Nuclear policy
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Abstract: What are the causes of change in Russian declaratory nuclear strategy? Three cases of Russian declaratory nuclear strategy, the military doctrines from 1993, 2000 and 2010, demonstrate significant variation in the role nuclear weapons play in Russian national security.

Structural theories of international relations explain this variation as a function of the balance of military power. Perceived nuclear or conventional inferiority vis-a-vis potential adversaries certainly inspires Russian behavior, but Russia chooses to balance in different ways than balance of power theory predicts, depending on available resources and capabilities.
 
A more compelling explanation for strategy variation lies in the politics of strategy formulation in Russia. Russian military actors effectively influence nuclear strategy due to both intellectual and institutional dominance. Civilian actors are less unified in their strategy preferences and less institutionally dominant in strategy formulation over time. Despite increased political control over the military, civilian influence on nuclear strategy outcomes does not seem to increase in Russia.
 
These findings have implications for how we understand the Russian security policy-making environment as well as for the content and context of Russian nuclear strategy and posture.
 
Speaker bio: Kristin Ven Bruusgaard is a Stanton Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow at CISAC, and a doctoral candidate at King’s College London. Her research focuses on Russian nuclear strategy and deterrence policy in the post-cold war era. Kristin is currently on leave from the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS). She has previously been a senior security policy analyst in the Norwegian Armed Forces, a junior researcher at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), and an intern at the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in Washington, D.C., and at NATO HQ. She holds an MA in Security Studies from Georgetown University, and a BA from Warwick University. Her work has been published in Security Dialogue, U.S. Army War College Quarterly Parameters, Survival and War on the Rocks
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard CISAC
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NBC Bay Area spoke with Shorenstein APARC director Gi-Wook Shin following a press conference held by DPRK foreign minister Ri Yong-Ho on September 25, in which Ri asserted that recent comments by President Donald Trump amounted to a "declaration of war."

The verbal barrage between North Korea and the United States has sharply escalated, with increased U.S. bomber flights near and around North Korea being met by North Korean threats to shoot down such flights, even those outside its borders.

While Shin still holds that the war of words will not turn into war, he is concerned that the escalation of rhetoric is dangerous.

"The South Korean people are really worried about the possibility of a military conflict," noted Shin. He further advised the president to deescalate personal attacks on Kim Jong-un, pointing out that Kim's "god-like" status in North Korea was effectively forcing the DPRK leader to respond to White House threats.

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North Korean leader Kim Jong-un now boasts that his country is in the final stages of completing a nuclear weapons development program, one capable of loading nuclear warheads on an ICBM that can reach the mainland United States.

Six years after his succession to power, Kim has continued to defy international pressure, conducting four nuclear tests and firing eighty-five ballistic missiles. Recently, the world has witnessed an extraordinary, high-intensity war of words between President Trump and the North Korean leader. Military tension mounts higher than ever as we enter a new phase, arguably the most serious one in decades, in dealing with a dangerous and bellicose North Korea.

There are many questions: Will North Korea conduct an atmospheric nuclear test? When will their weapons program really be capable of hitting the continental United States? How will the U.S. government respond to that capability? Will the likely result be war on the Korean Peninsula? What about the China factor?

Ambassador Kim will discuss some of these questions through his personal experiences at the Six-Party Talks, the UN Security Council and through his contacts with North Korean officials.

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Kim Sook former South Korean Ambassador to U.N; 2014-15 Pantech Fellow at APARC, Stanford University <i>former South Korean Ambassador to U.N; 2014-15 Pantech Fellow at APARC, Stanford University</i>
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Prior to joining CISAC as a Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow, Yogesh Joshi was an Associate Fellow in the Strategic Studies Program at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. He recently received his PhD from Jawaharlal Nehru University specializing in Indian foreign and security policy. 

At CISAC, Yogesh is finishing a book manuscript on the history of India's nuclear submarine program. His research traces the origins, process, and development of India's nuclear submarine program using multi-archival sources and extensive oral history interviews. Yogesh’s data-driven research posits that India’s nuclear submarine program was riddled with shifting motivations, ambivalent rationales and halting progress. Rather than being driven by a single coherent strategic plan, India stumbled upon a submarine-based nuclear deterrent. By situating the nuclear submarine program in India’s Cold War security policy, its nuclear policy, its naval strategy in the Indian Ocean, the bureaucratic politics of its military-scientific complex and its quest for technological prestige, this research is an attempt to understand path-dependency in one of India’s most secretive military-scientific programs. It not only has implications for explaining India's nuclear program and policy but also provides an avenue to explain the process of decision-making behind state's pursuance of specific kinds of nuclear delivery systems. This research is supported by the Stanton Foundation. 

He has held fellowships at George Washington University, King’s College London and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC. His research has appeared or is forthcoming in Diplomacy and Statecraft, Asian Security, International History Review, International Affairs, Survival, US Naval War College Review, Comparative Strategy, Harvard Asia Quarterly, India Review, Asia Policy, Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, War on the Rocks, World Politics Review and The Diplomat. He has co-authored two books: The US ‘Pivot’ and Indian Foreign Policy: Asia's Emerging Balance of Power (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) and India and Nuclear Asia: Forces, Doctrines and Dangers (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018).  A short introduction to India’s Nuclear Policy was recently published by Oxford University Press.  

 

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Abstract: Continuing social concerns over nuclear energy technologies still limit the application of long-term solutions to nuclear waste management in most countries. These concerns result from a lack of public trust in the scientific basis used in the decision-making approach to waste disposal, particularly the siting of a geologic repository.  Also, nuclear waste issues have become intertwined with the discussion of the future of nuclear energy. Moreover, setting aside the technical uncertainties about the long-term behavior of the waste materials under extended geologic disposal conditions, a scientific dilemma exists about how to deal with the preferences of future generations that will have to safely manage the waste. This stalemate situation has motivated an effort to frame the discussion from a different and interdisciplinary perspective.

An innovative approach to nuclear waste management called ENTRUST is proposed. The approach consists of an analytical framework for the holistic assessment of nuclear waste management strategies and policies where the primary focus is on building and maintaining public trust. Based on a careful use of quantitative information for technical issues, ENTRUST seeks to support a participative and deliberative analysis of the policy and narratives on strategies for nuclear waste management and disposal.

Speaker Bio: François Diaz-Maurin is a Nuclear Security Visiting Scholar at CISAC (2017-2019) and a European Commission’s Marie Sklodowska-Curie Fellow (2017-2020).

François’ research at CISAC deals with the issue of the long-term management of nuclear waste produced at commercial power plants in a context of uncertain transitions and persisting social concerns over nuclear energy technologies. His interdisciplinary research seeks to merge quantitative and qualitative methods for the holistic study of nuclear waste management systems and policies.

In this talk, François will be presenting the preliminary results of his 3-year research project entitled “Building Trust in Nuclear Waste Management through Participatory Quantitative Story Telling (ENTRUST)”. The project will contribute to CISAC’s “Reset of U.S. Nuclear Waste Management Policy” science-policy initiative.

François received both B.S. (2004, with distinction) and M.S. (2007, with distinction) degrees in civil engineering from the University of Rennes 1, France, and a Ph.D. degree in environmental science and technology (2013, summa cum laude) from the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain. Before joining academia, François spent four years as an engineer in the design of nuclear energy technologies in Paris, France (2007-2008) and in Boston, MA (2009-2010) for AREVA Inc. North America and AREVA Federal Services LLC.

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François Diaz-Maurin is the associate editor for nuclear affairs at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

Previously, Diaz-Maurin was a MacArthur Foundation Nuclear Security Visiting Scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University, and a European Commission’s Marie Sklodowska-Curie Fellow. He has been a scientific advisor to members of the European Parliament on nuclear issues, and he is a founding member of the Emerging Leaders in Environmental and Energy Policy network (ELEEP) of the Atlantic Council, Washington D.C. and the Ecologic Institute, Berlin.

Prior to joining academia, Diaz-Maurin spent four years as a research engineer in the nuclear industry in Paris, France and Boston, MA. There, he worked on the safety design of new reactors and of a treatment plant to vitrify Hanford’s tank waste from WWII and Cold War nuclear weapons production.

Diaz-Maurin received multi-disciplinary training in civil engineering (B.Sc./M.Sc., University of Rennes 1, 2004/2007, both with distinction), environmental and sustainability sciences (Ph.D., Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2013, summa cum laude and “Extraordinary Ph.D.” Award), and nuclear materials, geochemistry of radionuclides and nuclear security (postdoctoral training, Stanford University, 2017–2019).

Diaz-Maurin reads, writes, and speaks French, English, Spanish, and Catalan. Outside the office, he is a classical music lover and an amateur cellist.

He is based in Barcelona, Spain.

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President Donald Trump's ominous threat to unleash “fire and fury” on North Korea succeeded at least in garnering the attention of not only Kim Jong Un but the globe. The vague assertion of readiness to carry out a preventive attack on North Korea, even to use nuclear weapons, roiled stock markets, sent Japanese to look for bomb shelters and prompted alarmed warnings against the use of force from both foes and allies, including South Korean President Moon Jae-in. The piece is available in Chinese, English and Japanese.

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In a Q&A, SK Center Fellow Yong Suk Lee discusses U.S. policy toward North Korea and the viability of 'secondary sanctions'

North Korea launched its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on July 3, a first for the country that has increasingly advanced proliferation and testing over the last three years despite condemnation from the international community.

The United States, following the ICBM launch, called for additional efforts to cut-off flows of currency into North Korea. Officials have said, as part of the proposals, they are considering ‘secondary sanctions’ that would target companies and financial institutions that deal with North Korea even beyond those already banned by U.N. Security Council resolutions.

Just returned from Seoul, SK Center Fellow Yong Suk Lee spoke with Shorenstein APARC about the effectiveness of historical sanctions on North Korea, one of his research areas. He also shared thoughts on U.S. policy toward North Korea and the viability of new sanctions.

Could you describe how sanctions have historically been applied on North Korea? What do they generally look like in terms of scope and whom do they often target?

Sanctions generally fall into three different categories: trade, travel and financial transactions, and in the case of North Korea, all three kinds have been applied. Trade sanctions, for example, have focused on minerals, technology and energy sources, with the goal of hindering the purchase of products that could aid in weapons development. Financial sanctions, for example, have sought to control flows of money to and from certain individuals and entities associated with the government. Whether sanctions are applied multilaterally through the U.N. or unilaterally, it’s difficult to enforce them especially in a country as closed-off as North Korea. It’s also difficult to identify how to draw the line between sanctions that only punish the bad behaviors of a few versus those that affect the broader population: that’s a balance policymakers attempt to strike.

Your research has looked at the impact of sanctions in both rural and urban areas of North Korea from the 1990s through the 2000s. How did you analyze their implementation and performance? In a technical sense, have sanctions been effective?

In the 1990s, sanctions on North Korea relaxed in concert with the Sunshine Policy, an effort by the South Korean administration under Kim Dae-jung to engage North Korea. By the early to mid-2000s, the international community began to increase sanctions again as North Korea continued its nuclear and weapons development. The goal of my research in analyzing those two time periods was to compare and understand the impact of sanctions within North Korea, particularly the impact on its domestic economy. Since there’s not much subnational data available, I identified a proxy for economic activity – nighttime lights as seen from outer space – that acted as an indicator of consumption, production and energy allocation across North Korea.

I found that certain areas became relatively brighter than other areas when sanctions increased. The capital Pyongyang, cities that share a border with China, and pockets where manufacturing is clustered all became brighter. This result indicates that sanctions were effective in a technical sense, yet were ineffective in reaching their intended target. The North Korean regime has found ways to reallocate resources toward urban areas where government officials and elites reside.

How has North Korea evaded potential effects of sanctions in the past?

North Korea has avoided effects of sanctions through internal actions, such as redistribution of resources to government officials and elites, like those patterns identified in my research, and also though external actions, such as trade with other countries. Increasing financial activities and trade with neighbor countries fills in some of the gaps caused by sanctions. North Korea has also maintained ties with African, Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern countries, some of which receive migrant workers from North Korea. Those workers often send remittances back to acquaintances in North Korea, thereby supporting its economy.

In a recent report, you’ve written about China’s relationship with North Korea and how that relationship has aided in the development of markets. Can you describe how the two are tied?

The relationship between China and North Korea is close. By sheer numbers, around 80 percent of North Korea’s trade is with China. All sorts of goods are exchanged through China. For example, goods produced in Western countries that are barred from directly trading with North Korea are often funneled through China. Especially outside of urban areas, North Koreans seek goods from China because they can’t otherwise access them. They also make money by selling goods, mostly minerals, to China. The China-North Korea border is quite porous, so you have a situation where a large number of individuals are engaging in small transactions, and although they may be disparate, the transactions add up.

Is there a strategy that provides hope that China will step up pressure on North Korea?

A lot of the debate, especially in the United States, is about putting pressure on China to do something about North Korea. But if you take a step back and think about it from the Chinese perspective, I think a valid question to ask is: why would China be interested in pressuring their neighbor? For the United States, the main issue with respect to North Korea is the nuclear threat. For China, Japan and South Korea, however, the main issue is not necessarily the nuclear threat but instead the issue of regional stability. So, while China remains important, it is one of many actors that are involved in addressing challenges related to North Korea. I think that point is largely missing from the debate.

U.S. policy has maintained that sanctions will encourage the North Korean regime to change its behavior. Could additional sanctions help?

New sanctions might help. If the intended goal is to decrease flows of currency into North Korea, it would make sense to impose sanctions on Chinese entities or individuals since they remain North Korea’s most prolific trade partners. But the question remains: would it encourage the Chinese government to change its position, and in turn, the North Korean government to bow to additional pressure? From my perspective as an economist, I don’t think enough incentives are at play for either country to react significantly. North Korea is one of the poorest countries in the world, and as history has shown, poor countries can survive in that manner for a long time. They find ways to adapt. Additionally, North Korea has nuclear weapons and the government sees them as leverage for maintaining the status quo.

What should officials keep in mind when considering sanctions?

Sanctions by their very nature are meant to inflict some harm, and that aspect alone does not sit well with the North Korean government. This, however, is where U.S. policy currently stands. It is caught in a deadlock. On one hand, the United States feels an immediate need to discipline the regime for its repeated missile launches under grounds that it threatens national security, and on another hand, the United States does not recognize North Korea’s nuclear program. Given this context, there is little room to consider tools of engagement.

There’s clearly no easy solution to the challenges posed by North Korea, and whatever the solution may be, it will consist of many steps. Over the long-term, I think slowly relaxing sanctions and pursuing quiet engagement with North Korea has greater likelihood of success. Putting aside political leadership and ideology for a moment, if North Koreans had an opportunity to engage in limited economic activities, it could create incentives. Economic development is already changing North Korea and might be its greatest motivation to come to the table to talk about change.

The United States has placed unilateral sanctions on other countries such as Iran, for example, which negotiated the 2015 nuclear deal, and Cuba, which saw opening and reforms in 2016. Do those cases provide lessons that could be applied to the North Korea case?

Iran, compared to North Korea, has a much larger population and holds a prominent position on the world’s stage. Sanctions on Iran carry weight because of the country’s economic ties across the world. That’s one aspect to keep in mind. Another is that Iran isn’t a totalitarian society. The government has to respond to its people to some degree. So, in general, there are more incentives that exist in Iran that could have influenced the decision to negotiate the 2015 Nuclear Deal.

As for Cuba, the case is also unique. The U.S. trade embargo that existed following the end of the Missile Crisis of 1962 lasted for decades not because of a continued existence of nuclear weapons, as in the case of North Korea, but I believe because of ideological issues that remained between two countries. Cuba wasn’t as isolated either, so it was able to conduct business with many countries during that time period. Sanctions have recently been lifted by the United States due to the passage of time and diplomatic efforts.

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The most dangerous impact of North Korea’s long-range missile test this past week may not have been the one in the Sea of Japan, felt in Washington, Seoul and Tokyo. It was in Moscow where Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin locked arms in a united front on how to respond to the growing North Korea crisis. The target of this front was not, however, North Korea. It was the United States, who the Sino-Russian axis accused of pursuing a military “buildup” in the region.

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South Korean President Moon Jae-in and U.S. President Donald Trump recently held a summit in Washington, their first face-to-face meeting in a time of heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Experts from the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center offered insights in a series of publications and press interviews.

In advance of the summit, William J. Perry Fellow Kathleen Stephens spoke on Bloomberg television about the challenges facing the United States and South Korea, and how those challenges would be prioritized during the bilateral meeting.

Moon would be bringing the message that the U.S.-South Korea alliance is a “strong one and that he remains committed to it,” and that, “only by working transparently and closely together” could the two countries address areas of concern, Stephens said.

“Only when Washington and Seoul are able to talk very frankly to each other and come up with a coordinated plan do we have any chance of making some progress on North Korea,” she added.

Stephens joined the program from Seoul, where a group of Shorenstein APARC faculty and fellows participated in a public seminar and the Korea-U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum, a biannual conference that seeks to foster dialogue about issues affecting the Korean Peninsula and the U.S.-South Korea alliance.

The seminar, held in conjunction with The Sejong Institute, received press coverage; such articles can be read on the Voice of America website (in Korean) and Sisa Journal website (in Korean).

In an analysis piece for Tokyo Business Today, Associate Director for Research Daniel Sneider assessed the outcomes of the summit between Moon and Trump, suggesting that their meeting was satisfactory – without signs of major discord.

“For the most part, this display of calculated pragmatism worked well. There was no visible daylight between the two leaders over how to handle the North and THAAD totally disappeared from the summit talk, at least in public and in the joint statement issued by the two governments.”

The summit, however, may prove to be a “temporary gain,” Sneider added. “Beneath the smiles, there was plenty of evidence of the gaps, and even the tensions, that exist between a progressive government in Seoul, one that echoes the views of its ideological predecessors of a decade ago, and a nationalist, conservative regime in Washington.”

Read the piece in English and Japanese.

Days after the summit, North Korea test-launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which the United States and South Korea followed by hosting joint military exercises.

Stephens spoke on WBUR radio about the ICBM test launch and the initial reactions of the Trump administration.

“If [President Trump’s] agenda is to take stronger defensive measures against North Korea, I think he will find strong partners in Japan and South Korea,” she said, noting that other measures, such as diplomacy and economic sanctions, have also been used to affect pressure on the regime.

Responding to a question about China’s relationship with North Korea, Stephens said Beijing has not exhausted all possible tools in its efforts to persuade Pyongyang to slow or abandon its nuclear and missile activities. This is because China fears a collapse of the regime and “takes a long view” in its calculus, she said.

This news item has been updated.

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This is a chapter in the second edition of The National Security Enterprise, a book edited by Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof that provides practitioners' insights into the operation, missions, and organizational cultures of the principal national security agencies and other institutions that shape the U.S. national security decision-making process. Unlike some textbooks on American foreign policy, it offers analysis from insiders who have worked at the National Security Council, the State and Defense Departments, the intelligence community, and the other critical government entities. The book explains how organizational missions and cultures create the labyrinth in which a coherent national security policy must be fashioned. Understanding and appreciating these organizations and their cultures is essential for formulating and implementing it. Taking into account the changes introduced by the Obama administration, the second edition includes four new or entirely revised chapters (Congress, Department of Homeland Security, Treasury, and USAID) and updates to the text throughout. It covers changes instituted since the first edition was published in 2011, implications of the government campaign to prosecute leaks, and lessons learned from more than a decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq. This up-to-date book will appeal to students of U.S. national security and foreign policy as well as career policymakers.

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