This commentary by Kiyoteru Tsutsui and Charles Crabtree was originally published in The Hill.

The recent White House summit meeting between President Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga signaled to the world, and especially to China, that the U.S.-Japan alliance is strong and ready for intensifying competition in Asia.

For the first time in more than 50 years, the Japanese and American leaders mentioned Taiwan in their joint statement. China immediately responded with strong words, as expected, but since has moderated its tone. Furthermore, Chinese leader Xi Jinping participated in the U.S.-organized Leaders Summit on Climate the week after the Biden-Suga meeting and took a collaborative stance, a hopeful sign that competition will not eliminate the possibility of some collaboration and that climate change is an area where Beijing, Tokyo and Washington can work together.

But the U.S. and Japan still have at least three concerns about China: Beijing’s continued posturing on Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands; its significant leverage in economic relations; and its repression of human rights in Xinjiang, Hong Kong and beyond. How should the alliance handle these important issues? 

On the security front, America’s return to multilateralism under Biden is a welcome development for Japan and other like-minded states in the region. The U.S.-Japan alliance is obviously central in the coalition of democratic nations concerned about China’s ambitions. The primary goal of these countries ought to be walking the thin line between demonstrating their resolve to counter any aggressive behavior by China with force and avoiding any unnecessary provocation against China. 

Toward that end, the most promising framework is the Quad that includes India and Australia in addition to Japan and the U.S. The first-ever leader-level meeting in March elevated the Quad’s status significantly. While it still is a long way from becoming a NATO-like security apparatus — and it’s not even clear if that’s the consensus goal — it could help stabilize the region by creating a credible counterweight to check China’s territorial ambitions.

Beyond the Quad, the inclusion of other like-minded stakeholders such as South Korea and ASEAN countries on security matters is important. With South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s visit to Washington planned in late May, a good first step for the Biden administration would be to invest some diplomatic capital in mending fences between Japan and South Korea. A full-scale reconciliation between the two regional powers is unlikely this year; Suga faces elections in the fall, for which he needs to consolidate the conservative base, and Moon is a lame duck with limited political power. But some reconciliation would be welcome for the U.S. as it seeks to resurrect the trilateral alliance with Japan and South Korea to complement the Quad in deterring China’s ambitions and addressing the threat posed by North Korea. 

In the economic domain, China is arguably even more difficult to contain, being the largest trade partner for virtually all the countries in the region. Decoupling from China was a key theme at the Biden-Suga summit, but this is a task that has proven much easier said than done. From semiconductors to rare earth minerals, the battle for key materials for the 21st century economy will only intensify, and China’s grand scheme in the Belt and Road Initiative needs to be countered by a similarly grand long-term strategy that would flesh out the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision.

In this regard, the U.S.-Japan Competitiveness and Resilience Partnership can be quite consequential. In addition to pledging cooperation on “sensitive supply-chain” issues, it outlines the agenda for technological innovation that cuts across security and economic domains, making it a critical tool in the competition with China. This is because whoever develops an edge in transformational technologies — such as artificial intelligence, 5G infrastructure, and outer space development — will enjoy diplomatic and military advantages as well as economic profits. The combined $4.5 billion investment in the partnership is a good first step to ensuring that the U.S. and Japan retain an innovation advantage. Additional expenditures likely will be necessary, though, considering China’s commitment in these areas.

On human rights, Japan and America take different approaches. While the U.S. has called the situation in Xinjiang a genocide and imposed sanctions there, as well as in Myanmar following the military coup, Japan has taken a more subdued stance. This is a standard approach for Tokyo, which prefers to emphasize engagement with violating governments.

The Biden administration seems to accept Suga’s strategy of engagement, and perhaps the diplomatic channel that this approach provides can be useful in negotiating some kind of settlement. However, the strategy of engagement that has produced some benefits in countries such as Thailand and possibly Myanmar is unlikely to be as effective with China. Furthermore, several Western corporations are facing boycotts in China for taking a stand against forced labor in Xinjiang. If Japanese corporations avoid paying the price and continue business as usual, Tokyo might face greater pressure to take some action. Given the central importance of the Chinese market for Japanese businesses, this could give rise to significant tension between Tokyo and Washington. 

On all these dimensions, for Japan and the U.S. to be effective in countering China, both Biden and Suga would have to consolidate domestic support. Biden’s first 100 days generally were seen as successful, with COVID-19 vaccine distribution going smoothly and Congress passing ambitious spending bills. Besides, Biden has at least until the midterm elections in November 2022 to move things forward.

The timetable is less friendly for Suga, who needs to win the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) presidential election in September and hold a House of Representatives election by October. His fate will be shaped in large measure by his government’s pandemic response and how that influences economic fortunes, and to a lesser extent the success of the Tokyo Olympics. Most Tokyo insiders predict that he will remain in office past October, citing weak opposition both in and outside of the ruling LDP. If, however, COVID-19 vaccine distribution does not move forward by the fall, as projected by the government, and the economy continues to slide, that could still trip him up.

Only with domestic political stability and economic prosperity can Tokyo and Washington take the next steps in projecting strength vis-à-vis China, and that is the best deterrent against China’s expansionist ambitions and toward ensuring peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific area.

SPICE currently runs four regional programs for high school students in Japan: Stanford e-Hiroshima, Stanford e-Kawasaki, Stanford e-Oita, and Stanford e-Tottori. These online courses are coordinated in collaboration with school and government officials at the city and prefectural levels, with the goal of presenting creative and innovative approaches to teaching Japanese high school students about U.S. society and culture and global themes.

All four courses recently finished their 2020–21 term. This summer, two top students from each course will be honored through a virtual event hosted by SPICE, Stanford University. Congratulations to the eight honorees below on their academic excellence!

Stanford e-Hiroshima (Instructor Rylan Sekiguchi)

Student Honoree: Sara Arakawa
School: Hiroshima Prefectural Hiroshima Kokutaiji Senior High School
Project Title: Silicon Valley: Secrets Behind Success

Student Honoree: Chika Isone
School: Hiroshima Prefectural Hiroshima Senior High School
Project Title: Making Innovation by Design Thinking in Silicon Valley

Stanford e-Kawasaki (Instructor Maiko Tamagawa Bacha)

Student Honoree: Eric Silang
School: Kawasaki High School
Project Title: Humor and America

Student Honoree: Shunya Tani
School: Kawasaki High School
Project Title: Possible Ways to Promote Renewable Energy in Japan and the U.S.

Stanford e-Oita (Instructor Kasumi Yamashita)

Student Honoree: Hana Burkart
School: Hofu High School
Project Title: Social Discrimination Against Foreigners in Japan

Student Honoree: Yayano Okuda
School: Usa High School
Project Title: Environmental Education

Stanford e-Tottori (Instructor Jonas Edman)

Student Honoree: Eri Tamura
School: Tottori Nishi High School
Project Title: Teachers’ Treatment in the U.S.

Student Honoree: Hinata Yonemura
School: Yonago Higashi High School
Project Title: Veganism: How Japanese Society Can Promote It

The SPICE staff is looking forward to honoring these eight students in a virtual ceremony on August 23, 2021 (August 24 in Japan). Each student will be given the opportunity to make a formal presentation to members of the Stanford community and the Japanese community in the San Francisco Bay Area.

SPICE also offers online courses to U.S. high school students on Japan (Reischauer Scholars Program), China (China Scholars Program), and Korea (Sejong Korea Scholars Program), and online courses to Chinese high school students on the United States (Stanford e-China) and to Japanese high school students on the United States and U.S.–Japan relations (Stanford e-Japan).

To stay informed of SPICE news, join our email list and follow us on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.

The Instructor of the Reischauer Scholars Program (RSP) is Naomi Funahashi.

When Tai Young Whang, an ambitious high school graduate from Pyongyang, stepped onto the dock in Tokyo in 1933 to attend Hitotsubashi University, he never could have imagined that his personal dream of building economic bridges between Korea and Japan would fuel his great-grandson’s desire to follow in his footsteps almost a century later.

***

At the end of my first year of middle school, I chose to study the Japanese language for the first time. What started out as a curiosity of the language and some of Japan’s popular cultural exports (such as Pokémon games) gradually blossomed into a deeper passion for Japan’s culture and history. During my eighth-grade world history class, I turned my focus to researching the intricate sankin kōtai system and skilled political maneuverings underlying the Tokugawa shogunate’s iron grip on power during the 17th century. I even found myself at Eiheiji Temple in Fukui Prefecture that May meditating towards a blank wooden wall at four in the morning. Yet, I was not satisfied. These brief historical vignettes, like still frames in the film reel of humanity, remained fragments of a larger narrative that I was increasingly eager to discover.

As my school did not offer courses in East Asian or Japanese history, I was excited to apply during my sophomore year to Stanford’s Reischauer Scholars Program (RSP), an online program on Japan offered to high school students across the United States. By providing its students with the ability to comprehensively explore Japanese history, economics, society, and more, the program presents a unique opportunity to delve into these topics alongside similarly motivated peers. While the course taught me a lot about Japan proper, I also gained a much deeper understanding of the U.S.–Japanese relationship.

During the course of the 20-week program, we spent the first 14 weeks on a series of in-depth readings and comprehensive seminars led by government officials, business leaders, and scholars. As actual practitioners of the fields we were studying, these visiting experts brought their worldviews and inspiring insights to life. During one of the virtual seminars, for example, we had the opportunity to meet Rachel Brunette-Chen, the then-Principal Officer for the U.S. Consulate General in Sapporo, and learn about both the U.S.–Japan Security Alliance and her own foreign service experience bolstering the ties that connect the two countries. Hearing from an actual foreign service officer provided a tangible sense of the dedication and importance of those who work to link American and Japanese interests on the ground.

Starting from week one, we unpacked what we had learned from our readings and virtual classrooms through weekly discussion boards. These online forums continued throughout the week, often filled with thought-provoking perspectives, respectful rebuttals, and witty banter. We debated the efficiency of Abenomics, the impact of textbook revisions on Japanese history education, and the societal strains of modernization on early 20th century Japan, among other topics. Each new post became another thread weaving our different ideas together into a tapestry of cross-cultural connections that we all grew to treasure. Even today, many of us remain connected both online and by our shared experience.

***

Brandon Cho’s great-grandparents, Tai Young Whang and Bong Soon Whang, Seoul; photo courtesy Brandon Cho

This op-ed by Kiyoteru Tsutsui originally appeared in Nikkei Asia.

In one of the few unscripted moments in the meticulously planned U.S.-Japan summit meeting last Friday, President Joe Biden referred to Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga as "vice president" before quickly correcting himself.

In a different era, this could have turned into a diplomatic incident, with right-leaning Japanese pundits calling it evidence of the U.S.'s patronizing approach to Japan. Fortunately for Biden, the current geopolitical environment is not conducive to such provocation, and no major media picked up on the slip.

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Much has been made of Suga being the first foreign leader to meet Biden in person. According to the U.S. State Department Office of the Historian, this is only the second time ever that a Japanese prime minister became the first foreign leader to meet a new president in the White House.

The other time was in 1989, when Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita visited President George H.W. Bush. Back then, Japan was a major threat to U.S. economic hegemony. Today, China is that threat, and not just in the economic domain. China is the first bona fide competitor to the U.S. since the Soviet Union, and its threat extends to every nook and cranny of the globe.

To counter China's ascension, the U.S. needs its allies, and Japan is the most important partner for that purpose. This is the context in which Suga visited the White House despite all the COVID-related restrictions.

Not surprisingly, the statements were carefully crafted to send strong signals to China. Building on the two-plus-two dialogue in March, the joint statement touched on the importance of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific, from the East and South China seas to even Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Taiwan.

Japan certainly wanted a reference to the Senkaku Islands, which Beijing claims and calls the Diaoyu, and the applicability there of Article V of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The Biden administration had made that commitment earlier, calming concerns among Japanese leaders that the new administration may be softer on China than the Trump administration.

Biden has, in fact, been quite tough on China and has given almost a perfect answer to what Japanese foreign policymakers wanted. In return, the U.S. wanted Japan to be squarely on Washington's side. The wording of the joint statement — negotiated until the last minute — saw Japan agree to include a reference to Taiwan for the first time in 52 years, but with Japan's preferred wording, encouraging "the peaceful resolution of the cross-Strait issues."

Predictably, China reacted quickly and strongly, accusing the two countries of interfering in its domestic affairs and warning Japan about siding with the U.S. We have yet to see what retaliatory actions China might take, but the reference to Taiwan signals the beginning of a new trilateral relationship between China, Japan and the U.S.

The summit covered other important issues, all with China in the background. One key issue is economic security. In particular, supply chain decoupling will become a battle cry for the U.S. and its allies as they seek to reduce dependence on materials from China. Semiconductors are especially critical, as they power all the major growth areas in the new economy. Taiwan's dominance in the semiconductor industry is the main reason why Taiwan is so important to both sides.

To remain in the driver's seat in the new economy, the joint statement announced a new U.S.-Japan Competitiveness and Resilience (CoRe) Partnership. The most concrete proposal was an initial commitment of $4.5 billion from the two governments toward fifth generation (5G) and 6G networks, reflecting concerns about China's dominance in the key digital infrastructure of the future.

Human rights is another thorny issue, with the joint statement specifying concerns over Xinjiang and Hong Kong. With some companies joining the boycott campaign on cotton from Xinjiang, and China countering by criticizing racial division in the U.S., the clash between China and the U.S. will intensify in this area as well. Japan has stepped out of its comfort zone and criticized China on human rights, following the American approach more explicitly than before. In this regard, it is notable that Suga also referred to rising violence against Asians in the U.S.

One area in which China might be more of a partner than a competitor is climate change, with all three countries committing to zero emissions by mid-21st century. Almost concurrently with the Biden-Suga meeting, American and Chinese climate envoys — John Kerry and Xie Zhenhua — met in China and issued a joint statement affirming their commitment to work together on global climate challenges.

All these initiatives and commitments are potentially meaningful and consequential developments that can reshape the Indo-Pacific, although more concrete ideas are needed before we can evaluate their impact. The biggest take-away ought to be the confirmation that the U.S.-Japan alliance is gearing up for a new era of competition with China.

Japan more than reaffirmed its commitment to the alliance with the U.S., risking its economic relations with China. The U.S. will be sure to ask for more concrete actions from Japan on the basis of the joint statement, and Japan can no longer evade questions about what it would do in a confrontation with China. Japan has to navigate a tough terrain of standing with the U.S. in the competition with China while preventing the escalation of tensions between Beijing and Washington, and at the same time protecting its own national interests.

A new phase of the trilateral relationship has just begun, and like it or not, other Asian nations might face the same decision that Japan faced, and sooner rather than later.

Stanford e-Japan is an online course that teaches Japanese high school students about U.S. society and culture and U.S.–Japan relations. The course introduces students to both U.S. and Japanese perspectives on many historical and contemporary issues. It is offered biannually by the Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education (SPICE). Stanford e-Japan is currently supported by the Yanai Tadashi Foundation.

In Summer 2021, top students of the Spring 2020 and the Fall 2020 Stanford e-Japan courses will be honored through an event at Stanford University.

The three Spring 2020 honorees—Minami Matsushima (Senri & Osaka International Schools of Kwansei Gakuin), Yuna Naoi (Tokyo Metropolitan Hibiya High School), and Kenta Yoshii (Shukutoku Junior and Senior High School)—will be recognized for their coursework and exceptional research essays that focused respectively on “The Price We Pay for Men to be Men: Toxic Masculinity in the United States,” “Online Secondary School Education in Japan and the U.S. Amid the COVID-19 Crisis,” and “In Search of a Realistic Substitute for U.S. Extended Deterrence for Japan.”

Risako Nomura (Yokohama Senior High School of International Studies) received an Honorable Mention for her research paper on “How Untranslatability Between Japanese and English Fosters the U.S.–Japan Relationship.”

The three Fall 2020 honorees—Coco Kawaguchi (Keio Girls Senior High School), Sotaro Kunieda (Suwa Seiryo High School), and Yun-Tzu (Allison) Lin (Canadian Academy)—will be recognized for their coursework and exceptional research essays that focused respectively on “To Infinity and Beyond! National Survival in the Era of Venture Space Development,” “Fostering Social Enterprises in Japan: Lessons from the United States,” and “Nuclear Deterrence Theory: An Evaluation of Its Effectiveness in Preventing Future Deployment of Nuclear Weapons.”

Satoru Uchida (Tokyo Metropolitan High School) received an Honorable Mention for his coursework and research paper on “What the Japanese Government Should Do Immediately to Protect Children’s Human Rights.”

In the Spring 2020 session of Stanford e-Japan, students from the following schools completed the course: Aoba Japan International School (Tokyo); Clark Memorial International High School (Osaka); Hiroshima Jogakuin Senior High School (Hiroshima); Hiroshima Prefectural Junior/Senior High School (Hiroshima); Kaijo High School (Tokyo); Kamakura Gakuen High School (Kamakura); Katoh Gakuen Gyoshu Senior High School (Shizuoka); Keio Girls Senior High School (Tokyo); Kurume University Senior High School (Fukuoka); Meikei High School (Ibaraki); Municipal Urawa High School (Saitama); Musashino University Chiyoda High School (Tokyo); Nirayama High School (Shizuoka); Okayama Prefectural Okayama Asahi High School (Okayama); Seigakuin High School (Tokyo); Senior High School at Komaba, University of Tsukuba (Tokyo); Senior High School at Otsuka, University of Tsukuba (Tokyo); Senri & Osaka International Schools of Kwansei Gakuin (Osaka); Shibuya Makuhari Senior High School (Chiba); Shukutoku Junior and Senior High School (Tokyo); Tokyo Gakugei University International Secondary School (Tokyo); Tokyo Metropolitan Hibiya High School (Tokyo); Tokyo Metropolitan Ryogoku High School (Tokyo); Urawa Minami High School (Saitama); Waseda University Senior High School (Tokyo); Yokohama Senior High School of International Studies (Kanagawa); Yonezawa Kojokan High School (Yamagata); and Zero High School (Fukushima).

In the Fall 2020 session of Stanford e-Japan, students from the following schools completed the course: Canadian Academy (Hyogo), Doshisha International High School (Kyoto), Fukushima Prefectural High School (Fukushima), Hamamatsu Nishi High School (Shizuoka), Hiroo Gakuen High School (Tokyo), Hiroshima Prefectural Hiroshima Senior High School (Hiroshima), Fukuoka Prefectural Kaho High School (Fukuoka), Kaichi Junior/Senior High School (Wakayama), Kamakura Jogakuin (Kanagawa), Keio Girls Senior High School (Tokyo), Kyoto Prefectural Rakuhoku Senior High School (Kyoto), Miyagi Prefectural Sendai Nika High School (Miyagi), Musashino University Chiyoda High School (Tokyo), N-High School (Okinawa), Otaru Choryo High School (Hokkaido), Seikei High School (Tokyo), Seisho High School (Nara), Senior High School at Otsuka, University of Tsukuba (Tokyo), Shibuya Makuhari Senior High School (Tokyo), Suwa Seiryo High School (Nagano), Takada Senior High School (Mie), Tokyo Gakugei University International Secondary School (Tokyo), Tokyo Metropolitan Hitotsubashi High School (Tokyo), Tokyo Metropolitan Ryogoku High School (Tokyo), Tsurumaru Senior High School (Kagoshima), and Waseda University Senior High School (Tokyo).

For more information about the Stanford e-Japan Program, please visit stanfordejapan.org.

To stay informed of news about Stanford e-Japan and SPICE’s other programs, join our email list and follow us on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.

SPICE offers separate courses for U.S. high school students. For more information, please see the Reischauer Scholars Program (online course about Japan), Sejong Scholars Program (online course about Korea), and China Scholars Program (online course about China).

On March 26, 2021, a virtual award ceremony was held to honor SPICE’s Spring and Fall 2019 Stanford e-Japan honorees and 2020 Reischauer Scholars Program honorees. The honorees performed at the highest levels of their courses as determined by Stanford e-Japan Instructors Waka Brown and Meiko Kotani, Reischauer Scholars Program Instructor Naomi Funahashi, and research paper review committees.

Spring and Fall 2019 Stanford e-Japan Program Honorees

• Ayano Hirose (Okayama Sozan High School, Okayama)
• Rinko Kawamoto (UWC ISAK Japan, Nagano)
• Yuta Myojo (Rikkyo Ikebukuro High School, Tokyo), honorable mention
• Renee Ohnuki (Senior High School at Sakado, University of Tsukuba, Saitama)
• Chisaki Sano (Gunma Kokusai Academy, Gunma)
• Natsumi Shindo (Keio Girls Senior High School, Tokyo)
• Kota Watanabe (Waseda University Senior High School, Tokyo)
• Isshin Yunoki (Kaisei Academy, Tokyo), honorable mention
   

2020 Reischauer Scholars Program Honorees

• Brandon Cho (The Nueva School, California)
• Sara Fujimori (Menlo School, California)
• Noah Harrigan (Great Valley High School, Pennsylvania), honorable mention
• Kristie Moore (Irvine High School, California), honorable mention
• Tyler Vold (Kamiak High School, Washington), honorable mention
• Amy Joy Zhai (Richard Montgomery High School, Maryland)

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The Honorable Toru Maeda, Consul General of Japan in San Francisco, made opening comments and underscored the students’ critical roles as future leaders in both countries and key players in the U.S.–Japan relationship. He noted, “By enrolling in and completing these programs, you have demonstrated initiative and determination to further your understanding of Japan and the United States. I strongly encourage you to continue your studies. I hope that this experience will inspire you to consider a career involving Japan and the United States… The continued strength of our government, business, and culture relations will be determined by the coming generations.” Consul General Maeda’s comments perfectly set the stage for the presentations by the honorees.

The honorees’ presentations focused on their course research projects that included U.S.–Japan relations in the areas of technology, security, and economics; Japanese education-related topics such as language learning for foreign students and cross-cultural understanding; identity issues and Zainichi Koreans; and topics that are regularly in the news such as Hollywood films, nuclear power and energy policy, and immigration. Their presentations were followed by the presentation of plaques by Brown, Kotani, and Funahashi.

Professor Rie Kijima (PhD, Stanford ’13) of the University of Toronto commented, “There is no doubt that the honorees of Stanford e-Japan and the RSP will use the experience they gained from participating in SPICE’s programs to engage in further research and activities that will bring greater awareness of and appreciation for the social, economic, political, and cultural contexts unique to the United States and Japan.” She continued, “What I am most impressed about the honorees of the Stanford e-Japan and the RSP programs are the quality of their research papers and their persuasiveness in conveying their main argument to a larger audience.” Brown, Kotani, and Funahashi hope that their students will have the opportunity to study with scholars like Kijima in their college years—scholars who would encourage them to explore careers involving Japan and the United States, a hope expressed by Consul General Maeda.

I was in touch with each of the honorees following the ceremony and they all expressed their gratitude to their instructors and the supporters of the courses. The Yanai Tadashi Foundation is the supporter of Stanford e-Japan, and Chikano Shiroma and Daisuke Kato represented the Yanai Tadashi Foundation during the ceremony. Naoaki and Yuka Mashita are the current supporters of the Reischauer Scholars Program. These courses and the ceremony would not have been possible with their support.

This op-ed by Kiyoteru Tsutsui originally appeared in Nikkei Asia.

As the summer of racial unrest forced America to confront its racist past and present yet again, a book by Heather McGhee, The Sum of Us: What Racism Costs Everyone and How We Can Prosper Together, which documents how racial division prevents Americans from uniting to lift everyone's lot, has attracted a good deal of attention.

From welfare to education to policing, Americans have generally supported policies that lifted the white middle class. But as the middle class has become more racially diverse, politics has become a divisive zero-sum game, with many whites seeing government spending as shifting money away from them toward minorities, even if whites also benefit.

This politics of racial division forecloses a social consensus that could boost the U.S. as a whole, leading to flagging social infrastructure, sputtering criminal justice system reform and challenges in offering broad economic support even to counter the pandemic.

This is not a problem unique to the United States. Social scientists have studied the relationship between racial division and low levels of public goods provision in multiple countries and established that ethno-racially heterogeneous societies tend to provide less in the way of public services.

Plagued by suspicions that some groups might benefit more than others, diverse societies tend to have greater difficulty in reaching consensus and working together on a strategy for economic and social development that would improve everyone's lives.

On this count, Japan is at the other end of the spectrum. More ethno-racially homogenous than most other advanced democracies, Japan has fared well when it comes to providing public goods such as efficient public transportation systems, low crime rates and universal health care.

Japan is often quick to reach a broad consensus about government spending on public services, since people generally feel that everyone benefits if they all support each other. Strong social cohesion, facilitated by the relative homogeneity of the population, enables this social consensus that supports spending on public goods.

The flip side of this coin is Japanese society's persistent resistance to diversity and disruption. Used to the comfort of living and working with similar people, Japan has been criticized for its reluctance to accept immigrants.

In response, the Japanese government has rather clumsily allowed immigrant workers in recent decades, first encouraging the migration of Japanese-Brazilians on the basis of shared ethnic roots that were supposed to make it easy for them to assimilate.

Learning that the reality of Japanese-Brazilians' life in Japan did not support this idea, Japan then adopted trainee programs to bring in foreign workers on a temporary basis. With the emphasis squarely on the temporary nature of their stay, those who came to Japan under this scheme could not contribute toward the country's long-term diversity.

Faced with a declining population, Japan needs immigrant labor, and its business leaders have consistently supported accepting more migrant workers. In addition to addressing the labor shortage, a more diverse workforce would likely stimulate innovation and facilitate adaptation to changing economic environments. Much social science research has demonstrated positive relationships between diversity and innovation.

Yet Japan's leaders are having a hard time pressing ahead. While it is easy for the public to come to a consensus for policies that boost all Japanese, it has proved difficult for them to support any policy that would undermine Japan's homogeneity.

Aside from ethnic diversity, Japan's consensus-oriented society is generally resistant to change. Valuing the protection of all members, companies have been slow to streamline and transform their operations to adapt to the changing economic environment, resulting in the prolonged economic decline since the 1990s.

While Brazil is home to the world's largest overseas Japanese population, many Japanese-Brazilians who moved to Japan discovered it was not easy for them to assimilate.

Urged on by American consultants, Japan imported America's neoliberal economic model to revitalize its economy through this period, and the lifetime employment and seniority-based salary system has given way to a rise in temp workers and various attempts to introduce a merit-based salary system. These efforts have not met with much success, leaving behind a questionable legacy, including the suppression of wages after the labor shortage of recent years.

In the U.S., racial division undermines the provision of public goods that would reduce economic inequality. But its acceptance of diversity contributes to innovation and economic revitalization that keeps the U.S. at the vanguard of a new economy.

In Japan, ethno-racial harmony facilitates public goods provision that prevents economic inequality from spiraling out of control. But aversion to diversity and dissent makes it difficult to accept much-needed immigrant labor and to adapt to changes in the economic environment.

In both countries, these characteristics are ingrained into their social fabric and resistant to change. However, the two largest economies with a democratic polity have much to learn from each other, and they should work together to find solutions for their problems.

Otherwise, China's nondemocratic model could become the dominant model for economic success, with its top-down forced consensus and suppression of diversity.

Democracies have long proven better at correcting their mistakes and adjusting to changes in their environment. As the two largest democratic economies in the world, the U.S. and Japan should be able to overcome the cost of racial division and the cost of homogeneity respectively even if it takes decades to achieve that.