that Marciel would find himself witnessing historic moments in Southeast Asia and in the U.S. relationship with the countries of the region.

That illustrious career includes being the first U.S. diplomat to work in Hanoi since the end of the Vietnam War and serving as the first U.S. ambassador for ASEAN Affairs and as U.S. ambassador to Indonesia and Myanmar.

Marciel, Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at FSI and affiliated with APARC, has distilled his experiences and observations into his new book, Imperfect Partners: The United States and Southeast Asia (Shorenstein APARC/ Rowman & Littlefield, 2023). In it, he offers his on-the-ground account of the ups and downs of critical U.S. relationships in the region — focusing on the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Indonesia — and examines the role of ASEAN and China’s influence in Southeast Asia.

To mark the book’s release, we talked with Marciel about recent events in the region and his views on how the United States should approach Southeast Asian countries in the context of China’s efforts to sow closer ties with them. Watch the conversation:

A Return to the Philippines

The Philippines under President Ferdinand “Bong Bong” Marcos, Jr. is now allowing U.S. forces expanded access to four of its bases. Marciel, who first met Marcos, Jr. as the provincial governor of Ilocos Norte in 1985, expressed some surprise at the Philippine president’s rapid shift to strengthen the country’s alliance with the United States. He noted, however, that even in the last year of the Duterte presidency, which frequently was at odds with the United States, there was some recognition in the Philippines that the relationship with China wasn’t bearing the fruit that had been anticipated. Marciel also pointed out that the deal with the United States does not mean Marcos has abandoned China: he is still working on keeping the relationship with Beijing healthy and visiting Japan, another important partner.

Although there is some Philippine civil opposition to the renewed presence of U.S. forces, Marciel believes that the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) will provide an opportunity for a “more modern and equal partnership,” and hopefully one that can supplant memories of the U.S. colonial history in the Philippines.

Southeast Asian Charm Competition?

As concern continues to rise about a possible invasion of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China, some have questioned the effectiveness of the U.S. capability to compete with China, particularly in terms of a diplomatic offensive. Marciel responded to a recent New York Times article on U.S. and Chinese efforts to “woo” Indonesia. As China continues to seal trade deals in Southeast Asia, some of which are part of its Belt and Road Initiative, we asked whether the United States can compete with China’s free-flowing cash.

Marciel, taking a step back, cautions that “Indonesia is not a prize to be won,” and that we should not be “scoring diplomatic relations like a sporting event” when we look at improving ties with the countries of Southeast Asia. Indonesia, for example, has a long history with the Non-Aligned Movement, so while it attempts to attract foreign investment, it will resist aligning with any one major power. China tends to offer attractive investment packages with minimal conditions, but “you can’t always count on those investments to happen,” notes Marciel, and even when they do, there can be issues with corruption, as well as social and environmental consequences. The United States tries to put together investments that consider issues like labor and the environment, but Marciel believes that “sometimes we aim a little high” and the conditions make U.S. offerings less attractive.

The Continuing Crisis in Myanmar

We spoke with Marciel just after the second anniversary of the 2021 coup in Myanmar. He began his term as U.S. ambassador to that country in 2016, just before Aung Sang Suu Kyi’s new government was about to take office. As he puts it, it was a time of “euphoria,” not only in Myanmar but also in terms of U.S. hopes for democracy there. It turned out to be a difficult four years for Myanmar and Marciel, as the Rohingya crisis repeatedly erupted and the Myanmar military reacted with violent operations that drove hundreds of thousands of Rohingya out of Myanmar. As Marciel relates in his book, he soon found that even using the word “Rohingya” in U.S. embassy statements could create a diplomatic crisis.

Even with the horrific Rohingya genocide, Marciel cautiously notes that by 2020, when he left the country, most people in Myanmar had more opportunity and freedom under four years of a democratically elected government—the Rohingya themselves being the obvious exception. But in 2021, the “military coup basically eliminated that hope and opportunity.”

Marciel doesn’t hold much hope for an end to the coup anytime soon, but he does see at least one “positive development” over the last two years. During the worst of the Rohingya crisis, many in the majority Bamar community did not believe the reports of massacres, or even worse, did not care. But now, after two years of military rule, “more and more Myanmar people are explicitly recognizing the legitimate grievances and the suffering of many of the ethnic minority populations, including the Rohingya, over the past years, and [there is] some recognition that they were fed a lot of propaganda for a long time about what was really happening.”

Establishing Relations with Vietnam

One of Marciel’s great success stories is the normalization of U.S. ties with Vietnam. It was an improbable success with any number of obstacles likely to prevent it from happening, not the least being the debate about the fate of U.S. prisoners of war and servicemen reported as missing in action. Saigon fell in 1975, and yet in 1995, just 20 years later, diplomatic relations were restored and the U.S. embassy opened in Hanoi.

According to Marciel, it took patience, pragmatism, but also the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. No longer able to rely on Soviet help for their economy, the Vietnamese became more open to work with the United States, particularly on POW-MIA issues, allowing Vietnamese imprisoned in re-education camps to flee the country, and withdrawing Vietnamese forces from Cambodia.

Marciel sees the U.S.-Vietnam relationship today as a “good-news story” that shows the degree of progress that can be attained when two countries are willing to be rational and work together. The United States still has significant concerns about human rights in Vietnam yet “both sides have agreed to talk about that issue, but not let it define or limit the relationship excessively.”

How the United States Can Improve Relations in Southeast Asia

When pressed for a prescription on what the United States can do to further improve its relationships with the countries in the region, Marciel said, “In brief, show up and engage consistently, with humility, and with a focus on the countries that we’re talking to, not on China, because what they’re looking for, for the most part is, ‘Can we count on the United States being a long-term partner?’”

By ensuring the reliability of the partnership, countries in Southeast Asia have more freedom of maneuver, and they can, if necessary, be more capable to “make decisions China might not like.” The flip side of that—the failure to show up at presidential and high governmental levels, like what happened during the Trump administration—means “you’ve undone all the good that you had done in previous years by investing in those relationships.” The price of isolationism, of neglecting U.S. diplomatic relations in Southeast Asia, is that those countries lose confidence in the United States as a reliable partner. 

Although Japan’s approach to economic diplomacy under the Fukuda Doctrine initially was subject to criticism because of its stance on non-interference in domestic affairs, now some are in retrospect lauding the approach, according to Kiyoteru Tsutsui, deputy director at Shorenstein APARC and director of the Japan Program, and co-editor of the recent book The Courteous Power: Japan and Southeast Asia in the Indo-Pacific Era. This reevaluation comes after consideration of relatively unsuccessful attempts by the United States to “push” democracy onto Southeast Asian countries. 

The better approach is to focus on advancing the rule of law, which the Japanese have done by investing resources in establishing legal infrastructure in the region, Tsutsui tells Shorenstein APARC Visiting Scholar Gita Wirjawan, host of the popular Endgame video podcast. “Liberal democracy in the sense of the rule of law is a good sort of marketing ploy to sell to Southeast Asian countries because that leads to economic benefits, which is critical to making liberal democracy attractive,” he says.

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Tsutsui joined Wirjawan for an Endgame conversation about Japan’s approaches to foreign direct investment (FDI) in Southeast Asia and other topics. One issue that both scholars agreed upon is the difficulty in getting Americans to focus on Southeast Asia, which has been long recognized as a critical region by the Japanese. Part of the problem is proximity, of course, but the region also tends to be overshadowed in American eyes by East Asian countries. 

The conversation also turned to the demographic issue Japan and other Asian countries are facing as populations age and economic growth stagnates. Tsutsui pointed out that, before 1945, the Japanese Empire saw itself as multi-ethnic; it was only after WWII that the nation was perceived as homogenous, a viewpoint bolstered by Japan’s great economic success in the 1960s and 70s. Now, however, Tsutsui says there is no choice: “Japan has to become more heterogenous,” and even conservative voices acknowledge that women need a larger role in the labor force and that immigrant labor will be essential to combat the demographic crisis.

This discussion with Tsutsui is part of an "Endgame" interview series Wirjawan is recording with Stanford experts during his residency at APARC.

This commentary was originally published by Nikkei Asia.

As Myanmar's national uprising against its military's Feb. 1, 2021 takeover enters its third year with no resolution in sight, the international community remains without a viable strategy to help end the crisis.

In April 2021, Association of Southeast Asian Nations leaders sought to lead the international response by proposing a five-point consensus plan to end the violence and start a dialogue to forge a compromise solution.

The consensus, however, was stillborn, both due to the regime's refusal to budge from its hard-line stance and widespread skepticism that any dialogue could lead to a compromise deal in what is fundamentally a zero-sum battle.

This month, ASEAN foreign ministers meeting in Jakarta expressed disappointment at the lack of progress, even as they continued to promote the five-point consensus as the best way forward for Myanmar.

These are smart people. They know the consensus is leading nowhere but they continue to tout it as the path forward because member states are divided and cannot reach consensus on a better approach.

This impasse has left the U.S. in a bind. In the 2000s, ASEAN's engagement with Myanmar's then-military regime while the U.S. pursued a policy of sanctions and isolation was a constant irritant in Washington's relations with the bloc. Each side was disappointed and often frustrated with the other's stance.

In the current crisis, Washington has been more deferential to ASEAN, expressing support for its five-point plan despite the lack of progress.

This approach might have made sense initially, as it reinforced U.S. support for ASEAN centrality and hid the fact that Washington had no better ideas. But ASEAN's failure to move beyond its moribund consensus should be an overdue wake-up call for the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden.

Vows to continue to "stand with the Burmese people" ring increasingly hollow in light of continued U.S. support for ASEAN's failed approach and Washington's insistence on a peaceful resolution to a crisis for which there is no peaceful answer. The longer the U.S. follows this approach, the more its credibility will suffer, as will its ability to influence events in Myanmar.

The cautious U.S. approach to date is likely due to the reluctance of administration officials to take the risk of adopting a bolder policy of fully supporting the resistance. Perhaps they fear that doing so will only lead to more violence, or they question the ability of the disparate elements within the resistance to defeat the military or to hold the country together if they win.

American officials may also be concerned about prompting China to increase its support for the military regime, or may be so preoccupied with Ukraine that they cannot muster the energy to go all in on a strategically less important conflict.

Whatever the reason, Washington's approach has the U.S. notionally on the side of the resistance but without the commitment and resources to help it win.

Policymakers should recognize that the only potentially positive way out of this crisis is for the resistance to successfully oust Myanmar's military regime. As long as the military holds power, there is no hope for the country.

Supporting the resistance more fully carries risks. But staying on the current path all but guarantees years of continued violence, instability and suffering.

What, then, should the U.S. do? First, it should not go back to the previous era of badgering ASEAN to be tougher. That would be counterproductive. It should, however, stop pretending that the five-point consensus offers a path forward, or that there is a peaceful solution to the crisis.

To the extent that Indonesia, ASEAN's chair for 2023, offers a more ambitious approach, Washington should support Jakarta. The U.S. does not need to jettison ASEAN, but it should not tie itself to the bloc's lowest-common denominator.

Absent a viable ASEAN strategy, the Biden administration should assert leadership by offering much more support to the resistance campaign to force the military out of power, or at least to weaken it sufficiently that it looks for a way out.

This should include stepped-up engagement with the parallel National Unity Government and other resistance elements. NUG Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung's high-level reception in Washington last week marked a positive step and should be followed by more regular meetings, including at the secretary of state level. The State Department should also appoint a career diplomat to serve as special envoy for Myanmar, engaging with the resistance and coordinating sanctions with key partners.

Washington should bite the bullet and provide substantial funding to the NUG and its partners, as envisioned in the recently passed Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability Act.

This aid should not be conditioned on progress toward building a fully united resistance, for the simple reason that this process cannot be artificially forced. To the extent that Washington worries about the resistance's ability to account for the money, U.S. agencies should provide training rather than use the concern as an excuse not to offer aid.

Provision of substantial arms directly to the resistance is both unlikely to happen and would be difficult logistically, but channeling funds would free up resources that the NUG could use to purchase weapons.

The U.S. also should consider providing equipment to help the resistance improve communications and build on nascent efforts to supply internet access to the public. Washington can also gather military experts to consider ways to help the resistance counter the regime's air power, mindful of concerns about supplying sophisticated anti-aircraft systems.

The U.S. has been supporting democracy and civilian rule in Myanmar for decades but has punched far below its weight in the current crisis. It can and should provide much-needed leadership now, while continuing to partner with those elements in ASEAN that recognize that the current trajectory is not a viable option.