Download Muslim-brotherhood report DOWNLOAD IRAN / AFGHANISTAN REPORT

On November 5, 2020 Facebook announced the takedown of two networks: 

• 25 Pages, 31 profiles, and 2 Instagram accounts affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. According to Facebook, the operation originated in Egypt, Turkey, and Morocco. The network targeted audiences both in Egypt directly and across the Middle East and North Africa.

• 11 Pages, 6 Groups, 33 profiles, and 47 Instagram accounts that originated in Afghanistan and Iran and targeted Farsi/Dari speakers in Afghanistan.

Facebook suspended these networks not due to the content of their posts, but for coordinated inauthentic behavior: the Facebook Pages and Groups were managed by fake accounts. A summary of the two networks is below, and full reports are linked at the top of this post. Facebook's announcement is here.

Muslim Brotherhood-Linked Takedown

Many social media disinformation campaigns—and associated takedowns—have been linked to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt. But we believe this is the first takedown linked to opposing pro-Muslim Brotherhood actors. Interestingly, this network appears markedly similar to networks from anti-Muslim Brotherhood disinformation campaigns on Facebook. Both sides create professional branding for Pages and share polished, original videos. We conjecture that like anti-Muslim Brotherhood operations, this network may be linked to a digital marketing firm in Egypt. These firms have a particular signature.   

Key takeaways:

• This was a complex cross-platform operation with a substantial audience. The Facebook Pages the Stanford Internet Observatory analyzed had nearly 1.5 million followers. The operation was also linked to many Twitter accounts, YouTube channels, and Telegram channels, many of which had large followings. 
• The network created and shared hundreds of original videos and dozens of original songs. 
• While most of the profiles linked to this operation were stub accounts, one of the profiles ran a social media advertising agency in Egypt.
• Central messages included:
  • Praise for the Muslim Brotherhood-supporting governments of Turkey and Qatar.
  • Criticism of Saudia Arabian, Egyptian, and UAE governments. 
  • Accusations that the Egyptian government had imprisoned and killed Muslim Brotherhood supporters, and that Muslim Brotherhood supporters were being detained across countries
  • The Facebook Page names were direct and unsubtle. Examples include Tunisia Against the UAE, Hearts with Qatar, and YemenAgainstKSAUEA [sic].

The People and Hearts with Qatar Facebook Page

Takedown of Accounts Originating in Afghanistan and Iran

This operation produced content oriented towards women, including promoting women's rights. It also promoted the narrative that Iran is a good ally for Afghanistan, highlighted the brutality of the Taliban, and criticized Pakistani and American intervention in Afghanistan. 

Key takeaways:

• The network aimed to appeal to women. Fifty-three percent of the Instagram accounts had profile photos of women (compared to 11% with photos of men), and the network shared stories about the educational success of women. It is possible the intent was to undermine the peace negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban; the Taliban is known for restricting women’s rights.  

• The network shared messaging that criticized Pakistan, the Taliban, and the U.S. Content about the U.S. criticized U.S. President Donald Trump in general, and specifically claimed that Trump was colluding with the Taliban. The network praised the role Iran could play in Afghan peace negotiations.

• Posts from accounts purporting to be in Afghanistan used the term Farsi to describe its language, instead of Dari, often explicitly saying they were proud to use the term Farsi. The two languages are very similar; Iran uses the term Farsi and Afghanistan uses the term Dari. 

• The Facebook profiles and Instagram accounts were as actively involved in pushing particular narratives as the Pages and Groups, and in many cases had larger followers. 

• We identified five Telegram channels linked to this Facebook/Instagram operation. 

A post from the Afghanistan My Passion Instagram account using a fabricated photo. The Taliban are shown praying for their “partner” Trump.

Q. Why is this work important?

A lot of tech is produced in China so it’s important to understand their policies. And in Washington, D.C., you hear a lot of people say, “Well, you can’t know what China’s doing on tech policy. It’s all a secret.” But while China’s political system is often opaque, if you happen to read Chinese, there’s a lot that’s publicly available and can explain what the Chinese government is thinking and planning.

With our network of experts, DigiChina works at the intersection of two policy challenges. One is how do we deal with high technology, and the questions around economic competitiveness, personal autonomy and the security risks that our dependence on tech creates.

The other challenge is, from a US government, business or values perspective, what needs to be done about the increased prominence and power of the Chinese government and its economic, technological and military capabilities.

These questions cut across tech sectors from IT infrastructure to data-driven automation, and cutting-edge developments in quantum technology, biotech, and other fields of research.

Q: How was DigiChina started?

A number of us were working at different organizations, think tanks, consultancies and universities and we all had an interest in explaining the laws and the bureaucratic language to others who aren’t Chinese policy specialists or don’t have the language skills.  

We started working informally at first and then reached out to New America, which is an innovative type of think tank combining research, innovation, and policy thinking on challenges arising during this time of rapid technological and social change. Under the New America umbrella, and through partnerships with the Leiden Asia Centre, a leading European research center based at the University of Leiden, and the Ethics and Governance of Artificial Intelligence Initiative at Harvard and MIT, we were able to build out the program and increase the number of experts in our network.

Q: Who is involved in DigiChina and what types of expertise do you and others bring to the project?

More than 40 people have contributed to DigiChina publications so far, and it’s a pretty diverse group. There are professors and think tank scholars, students and early-career professionals, and experienced government and industry analysts. Everyone has a different part of the picture they can contribute, and we reach out to other experts both in China and around the world when we need more context.

As for me, I was working at Yale Law School’s China Center when I was roped into what would become DigiChina and had spent several years in Beijing and New Haven working more generally on US-China relations and Track 2 dialogues, where experts and former officials from the two countries meet to take on tough problems. As a journalist and graduate student, I had long studied technology and politics in China, and I took on a coordinating role with DigiChina as I turned back to that pursuit full time.

Q. Are there other organizations involved as well?

We have a strong tie to the Leiden Asia Centre at the University of Leiden in the Netherlands, where one of DigiChina’s cofounders, Rogier Creemers, is a professor, and where staff and student researchers have contributed to existing and forthcoming work. We coordinate with a number of other groups on translations, and the project benefits greatly from the time and knowledge contributed by employees of various institutions. I hope that network will increasingly be a resource for contributors and their colleagues.

The project is currently supported by the Ford Foundation, which works to strengthen democratic values, promote international cooperation and advance human achievement around the world. A generous grant from Ford will keep the lights on for two years, giving us the ability to build our open-access resource and, with further fundraising, the potential to bring on more in-house editorial and research staff.

On September 29, the APARC China Program hosted Thomas Fingar and Stephen Stedman for the program “Rebuilding International Institutions.” The program, which was moderated by China Program Director Jean Oi, examined the future of international institutions such as the United Nations (UN), World Trade Organization (WTO), and World Health Organization (WHO) in our evolving global political landscape. While Fingar and Stedman acknowledged that such institutions facilitated attainment of unprecedented peace and prosperity after WWII, they also asked difficult questions: Are these institutions still adequate? And if not, how will we change them?

Shorenstein APARC Fellow Thomas Fingar kicked off the session by asking whether or not US-China tensions would impede cooperation on major global challenges, or if those challenges were so serious as to render such rivalries immaterial. Perhaps the most obvious example of such a crisis is the current COVID-19 pandemic. The efforts to curb the virus’ spread not only by individual countries, but also by international organizations like the WHO, have proven largely inadequate. According to Fingar, our existing institutions need to be reformed or supplemented to deal with these types of threats. However, such an overhaul of our international systems will be difficult, he says.

How, then, will we go about such a massive project? Stephen Stedman, Deputy Director at Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), responded by explaining that the current failure of international cooperation makes such undertakings tough. Globalization has been a double-edged sword: On one hand, more contact, perhaps inherently, leads to increased tension. The resurgence of traditional notions of sovereignty in 2010, kickstarted by the opposition of countries like Russia and China to what was seen as UN overreaching, has led to a reduction of international cooperation overall. On the other hand, Fingar posits that our interconnectedness may force us toward cooperation despite rivalries as we face more and more transnational threats. International institutions create rules to organize and manage our many interconnected relationships so that we can deal with our problems effectively and reduce friction.

Stedman also pointed to the upcoming US elections and the major impact their outcome will have on how these problems are addressed—or not. In the last four year, the United States has pulled back significantly from international institutions and agreements, leaving a gap that China has started to fill. Furthermore, despite the US’s retreat from international responsibility, the country still remains a critical actor in global initiatives. China’s embrace of a global leadership role is not inherently negative, but its future relationship with the US will need to be “managed in a way that you get greater cooperation and not just paralysis.” Stedman says that it is likely that progress will need to be made on a bilateral front in order to have productive conversations about international issues with China.

Concluding on an optimistic note, Fingar voiced his hope that the current tensions and negative perceptions between rivals might ultimately “be mitigated by success in dealing with a common problem,” because “experience does shape perceptions.”

A video recording of this program is available upon request. Please contact Callista Wells, China Program Coordinator at cvwells@stanford.edu with any inquiries.