This commentary originally appeared in Shukan Toyokeizai.

Military tensions between China and Taiwan rise, and the U.S. government informs the Japanese government that it wants to deploy U.S. forces in Japan to defend Taiwan. At the same time, China sends a message through various channels that it will not touch Japan at all if it does not cooperate with the U.S. military and remains neutral.

In the event of a Taiwan contingency, It is highly likely that military conflict between China and Taiwan will lead to a decision by the U.S. military to intervene, followed by the deployment of fighter jets and naval vessels from U.S. military bases in Japan. In the process, Japan will be forced to make a major choice. 

If U.S. forces are deployed to the area around Taiwan, U.S. bases located in Japan, including Okinawa, will serve as bases. Under the so-called “Far East Clause” of Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, U.S. forces can use Japanese facilities and areas “to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.” However, the deployment of U.S. forces under the Far East Clause requires prior consultation with the Japanese side. Nevertheless, there is little chance that the Japanese government will turn the US down for fear of a confrontation with China. If Japan were to refuse at the last minute, the trust between Japan and the U.S. would be damaged, and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty regime would effectively collapse. As a result, Japan would have no choice but to confront China alone. This would be a bad move that would only be a temporary fix. 

However, some officials from the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces are concerned about how the public would react. From China's point of view, this is a point to take advantage of, and by communicating that "Japan will be safe if it declares its neutrality," it may be able to divide Japan, the U.S., and Taiwan. 

The phrase "a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency" was introduced by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at a symposium sponsored by a Taiwanese think tank in 2006. This comment was followed by the statement, "It is also a contingency for the Japan-U.S. alliance." How will Japanese public opinion react to the "ultimate choice" in the face of a Taiwan contingency? 

An interesting study, part of the Stanford Japan Barometer, conducted by Stanford University sociologist Kiyoteru Tsutsui and his colleagues examined this issue using a method called conjoint experiments. 

The subjects were presented with two scenarios: "In the event of an emergency in Taiwan, under what circumstances would you be more likely to support military involvement by the Self-Defense Forces?" The subjects were presented with two scenarios and asked to choose the one in which they would be more likely to support Japan's military involvement. 

In the event of a Taiwan contingency, the researchers presented three options in each of five categories: "Chinese actions," "U.S. actions," "Chinese actions toward Japan," "U.S. actions toward Japan," and "international community reaction. In an experiment in which each of more than 7,000 subjects was asked to answer which of two scenarios in which they were randomly combined would support Japan's military involvement in the event of an emergency in Taiwan. The series of scenarios reflect the opinions of security experts who participated in simulations of a Taiwan contingency conducted by various agencies in the United States. The results show whether support for Japan's military involvement strengthened or weakened when each scenario was presented.

One of these scenarios is precisely related to the aforementioned issue. When China promised Japan that it would not touch Japanese territory, including the Senkaku Islands, support for Japan's military involvement weakened. On the other hand, if China landed on and occupied the Senkaku Islands at the same time as its invasion of Taiwan, support for Japan's military involvement increased. The result is clear: "Japanese people place the highest priority on the impact on Japanese territory," said Professor Tsutsui. 

The survey results indicate that Japan is hesitant to fight China but would respond to a request from the U.S. military for logistical support. How will Japan be involved in a Taiwan contingency? Public opinion is not yet settled. 

In reality, many experts believe that if U.S. forces deployed from bases in Japan clash with Chinese forces, the next request will be for cover by the Self-Defense Forces. It is quite a narrow pass to say that they will not participate in combat and only provide logistical support. 

As for why Japan should get involved in a Taiwan contingency, the debate tends to settle on supply chain issues, particularly in the area of semiconductors, or geopolitical importance. Many Japanese, however, may feel that such reasons alone are not sufficient to make a decision to put the lives of Self-Defense Force personnel on the line and the residents of the Nansei Islands at risk. 
The supply chains that Japanese firms have built in East Asia, including China, would also be severely damaged. In addition, Chinese nationalism would flare up violently if it were to fight Japan again. The cost of fighting China as a neighbor is extremely high for Japan. 

Where Did You Get the Money To Pay for the Succession?
 

The issue of money is also unavoidable. In order to prepare for contingencies, we must also consider financing the cost of war. 

If the armed conflict with China is prolonged, huge fiscal outlays will be required not only for the continuation of the war but also for the repair of domestic infrastructure. In addition to supplementary budgets, it will be necessary to issue government bonds. 

However, Japanese financial institutions alone may not be able to digest the Japanese Government Bonds. For this reason, a simulation by the Japan Strategy Research Forum this year called for the direct underwriting of Japanese Government Bonds by the Bank of Japan. 

Junichi Kanda, a Bank of Japan alumnus in the House of Representatives who served as finance minister, opposed this proposal, saying, "It would cause a sudden loss of confidence in Japan's finances and the yen, leading to a significant depreciation of the yen to over 300 yen to the dollar and an increase in interest rates to over 10%. Such an extreme depreciation of the yen would also hinder the purchase of equipment and materials in foreign currency. 

Instead, Kanda suggested issuing foreign currency-denominated government bonds for foreigners. However, since there has been no such issuance since 1988, it is necessary to gradually issue these bonds from normal times to develop investors, he said. 

The prerequisite is that confidence in Japan's finances is secured. Japan needs to maintain fiscal discipline on a regular basis in case of emergency," said Kanda. Even in peacetime, there is a strong argument in Japan for using government bonds as a source of funds for increased defense spending. If the government cannot even raise taxes, China will question its seriousness. More open and substantive discussions are needed if the Japanese people are to be convinced to accept the costs of a Taiwan contingency.

This is an English translation of an article originally published by The Asahi Shimbun. 

Stanford University Professor of Sociology Kiyoteru Tsutsui is a recipient of the Suntory Prize for Arts and Sciences and the Ishibashi Tanzan Prize for his book Human Rights and the State (Iwanami Shinsho, 2022). Although he has published many works in English, this was his first publication in Japanese. After earning a master's degree at Kyoto University, he moved to the United States. Before Stanford, he served as a professor at the University of Michigan. “I wanted to make a difference in the United States first,” he says. “I had not thought about publishing in Japanese.”

However, since he joined Stanford in 2020 and has undertaken the role of director of the Japan Program at the University's Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), Tsutsui has become increasingly aware of the importance of Japanese studies and publishing in Japanese. He recognizes the decline of Japanese studies and the necessity of revitalizing the field and connecting Japan and the United States. Tsutsui is currently the only professor of Japanese studies at APARC. In the 1990s, there were three or four faculty experts in Japanese studies at the center.

With the popularity of Japanese anime, manga, video games, and other forms of Japanese culture, the number of Japanese-language students in the United States is not decreasing," notes Tsutsui. However, “the departure from Japan in the social sciences is severe.” The reason for this, according to Tsutsui, is that area studies are declining, and there is an increasing emphasis on theories and models. “But Chinese studies are growing, and the subjects of German, French, and other area studies maintain interest.” In 2019, a session titled "The Death of Japanese Studies" was held at the North American Association for Asian Studies, attracting much attention.

Tsutsui worries that the declining interest in Japanese studies could negatively impact public opinion and policymaking toward Japan in the United States. For example, during the Japan-U.S. trade friction of the 1980s, the Japan-U.S. relationship was hardly a focus of Japanese studies scholars in the United States.

Tsutsui works to advance U.S.-Japan dialogue, promote Japanese studies research, and clear up misunderstandings about Japanese affairs. Last year, he launched the Stanford Japan Barometer (SJB), a periodic public opinion survey on political, economic, and social issues concerning contemporary Japan — a project he started in hopes of fostering young researchers’ interest in Japan.

“We have already researched gender and policy and the Taiwan contingency and security,” he says. “In the future, we will continue to cover a wide range of topics in Japanese politics, economy, and society, including techno-media, artificial intelligence, Japan’s declining birthrate, and its Constitution.” Unlike a typical public opinion survey, SJB focuses on types of questions that move people’s opinions. Therefore, SJB asks questions on different issues with different assumptions, comparing people’s responses.

In the case of the questions on same-sex marriage, the respondents randomly received one of eight explanations, such as “In Japanese society, it is a tradition to see marriage as a heterosexual relationship” and “In Japanese society, there is a tradition of toleration towards same-sex relationships stemming back from the Sengoku Period.” The study examined the difference between respondents who received no explanation and those provided with arguments supportive of same-sex marriages. “Our results showed that respondents tend to become more supportive of same-sex marriage when presented with an argument that not allowing same-sex marriage is unfair from the point of view of human rights and gender equality,” Tsutsui explains.

“I hope that many young scholars will eventually participate in the project and that it will provide an opportunity for the next generation of outstanding researchers to enter Japanese studies and increase their opportunities to work abroad.”
 

View a Japanese version of this announcement.

The Japanese public supports women’s advancement in society, finds the Stanford Japan Barometer, a survey platform launched by the Japan Program at Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC). This result is somewhat surprising, considering Japan’s poor showing in global gender equality rankings.

Led by Professor of Sociology Kiyoteru Tsutsui, the Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Professor and director of the Japan Program at APARC, and Charles Crabtree, an assistant professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College and a former visiting assistant professor with the Japan Program, the Stanford Japan Barometer (SJB) is a periodic public opinion survey on political, economic, and social issues concerning contemporary Japan with three main parts: (1) questions about respondents’ demographic background; (2) a stable set of questions about support for policy issues, political parties, public institutions, and international entities; and (3) a thematically focused set of questions and experimental studies on topics of great relevance at the time of the survey. The survey is conducted with a national, quota-based sample of 8,000 Japanese residents.

In the first installation of the survey, conducted in late November 2022, the SJB examined issues concerning gender and sexuality in Japan. It found, among other results, that most Japanese are in favor of recognizing same-sex unions and support a legal change to allow married couples to keep separate surnames. The SJB also examined questions related to women’s advancement in Japanese society, the focus of the following report.

One prominent gender equality issue that often recurs in Japanese public discourse is women’s under-representation in prominent positions, especially in politics and business. According to the latest Global Gender Gap Report released by the World Economic Forum, Japan ranks 116th out of 146 countries in terms of gender equality. Japan fares well in the categories of Education and Health, but in Politics and Economy, it ranks 139th and 121st respectively. In another ranking on women’s role and influence in the workforce, the Glass-Ceiling Index compiled by The Economist, Japan ranks second-worst among the 29 developed countries surveyed. Japan barely avoided the lowest ranking (a dubious distinction taken by South Korea), but indeed ranks lowest in terms of the proportion of women in national parliaments (single or Lower House) among OECD countries, with only 10% of Lower House members being female.

To better understand this striking gender disparity, Tsutsui and Crabtree had respondents complete conjoint experiments that examined what types of candidates the Japanese public is more likely to support for a Diet seat and an external corporate board member. The results show, perhaps surprisingly, that Japanese people prefer women for these positions (52% to 48% for the Diet and 51% to 49% for corporate board). Women support female candidates more than men, but men also prefer female candidates over male ones, averaging across all other candidate characteristics such as education and occupational background. These differences are fairly stable across different ages, educational and family backgrounds, and political party support. Contrary to what gender representation in politics and corporate leadership would indicate, the SJB results suggest that there is robust support for women’s representation in those powerful positions across different spectrums of the Japanese public.

Tsutsui and Crabtree also asked a series of questions about views on gender roles and women’s advancement in Japanese society. Respondents were particularly supportive of more men taking parental leave and helping with childcare, registering 6.3 on a scale of 0-10 (5 being neutral and a number larger than 5 indicating support for the statement). They were not supportive of the statements about traditional gender roles, such as “Men should work outside the home and women should stay home” (3.8), or “Boys should be raised to be manly and girls should be raised to be womanly” (4.3). Interestingly, for all these questions, there is a statistically significant difference between male and female respondents, with men showing greater support for traditional gender roles, although the general trend is a shift away from traditional gender roles even among men.

On questions concerning women’s advancement in Japanese society, the Japanese public demonstrated strong support for the argument that more efforts should be made to increase the number of female politicians (5.8), executives (5.9), and board members (5.8). There is no substantial difference between men and women for these questions, indicating that the support for women’s advancement in politics and business is broadly shared across genders.

When it comes to using a quota to ensure women’s seats in the national Diet, management positions, and board rooms, the opinions are divided across the gender line, with women being significantly more supportive (5.1, 5.2, 5.2) than men (4.8, 4.7, 4.7). This likely indicates that men are threatened by the idea of quota as it would reduce the likelihood of their advancement toward these powerful positions.

Men’s resistance to quotas notwithstanding, overall, the Japanese public supports women’s advancement in society, perhaps recognizing the need for Japan to change in light of the embarrassing showing in global rankings of women’s empowerment. These results suggest that the slow pace of change in women’s advancement in Japan might be attributable to the behavior of gatekeepers, who are mostly older men who come from different socioeconomic backgrounds than the SJB’s average survey respondent, rather than to a lack of public support.

For media inquiries about the survey, please reach out to:
Noa Ronkin
APARC Associate Director for Communications and External Relations
noa.ronkin@stanford.edu

View a Japanese version of this announcement.

Survey results from the Stanford Japan Barometer, launched by the Japan Program at Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), indicate that the Japanese public supports women’s advancement in society. In addition to this broad support, the survey found that, on the issue of married couples with the same last name in particular, roughly 70% of the Japanese public support a change to accommodate women who do not want to use their husband’s last name.

Led by Professor of Sociology Kiyoteru Tsutsui, the Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Professor and director of the Japan Program at APARC, and Charles Crabtree, an assistant professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College and a former visiting assistant professor with the Japan Program, the Stanford Japan Barometer is a periodic public opinion survey on political, economic, and social issues concerning contemporary Japan with three main parts: (1) questions about respondents’ demographic background; (2) a stable set of questions about support for policy issues, political parties, public institutions, and international entities; and (3) a thematically focused set of questions and experimental studies on topics of great relevance at the time of the survey. The survey is conducted with a national, quota-based sample of 8,000 Japanese residents.

In its first installation of the survey conducted in late November 2022, the Stanford Japan Barometer examined issues around gender and sexuality in Japan and found, among other results, that most Japanese support same-sex marriage, as reported in an earlier press release. The survey also examined the issue of married couples’ last names, which has emerged as a potent symbol of gender inequality in Japan over the past years.

In Japan, married couples are legally required to have the same last name. While the law does not require wives to adopt the last name of their husbands, in reality, more than 95% of married women do so. Many argue that this creates a hurdle for women to advance their careers, as they have to change their last name when they get married, and if they get divorced they have to change it back to their maiden name. Known to lag behind other highly developed economies when it comes to gender equality, Japan has struggled to place women in positions of authority and raise their earnings to a level closer to those of men. Many argue that changing the law to enable married couples to maintain different last names, i.e. keep their own last name, would facilitate a movement toward gender parity as a symbolic sign of support for women’s autonomy in public spaces and a means of practical support for them to advance their career.

The government has tracked public opinion on this issue, with a cabinet office periodically conducting a survey on this topic. In the most recent government survey from 2022, there was a decline in support for a legal change to allow couples to maintain different last names and an increase in support for facilitating the use of a maiden name as the common name in workplaces, compared to the previous survey by the same office conducted in 2017. These results triggered a controversy around this issue, and media allegations surfaced that the survey question was manipulated in such a way as to decrease support for a legal change and increase support for use of a maiden name as a common name, hence pleasing the conservative ruling party LDP leaders. A debate followed as to whether the changes in the question format and answer options contributed to the results that suited what the ruling LDP wanted.

To test the validity of these allegations, Tsutsui and Crabtree conducted an experiment randomly assigning respondents to answer two versions of the government survey under scrutiny, from 2017 and 2022. They found that the survey question and answer format significantly affected the results, as support for a legal name change was at 57% when the respondents were assigned the 2017 version but 30% when they answered the 2022 version, while support for using maiden names as common names found only 19% support in the 2017 version but 39% in the 2022 version. These results provide strong evidence that it was the question format that changed the results between 2017 and 2022. The exact level of support among the Japanese public for a legal change on this issue and how public opinion might have changed over the recent past remain to be seen.

Another thing to note about these results is that in either version of the survey, support for the status quo — married couples having the same last name with no accommodations — is low, at 23% in the 2017 version and 30% in the 2022 version. This indicates that the Japanese public largely recognizes that a change is needed on this issue of married couples’ last names in order to accommodate women seeking career advancement. Tsutsui and Crabtree further examined who still resists the change and found, in their multivariate analysis, that status quo supporters have completed fewer years in school, are currently married, have children, and support Prime Minister Kishida at higher levels. Interestingly, they find a quadratic relationship when it comes to income, showing that both those at the low- and high end of the income distribution are more likely to support the status quo.

Next, Tsutsui and Crabtree conducted an experiment on different arguments that might influence support for a legal change to allow married couples to keep different last names. These arguments focused on several themes. In terms of tradition, some respondents read a prompt that argued that the custom in Japan is for married couples to have the same last name, while others read an argument that married couples in Japan kept different last names up until the first decades of the Meiji era and that is more of Japan’s tradition. Similarly, the researchers presented both pro and con arguments in terms of the social and international reputation costs of legalizing married couples with different last names, as well as the fairness of the practice from the point of view of gender equality and human rights principles.

The results show that an argument about social costs — how allowing married couples to maintain different last names would weaken family bonds with harmful effects on children — is the only one that seems to substantially change public attitudes, reducing support for a legal change. The effect is substantial, roughly 1/7 of a standard deviation, and suggests that it is easier to mobilize opposition to than support for changing the law, a finding with consequences for advocates and opponents of the legal change.

These results reflect complex gender politics at play in Japan. Whatever the intentions of the survey designers for the 2017 and 2022 government surveys, the question and answer formats they used have a significant impact on how much support can be found for married couples keeping different last names. On the other hand, the Japanese public largely recognizes that a change is needed, demonstrating broad support for some kind of change to accommodate calls for women to use their maiden name even after marriage.

As the debate on this issue continues, there is a need to observe how future surveys ask questions about it since public support for a legal change can be influenced by the question framing, format, and answer options.

For media inquiries about the survey, please reach out to:
Noa Ronkin
APARC Associate Director for Communications and External Relations
noa.ronkin@stanford.edu

By traditional measures, South Korea is not a large country. It ranks 28th in the world in population and only 107th in land mass. Its language is not widely spoken outside the Korean peninsula, and it does not have a large diaspora. Yet since around 2005, it has arguably become the major producer of youth culture in the world. How did this happen?

Stanford professor Dafna Zur has filmed a video to answer that complicated and important question. Dr. Zur is an Associate Professor of Korean literature and culture in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures of Stanford University. She specializes in Korean literature, cinema, and popular culture. As part of her research, Dr. Zur has interviewed the main architects of South Korea’s popular culture wave, including SM Entertainment founder Lee Soo-man and many K-Pop stars.

Stanford’s Center for East Asian Studies and SPICE collaborated on a discussion guide to bring the lessons from Dr. Zur’s video to high school and university students. The video and discussion guide are available for free on SPICE’s Multimedia page. They address the following questions:

• What is popular culture?
• What is soft power, and why is it important?
• How did South Korea become such a successful producer of popular culture in the past 20 years?
• How can we measure South Korea’s success in becoming a popular culture powerhouse? 
• How did South Korea’s popular culture evolve in response to the COVID-19 pandemic? What’s the next stage in its development?
• How easy would it be for other countries to replicate South Korea’s soft power success? 

Because the main vehicle for South Korea’s rise as a soft power giant has been Korean pop music, known as K-Pop, Dr. Zur directs viewers to several music videos that illustrate how K-Pop has evolved since 1997 and where it might go in the future.

She provides deep insight into the building blocks of K-Pop’s success, which she identifies as support from the national government, the kihoeksa (entertainment conglomerate) system, technology, timing, content release strategy, and fan communities. In particular, Dr. Zur explains how the kihoeksa are able to produce high-quality entertainment at a low cost and how their scale has allowed them to invest in new technologies that keep them at the forefront of pop culture production.

The discussion guide provides context for students to understand the complexity in Dr. Zur’s video. In preparation for the video, students take and then discuss a quiz on South Korea’s popular culture. The teacher then defines key terms such as popular culture and soft power and displays charts that show how South Korea’s soft power has increased since 2000. 

Students view Dr. Zur’s video and the accompanying K-Pop music videos as homework and respond to a series of questions on the main themes of the video. During the next class period, they work in groups to develop a plan for another country to elevate its soft power by drawing on what they learned about South Korea’s success. This complex activity requires students to clearly define the factors that have led to the popularity of Korean popular culture, distinguish between the factors they believe are replicable and those that are not, and then adapt this analysis into a set of recommendations for another country that hopes to achieve the same success as South Korea. After groups present their findings to the class, the teacher concludes the lesson by asking students to predict whether South Korea will be able to maintain its soft power dominance into the future. 

The discussion guide contains a complete transcript of the video and is appropriate for advanced secondary students and university students. 

The video lecture and guide were made possible through the support of U.S. Department of Education National Resource Center funding under the auspices of Title VI, Section 602(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965.

To stay informed of SPICE news, join our email list and follow us on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.