Nuclear policy
Authors
Ryan A. Musto
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China is ready to rock with the Treaty of Bangkok.

In a rare appearance at the special online summit for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on Nov. 22, China’s President Xi Jinping announced that China is prepared to sign the protocol of a 1995 agreement that establishes Southeast Asia as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Under the agreement, known as the Bangkok Treaty, 10 regional states renounce the right to nuclear weapons in any form within the ASEAN zone. If it joins the treaty, China would agree not to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons within the zone or against its members. It would make China the first nuclear-weapon state to adhere.

Read the rest at Lawfare Blog 

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President Xi Jinping recently announced that China wants to adhere to Southeast Asia’s nuclear-free zone “as early as possible" to become the first nuclear state to join the pact. Musto finds that Xi wants to act now in order to distract from China’s nuclear build-up and, more importantly, counter the AUKUS security partnership.

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Stephen Buono
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Look up! The ghosts of space weapons past have once again darkened our cosmic doorway. Recently Britain’s Financial Times reported that China flight-tested a new breed of space weapon when it launched a massive “Long March” rocket tipped with a nuclear-capable, hypersonic glider. The missile briefly entered orbit before descending on its target, which it missed by roughly two dozen miles. The report suggested that the test was evidence that China has “made astounding progress on hypersonic weapons and [is] far more advanced than US officials realised.”

Read the rest at The Washington Post

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China flight-tested a new breed of space weapon when it launched a massive “Long March” rocket tipped with a nuclear-capable, hypersonic glider. But history tells us why the test isn’t a cause for panic.

Authors
Ryan A. Musto
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China is furious about the new AUKUS security partnership. Under the deal announced on September 15, the United States and United Kingdom will help Australia acquire a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines to counter China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific. A day after it became public, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian blasted the pact as “extremely irresponsible” and one that “undermined regional peace and stability.” 

Read the rest at The Diplomat

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China is tapping into broader anti-nuclear sentiment in the region to attack Australia’s nuclear submarine deal.

Authors
Debak Das
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Abstract

What role does the international audience play in nuclear crises? Scholars of nuclear crises and deterrence have treated nuclear crises as dyadic interactions between two sides. However, states do not only interact with each other during a nuclear crisis. They also signal to a third actor—the international audience. There are two reasons for this. First, states care about their international social reputation and want to be perceived as responsible and legitimate actors. Second, there are material benefits to states maintaining a good social reputation with the international audience, which possesses the leverage to reward, condemn, and sanction. States thus attempt to leverage this power of the international audience to apply diplomatic pressure on their adversary during nuclear crises. They also engage in costly signaling and strategic restraint to ensure that the international audience considers their actions legitimate during the crisis. I use original qualitative evidence from the Kargil War (1999) between India and Pakistan to demonstrate this dynamic. Incorporating the international audience as a critical third actor during nuclear crises has important academic and policy implications for the study of nuclear crises and their management.

Read the rest at Global Studies Quarterly

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What role does the international audience play in nuclear crises? Scholars of nuclear crises and deterrence have treated nuclear crises as dyadic interactions between two sides. However, states do not only interact with each other during a nuclear crisis. They also signal to a third actor—the international audience.

Authors
Rose Gottemoeller
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Emerging and disruptive technologies spell an uncertain future for second-strike retaliatory forces. New sensors and big data analysis may render mobile missiles and submarines vulnerable to detection. I call this development the “standstill conundrum”: States will no longer be able to assure a nuclear response should they be hit by a nuclear first strike. If the nuclear weapons states can manage this vulnerability, however, they might be able to escape its worst effects. “Managing” could mean shoring up nuclear deterrence; it could mean focusing more on defenses; or it could mean negotiating to ensure continued viability of second-strike deterrent forces.

Read the rest at Texas National Security Review

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Emerging and disruptive technologies spell an uncertain future for second-strike retaliatory forces. New sensors and big data analysis may render mobile missiles and submarines vulnerable to detection. I call this development the “standstill conundrum”: States will no longer be able to assure a nuclear response should they be hit by a nuclear first strike.

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Cover of North Korean Conundrum, showing a knotted ball of string.

Read our news story about the book >> 

North Korea is consistently identified as one of the world’s worst human rights abusers. However, the issue of human rights in North Korea is a complex one, intertwined with issues like life in the North Korean police state, inter-Korean relations, denuclearization, access to information in the North, and international cooperation, to name a few. There are likewise multiple actors involved, including the two Korean governments, the United States, the United Nations, South Korea NGOs, and global human rights organizations. While North Korea’s nuclear weapons and the security threat it poses have occupied the center stage and eclipsed other issues in recent years, human rights remain important to U.S. policy. 

The contributors to The North Korean Conundrum explore how dealing with the issue of human rights is shaped and affected by the political issues with which it is so entwined. Sections discuss the role of the United Nations; how North Koreans’ limited access to information is part of the problem, and how this is changing; the relationship between human rights and denuclearization; and North Korean human rights in comparative perspective.

Contents

  1. North Korea: Human Rights and Nuclear Security Robert R. King and Gi-Wook Shin
  2. The COI Report on Human Rights in North Korea: Origins, Necessities, Obstacles, and Prospects Michael Kirby
  3. Encouraging Progress on Human Rights in North Korea: The Role of the United Nations and South Korea Joon Oh 
  4. DPRK Human Rights on the UN Stage: U.S. Leadership Is Essential Peter Yeo and Ryan Kaminski
  5. Efforts to Reach North Koreans by South Korean NGOs: Then, Now, and Challenges Minjung Kim
  6. The Changing Information Environment in North Korea Nat Kretchun
  7. North Korea’s Response to Foreign Information Martyn Williams
  8. Human Rights Advocacy in the Time of Nuclear Stalemate: The Interrelationship Between Pressuring North Korea on Human Rights and Denuclearization  Tae-Ung Baik
  9. The Error of Zero-Sum Thinking about Human Rights and U.S. Denuclearization Policy Victor Cha
  10. Germany’s Lessons for Korea Sean King
  11. Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Puzzles, Priorities, and Political Power Thomas Fingar

Desk, examination, or review copies can be requested through Stanford University Press.

June 2022 Update

The Korean version of The North Korean Conundrum is now available, published by the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB). Purchase the Korean version via NKDB's website >>

To mark the release of the Korean version of the book, APARC hosted a book talk in Seoul jointly with the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights, on June 9, 2022.
Watch NTD Korea's report of the event:

View news coverage of the event by Korean Media:

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Balancing Human Rights and Nuclear Security

Authors
Robert R. King
Gi-Wook Shin
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Shorenstein APARC
Authors
Siegfried S. Hecker
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What we know for sure is that North Korea can build the bomb because the tremors from deep inside the Punggye-ri nuclear test-site tunnels have been detected around the world six times. The most recent blast in September 2017 was more than 10 times the size of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear explosions. With these explosions, North Korea joined seven other countries known to have detonated nuclear devices.

Read the rest at Global Asia

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Facts are difficult to come by, myths are deeply ingrained, and uncertainties lurk everywhere — that, in short, is the nature of North Korea’s nuclear program.

Authors
Steven Pifer
Ami Bera
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Thirty years after the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons pose a far greater threat to the safety and security of Americans than is reflected in our public discourse. While the United States must maintain a strong nuclear deterrent as an important tool of U.S. foreign and defense policy, an oversized global arsenal of nuclear weapons makes Americans equally unsafe. It is time to reinvigorate arms control discussions to seek reasonable reductions that will make us all more secure.

Too many nuclear weapons increase the risk of theft by terrorists or other nefarious actors, encourage more countries to develop nuclear arms, and raise the risk of nuclear war. Reasonable arms control measures, taken in conjunction with adversaries like Russia, make Americans safer by diminishing the large Russian nuclear arsenal, reinforcing norms against the development and use of nuclear arms, securing or eliminating nuclear material from theft or misuse by terrorists, and saving money that can be used to strengthen the United States military’s conventional deterrence against costly and destructive wars. 

In order to achieve those goals, Washington and Moscow have cut their strategic nuclear weapons since the height of the Cold War. Through the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START, which the U.S. and Russia recently extended, both countries each reduced their nuclear arsenals to no more than 1,550 deployed strategic warheads arming no more than 700 deployed strategic ballistic missiles and bombers.

Yet, despite these historic cuts, the United States and Russia each still have far more nuclear weapons than either side could conceivably use in a conflict, and at least ten times more weapons than any other country in the world. This actually makes Americans less safe, rather than the other way around.

In 2013, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that the United States could safely reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads by one-third. The Biden administration should use that study—along with the current Nuclear Posture Review– to set the United States on the path to reasonable reductions. 

The Biden administration should aim for new negotiations between the United States and Russian to limit each country’s armed forces to 1,000 deployed strategic warheads. The agreement can be executed incrementally, and the sides might informally agree once negotiations began to deploy no more than 1,400 strategic warheads, as an early confidence-building measure. This first step is an easy and safe one to take, as there have been times over the past decade when both countries already deployed fewer than 1,400 strategic warheads.

As part of a bold new vision for arms control and strategic stability, U.S. negotiators should seek an agreement that encompasses all U.S. and Russian nuclear warheads, including reserve (non-deployed) strategic warheads, and non-strategic nuclear weapons. Negotiators should work to limit all nuclear warheads to no more than 2,500 each, with an embedded sub-limit of 1,000 deployed strategic warheads within the overall aggregate limit. Even with the dramatic arsenal reductions outlined here, the United States would maintain the ability to deter and, if necessary, defend against any global adversary.

Such a nuclear arms reduction agreement would have significant additional advantages for the United States:

First, it could position Washington and Moscow to press China to freeze or limit its build-up of nuclear arms as long as the United States and Russia are reducing their nuclear arsenals. 

Second, such an agreement could give the Pentagon additional resources to support wider force modernization requirements for nuclear and conventional forces alike, including new ballistic missile submarines and the B-21 bomber. If we have the forces to deter conventional conflict, we dramatically reduce the prospect of nuclear war.

Third, such an agreement would bolster America’s non-proliferation credentials and leadership. A new U.S.-Russia nuclear arms reductions treaty may not lead North Korea to abandon its nuclear program overnight, but it would increase the ability of U.S. diplomats to urge third countries to pressure and sanction outliers such as North Korea.

Right-sizing U.S. and global nuclear arsenals strengthens deterrence, reduces proliferation risks, and lowers the threat of nuclear war to the United States and our allies. The Biden administration has an opportunity to reduce that risk. It should seize it.

Rep. Ami Bera, D-Calif., is chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia, and Nonproliferation. Steven Pifer is a William J. Perry Research Fellow at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation.

Originally for Defense One

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Biden has an opportunity to bolster deterrence, reduce proliferation risks, and lower the risk of nuclear war.

Authors
Rose Gottemoeller
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President Biden is reviewing America’s nuclear posture. By January, we should know what he thinks about U.S. nuclear weapons, what policies should govern them and how many we need. Congress is watching closely, and the Senate and House of Representatives are sure to debate the results; they always do. 

But this year will be different. A new player has entered the field — China. 

Read the rest at The Hill

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President Biden is reviewing America’s nuclear posture. By January, we should know what he thinks about U.S. nuclear weapons, what policies should govern them and how many we need. Congress is watching closely; senators and representatives always do. But this year will be different. A new player has entered the field — China.

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