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About the Seminar: How are politicians selected in the countries of Middle East and North Africa where electoral politics is to a large extent dominated by secular-Islamist competition? By bringing together a novel candidate survey, a contemporaneous household survey, interviews and a conjoint experiment with party officials, this paper describes the political selection processes around the first democratic local elections in Tunisia. It shows that there is a divergence between the main secular party and the main Islamist party: The secular party suffers from a relatively negative political selection, because its candidates are less competent even though the secular voter base has a larger share of citizens with higher educational attainment. Party-related factors, i.e. what the party elites look for when selecting their candidates, are likely to explain a large share of this divergence: Secular party officials prioritize connectedness and loyalty over competence.

 

 

About the Speaker: Aytug Sasmaz is a political scientist working on political parties, social policy and democratic decline, primarily in the Middle East and North Africa region. He recently received his PhD from Harvard.

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Aytug Sasmaz

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CDDRL Postdoctoral Scholar, 2021-22
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I am a political scientist (PhD degree expected in July 2021 from Harvard) working on political parties, social welfare policies and local governance, primarily in the Middle East and North Africa. My dissertation project focuses on secular parties in the region and explores why they could not form a robust electoral alternative to the Islamist parties in the post-uprisings period. In other projects, I explore voters' responses to executive aggrandizement (focusing on Turkey), and social welfare in the context of ethnic and organizational diversity (focusing on Lebanon). Prior to PhD, I worked as an education policy analyst in Turkey, managing several research projects in collaboration with the Ministry of Education, World Bank and UNICEF. I hold a BA degree in Political Science from Boğaziçi, and Master's degrees from the LSE and Brown. 

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This Q&A with Allen S. Weiner was originally published on the Stanford Law School website.

As the Taliban’s forces closed in on Kabul on Sunday, August 15, 2021, the Afghan President Ashraf Ghani left his country, the acting U.S. ambassador was evacuated, the American flag on the embassy in the country’s capital lowered—and the Biden administration’s plans for an orderly withdrawal of troops, diplomats, and Afghan aids and translators by the anniversary of 9/11 dashed as a scramble for the door becomes more chaotic. After twenty years, 2 trillion dollars, and the lives of almost 2,500 American personnel lost, President Biden said it was time to let the Afghan government and military stand on its own. Here, Stanford Law national security law expert Allen Weiner, who is a research affiliate at FSI’s Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, and the Center for International Security and Cooperation, discusses the U.S. mission to Afghanistan, its withdrawal, and potential consequences.

What was the American/NATO objective when we invaded Afghanistan almost twenty years ago?

The immediate United States objective at the time of the 2001 invasion was to destroy Al Qaeda’s base of operations in Afghanistan and to kill or capture senior Al Qaeda leaders there.  As those of us who are old enough to remember will recall, the invasion (“Operation Enduring Freedom”) was the U.S.-led response to the 9/11 attacks against World Trade Center twin towers and the Pentagon that were carried out by Al Qaeda. Because the Taliban regime in Afghanistan had a symbiotic relationship with—and provided a safe haven to—Al Qaeda on Afghanistan’s territory, the U.S. and its NATO allies also sought to drive the Taliban from power. At the time, the Taliban was fighting a civil war in Afghanistan and by October 2001 had achieved effective control over most of the country. President Bush and others quickly began to emphasize an additional objective for overthrowing the Taliban— to liberate the Afghan people from the regime’s repressive practices. We sought to promote basic human rights and to end the Taliban’s oppression of women.

Were those objectives met?

The U.S. and its NATO allies largely met those initial goals. Al Qaeda’s training camps in Afghanistan were destroyed, many of its leaders were killed and captured (although some, including Osama bin Laden, managed to escape at least initially), and its ability to plan, finance, and execute major global terrorist operations was severely diminished. U.S. and NATO forces drove the Taliban from power, and after a transitional period, a new government led by Hamid Karzai was established. Women and girls resumed participation in public life in Afghanistan, including education.

But those successes were fleeting?

As we know, the successes did not last. Although Al Qaeda never resumed significant operations in Afghanistan, the organization metastasized, and lethal variants of the organization arose in Yemen, Iraq and Syria, and the Maghreb, among other places. Other terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State and al Shabaab, either grew out of or have affiliations of varying degrees of intensity with Al Qaeda. We have also seen attacks carried out by homegrown terrorist organizations with only loose affiliations to Al Qaeda, sometimes only ideological affinities. So, while Operation Enduring Freedom significantly disrupted terrorist operations originating from Afghanistan, it cannot be said to have eliminated the threat of transnational terrorism.

And the Taliban continued to be a simmering problem in Afghanistan, didn’t it?

The goal of eradicating the Taliban, obviously, also was unmet. Although then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared an end to major combat operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in May 2003, a revitalized Taliban renewed an intense civil war in the summer of  2006. That civil war against the Afghanistan government—which appears now to have been won by the Taliban—continued with varying degrees of intensity until the past few days. And if another of the goals of the invasion was to improve the protection of human rights in Afghanistan, we must recognize that civilians suffered terribly during the civil war.

Are there any (hopefully) enduring successes from the twenty-year investment by the U.S. and NATO?

Afghanistan did make significant progress in terms of economic development and the realization of at least some civil and political rights. Per capita GDP rose dramatically in the decades after the U.S. invasion. The status of women and girls improved along many dimensions, including health, life expectancy, education levels, and participation in government institutions. The Taliban’s victory clearly imperils these gains.

The Trump Administration negotiated an agreement with Taliban in 2020 providing for the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Afghanistan by May 2021, as part of which the Taliban promised not to deliberatively attack U.S. troops during the withdrawal period.  Since then, the Taliban has been steadily gaining control over provinces in the county, and civilian casualties have been rising. Was it pure fantasy that the US was maintaining the peace?

The Trump Administration’s February 2020 agreement with Taliban, in which the U.S. promised to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan in a little over a year, even though the Taliban did not agree to even a ceasefire, much less reach any political agreements with the government about ending the civil war, was the beginning of the end. It clearly signaled to both the Taliban and the government that the U.S. was now concerned only with the security of its own forces, and that the Afghan government was on its own. Given that the Taliban was making progress in gaining territory, at least in the countryside, even with U.S. troops present, many analysts—including the U.S. intelligence community—forecast the eventual overthrow of the Afghan government. It is only the shocking speed with which that happened that is a real surprise.

The fall of the Afghan government has taken many, including apparently some in the Biden administration, by surprise. Why did the collapse of the Afghan military happen so swiftly?  And what role did the Afghan police force and corruption play?

Many commentators who have been critical of the U.S. effort to build up the Afghan military have long expressed doubts about the effectiveness of the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), and many analysts predicted that the Taliban would ultimately prevail against the government after the U.S. and its NATO allies withdrew from Afghanistan. That said, I don’t think anyone predicted it would happen as swiftly as it did.

Multiple factors have been cited to explain how the Taliban—a force estimated to comprise some 75,000 fighters—defeated the 300,000-member strong ANDSF. First, despite the seeming superiority of the government forces, conditions for ANDSF soldiers were quite abysmal. Many reportedly went months without being paid. They lacked ammunition and even food. There are reports of incompetent leadership within the armed forces, leaving Afghan soldiers exposed in the middle of pitch battles, without reinforcements.

A second factor is the pervasive and corrosive corruption among Afghan government actors.  This helps explain why—despite the U.S. infusion of billions of dollars in military assistance— Afghan soldiers went without pay and lacked adequate ammunition.  It also explains why in some cases, after Afghan forces fighting alongside U.S. forces succeeded in clearing territory of Taliban insurgents, the Afghan government would fail to hold it. The notoriously corrupt and unprofessional Afghanistan police forces—who were in charge of security after territory had been cleared of Taliban fighters by the ANDSF—reportedly engaged in predatory practices targeting the local community or could be bought off by the insurgency to cede ground back.

Third, some critics of the U.S. effort to modernize the Afghan army have long argued that the ANDSF lacked resolve to aggressively engage the Taliban insurgency in the absence of active support from U.S. soldiers. Although there are many stories of Afghan soldiers fighting fiercely, there are anecdotal accounts of Afghan armed forces engaging in “mini non-aggression deals” with Taliban fighters in their area of responsibility in an effort to avoid armed engagement.

Fourth, the lack of motivation of Afghan armed forces was exacerbated in recent years by the unpopularity and perceived fecklessness of the Afghan government led by President Ashraf Ghani. Re-elected in 2019 after an election with sharply disputed results, in which voter turnout was less than 20 percent, the Ghani government was widely seen as ineffective in addressing corruption, effectively managing the country, or confronting the growing security threat posed by the Taliban. It became a common refrain among Afghan soldiers that the Ghani government was not one worth fighting for.

Fifth, it appears that in at least some provinces in Afghanistan, the Taliban, in essence, offered government forces negotiated settlements to cede control of territory. In some cases, this involved offering payments to government soldiers to switch sides—a particularly attractive offer for soldiers who had not been paid in months. It is likely that the Taliban offered broader commitments, e.g., not to engage in retribution against government soldiers who abandoned the fight, although I have not yet seen reports of such deals.

Sixth, there a seasonal calendar to armed conflict in Afghanistan, and the Taliban has typically engaged in its major military operations during the spring and summer.  Delaying the U.S. withdrawal by six months, so that U.S. forces did not leave during the height of what is known in Afghanistan as “fighting season,” might have given the ANDSF more time to prepare to defend Afghanistan’s cities. Although given how swiftly Afghan government forces were swept aside, this now seems doubtful to me.

Finally, from an operational standpoint, the U.S. has invested billions of dollars in Afghanistan to attempt to build up a military that functions in ways that resemble how a NATO army operates, with air power and advanced weaponry. Such a military depends on extremely complex behind-the-scenes logistics arrangements. In Afghanistan, these logistics systems depended heavily on U.S. contractors, who also began withdrawing from the country after President Biden announced the U.S. withdrawal. Many of the aircraft in Afghanistan’s air force, for instance, were grounded because they lacked parts needed for repairs or routine servicing. One of the lessons of the defeat of the ANDSF is that building a foreign country’s military also requires developing indigenous logistics capacity.

Troops had been drawn down to about 3,000 and negotiations that excluded the Afghan gov’t were conducted with the Taliban during the Trump administration. Could Biden, realistically, have rewound the clock–bringing more troops back? Was Biden pushed into a tough corner?

Although the withdrawal agreement the Trump Administration concluded with the Taliban in February 2020 may not have initiated the death spiral for the Afghanistan government and military, it certainly catalyzed it, as I noted above. It did put the Biden Administration in a tough position; the only option would have been to renege on the agreement, leave U.S. troops in Afghanistan, and to seek to renegotiate the agreement. That said, although that may have been a tough position, it was not an impossible one, as evidenced by the fact that the Biden Administration unilaterally changed the agreed upon date by which U.S. forces would withdraw from Afghanistan from May to August.

I’m not a military strategist, so I can’t say whether maintaining a force of 3,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan would have changed the military situation on the ground. But I think if the U.S. had said that it would not withdraw the U.S. military presence until there was a ceasefire and the Taliban and the Afghan government have negotiated a power sharing agreement/end to the civil war, that might have changed the Taliban’s political assessment about how to proceed. I stress that this only “might” have changed the Taliban’s thinking. The fact that the Taliban has been fighting for twenty years suggests that the group was very determined to regain control of Afghanistan and re-establish its vision of life for the Afghan people.

I understand that Russia and other countries have negotiated agreements to ensure the safety of their embassies and diplomatic staff so that they can continue operations in Kabul. Have the Americans done the same? If not, how significant will that be for the future safety of the U.S and the threat of terrorism? Will we have “eyes on the ground” and intelligence sources?

The United States is currently withdrawing all of its diplomatic personnel from Afghanistan and will presumably once again shutter its embassy in Kabul. The U.S. will face a difficult question about whether to recognize the new Taliban regime that will be installed in Afghanistan, and if so, whether to resume diplomatic relations and re-open its embassy. If the Taliban regime pursues the policies that characterized its period of rule in the late 1990s, particularly the severe repression of women and girls, I doubt the U.S. will re-establish relations. Even if the U.S. did re-establish diplomatic relations, it is inconceivable that the Taliban would permit the United States to maintain the large intelligence and security presence we have had in Afghanistan over the past two decades. So, we will not have the ability gather intelligence on the ground or to conduct military operations against any terrorist threats that emerge in Afghanistan.

The Taliban has pledged that it will not allow Afghanistan’s territory to be used by terrorist groups that seek to conduct hostile operations against foreign countries. Although the Taliban learned in 2001 about the potential costs to it of harboring such groups on Afghanistan’s territory—namely, being overthrown by the U.S. and its NATO allies—there are obviously reasons to question the Taliban’s promise.

Is there anything Biden can do now to minimize the damage?

The Biden administration does not have much leverage at this point. The administration will presumably signal to the Taliban that it will closely monitor its conduct with respect to preventing its territory from being used by terrorist groups and its performance on human rights issues, including the treatment of women and girls. Should the Taliban perform poorly on these issues, the U.S. could try to secure sanctions against the Taliban regime through the Security Council; after all, the Council had imposed sanctions on the Taliban in the 1990s in response to its providing a safe haven to Osama bin Laden and its violation of human rights, particularly discrimination against women and girls. Today, however, it is unclear whether Russia and China, which are likely to seek stable relations with the Taliban government, would support such sanctions. That means the U.S. would probably be limited to unilateral sanctions as a way of signaling disapproval of, and seeking to change the behavior of, a prospective Taliban government.

Allen S. Weiner

Allen S. Weiner

Affiliate at CDDRL and CISAC
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Helicopter crew members in Afghanistan.
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Biden's Afghanistan Decision

President Biden has inherited America’s longest war—the war in Afghanistan—at a critical moment. Under the Trump administration’s deal with the Taliban, the US government is supposed to withdraw forces from the country by May 2021. But the Taliban hasn’t taken the steps required in the deal against international terrorists, like Al Qaeda.
Biden's Afghanistan Decision
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Q&As

There's no reason' for Trump's move to pull troops from Afghanistan

Brett McGurk, former presidential envoy for the global coalition to defeat ISIS, joins Andrea Mitchell to discuss the last minute foreign policy moves, including the decision to draw down the number of troops in Afghanistan, that President Trump is saddling the incoming Biden administration with.
There's no reason' for Trump's move to pull troops from Afghanistan
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Sarah Chayes discusses life in Taliban-resurgent Afghanistan

Sarah Chayes discusses life in Taliban-resurgent Afghanistan
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National security law expert Allen Weiner, a research affiliate at CDDRL and CISAC, discusses the U.S. mission to Afghanistan, its withdrawal and consequences moving forward.

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Nora Sulots
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This week we launched the long-awaited 17th year of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law's Draper Hills Summer Fellowship Program. Founded in 2005 with generous support from Bill and Phyllis Draper and Ingrid von Mangoldt Hills, Draper Hills is an executive training program for world leaders striving to promote democracy. For the next two weeks, Fellows will participate in workshops led by an interdisciplinary team of faculty to study new theories and approaches to democratic development.

Fellows in the class of 2021 were selected from among thousands of applicants for their ground-breaking work to defend democracy. These 34 leaders drawn from 30 countries around the world are pioneering new approaches and models to advance social and political change in some of the most challenging global contexts. Representing business, government, and the nonprofit sector, our fellows are working on the frontlines of democratic change to combat the global rise of authoritarianism and populism. In countries moving towards democracy, our fellows are working to institutionalize new systems and practices to support democratic transitions.

An Unconventional Year


Traditionally, Fellows would travel from their home countries to the U.S. and spend three weeks on campus at Stanford learning together. However, due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the program is currently taking place virtually for the first time (for the same reasons, the program did not run in 2020). The shift to online programming posed a number of logistical obstacles – from what time to run virtual sessions when participants span over a dozen time zones, to how to foster the sense of belonging and personal connections that occur more naturally with in-person settings.

To begin addressing the latter, Fellows were sent welcome packages to build excitement and foster community both within the program and Stanford. Upon receiving hers, Aisha Yesufu of Nigeria shared "I am so excited at the different people I'll be meeting from all over the world, and also learning from different people, lecturers, professors... It's going to be quite interesting and, for me, that is what I am most looking forward to," along with the video below:

"One of the most important things I have ever been involved with."


Opening against the backdrop of the fall of Kabul to the Taliban in Afghanistan, the importance of the Draper Hills program and the need to promote democratic change is now more evident than ever.

The inaugural session for the 2021 cohort began with Francis Fukuyama introducing the fellows to several of the esteemed faculty they will be learning from over the next two weeks, including Larry Diamond, Erik Jensen, and Michael McFaul. McFaul shared that not only did he found the program, but "it is one of the most important things I have ever been involved with." Jensen later added that "participating in this program is one of the great pleasures I have every year."

More to Come


Throughout the next two weeks, our Draper Hills Fellows will examine the political development, democratic transitions, and the relationship of law to economic development, public administration, administrative law, transitional justice, food security, and global health policy, among others. The group is eager to learn, and we look forward to seeing the many great things the training they receive here will enable them to do in their home countries and beyond.

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For the next two weeks, Fellows will participate in workshops led by an interdisciplinary team of faculty to study new theories and approaches to democratic development.

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The Program on Arab Reform and Democracy (ARD) at CDDRL is pleased to announce the launch of an interview series titled “Conversations on Arab Reform and Democracy” (CARDs). CARDs is an outgrowth of ARD’s efforts to promote critical discussions around questions of political change, and social and economic rights in the Arab World. The series provides a forum for scholars to address timely, salient issues in public debates based on their recent publications and long-term research engagement.

Hosted by ARD Research Scholar and Associate Director Hesham Sallam, the launching episode brings to focus ongoing political developments in Tunisia and features Daniel Brumberg, associate-professor of Government at Georgetown University where he also serves as the director of the MA Program in Democracy and Governance. The conversation covers the recent power grab by President Kais Saied, its implications for various political actors in the country, the political legacies that are shaping the ongoing political conflicts, and more. Click below to watch the first episode.

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The Program on Arab Reform and Democracy (ARD) at CDDRL is pleased to announce the launch of an interview series titled “Conversations on Arab Reform and Democracy” (CARDs).

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The Project on Middle East Political Science partnered with Stanford University’s Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law and its Global Digital Policy Incubator for an innovative two week online seminar to explore the issues surrounding digital activism and authoritarianism. This workshop was built upon more than a decade of our collaboration on issues related to the internet and politics in the Middle East, beginning in 2011 with a series of workshops in the “Blogs and Bullets” project supported by the United States Institute for Peace and the PeaceTech Lab. This new collaboration brought together more than a dozen scholars and practitioners with deep experience in digital policy and activism, some focused on the Middle East and others offering a global and comparative perspective. POMEPS STUDIES 43 collects essays from that workshop, shaped by two weeks of public and private discussion.
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Larry Diamond
Shelby Grossman
Renée DiResta
Josh A. Goldstein
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Falling costs of wind and solar have encouraged development agencies and multilateral lenders to restrict financing for new fossil fuel developments. But African countries face significant obstacles to the grid integration of high shares of intermittent renewable energy. Donors that are genuinely interested in renewable development in Africa should invest in grid operator capability and transmission interconnection while remaining supportive of a range of technologies for dispatchable backup.

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Electricity Journal
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Mark C. Thurber
Murefu Barasa
Rose M. Mutiso
Beryl Ajwang
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Mark C. Thurber
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PESD Associate Director Mark Thurber co-authored a new paper in The Electricity Journal on the electricity grid improvements that are needed to unlock the full potential of wind and solar energy in Africa. Donors and development agencies need to devote more attention to these missing pieces, rather than assuming that bans on fossil fuel financing alone will spur the desired transition to cleaner energy. 

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Whether the targets are local governmentshospital systems, or gas pipelines, ransomware attacks in which hackers lock down a computer network and demand money are a growing threat to critical infrastructure. The attack on Colonial Pipeline, a major supplier of fuel on the East Coast of the United States, is just one of the latest examples—there will likely be many more. Yet the federal government has so far failed to protect these organizations from the cyberattacks, and even its actions since May, when Colonial Pipeline was attacked, fall short of what’s necessary.

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Op-ed in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, by Gregory Falco and Sejal Jhawer
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Sejal Jhawer
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With the rise of national digital identity systems (Digital ID) across the world, there is a growing need to examine their impact on human rights. While these systems offer accountability and efficiency gains, they also pose risks for surveillance, exclusion, and discrimination. In several instances, national Digital ID programmes started with a specific scope of use, but have since been deployed for different applications, and in different sectors. This raises the question of how to determine appropriate and inappropriate uses of Digital ID programs, which create an inherent power imbalance between the State and its residents given the personal data they collect.

On Wednesday, June 23rd @ 10:00 am Pacific Time, join Amber Sinha of India’s Center for Internet and Society (CIS), Anri van der Spuy of Research ICT Africa (RIA) and Dr. Tom Fischer of Privacy International in conversation with Kelly Born, Director of the Hewlett Foundation’s Cyber Initiative and fellow at Stanford’s Cyber Policy Center, to discuss the challenges and opportunities posed by digital identity systems, a proposed framework for assessing trade-offs and ensuring that human rights are adequately protected, and a discussion of experiences in translating and adapting new digital ID assessment framework by CIS and RIA to different contexts and geographies.

Amber Sinha 
Anri van der Spuy
Dr. Tom Fischer 
Kelly Born
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Riana Pfefferkorn
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India’s information technology ministry recently finalized a set of rules that the government argues will make online service providers more accountable for their users’ bad behavior. Noncompliance may expose a provider to legal liability from which it is otherwise immune. Despite the rules’ apparently noble aim of incentivizing providers to better police their services, in reality, the changes pose a serious threat to Indians’ data security and reflect the Indian government’s increasingly authoritarian approach to internet governance.

The government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi has in recent years taken a distinctly illiberal approach to online speech. When India’s IT ministry released its original draft of the rules more than two years ago, civil society groups criticized the proposal as a grave threat to free speech and privacy rights. In the intervening years, threats to free speech have only grown. To quell dissent, Modi’s government has shut off the internet in multiple regions. Facing widespread protests led by the country’s farmers against his government, Modi has escalated his attacks on the press and pressured Twitter into taking down hundreds of accounts critical of the government’s protest response. The new rules represent the latest tightening of state control over online content, and as other backsliding democracies consider greater restrictions on online speech, the Modi government is providing a troubling model for how to do so. 

Beyond chilling digital rights, the new rules threaten to undermine computer security systems that Indian internet users rely on every day in order to grant the state increased power to police online content. The new rules require messaging services to be able to determine the origin of content and demand that online platforms develop automated tools to take down certain content deemed illegal. Taken together, the new rules pose threats to freedom of speech and the privacy and security of India’s internet users. 

The relevant provisions apply to “significant” “social media intermediaries” (which I’ll call SSMIs for short). “Significant” means the provider has hit a yet to be defined number of registered Indian users. “Social media intermediary” broadly encompasses many kinds of user-generated content-driven services. A government press release calls out WhatsApp, YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter specifically, but services as diverse as LinkedIn, Twitch, Medium, TikTok, and Reddit also fall within the definition. 

Two provisions are of particular concern. Section 4(2) of the new rules requires SSMIs that are “primarily” messaging providers to be able to identify the “first originator” of content on the platform. Section 4(4) requires any SSMI (not limited to messaging) to “endeavour to deploy technology-based measures, including automated tools or other mechanisms to proactively identify” two categories of content: child sex abuse material and content identical to anything that’s been taken down before. I’ll call these the “traceability” and “filtering” provisions.

These provisions endanger the security of Indian internet users because they are incompatible with end-to-end encryption. End-to-end encryption, or E2EE, is a data security measure for protecting information by encoding it into an illegible scramble that no one but the sender and the intended recipient can decode. That way, the encrypted data remains private, and outsiders can’t alter it en route to the recipient. These features, confidentiality and integrity, are core underpinnings of data security. 

Not even the provider of an E2EE service can decrypt encrypted information. That’s why E2EE is incompatible with tracing and filtering content. Tracing the “originator” of information requires the ability to identify every instance when some user sent a given piece of information, which an intermediary can’t do if it can’t decode the encrypted information. The same problem applies to automatically filtering a service for certain content. 

Put simply, SSMIs can’t provide end-to-end encryption and still comply with these two provisions. This is by design. Speaking anonymously to The Economic Times, one government official said the new rules will force large online platforms to “control” what the government deems to be unlawful content: Under the new rules, “platforms like WhatsApp can’t give end-to-end encryption as an excuse for not removing such content,” the official said

The rules confront SSMIs with a Hobson’s choice: either weaken their data security practices, or open themselves up to expensive litigation as the price of strong security. That is an untenable dilemma. Intermediaries should not be penalized for choosing to protect users’ data. Indeed, the existing rules already require intermediaries to take “reasonable measures” to secure user data. If SSMIs weaken their encryption to comply with the new traceability and filtering provisions, will that violate the “reasonable data security” provision? This tension creates yet another quandary for intermediaries. 

The new rules make a contradictory demand: Secure Indians’ data—but not too well. A nation of 1.3 billion people cannot afford half-measures. National, economic, and personal security have become indivisible from data security. Strong encryption is critical to protecting data, be it military communications, proprietary business information, medical information, or private conversations between loved ones. Good data security is even more vital since the COVID-19 pandemic shifted much of daily life online. Without adequate protective measures, sensitive information is ripe for privacy invasions, theft, espionage, and hacking.

Weakening intermediaries’ data security is a gift to those who seek to harm India and its people. Citing national security and privacy concerns, Indian authorities have moved to restrict the presence of Chinese apps in India, but these new rules risk exposing the country’s internet users. The rules affect all of an intermediary’s users, not just those using the platform for bad acts. Over 400 million Indians currently use WhatsApp, and Signal hopes to add 100-200 million Indian users in the next two years. Most of those half-billion people are not criminals. If intermediaries drop E2EE to comply with the new rules, that primarily jeopardizes the privacy and security of law-abiding people, in return for making it easier for police to monitor the small criminal minority. 

Such monitoring may prove less effective than the Indian government expects. If popular apps cease offering E2EE, many criminals will drop those apps and move to the dark web, where they’re harder to track down. Some might create their own encrypted apps, as Al-Qaeda did as far back as 2007. In short, India’s new rules may lead to a perverse outcome where outlaws have better security than the law-abiding people whom they target. 

Meanwhile, weakening encryption is not the only way for police to gather evidence. We live in a “golden age for surveillance” in which our activities, movements, and communications generate a wealth of digital information about us. Many sources of digital evidence, such as communications metadata, cloud backups, and email, are not typically end-to-end encrypted. That means they’re available from the service provider in readable form. If Indian police have difficulty acquiring such data (for example because the data and the company are located outside of India), it’s not due to encryption, and passing rules limiting encryption will do nothing to ameliorate the problem.

When intermediaries employ end-to-end encryption, that means stronger security for communities, businesses, government, the military, institutions, and individuals—all of which adds up to the security of the nation. But the new traceability and filtering requirements may put an end to end-to-end encryption in India. The revised intermediary rules put the whole country’s security at risk. Amid a global backsliding for internet freedom, the proposal may offer an example for other would-be authoritarians to follow. 

Riana Pfefferkorn is a research scholar at the Stanford Internet Observatory.

Facebook, Google, and Microsoft provide financial support to the Brookings Institution, a nonprofit organization devoted to rigorous, independent, in-depth public policy research. 

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Riana Pfefferkorn
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Q&A with Riana Pfefferkorn, Stanford Internet Observatory Research Scholar

Riana Pfefferkorn joined the Stanford Internet Observatory as a research scholar in December. She comes from Stanford’s Center for Internet and Society, where she was the Associate Director of Surveillance and Cybersecurity.
Q&A with Riana Pfefferkorn, Stanford Internet Observatory Research Scholar
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Analysis of February 2021 Twitter Takedowns

In this post and in the attached reports we investigate a Twitter network attributed to actors in Armenia, Iran, and Russia.
Analysis of February 2021 Twitter Takedowns
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Analyzing a Twitter Takedown Originating in Saudi Arabia

Analyzing a Twitter Takedown Originating in Saudi Arabia
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