As a new U.S. administration assumes office next year, it will face numerous policy challenges in the Asia-Pacific, a region that accounts for nearly 60 percent of the world’s population and two-thirds of global output.

Despite tremendous gains over the past two decades, the Asia-Pacific region is now grappling with varied effects of globalization, chief among them, inequities of growth, migration and development and their implications for societies as some Asian economies slow alongside the United States and security challenges remain at the fore.

Seven scholars from Stanford’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) offered views on policy challenges in Asia and some possible directions for U.S.-Asia relations during the next administration.

View the scholars' commentary by scrolling down the page or click on the individual links below to jump to a certain topic.

U.S.-China relations

U.S.-Japan relations

North Korea

Southeast Asia and the South China Sea

Global governance

Population aging .

Trade

U.S.-China relations

By Thomas Fingar

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Alarmist predictions about China’s rise and America’s decline mischaracterize and overstate tensions in the relationship. There is little likelihood that the next U.S. administration will depart from the “hedged engagement” policies pursued by the last eight U.S. administrations. America’s domestic problems cannot be solved by blaming China or any other country. Indeed, they can best be addressed through policies that have contributed to peace, stability and prosperity.

Strains in U.S.-China relations require attention, not radical shifts in policy. China is not an enemy and the United States does not wish to make it one. Nor will or should the next administration resist changes to the status quo if change can better the rules-based international order that has served both countries well. Washington’s objective will be to improve the liberal international system, not to contain or constrain China’s role in that system.

The United States and China have too much at stake to allow relations to become dangerously adversarial, although that is unlikely to happen. But this is not a reason to be sanguine. In the years ahead, managing the relationship will be difficult because key pillars of the relationship are changing. For decades, the strongest source of support for stability in U.S.-China relations has been the U.S. business community, but Chinese actions have alienated this key group and it is now more likely to press for changes than for stability. A second change is occurring in China. As growth slows, Chinese citizens are pressing their government to make additional reforms and respond to perceived challenges to China’s sovereignty.

The next U.S. administration is more likely to continue and adapt current policies toward China and Asia more broadly than to pursue a significantly different approach. Those hoping for or fearing radical changes in U.S. policy will be disappointed..

Thomas Fingar is a Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow and former chairman of the U.S. National Intelligence Council. He leads a research project on China and the World that explores China’s relations with other countries.

U.S.-Japan relations

By Daniel Sneider

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Three consecutive terms held by the same party would certainly preserve the momentum behind the ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy of the last few years, especially on the security front. Still there are some dangers ahead. If Japan moves ahead to make a peace treaty with Russia, resolving the territorial issue and opening a flow of Japanese investment into Russia, that could be a source of tension. The new administration may also want to mend fences early with China, seeking cooperation on North Korea and avoiding tensions in Southeast Asia.

The big challenge, however, will be guiding the TPP through Congress. While there is a strong sentiment within policy circles in favor of rescuing the deal, perhaps through some kind of adjustment of the agreement, insiders believe that is highly unlikely. The Sanders-Warren wing of the Democratic party has been greatly strengthened by this election and they will be looking for any sign of retreat on TPP. Mrs. Clinton has an ambitious agenda of domestic policy initiatives – from college tuition and the minimum wage to immigration reform – on which she will need their support. One idea now circulating quietly in policy circles is to ‘save’ the TPP, especially its strategic importance, by separating off a bilateral Japan-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. Tokyo is said to be opposed to this but Washington may put pressure on for this option, leaving the door open to a full TPP down the road. .

Daniel Sneider is the associate director for research and a former foreign correspondent. He is the co-author of Divergent Memories: Opinion Leaders and the Asia-Pacific Wars (Stanford University Press, 2016) and is currently writing about U.S.-Japan security issues.

North Korea

By Kathleen Stephens

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From an American foreign policy perspective, North Korea policy challenges will be inherited by the next president as “unfinished business,” unresolved despite a range of approaches spanning previous Republican and Democratic administrations. The first months in a new U.S. president’s term may create a small window to explore potential new openings. The new president should demonstrate at the outset that North Korea is high on the new administration’s priority list, with early, substantive exchanges with allies and key partners like China to affirm U.S. commitment to defense of its allies, a denuclearized Korean Peninsula and the vision agreed to at the Six-Party Talks in the September 2005 Joint Statement of Principles. Early messaging to Pyongyang is also key – clearly communicating the consequences of further testing or provocations, but at the same time signaling the readiness of the new administration to explore new diplomatic approaches. The appointment of a senior envoy, close to the president, could underscore the administration’s seriousness as well as help manage the difficult policy and political process in Washington itself.

2017 is a presidential election year in South Korea, and looks poised to be a particularly difficult one. This will influence Pyongyang’s calculus, as will the still-unknown impact of continued international sanctions. The challenges posed by North Korea have grown greater with time, but there are few new, untried options acceptable to any new administration in Washington. Nonetheless, the new administration must explore what is possible diplomatically and take further steps to defend and deter as necessary. .

Kathleen Stephens is the William J. Perry Distinguished Fellow and former U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Korea. She is currently writing and researching on U.S. diplomacy in Korea.

Southeast Asia and the South China Sea

By Donald K. Emmerson

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A new U.S. administration will be inaugurated in January 2017. Unless it wishes to adapt to such outcomes, it should:

(1) renew its predecessor’s refusal to endorse any claim to sovereignty over all, most, or some of the South China Sea and/or its land features made by any of the six contending parties—Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam—pending the validation of such a claim under international law.

(2) strongly encourage all countries, including the contenders, to endorse and implement the authoritative interpretation of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) issued on July 12, 2016, by an UNCLOS-authorized court. Washington should also emphasize that it, too, will abide by the judgment, and will strive to ensure American ratification of UNCLOS.

(3) maintain its commitment to engage in publicly acknowledged freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea on a regular basis. Previous such FONOPs were conducted in October 2015 by the USS Lassen, in January 2016 by the USS Wilbur, in May 2016 by the USS Lawrence, and in October 2016 by the USS Decatur. The increasingly lengthy intervals between these trips, despite a defense official’s promise to conduct them twice every quarter, has encouraged doubts about precisely the commitment to freedom of navigation that they were meant to convey.

(4) announce what has hitherto been largely implicit: The FONOPs are not being done merely to brandish American naval prowess. Their purpose is to affirm a core geopolitical position, namely, that no single country, not the United States, nor China, nor anyone else, should exercise exclusive or exclusionary control over the South China Sea.

(5) brainstorm with Asian-Pacific and European counterparts a range of innovative ways of multilateralizing the South China Sea as a shared heritage of, and a resource for, its claimants and users alike. .

Donald K. Emmerson is a senior fellow emeritus and director of the Southeast Asia Program. He is currently editing a Stanford University Press book that examines China’s relations with Southeast Asia.

Global governance

By Phillip Y. Lipscy

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Global economic activity is increasingly shifting toward Asia – most forecasts suggest the region will account for about half of the global economy by the midpoint of the 21^st century. This shift is creating important incongruities within the global architecture of international organizations, such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund and World Bank, which are a central element of the U.S.-based international order and remain heavily tilted toward the West in their formal structures, headquarter locations and personnel compositions. This status quo is a constant source of frustration for policymakers in the region, who seek greater voice consummate with their newfound international status. 

The next U.S. administration should prioritize reinvigoration of the global architecture.  One practical step is to move major international organizations toward multiple headquarter arrangements, which are now common in the private sector – this will mitigate the challenges of recruiting talented individuals willing to spend their careers in distant headquarters in the West. The United States should join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, created by China, to tie the institution more closely into the existing architecture, contribute to its success and send a signal that Asian contributions to international governance are welcome. The Asian rebalance should be continued and deepened, with an emphasis on institution-building that reassures our Asian counterparts that the United States will remain a Pacific power. .

Philip Y. Lipscy is an assistant professor of political science and the Thomas Rohlen Center Fellow. He is the author of the forthcoming book Renegotiating the World Order: Institutional Change in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2017).

Population aging

By Karen Eggleston

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China’s recent announcement of a universal two-child policy restored an important dimension of choice, but it will not fundamentally change the trajectory of a shrinking working-age population and burgeoning share of elderly. China’s population aged 60 and older is projected to grow from nearly 15 percent today to 33 percent in 2050, at which time China’s population aged 80 and older will be larger than the current population of France. This triumph of longevity in China and other Asian countries, left unaddressed, will strain the fiscal integrity of public and private pension systems, while urbanization, technological change and income inequality interact with population aging by threatening the sustainability and perceived fairness of conventional financing for many social programs.

Investment in human capital and innovation in social and economic institutions will be central to addressing the demographic realities ahead. The next administration needs to support those investments as well as help to strengthen public health systems and primary care to control chronic disease and prepare for the next infectious disease pandemic, many of which historically have risen in Asia. .

Karen Eggleston is a senior fellow and director of the Asia Health Policy Program. She is the editor of the recently published book Policy Challenges from Demographic Change in China and India (Brookings Institution Press/Shorenstein APARC, 2016).

Trade

By Yong Suk Lee

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Anti-globalization sentiment has ballooned in the past two years, particularly in regions affected by the import competition from and outsourcing to Asia. However, some firms and workers have benefited from increasing trade openness. The U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement of 2012, for example, led to substantial growth in exports in the agricultural, automotive and pharmaceutical sectors. Yet, there are winners and losers from trade agreements. Using an economist’s hypothetical perspective, one would assume firms and workers in the losing industry move to the exporting sector and take advantage of the gains from trade. In reality, adjustment across industries and regions from such movements are slow. Put simply, a furniture worker in North Carolina who lost a job due to import competition cannot easily assume a new job in the booming high-tech industry in California. They would require high-income mobility and a different skill set.

Trade policy needs to focus on facilitating the transition of workers to different industries and better train students to prepare for potential mobility in the future. Trade policy will also be vital in determining how international commerce is shaped. As cross-border e-commerce increases, it will be in the interest of the United States to participate in and lead negotiations that determine future trade rules. The Trans-Pacific Partnership should not simply be abandoned. The next administration should educate both policymakers and the public about the effects of trade openness and the economic and strategic importance of trade agreements for the U.S. economy.

Yong Suk Lee is the SK Center Fellow and deputy director of Korea Program. He leads a research project focused on Korean education, entrepreneurship and economic development.

Speaking at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center on Tuesday, U.S. Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus underscored the importance of partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region and need for an adaptable force to meet the rapidly changing security environment around the world.

Mabus began by recognizing William J. Perry, a Stanford emeritus professor and former U.S. secretary of defense, with a Distinguished Public Service Award for his exceptional record of public service and collaboration on alternative energy initiatives, and set the stage for a conversation on innovation in the Navy and Marine Corps.

Throughout his remarks, Mabus highlighted the challenges of preparing for today’s security landscape and offered examples of how the Navy engages them.

The Navy must not be complacent in its ways, he said, especially in a context of eroding trust in multilateral institutions, unpredictable threats, and increasing competition for resources as sea levels rise.

“You’re not going to be able to tell what those next threats are. You never will. But what you can do is make sure that whatever they are you can respond,” he said. “You’ve got to be flexible.”

Mabus, who has led the Navy administration for the past seven years, said four “Ps” – people, platforms, power and partnerships – have guided his approach to improve force capabilities and rapid-response time.

Reviewing his own record as secretary, he cited updates to policies that extend family leave time, boost diversity in the force, and explore alternative energy sources for Navy aircraft and ships, including the earlier launch of the “Great Green Fleet,” a carrier strike group that uses biofuels.

Partnerships in Asia

Implementing the U.S. rebalance to Asia strategy has been a focus of the Navy’s interaction in the region.

“We’re doing it diplomatically, we’re doing it economically, we’re doing it in every region that we as a government are active in,” said Mabus, who formerly served as U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia and governor of Mississippi.

Sixty percent of the United States naval presence is located in the Asia-Pacific region and it is poised toward growth, Mabus said. Three more guided missile destroyers will be stationed in Japan and be "on station when North Korea launches one of its missiles," he said.

“If something does happen, if a crisis does erupt, we’re already there,” Mabus said, emphasizing the importance of force readiness.

Responding to crises effectively, however, requires an awareness and interoperability between many countries, he said. To practice and prepare, around 500 naval exercises occur between the United States and other countries each year, including Malabar, a trilateral exercise between India, Japan and the United States, and the biannual 27-nation Rim of the Pacific “RIMPAC” exercise, which China joined last year.

South China Sea issues

Answering a question from the audience about fortifications being built by China on land features in the South China Sea, Mabus said, “We don’t think any one country should try and change the status quo.”

Mabus reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to both sail and fly over the land features in accordance with international law. The American naval presence in the region has been there for 70 years and will remain steadfast, he said.

He noted the importance of upholding international law and warned of the dangers of setting a precedent of reinterpreting the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea regarding the South China Sea, attempting to do so would have “a really dramatic impact, not just there, but around the world."

A main goal for the U.S. Navy is to continue engagement between China and the United States, he said. The two countries already collaborate on a number of bilateral measures, such as scheduled passing exercises and visits by the navies to each other’s ports of call.

“What we want China to do is to assume the responsibilities of a naval power, to work with us, and to make sure that freedom of navigation is ensured.”

Gi-Wook Shin, a Stanford professor of sociology and director of Shorenstein APARC, concluded the event by thanking Mabus, and recognized the secretary’s friendship with the late Walter H. Shorenstein, after whom the center was named.

The Bank of Japan (BOJ) conducted a comprehensive assessment of the “Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing (QQE)” on Sept. 21.  In Nikkei Shimbun, Takeo Hoshi gave his evaluation of the results and urged renewed focus on structural reforms in order for Japan to not lose another opportunity for its economic recovery.

The article was republished with permission and is available in English and Japanese below.

What Abenomics Is Missing: Structural Reforms Needed for Economic Revival

On September 21, 2016, the Bank of Japan announced a “comprehensive assessment” of its quantitative and qualitative monetary easing (QQE) policy, concluding that the decline in real interest rates over the three years since QQE was introduced in 2013 has lifted the Japanese economy out of deflation.

At the same time, the BOJ noted that its “price stability target” of 2%, which was to have been achieved in two years, is still not in sight. Inflation failed to materialize, the bank said, due to a fall in crude oil prices and other exogenous factors, as well as the fact that inflation expectations—which rose at the start of QQE—subsequently went flat and have recently weakened.

The negative interest rate policy that was introduced in January, the BOJ added, has substantially pushed down interest rates “across the entire yield curve,” affecting not only short-term but also long-term interest rates. But it also referred to the policy’s “negative consequences for financial institutions’ profits.” As the figure illustrates, the yield curve declined immediately after the January 29 announcement, and even 10-year Japanese government bond yields have now fallen into negative territory.

Changes in the Japanese Government Bond Yield Curve (2016)

Valid Assessment

Based on the conclusions of its assessment, the BOJ also announced a new policy framework calling for “QQE with yield curve control,” establishing a target (of around 0% for now) for 10-year JGB yields and making an “inflation-overshooting commitment” to continue with QQE even after the price stability target of 2% has been attained.

On the whole, the bank’s assessment presents a level-headed analysis of the impact of its monetary policy, and its conclusions are quite valid. The focus it gave to the importance of inflation expectations is also correct, as the initial success of QQE was precisely the result of the impact it had on market expectations. Inflation expectations rose before QQE had any impact on actual price levels, leading to lower real interest rates (nominal rate minus expected rate of inflation), higher stock prices, a weaker yen, and a boost in economic activity.

For many years, the BOJ had frowned on nontraditional monetary policies, and this hindered Japan’s efforts to overcome deflation. Since the appointment of Haruhiko Kuroda as governor, though, the BOJ has dramatically shifted course, acting with firm conviction that deflation can be defeated through QQE.

The rate of inflation failed to rise as anticipated, however; consumer prices are no longer declining, as they had been under deflation, but the inflation rate remains stubbornly low, having long hovered below 1% and recently once again approaching 0%. And while there was an initial jump in inflation expectations, they, too, have begun to decline without ever having pushed up the actual inflation rate.

Why has this been the case? The BOJ’s assessment points to the fact that in Japan, realized past inflation has a larger impact on wage negotiations than expected inflation, while medium- to long-term inflation expectations are more important determinants of wages in the Unites States and Germany. To test such an assertion more rigorously, it would have been helpful if the BOJ had offered a regression analysis using short-term inflation expectations as a variable as well. That said, one can still probably conclude that the biggest reason for the failure to reach the 2% inflation target was that inflation expectations were not fully incorporated in wages.

Doubts about Effectiveness

While the conclusions of the BOJ’s comprehensive assessment may be valid, I am skeptical about the effectiveness of the newly announced framework for yield curve control. The new policy is not an attempt at further monetary relaxation. As the figure shows, the yield on 10-year JGBs is already below the target of 0%. The effort to reinforce the BOJ’s commitment by announcing that QQE will continue even after the 2% price stability target is reached is not effective, either. We might even say it is misguided.

There were times in the past when the bank’s commitment was called into question. For example, the zero-interest-rate policy that was first introduced in 1999 was quickly terminated a year later, despite the fact that deflationary conditions still persisted. Various attempts at monetary easing undertaken over the ensuing decade achieved a certain degree of success, but they came to an end each time as soon as inflation returned to around 0%. There is no doubting the BOJ’s commitment under Governor Kuroda, though, as the bank has repeatedly and unequivocally affirmed its intention to take all necessary policy steps to achieve 2% inflation.

What remains dubious is whether the policies taken to date, including negative interest rates, are effective. The most important conclusion of the BOJ’s comprehensive assessment is that inflation expectations have failed to trigger higher wages and a surge in prices. The new framework for yield curve control, unfortunately, does nothing to address this issue.

One way of getting around this disconnect is to adopt measures that would lead directly to higher wages. Noting that Japan “needs meaningful positive inflation for reasons of fiscal stability,” Olivier Blanchard and Adam S. Posen of the Peterson Institute for International Economics proposed in a December 2015 Financial Times op-ed that nominal wages in Japan be boosted by 10% across the board (”Japan’s Solution Is to Raise Wages by 10 Percent”). While such measures are beyond the scope of monetary policy, the BOJ can certainly encourage the government to take action along these lines, as it would help the bank achieve its inflation target.

Need for Sweeping Reforms

Achieving the inflation target is not the most important goal for Japan. What the Japanese economy needs more is real economic growth. Abenomics may have helped to halt a downtrend in prices and end deflation in the narrow sense of the term, but a more important test is whether it can more broadly lift the country out of the deflationary state in which it has been stuck for decades. This, though, as the BOJ has maintained all along, is not a task for the bank to tackle alone.

Lack of demand is not the only cause of the decades-long stagnation. If it were, and if Japan’s potential growth rate had not declined, the economy would have been hit by a runaway deflationary spiral—not the gradual lowering of prices that it actually experienced. This suggests that there were problems on the supply side as well.

Monetary and fiscal policy tools can be mobilized to prop up faltering demand and pull the economy out of deflation, narrowly defined. But unless supply-side issues are also addressed, there will be no return to robust growth. Such a path will require sweeping reforms to restructure the economy into a shape befitting its level of maturity.

The initial success of QQE substantially alleviated weaknesses in demand. The output gap (the difference between the potential output and actual output of an economy) has recently been hovering around 0%, according to BOJ estimates, suggesting that further monetary and fiscal expansion to boost demand would not promote growth. Of greater importance—now more than ever—are structural reforms to expand potential output.

The third of the “three arrows” of Abenomics is a growth strategy consisting of various reforms to boost potential output. Compared to the first arrow of monetary easing, though, very little progress has been made in this area. What we need is a comprehensive assessment not only of monetary policy but of Abenomics as a whole, particularly its growth strategy.

Twenty-one years ago, in September 1995, with telltale signs of deflation on the horizon, the BOJ took the preventive step of lowering the official discount rate to 0.5%. The statement released by the bank at that time concluded that the problems confronting the Japanese economy could not be solved with monetary measures alone and that drastic deregulation and other structural reforms were also needed to ensure the effectiveness of looser credit.

This has been the BOJ’s position over the two decades since then. The BOJ has been doing more than its share, at least in the past few years. It is high time for the Japanese government to heed this call and advance full-fledged structural reforms, lest another valuable opportunity for economic revival be squandered.

Courtesy of Tokyo Foundation, http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2016/what-abenomics-is-missi… (Translated from “Abenomikusu no sotenken o,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Keizai Kyoshitu section), Sept. 30, 2016.)

アベノミクスの総点検を 成長戦略・金融緩和両輪で

９月21日、日銀は2013年春に開始した「量的・質的金融緩和」の政策効果の総括的検証の結果を発表した。

　それによると、量的・質的金融緩和は導入後３年間で実質金利を低下させ、経済はデフレの状況から脱出できた。しかし２年間で達成するはずだった ２%という物価上昇率の目標はいまだ実現されていない。その原因は、原油価格下落などで実際の物価上昇率が低下し、政策導入直後には上昇し始めた予想物価 上昇率が次第に横ばいになり、最近はまた低下したことにある。

　今年２月に始めたマイナス金利については、すべての期間で金利が大幅に低下する効果があった一方、金融機関の収益圧迫による悪影響も考慮せねばな らないという。図に示すように１月29日の発表直後からイールドカーブ（利回り曲線）が下方にシフトを始め、直近では10年物までがマイナス金利になって いる。

国債のイールドカーブの変化

　検証を踏まえて、日銀は新しい金融政策の枠組みとして「長短金利操作付き量的・質的金融緩和」を導入した。10年物国債金利に目標（当面はゼ ロ％）を設定した点と、消費者物価上昇率が２％を安定的に超える状態になるまで金融緩和を続ける「オーバーシュート型コミットメント」を導入した点が新し い部分だ。

　検証は全体として金融政策の効果を冷静に分析しており結論も妥当といえるだろう。分析が期待の重要性に焦点を当てているのも正しい。量的・質的金 融緩和の初期の成功は期待に働きかけた結果だった。金融緩和が実際のインフレ率に影響を与える前に期待インフレ率が上昇し、その結果として実質利子率（名 目利子率から期待インフレ率を引いたもの）が低下し、株価を押し上げ、円を減価させ、景気を刺激することになった。

　かつての日銀は、非伝統的金融政策の効果について悲観的で、結果としてデフレの継続を容認してしまった。黒田東彦総裁の率いる新しい日銀は打って変わり、量的・質的金融緩和によりデフレから脱却できるという信念を明確にしたことが最も重要だった。

　だが実際のインフレ率はなかなか上昇しなかった。物価水準の下落が続くデフレは終わったが、インフレ率は１％以下が続き、最近ではまたゼロ％近くに下がっている。当初は上昇した期待インフレ率も、実際のインフレ率に反映されることなく、また低下し始めている。

　インフレ期待が実際のインフレ率に反映されなかったのはなぜか。検証は、日本の賃金決定は中長期の期待インフレ率よりも過去のインフレ実績が大き い影響を与える点を指摘する。「米独では交渉賃金の適用期間がわが国よりも長いため」と推測するが、それを確かめるため短期の期待インフレ率を使った回帰 式も推定してほしかった。いずれにせよインフレ期待が賃金に反映されなかったことが、２％のインフレ目標が達成されない最大の理由だろう。

　検証の結論は妥当だが、それを踏まえた新しい政策の有効性には疑問がある。まず現状に比べてどれほど緩和になっているか疑わしい。図に示したよう に、10年物国債の金利は既にゼロ％を切っている状態だし、２％のインフレ目標が達成されていない段階で、２％を安定的に超えるまでは金融緩和を続けると いうことが、どれだけの違いをもたらすのか疑問だ。日銀のコミットメントを強めようとする政策は的外れでさえある。

　過去には日銀のコミットメントが疑われることはあった。1999年に始まった最初のゼロ金利政策は00年にまだデフレ的状態が続く中で解除され た。00年代の量的緩和もある程度の成功は収めたが、インフレがほぼゼロまで戻った段階で解除してしまった。だが黒田総裁の下では、日銀は一貫して２％の インフレ目標のためにあらゆる政策をとることを明確にしてきたし、日銀の姿勢を疑う者はほとんどいないだろう。

　疑われているのはマイナス金利政策も含めた今までの金融緩和策の有効性だ。総括的検証が到達した最も重要な結論は、インフレ期待から賃金上昇を通じて実際のインフレ率が上昇するチャネルが効いていないということだが、新しく導入された政策にはこの問題への解決策はない。

　期待インフレ率の上昇が賃金の上昇につながりにくいなら、賃金の上昇に直接働きかける方が、目標インフレ率の達成のために有効ではないか。米ピー ターソン国際経済研究所のオリビエ・ブランシャール、アダム・ポーゼン両氏はこの観点から最近、日本経済をデフレに近い状態から脱出させる政策として、一 律10％の賃金増加を提言している。賃金の増加を促すような政策は金融政策の範囲ではないが、インフレ目標を達成しようとする日銀が提案してもよい政策で はないだろうか。

　２％のインフレ目標を達成できるかよりも重要なのは、日本経済を停滞から脱出させられるかだ。物価水準の下落が続く狭義のデフレから抜け出すだけ でなく、20年に及ぶ経済停滞という広義のデフレ状態に終止符を打てるか。だが一貫して主張してきたように、金融政策だけではなし得ないことだ。

　20年間に及ぶ日本経済の停滞は需要不足によってのみ引き起こされたのではない。もし需要不足だけが問題で、日本経済の潜在的成長率が低下しな かったなら、日本は穏やかなデフレではなく、デフレの幅がどんどん広がるデフレスパイラルに陥っていただろう。そうならなかったことは、需要側だけでな く、供給側も停滞していた証拠だ。

　金融緩和や財政出動で総需要を刺激することで需要不足を解消し、狭義のデフレからは脱却できるだろう。しかし需要不足が解消しても供給側の問題が 解決されなければ、経済成長は回復しない。成長を取り戻すには、成熟経済の成長に適するように経済構造が変わらなければならない。

　量的・質的金融緩和の初期の成功により、需要不足はかなり回復した。日銀の推計によれば、最近のアウトプットギャップ（潜在産出量と実際の産出量 の差）はゼロになっている。金融緩和と財政出動に頼るだけでなく、日本の潜在産出量を拡大するような構造改革が今まで以上に必要とされているのである。

　安倍政権の経済政策「アベノミクス」の３本の矢の一つである成長戦略は、日本経済の潜在産出量を増加させるための様々な改革からなるはずだった。 だが第１の矢の金融政策に比べて、第３の矢の成長戦略はなかなか進まないようにみえる。金融政策の総括的検証に続いて必要なのは、アベノミクス全体の特に 成長戦略の総括的検証だろう。

　今から21年前の95年９月、日銀は既に兆しがみえていたデフレを防ぐため、公定歩合を0.5％に引き下げた。日銀はその際、日本経済の問題は金 融緩和だけでは解決できず、構造改革も必要だと指摘した。政策変更の発表文は「同時に、思い切った規制緩和の推進など構造政策の実施を伴ってこそ、こうし た金融緩和の効果が十分に発揮されるものと考える」と結ばれている。

　以後20年間、日銀は構造改革の必要性を訴え続けてきた。少なくとも今の日銀はあらゆる方法で金融緩和を続けるスタンスを貫いており、十分ではないものの結果も出てきている。構造改革を今こそ本格的に進めなければ、日本経済はまた復活の機会を失ってしまうだろう。

(2016年9月30日付『日本経済新聞』「経済教室」より転載）

A long line of research has shown that women live longer than men, yet according to Karen Eggleston, director of the Asia Health Policy Program, and four other Stanford health researchers, mortality rate differences between men and women are much more variable than previously thought, following predictable patterns. Life expectancy differs depending on time, location and socioeconomic circumstance, not on biological factors alone, according to their newly published findings.

The researchers found that women have greater resilience when faced with socioeconomic adversity in a developing country—living nearly 10 years longer than men on average—but this pattern changes as the country evolves. Developed countries typically have smaller gaps in mortality rates between men and women than developing countries do.

Japan and South Korea are outliers, however, with higher mortality rate differences between men and women than is average for developed countries. In addition to the prevalence of male smoking, one possible explanation they draw is the lack of career-related opportunities for women in Japan and South Korea, two countries that have low gender wage equity among Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development members.

Eggleston, who is part of the core faculty at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, et al. suggested the idea that reducing gender inequality may help narrow the mortality gap: men increase years lived when fewer barriers for women exist, but concluded that their findings supporting this conclusion merit further inquiry.

Their findings were published in the August edition of SSM – Population Health and highlighted in an earlier column on Voxeu.

North Korea conducted its fifth nuclear test in the wake of the G20 summit earlier this month. The United States immediately condemned North Korea’s behavior in a statement delivered by the White House, and a few days later, flew a set of bombers near the U.S. military base in Osan, South Korea.

Writing for Toyo Keizai, Daniel Sneider, associate director for research at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, said a consistent strategic and military reasoning drives the North Korean regime’s decision to test nuclear missiles. His analysis piece can be viewed in English and Japanese.

Sneider also spoke with Slate about how the next U.S. administration could respond, suggesting that a deployment of additional nuclear-capable aircraft at U.S. bases in Asia would send a strong signal to Pyongyang. The Slate article is available at this link.

South Korea has been seeking stronger international sanctions against North Korea since the test. As the country’s biggest trading partner, China is considered an important actor in the ability to influence North Korea. In the Korea Times, Sneider said a way to motivate China to augment their role in sanctions against North Korea is to remind Beijing that a continuation of North Korea's nuclear program would only lead to greater scale and capability of American military presence in the region. The Korea Times article is available at this link.