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Russia's War on Ukraine: A "Teach In" with Michael McFaul

Stanford students are invited to a question-and-answer session with Professor Michael McFaul about the current war in Ukraine. Professor McFaul is a former U.S. ambassador to Russia and the director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. This event is a chance to hear from him directly about Russia's attack on Ukraine, and for students to hear and connect with each other during this urgent crisis.

2022 Michael McFaul Headshot

Michael McFaul

Director of Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Former U.S. Ambassador to Russia
Full Profile

Encina Hall
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

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Director, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies, Department of Political Science
Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution
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Michael McFaul is Director at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, the Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies in the Department of Political Science, and the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He joined the Stanford faculty in 1995. Dr. McFaul also is as an International Affairs Analyst for NBC News and a columnist for The Washington Post. He served for five years in the Obama administration, first as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council at the White House (2009-2012), and then as U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation (2012-2014).

He has authored several books, most recently the New York Times bestseller From Cold War to Hot Peace: An American Ambassador in Putin’s Russia. Earlier books include Advancing Democracy Abroad: Why We Should, How We Can; Transitions To Democracy: A Comparative Perspective (eds. with Kathryn Stoner); Power and Purpose: American Policy toward Russia after the Cold War (with James Goldgeier); and Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin. He is currently writing a book called Autocrats versus Democrats: Lessons from the Cold War for Competing with China and Russia Today.

He teaches courses on great power relations, democratization, comparative foreign policy decision-making, and revolutions.

Dr. McFaul was born and raised in Montana. He received his B.A. in International Relations and Slavic Languages and his M.A. in Soviet and East European Studies from Stanford University in 1986. As a Rhodes Scholar, he completed his D. Phil. In International Relations at Oxford University in 1991. His DPhil thesis was Southern African Liberation and Great Power Intervention: Towards a Theory of Revolution in an International Context.

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Director FSI
Seminars
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Deinstitutionalization of Central Banking in Turkey

The central banks are at the center of any financial system.

This talk discusses the changing features of public policy and administration in Turkey, comparing central banking under the presidential and parliamentary systems. It argues that the deinstitutionalization of conventional central banking norms and practices is the mirror image of new presidential public policymaking and administration. Not only did this process erode the policy capacity of the Central Bank but also that of the Turkish state. Therefore, one should not be surprised by current policy design and implementation failures, poor policy outcomes, and increased socioeconomic costs as these tendencies are not reversed.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

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Caner Bakir
Caner Bakır is a Visiting Fellow at Hoover Institution at Stanford University, a professor of Political Science at Koc University, and the Director of the Research Centre for Globalisation, Peace and Democratic Governance (GLODEM). His research in political economy and public policy focuses on comparative institutional analysis and policy change and has appeared in leading journals such as Policy Sciences, Governance, Public Administration, and Policy and Society. He is the Associate Editor of Policy Sciences and the Journal Comparative Policy Analysis, editorial board member of the Journal of Economic Policy Research, and the International Journal of Emerging Markets. In addition, he has authored and co-edited nine books. He is the recipient of The Scientific and Technological Research Institution of Turkey (TUBITAK) 2010 Incentive Award and 2008 Early Career Researcher Award.

This talk is co-sponsored by the Center for Research on Globalization, Peace, and Democratic Governance at Koc University.

Ayça Alemdaroğlu

Online via Zoom

Caner Bakır Professor Visiting Fellow at Hoover Institution Koç University
Seminars
Authors
Scott D. Sagan
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Commentary
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On the third day of the invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin called a meeting with Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the general staff of the Russian Armed Forces, and Sergei Shoigu, the minister of defense. Seated at the opposite end of an extraordinarily long table, Putin ordered them to “transfer the deterrence forces of the Russian army”—which include its nuclear weapons—“to a special mode of combat duty.” The directive was aired on Russian national television. As Putin made his announcement, both Gerasimov and Shoigu looked surprised and uneasy.

Read the rest at Foreign Affairs

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Putin’s Unconstrained Power Over Russia’s Nuclear Arsenal. Putin has turned his government into a personalist regime: a system in which he monopolizes meaningful authority.

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Modern Authoritarianism and Geopolitics: Thoughts on a Policy Framework

Once upon a time, there was a seductive story about twin revolutions, a political one in France and an industrial one in Britain, that supposedly ushered in our modern world. This narrative never sat well with empirical realities, yet it lives on in textbooks. What might be a more persuasive framework for a global history of the modern era? What are the implications for research and the teaching of history?

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

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Steve Kotkin
Stephen Kotkin is the John P. Birkelund Professor of History and International Affairs in what used to be called the Woodrow Wilson School and in the History Department of Princeton University, as well as a Senior Fellow (adjunct) at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. He directs the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies and co-directs its program in History and the Practice of Diplomacy, which he founded. He also founded Princeton’s Global History Initiative. His scholarship encompasses geopolitics and authoritarian regimes in history and in the present.

Kotkin has published two volumes of a three-volume history of the world as seen from Stalin’s desk: Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928 (Penguin, November 2014) and Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941 (Penguin, October 2017). The final installment, Totalitarian Superpower, 1941-1990s, is underway. He writes reviews and essays for Foreign Affairs, the Times Literary Supplement, and The Wall Street Journal, and served as the business book reviewer for The New York Times Sunday Business Section. He is an occasional consultant for governments and some private companies. PhD UC Berkeley (1988).

 

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Kathryn Stoner

Online, via Zoom

Stephen Kotkin John P. Birkelund Professor of History and International Affairs
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Hitler, Stalin, and Mao ruled through violence, fear, and ideology. But in recent decades a new breed of media-savvy strongmen has been redesigning authoritarian rule for a more sophisticated, globally connected world.

In place of overt, mass repression, rulers such as Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Viktor Orbán control their citizens by distorting information and simulating democratic procedures. Like spin doctors in democracies, they spin the news to engineer support. Uncovering this new brand of authoritarianism, Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman explain the rise of such “spin dictators,” describing how they emerge and operate, the new threats they pose, and how democracies should respond.

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Spin Dictators
Spin Dictators traces how leaders such as Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew and Peru’s Alberto Fujimori pioneered less violent, more covert, and more effective methods of monopolizing power. They cultivated an image of competence, concealed censorship, and used democratic institutions to undermine democracy, all while increasing international engagement for financial and reputational benefits. The book reveals why most of today’s authoritarians are spin dictators—and how they differ from the remaining “fear dictators” such as Kim Jong-un and Bashar al-Assad, as well as from masters of high-tech repression like Xi Jinping.

Offering incisive portraits of today’s authoritarian leaders, Spin Dictators explains some of the great political puzzles of our time—from how dictators can survive in an age of growing modernity to the disturbing convergence and mutual sympathy between dictators and populists like Donald Trump.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

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Daniel Treisman
Daniel Treisman is a professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles, a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research, and a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (2021-2). His research focuses on Russian politics and economics as well as comparative political economy, including the analysis of democratization, the politics of authoritarian states, political decentralization, and corruption. A former lead editor of The American Political Science Review, he has been a Guggenheim Fellow and a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution (Stanford) and the Institute for Human Sciences (Vienna), as well as receiving fellowships from the German Marshall Fund of the US and the Smith Richardson Foundation. His book, The Return: Russia’s Journey from Gorbachev to Medvedev (The Free Press 2011) was one of the Financial Times’ “Best Political Books of 2011”. He is the editor of The New Autocracy: Information, Politics, and Policy in Putin’s Russia (Brookings Institution Press 2018), and co-author of Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century (Princeton University Press 2022).

 

At this time, in-person attendance is limited to Stanford affiliates only. We continue to welcome our greater community to join virtually via Zoom.

Kathryn Stoner

Online, via Zoom

Daniel Treisman UCLA CASBS
Seminars
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VIDEO RECORDINGS

Read the full transcript of President Barack Obama's keynote.

PANEL I

10:00-11:30am

THE TRUST PROBLEM: What is the role of the U.S. government in facilitating consensus and reducing polarization at home?

Renée DiResta is the Research Manager at the Stanford Internet Observatory. She investigates the spread of malign narratives across social networks, and assists policymakers in understanding and responding to the problem.
renee diresta

KEYNOTE | PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA

12:15pm

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President Barack Obama

President Barack Obama will deliver a keynote speech about disinformation and challenges to democracy in the digital information realm. The Obama Foundation is co-hosting the event.

PANEL II

2:00-3:30pm

DESIGNING FOR DEMOCRATIC DISCOURSE: What is the role for media and tech companies to ensure quality, access, and participation?

Marietje Schaake is international policy director at Stanford University Cyber Policy Center and international policy fellow at Stanford’s Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence.
Marietje Schaake

PANEL III

3:45-5:15pm

THE THREAT OF DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM: What are the most effective ways to defend open democratic systems in a global digitized world?

Eileen Donahoe is the Executive Director of the Global Digital Policy Incubator (GDPI) at Stanford University, FSI/Cyber Policy Center. She served as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Human Rights Council during the Obama administration.
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The student lottery administered by FSI is now closed. Randomly selected students have been notified via email.

Marietje Schaake
Renee DiResta
Barack Obama
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Artem Romaniukov
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I am a Ukrainian national. I studied at Stanford University in 2019 and 2020 in the Ukrainian Emerging Leaders Program run by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

For several years now, I have been a leader of environmental and anti-corruption NGOs. Among other endeavors, my team and I developed the SaveEcoBot program, which is the most popular air quality monitoring service in Ukraine and has 1.5 million users in 15 countries.

I was with my wife and six-year-old daughter in Kyiv when Putin’s invasion of Ukraine began. I grabbed my family and brought them to a place I thought they would be safer. Then I immediately volunteered to join the Ukrainian Defense Force. I have already seen active fire, which has resulted in a dreadful number of casualties, both for Ukrainians and Russians. But this tragedy is not just a humanitarian emergency.

Ukraine at Stanford: Meet the Third Cohort, Freeman Spogli Institute, Stanford University, 3 October 2019. From left, (1) Francis Fukuyama; (2) Artem Romaniukov; (3) Kateryna Bondar; and, (4) Pavel Vrzheshch. Ukraine at Stanford: Meet the Third Cohort, Freeman Spogli Institute, Stanford University, 3 October 2019. From left, (1) Francis Fukuyama; (2) Artem Romaniukov; (3) Kateryna Bondar; and, (4) Pavel Vrzheshch. Artem Romaniukov

The Pentagon estimates that 600 Russian missiles have been fired at Ukrainian targets in the first 10 days of war alone. Additionally, the infamous abandoned Chernobyl nuclear plant has been seized by Russian forces and, most recently, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station in Enerhodar has been attacked and occupied by armed Russian soldiers. Zaporizhzhia is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe and Russian projectiles started a localized fire in an auxiliary building on the site on March 3, 2020.

Russian forces have also cut off the power supply to the Chernobyl reactor and containment site. This means that spent nuclear fuel is not being cooled at the site in accordance to internationally recognized standards. The head of the Chernobyl nuclear plant has said that the back-up generators have enough fuel to power the site for 48 hours. We can only guess what might happen after that. If this were not enough, there is still ongoing shelling at a nuclear research facility in Kharkiv. The current conditions there are unknown.


In Ukraine, we have a saying, “мавпа з гранатою,” which means, “Like a monkey with a grenade." Russia is playing the monkey to all of Europe.

Despite these chaotic circumstances, the SaveEcoBot team, in coordination with the Ministry of Environmental Protection, has put a lot of effort into radiation monitoring and informing the public about changes in background radiation. We’ve been set back in this critical work by the damages done to our monitoring equipment by Russians, but Ukrainian technicians are restoring the systems as fast as they can.

The assaults on the Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhia power plants have already had implications for the environment. The radioactive dust raised by the wheels and trucks of the Russian combat vehicles in the Chernobyl zone has raised the background radiation levels to a hundredfold excess of the normal threshold. Just imagine what chaotic attacks, with Russians shooting, firing missiles, and bombing other parts of Ukrainian territory might lead to. In Ukraine, we have a saying, “мавпа з гранатою,” which means, “Like a monkey with a grenade." Russia is playing the monkey to all of Europe.

Lieutenant Artem Romaniukov, on active duty at the Ukrainian Defence Forces, March 2022. Lieutenant Artem Romaniukov on active duty with the Ukrainian Defence Forces, March 2022. Artem Romaniukov

Russia continues to assert that its forces are in Ukraine for reasons of safety and security. The takeover of Chernobyl disturbed large amounts of radioactive soil, propelling it into the air. The attack on Zaporizhzhia resulted in a fire on the site of an active nuclear plant. This is not what safety looks like. To pretend that these actions are anything but a dangerous disregard for life is an insult to all sane, rational people. We are all very lucky that none of Zaporizhzhia’s six reactors were hit by the tank shell that started that fire.

Russia, the U.S. and the UK committed 20 years ago to ensure Ukraine’s peaceful sovereignty in exchange for Ukraine giving up its nuclear weapons program. This agreement was built on the idea that Ukraine without nuclear weapons would never have cause to be the target of any attack. This assurance was guaranteed by the signers of the memorandum.

But Russia’s violent attacks have proven that a nuclear threat still exists in Ukraine. It is not a threat of Ukraine’s making, but one engineered by Russia’s own reckless assault on our civilian nuclear facilities. The consequences of this diabolical action go well beyond a potential environmental catastrophe for Ukraine; our neighbors, including Russia itself, and even countries outside of Europe could all be affected by nuclear fallout carried on high-atmosphere winds across continent and over oceans.


This is not what safety looks like. To pretend that these actions are anything but a dangerous disregard for life is an insult to all sane, rational people.

One way to mitigate this threat and to realize security assurances to Ukraine is to implement a no-fly zone over Ukraine. The hesitance of the EU and U.S.  to implement a no-fly zone is understandable. But at the same time, it is critically important to develop options and generate models for other types of no-fly zones beyond the proposals being discussed today. Such alternative options could be the key to helping prevent a Ukrainian tragedy not only in terms of nuclear security, but also in averting a similar tragedy to what the world witnessed in Aleppo.

To do this, Ukraine needs more military support. We have gratefully received strong military support from our allies, but even this bounty is not enough to defend our country. Stinger missiles can shoot down small, low-flying aircraft from a fairly short distance, but are useless against ballistic missiles and high-altitude bombers. We need weapons that can shoot down planes at considerable distances and altitudes, systems to detect and shoot down cruise missiles, and planes to protect our airspace. Early Russian attacks targeted our airports to deplete our air defense capabilities and frustrate our ability to get planes in the air. But we still stand. But if we want to avert a second Chernobyl or another Aleppo, we need to strengthen our air defenses.

We learned in 1939 that making concessions to tyrants is no plan for peace. Putin is a bully. Like all bullies, he will take as much as he can get while treating all harm — including environmental harm — as merely incidental. Like all bullies, he will stop only when he meets strong resistance. Putin and the Russia propaganda machine frame all attempts to stymie Russian aggression as not only a provocation, but a provocation that could trigger a nuclear response. Such veiled threats of nuclear attacks are a form of prior restraint meant to constrain Ukraine’s allies from even suggesting that the Russian invasion is improper. But we must not accept this starkly irrational framework. Nuclear weapons are weapons of deterrence, not tools to chill diplomatic criticism.


Any compromised nuclear facility in Ukraine inherently becomes an international problem, not just a local one. Like Putin, radioactive fallout does not respect borders.

American analysts say that they expect the Russian attacks to become increasingly more brutal. Any increased risks to civilian and military targets commensurately increases risks to nuclear sites as well. And any compromised nuclear facility in Ukraine inherently becomes an international problem, not just a local one. Like Putin, radioactive fallout does not respect borders.

Just ten days ago, my life changed dramatically. I used to be a successful civil leader and entrepreneur with an innovative business. Now I sleep on the floor of an abandoned building with my gun in hand. My daughter knows exactly how the air raid siren sounds. But we are still Ukrainians. We are still Europeans. We still count on our allies. So to our allies, I say: close the Ukrainian sky. Provide us with enough weapons. We will do the rest.

Resources on the Ukraine-Russia Conflict

As the war in Ukraine evolves, the Stanford community is working to provide support and perspectives on the unfolding crisis. Follow the links below to find FSI's resource page of expert analysis from our scholars, and to learn how to get involved with #StandWithUkraine.

Read More

Left to right: Denis Gutenko, Nariman Ustaiev, Yulia Bezvershenko -- fellows of the Ukrainian Emerging Leaders Program -- and Francis Fukuyama, senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.
News

Stanford welcomes Ukrainian emerging leaders after COVID-19 disruption

After a hiatus due to the pandemic, fellows of the Ukrainian Emerging Leaders Program are now on campus, ready to begin their ten months attending classes and working on projects tackling issues relevant in Ukraine.
Stanford welcomes Ukrainian emerging leaders after COVID-19 disruption
Students from the FSI community gather for a teach-in about the Ukraine conflict at the McFaul residence in Palo Alto, CA.
Blogs

Students Find Solidarity and Community Amidst the Conflict in Ukraine

Four students from the FSI community share their thoughts on the conflict in Ukraine, its implications for the world, and the comfort and solidarity they have felt in communing with one another at Stanford.
Students Find Solidarity and Community Amidst the Conflict in Ukraine
Members of the Ukrainian military carry the flag of Ukraine during the 30th anniversary of the country's independence.
News

What the Ukraine-Russia Crisis Says about the Global Struggle for Democracy

Former prime minister of Ukraine Oleksiy Honcharuk joins Michael McFaul on the World Class Podcast to analyze Russia's aggression towards Ukraine and how it fits into Vladamir Putin's bigger strategy to undermine democracy globally.
What the Ukraine-Russia Crisis Says about the Global Struggle for Democracy
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Firing on civilian nuclear facilities is an unacceptable disregard for the rules of war that endangers the entire world, not just Ukraine.

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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky pleaded with the West to send fighter jets to help against Russian aggression but when Poland offered to transfer Soviet-era MiG-29s, the Pentagon called the transfer untenable.

To learn more about fighter jets and the people who fly and maintain them, we spoke to CISAC senior fellow Dean Winslow, a professor of medicine and former Air Force colonel who has 1150 military flying hours including 431 combat hours and 263 combat sorties and extensive operational experience in fighter, tactical airlift, and combat rescue missions.

Winslow reached out to his former colleague, Ben Lambeth, a long-time specialist in international security affairs and air warfare with the RAND Corporation, who has extensive flight experience in more than 40 different combat aircraft types, including Eastern bloc aircraft. Here are excerpts from our conversation:

Q: What did you make of this conversation between Ukraine, Poland and the United States?

Ben Lambeth: The Ukrainian AF has more than a couple dozen each of single-seat and combat-configured MiG-29s and Su-27s and presumably an equivalent or even larger-sized contingent of pilots trained to fly them. What is their current state of play? 

Also, why are the Ukrainians requesting Polish MiG-29s to begin with? Has much of the existing Ukrainian fighter force been destroyed on the ground by Russian air and cruise-missile strikes?

Q: How are MiG-29s used?

Dean Winslow: The primary mission is as an air superiority fighter, like our F 15 Eagle, so it's an air-to-air fighter.

Dean Winslow flying L-39C, April 2019 Dean Winslow flying L-39C, April 2019

Q: Can pilots who have trained in similar aircraft fly these jets?

Lambeth: At bottom, fighter pilots are fighter pilots the world over, and when given a problem, they will figure it out. If the Ukrainian AF is urgently asking for Polish MiG-29s, they must have a good reason for it and must believe that they will make a difference.

Winslow: It would not be too much of a stretch for a pilot, let's say who's already an experienced and qualified in a MiG 29 Ukrainian aircraft to fly a Polish aircraft.  As little as a couple of days of “differences training” between aircraft types (similar to what commercial airline pilots undergo routinely when transitioning from an earlier to a later model of a Boeing 737), would likely be adequate for an experienced MiG 29 pilot. Having either simulators or even low-tech procedures trainers would make such a transition even easier.

Lambeth: A mission-ready Su-27 pilot could probably get barely combat-qualified for air-to-air in a MiG-29 with a minimum of cross-training needed to master the involved procedures and switchology. Things like just starting the jet, getting the radar up, and mastering all the associated checklist procedures. This couldn't happen in just an hour or two, but possibly in a day or two.

Winslow: What separated the really, really good fighter pilots from people like me, who, you know, I'm just a reasonably competent civilian pilot, is the fact that a good fighter pilot has the amazing ability to not only maneuver the aircraft, but to also operate these incredibly complex weapons systems while flying at near supersonic speeds and experiencing high G forces.

A good fighter pilot has the amazing ability to not only maneuver the aircraft, but to also operate these incredibly complex weapons systems while flying at near supersonic speeds and experiencing high G forces.
Dean Winslow

I'm pretty sure that they have some type of what's called a pulse Doppler fire control radar system in their aircraft. And the software can be more or less sophisticated. I still can't talk about all of the features that we had in our Eagles, but I'm sure now they're different because the last time I was in a F-15 was 26 years ago. But even then, the software that supported the radar was very sophisticated. And learning how to operate the fire control radar and all the different modes that you would need to track and target multiple aircraft simultaneously is challenging. In addition, these aircraft have sophisticated threat warning systems for detection and tracking of surface to air and air to air threats.

Q: How difficult is it to maintain the aircraft?

Winslow: I hate to use the word supply chain. People are now using that term a lot in the civilian world too—but the challenge of maintaining adequate supplies of spare parts that you would need to maintain that aircraft is formidable.

Dean Winslow with Maj Bob Coffman with F-15B after flying NATO mission, RAF Lossiemouth (Scotland), 1990. Dean Winslow with Maj Bob Coffman with F-15B after flying NATO mission, RAF Lossiemouth (Scotland), 1990.

While these are modern aircraft, they still are incredibly maintenance intensive. I think with the F-4 Phantom that we figured that usually it was something like for every hour the aircraft flew, it was as much as 12 to 15 man/woman hours to keep them mission ready.

 

(Dean Winslow with Maj Bob Coffman with F-15B after flying NATO mission, RAF Lossiemouth (Scotland), 1990.)

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Q & A with Dr. Dean Winslow and Ben Lambeth

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For spring quarter 2022, CISAC will be hosting hybrid events. Many events will offer limited-capacity in-person attendance for Stanford faculty, staff, fellows, visiting scholars, and students in accordance with Stanford’s health and safety guidelines, and be open to the public online via Zoom. All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 

                                                                                           

About the Event: Existing literature posits that the main challenge for nuclear security guarantees lies in making the promise of protection sufficiently credible. If allies do not believe their guarantor will actually come to their aid, they may seek alternate means of protection, including by investing in nuclear infrastructure. Credible security guarantees, on the other hand, are thought to reassure allies. In contrast to this approach, Dr. Sukin argues that credible nuclear guarantees can backfire. These guarantees can cause clients to fear that their guarantors will drag them into a precipitous nuclear conflict. Fears of nuclear escalation by their guarantor can drive clients to distance themselves from their alliance or seek stronger independent nuclear capabilities. Using survey experiments and case studies of U.S. alliances in East Asia and Europe, this project explores the risks of credible U.S. nuclear security guarantees.


About the Speaker: Dr. Lauren Sukin is currently a MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. In September 2022, she will join the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science as an Assistant Professor of International Relations. Dr. Sukin holds a Ph.D. (2021) and M.A. (2020) from the Department of Political Science at Stanford University. She also holds A.B.s from the Departments of Political Science and Literary Arts at Brown University (2016). Dr. Sukin’s research examines issues of international security, focusing on the role of nuclear weapons in international politics.

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to William J Perry Conference Room in Encina Hall may attend in person. 

Lauren Sukin
Seminars
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For spring quarter 2022, CISAC will be hosting hybrid events. Many events will offer limited-capacity in-person attendance for Stanford faculty, staff, fellows, visiting scholars, and students in accordance with Stanford’s health and safety guidelines, and be open to the public online via Zoom. All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 

About the Event: Artificial intelligence (AI) has enormous potential for both positive and negative impact, especially as we move from current-day systems towards more capable systems in the future. However, as a society we lack an understanding of how the developers of this technology, AI researchers, perceive the benefits and risks of their work, both in today's systems and impacts in the future. In this talk, Gates will present results from over 70 interviews with AI researchers, asking questions ranging from "What do you think are the largest benefits and risks of AI?" to "If you could change your colleagues’ perception of AI, what attitudes/beliefs would you want them to have?"


About the Speaker: Dr. Vael Gates is a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (HAI) and the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University. They study perceptions of AI safety, and are currently interviewing technical AI researchers to understand their views about risks from AI. They previously completed their PhD at UC Berkeley, formalizing and testing computational models of social collaboration.

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Vael Gates
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