This interview by Melissa De Witte originally appeared in Stanford News.

The upcoming summit between President Joe Biden and President Vladimir Putin is not rewarding the Russian leader for his bad behavior: It’s opening negotiations and delivering a warning to him instead, says Stanford scholar Kathryn Stoner.

Here, Stoner is joined by Stanford political scientist and former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul, Payne Distinguished Lecturer at CISAC and former Deputy Secretary General of NATO Rose Gottemoeller and Russia historian Norman Naimark to discuss what to expect at the summit in Geneva on Wednesday.

The meeting, the scholars say, could reset U.S.-Russia relations, signal deterrence on certain issues – including cybersecurity in light of attacks like the SolarWinds breach that the U.S. has blamed on the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service – and launch strategic stability talks related to nuclear weapons.

Interviews have been edited for length and clarity. For more information on what to expect about the Biden-Putin summit from FSI scholars, visit the FSI website.

Where does diplomacy now stand between the U.S. and Russia?

Naimark: Russian-American relations are at their lowest point since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, perhaps even since the last years of Gorbachev’s rule. When relations are fraying between the world’s two most powerful nuclear powers, the coming of the summit on June 16 between President Biden and President Putin should be welcomed. It’s worth recalling the heightened military tensions just three months ago between Moscow and Washington, when Moscow moved tens of thousands of troops to the Ukrainian border and mobilized its air and sea power in the region. Both leaders have emphasized that they seek stability, reliability and predictability in their bilateral relations; at the same time, their respective administrations have warned that expectations should be kept at the minimum for any kind of serious breakthrough at the summit.

Stoner: We’ve lost a lot of leverage because of the withdrawal from global politics that started under the latter part of the Obama administration and continued with Trump with his America First platform, which meant America alone. There is some leverage, it’s just how much. We don’t necessarily want to destabilize Russia because it’s a big, complicated country with nuclear weapons, but all signs point to Putin staying in office until 2036. He’s not going away. I think we have to try to signal deterrence on certain issues, like trying to move into another former Soviet republic as he is doing with Ukraine, Georgia and potentially Belarus, but then cooperate in other areas where it is productive to do so.

What do you think about some of the criticisms toward Biden meeting with Putin? For example, that Biden meeting with Putin is only rewarding him for his bad behavior.

Stoner: There is a reasonable question about why Biden and Putin are meeting and if it is somehow rewarding Putin for bad behavior by having a summit with the President of the United States. Rather than rewarding Putin, however, I think this meeting could be Biden’s warning to him that if hacking and other cyberattacks continue, we have a menu of things we could do as well.

Naimark: There is no reason that the American president cannot talk about difficult subjects like cybersecurity, ransomware attacks, human rights, the release of Alexei Navalny, the protection of Ukrainian sovereignty and other important items on the American agenda while focusing on issues of mutual interest: the future of arms control, global warming and the regulation of the Arctic, and outer space. One can always hope that, like the last summit on Lake Geneva between Russian and American leaders [Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan] in November 1985, this one can lay the groundwork for serious improvements in relations in the near future.

Is this meeting a reset of diplomatic relations between the two nations?

Stoner: I know in Washington it is popular to say that Biden is not having a reset of relations with Russia when past presidents all have tried that. I think that’s wrong. I do think it is a reset in the relationship in that there should be more clarity and stability, but that doesn’t mean it’s going to be friendly and universally cooperative, given that we still see many differences in perspectives and some antagonism too. Still, Russia and the U.S. need to talk because there are a lot of issues in common where it would be helpful to coordinate with Russia. After all, even in the depths of the Cold War, the leaders of both countries still talked. Russia has reestablished itself as the most formidable power in Europe and it looks like Biden is acknowledging that and the fact that the U.S. can no longer afford to ignore Russia.

Is there anything the two leaders will be able to agree upon?

McFaul: I used to organize these kinds of meetings when I worked in the government and back when President Medvedev was there. We would have these meetings as a way to force our governments to produce what is called in State Department-speak “deliverables.” We didn’t have meetings to have them, we wanted to get things done. In the first Obama-Medvedev meeting we had a long list of deliverables when they met in July of 2009.

But there is no way that will happen with Putin today because he doesn’t really want to cooperate, he doesn’t really want deliverables. That’s challenging for President Biden, I think, because he has said that he wants a stable, predictable relationship with Putin. I think that’s fine to aspire to, but I don’t think Putin is that interested in that kind of relationship, so that creates a challenge of substance for summits like this.

Gottemoeller: With such different threat perceptions, the two presidents are not going to agree in Geneva about what should go into the next nuclear treaty. They can agree, though, to put their experts together to hammer it out. They can also agree to put the two sides together to tackle the different threat perceptions and the question of what stability means. Finally, they can agree to a deadline, so the talks don’t stall. It won’t be a headline-grabbing outcome, but at least Moscow and Washington will get moving again on the nuclear agenda.

Where can Biden make progress?

McFaul: I think the most likely place to make progress is to launch strategic stability talks, which is an abstract phrase for beginning the process of negotiations about nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles that would be a follow-on to the New START treaty. Biden and Putin rightfully extended the New START treaty early in his term for five years, and I think that was very smart. I personally worked on that treaty, so I think it’s a good treaty and deserves to be extended. But it’s going to run out really fast because the next set of negotiations are going to be much more complicated. I hope they would start some process to begin those negotiations now.

Gottemoeller: Maybe the only place where President Biden can make progress with Vladimir Putin in Geneva is the nuclear agenda with Russia. Since the two men agreed, in February, to extend the New START treaty by five years, they have put out a clear public message that they intend to pursue a deal to replace New START and to launch strategic stability talks. They are not going to have identical ideas, however, about what those two goals mean.

Biden wants a new arms control deal that will control all nuclear warheads, whether launched on intercontinental strategic-range missiles or on shorter-range systems. He also wants to get a handle on some of the new types of nuclear weapons that the Russians have been developing. One new system, for example, uses nuclear propulsion to ensure that it can fly for many hours at great speed over long distances, earning it the moniker “weapon of vengeance.” These exotic weapons did not exist when New START was negotiated; now, they need to be controlled.

Putin, by contrast, focuses on U.S. long-range conventional missiles that he worries are capable of the accuracy and destructive power of nuclear weapons. The United States, in his view, could use these conventional weapons to destroy hard targets such as the Moscow nuclear command center. He also worries that the United States is producing ever more capable ways to intercept his nuclear missiles and destroy them before they reach their targets. In his worst nightmare, the United States undermines his nuclear deterrent forces without ever resorting to nuclear weapons.

What advice do you have for Biden?

McFaul: One, do not have a one-on-one meeting – just have a normal meeting. Two, I would recommend not having a joint press conference that just gives Putin a podium for the world to say his “whataboutism” stuff; it’s better to have separate press conferences because most of the world will be more interested in what Biden says compared to what Putin says.

Third, I think it’s important to cooperate when you can but also be clear about your differences and don’t pull punches on that. In particular, I want Biden to talk about Alexei Navalny, the Americans who are wrongly detained in Russia today, Crimea still being occupied, Russian proxies in eastern Ukraine, and parts of Georgia that are under occupation. They have been attacking us relentlessly with these cyberattacks, these Russian criminals who in my view have to have some association with the Russian government.

That’s a tough list, but I think it’s really important for President Biden to say those things directly to Putin. I have confidence that he can. I was at their last meeting. I traveled with the vice president in 2011 when he met with then Prime Minister Putin. Biden is capable of delivering tough messages and I hope he uses this occasion to do so again.

What would be a sign that their meeting was productive?

Stoner: One sign the meeting was productive would be if Biden and Putin could agree to establish a joint committee or council on some rules surrounding cybersecurity. Another would be if they make plans to talk again about either replacing or reviving the Minsk-2 agreement [that sought to bring an end to Russia’s war on Ukraine]. And three, a positive sign would be if they plan to do some negotiation on further reducing tactical nuclear weapons or strategic nuclear weapons. An agreement to disagree on some issues, but to continue talking on others would be indicative of at least some small progress.

U.S. officials have long sought to negotiate limits on non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), a sensible next step for U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control. Such a negotiation, however, would raise difficult issues, beginning with the imbalance in U.S. and Russian numbers. A likely Russian position that all NSNW be based on national territory would force the U.S. government to face the different perspectives within NATO on the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. As Washington prepares for a possible negotiation with Moscow, U.S. officials should consider ways to manage this issue from the outset.  

An Elusive Goal 

Since concluding the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the United States has sought to limit non-strategic nuclear weapons, also referred to as tactical or sub-strategic nuclear weapons. On signing New START, President Obama said “we hope to pursue discussions with Russia on reducing both our strategic and tactical weapons.” Republicans criticized New START’s lack of limits on NSNW, and the Senate resolution of advice and consent to ratification for New START called for a negotiation with Russia “to secure and reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner.” The Obama administration proposed such a negotiation, but Moscow declined. 

When the Trump administration belatedly engaged Russia on nuclear arms issues in 2020, it also sought to include NSNW. Russian negotiators accepted a one-year freeze on the total size of the stockpiles between the two countries (including NSNW), but the agreement did not include verification measures and quickly fell apart. In a statement noting the Biden administration’s agreement to extend New START, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Washington would pursue with Russia “arms control that addresses all of its nuclear weapons.”  U.S. allies have generally supported negotiating limits on and reductions in NSNW.

New START limits the United States and Russia each to no more than 1,550 deployed strategic warheads. The treaty only constrains deployed weapons and associated launchers. It does not limit NSNW or non-deployed strategic weapons. The U.S. nuclear stockpile numbers 3,800 warheads, of which 230 are B61 nuclear bombs designated as non-strategic (the U.S. military has eliminated all other NSNW). Russia’s nuclear stockpile numbers just under 4,500 warheads, with some 1,900 categorized as non-strategic or defensive. Russia’s diverse NSNW arsenal includes weapons for delivery by land-, air-, and sea-based systems.

Russia has resisted an agreement on NSNW because it has a much larger NSNW force and regards those weapons as a means to compensate for conventional inferiority compared to NATO or China. Moreover, such an agreement would entail difficult verification challenges. If Moscow agreed to a negotiation that covered NSNW, then it would almost certainly seek to leverage its numerical advantage in NSNW to gain a U.S. concession, perhaps conditioning its readiness to negotiate limits on all nuclear weapons on U.S. readiness to negotiate limits on missile defense, which would be politically controversial in Washington. 

Limiting and Reducing NSNW 

Given the disparity in numbers, a narrow stand-alone negotiation on NSNW has little prospect of success. What incentive would Moscow have to cut to the U.S. level? A more viable approach would seek an aggregate limit covering all U.S. and Russian nuclear warheads. In such an arrangement, the U.S. numerical advantage in non-deployed strategic warheads would partially offset the Russian advantage in NSNW. Within such an overall aggregate limit, the sides could negotiate a sub-limit to constrain the number of deployed strategic warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), warheads that could be launched in minutes and that pose the greater threat to strategic stability. 

If the sides agreed on such a framework, then a lower aggregate limit would force the Russians to reduce their NSNW number. However, that aggregate likely would not be low enough to drive the Russian military’s NSNW level down to anything close to the U.S. number. 

Despite the challenges, the United States should seek limits on Russian NSNW. First, non-strategic nuclear warheads deliverable by systems such as Iskandr missiles directly threaten U.S. allies. Second, many of these weapons are not “small.” The modernized B61 bomb will have a maximum yield of fifty kilotons, three times the size of the weapon that destroyed Hiroshima, and Russian NSNW reportedly have larger yields. Third, the most likely path to a U.S.-Russian nuclear conflict is a conventional war that escalates when one side employs NSNW.

The Looming Dilemma 

Russian acceptance of such a negotiating framework—an aggregate limit on all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons with a sublimit on deployed strategic warheads—would be welcomed in the United States and by allies, and rightly so. But it could end up posing a dilemma within NATO. 

The U.S. Air Force deploys 100-150 B61 bombs at a handful of air bases in Europe. Some of these B61 bombs are designated for use by U.S. aircraft. Others are maintained under U.S. custody but, in a conflict and with proper authorization, would be turned over to allies for delivery—sometimes referred to as “nuclear sharing.” The Belgians, Dutch, Germans, and Italians have aircraft and train for that purpose. 

In military terms, this small number of B61 bombs makes a marginal contribution in an overall stockpile of 3,800 weapons. U.S.-based aircraft (the B-2 and, in the future, B-21) could strike targets in Europe with B61 bombs, as could B-52s equipped with nuclear air-launched cruise missiles. The value of the Europe-based bombs is far more in political terms and assurance of allies. In peacetime, they are seen as symbols of the U.S. commitment to NATO’s defense and as coupling U.S. strategic nuclear forces to that commitment. If NATO were to use NSNW, or even signal the possibility of their use, then the alliance would aim to convey a political message that things were about to spin out of control and perhaps escalate to strategic nuclear exchanges.  Moreover, the process of planning, investing in, and exercising these systems is seen by alliance members as a unifying process helpful in assuring allies and deterring aggression. 

The dilemma? Suppose U.S. and Russian negotiators close in on an agreement limiting each side to 3,000 or 3,500 total nuclear warheads, with a sub-limit of 1,000 deployed strategic warheads and appropriate verification measures (an ambitious outcome, to be sure). The problem: the Russians almost certainly would insist on a provision requiring that all nuclear weapons be based on national territory. That would mean the removal of the B61 bombs to the United States. 

Many in the United States and Europe would regard such an agreement as a significant and very positive achievement. Belgian, Dutch, German, and Italian public would welcome an end to the unpopular presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in their countries.

The withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons could, however, end the involvement of a broad group of allies in NATO’s nuclear role. More importantly, such an outcome could be seen as calling into question U.S. readiness to use nuclear weapons in the alliance’s defense and signifying a diminution of the broader U.S. commitment to NATO. One could argue that allies should have confidence in the American president to use nuclear weapons if needed, regardless of where they are deployed, but the location of U.S. nuclear arms—in this case, their absence from Europe—could matter. To some, it could matter a great deal; they might even see it as decoupling the United States from European security.

If this issue were not managed carefully, then a split could develop within NATO. Those allies who see U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe as essential to their security, particularly in the Baltic and eastern European regions, might well oppose U.S. acceptance of the “base on national territory” provision—even at the expense of a new treaty. If U.S. negotiators went ahead and nevertheless accepted the provision, then opposition within NATO would complicate ratification prospects. If, on the other hand, U.S. negotiators rejected that provision out of deference to those concerns, and that blew up the chance for a new nuclear arms reduction treaty, one could expect a backlash and round of intra-alliance recriminations. (Knowing that this could be the case would only make it more likely that Russian negotiators would seek this outcome.) 

Thinking Ahead 

This is not to suggest that the Biden administration should not pursue limits on all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, including NSNW. Such an approach is the logical next step after New START. The administration does, however, need to factor this issue into consultations with allies and into its negotiating approach toward the Russians from the very beginning. A number of ideas might alleviate the basing on national territory problem, including: 

Seek to require that NSNW be stored at declared storage sites—with monitoring and significant transparency—at some distance from facilities basing NSNW delivery systems. This would slow the process of mating non-strategic warheads to delivery systems in a crisis or conventional conflict. (If the treaty did not require basing on national territory, then this would mean relocation of U.S. B61 bombs to new storage sites instead of the air bases where they are now.) 

Seek to require that Russian NSNW be stored at sites more than some distance, say, seven hundred kilometers, from a NATO member’s territory. This would provide distance between NATO allies such as the Baltic states and stored Russian NSNW. (It would have to apply reciprocally if the agreement did not require that nuclear weapons be based on national territory.) 

Seek to ban nuclear warheads for short-range land-based missiles. This would eliminate NSNW that pose a particular threat to countries such as the Baltic states and Poland, though it could prove hard to negotiate, as the U.S. military has no equivalent.   

Propose that NSNW stored outside of national territory be counted as “deployed strategic warheads.” Each U.S. B61 in Europe would mean one less deployed strategic warhead on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs. In order not to have to cut U.S. deployed strategic warheads too much, the number of Europe-based B61 bombs could be reduced. (Could thirty or fifty not provide allies the same level of political assurance?)

Continue nuclear sharing. NATO allies’ aircraft could train with U.S. strategic bombers in exercises for the use of (U.S.-based) nuclear weapons in support of the alliance. NATO allies could also maintain and exercise dual-capable aircraft for the contingency in which a crisis developed and/or the treaty broke down, even if there were no B61 bombs in Europe. 

Put more boots on the ground. NATO members could bolster conventional deterrence and defense in countries such as the Baltic states and Poland by increasing the size of the multinational formations in those countries to 2,000-2,500 troops each. The United States, which leads the multinational battalion in Poland, could deploy a company to each of the units in the Baltic states.

As Washington develops its negotiating approach, it should consult closely with allies, bearing in mind that the approach could have a major impact on their security perceptions. In a crisis or conventional war, a U.S. president would either be prepared to order the use of nuclear weapons in support of allies or not; the location of the weapons would be a secondary consideration. But location matters for purposes of assurance in NATO, and consultations should weigh whether and how to assure allies other than through the physical presence of U.S. nuclear arms.

Washington has for some time sought to get all U.S. and Russian nuclear arms on the negotiating table. That is a worthwhile goal for U.S. and allied security. Persuading Moscow will be hard enough. It would be a shame if differences within NATO emerged to frustrate that objective. 

Originally for The National Interest

The agenda for nuclear arms control and related issues in the 2020s is a broad one. As the United States, Russia and others figure out how to maintain and enhance strategic stability in a multi-player, multi-domain world, Washington and Moscow will continue to have a central role, writes Steven Pifer, a fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy and a retired US Foreign Service officer.

The Biden administration sees arms control as a tool that can advance security and stability. It will seek to engage Russia on further nuclear arms reductions and other measures. Arms control in the 2020s will reflect continuity with earlier efforts—nuclear arms reductions will remain a bilateral matter between Washington and Moscow—but also contain new elements. That reflects the fact that strategic stability has become a more complex concept.

Start with Strategic Stability

Donald Trump was the first American president in 50 years to reach no agreement in the area of nuclear weapons. President Biden sees arms control as an important policy tool. On his first full day in office, he agreed to extend the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) for five years. His administration plans to do more. On February 3, Secretary of State Blinken said Washington would “pursue with the Russian Federation, in consultation with Congress and US allies and partners, arms control that addresses all of its nuclear weapons.”

This will not happen immediately. The administration needs to get its team in place. It will conduct a review of US programs and doctrine, which may be broader than the nuclear posture reviews conducted by past administrations.

The first serious US-Russian engagement on nuclear arms issues will likely occur in strategic stability talks. The classic definition of strategic stability is a situation in which neither side has an incentive, in a severe crisis or conventional conflict, to use nuclear weapons first. For five decades beginning in the 1960s, strategic stability was based largely on comparing US and Soviet strategic offensive nuclear forces. If each side had the ability, even after absorbing a massive first strike, to retaliate with devastating consequences, neither had an incentive to use nuclear weapons.

Today’s strategic stability model is more complex. Instead of a two-player model based just on strategic nuclear forces, today’s is multi-player and multi-domain. Third-country nuclear forces such as China need to be factored in. In addition to nuclear weapons, the model should take account of missile defense, precision-guided conventional strike, space and cyber developments.

US-Russian strategic stability talks should address all these factors. They should also address doctrine. Case in point: escalate-to-deescalate. Most Russian experts assert that this never became official Russian doctrine. However, the Pentagon believes it has, and that influenced the 2018 US nuclear posture review. At the least, each side appears to believe that the other has lowered the threshold for using nuclear weapons. That should leave no one comfortable.

Nuclear Arms

Formal nuclear arms negotiations will, for the foreseeable future, remain a bilateral US-Russian matter. That is due to the disparity in numbers. According to the Federation of American Scientists, the United States has about 3,600 nuclear warheads in its active stockpile, while Russia has about 4,300. No third country has more than about 300.

The Trump administration tried to bring China into a US-Russia negotiation, but it never articulated a plan for doing so. That is no surprise. Washington and Moscow would not agree to reduce to China’s level, nor would they agree to legitimize a Chinese build-up to their levels, and China would not accept unequal limits.

New START caps the United States and Russia each at no more than 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and nuclear-capable bombers and no more that 1,550 deployed strategic warheads. Those limits will remain in force until February 2026.

However, New START’s limits do not cover 60-65 percent of the active nuclear stockpiles of the two countries. Reserve (or non-deployed) strategic nuclear warheads, and non-strategic nuclear warheads—whether deployed or non-deployed—are unconstrained.

After the Cold War, the United States dramatically reduced its non-strategic nuclear weapons, eliminating all sea-based and land-based systems. Today, the only US non-strategic nuclear weapon is the B61 gravity bomb. Russia, on the other hand, maintains a large number and variety of non-strategic nuclear warheads—close to 2,000 for land-, sea- and air-based delivery as well as for defensive systems. This raises concern that Russia might be postured to use such weapons in a conflict.

The US military maintains more reserve strategic warheads. This reflects a desire to hedge against technical surprises or adverse geopolitical developments. The US military has implemented New START reductions in a manner that would allow it, should the treaty collapse, to add or “upload” warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs that now carry fewer than their capacity. As Russia modernizes its strategic ballistic missiles, it also is expanding its upload capacity.

The logical next step for the United States and Russia would entail negotiation of an agreement with an aggregate limit covering all their nuclear warheads. (Retired but not yet dismantled warheads could be dealt with separately.) An aggregate limit could offset reductions in Russia’s numerical advantage in non-strategic nuclear warheads with reductions in the US numerical advantage in non-deployed strategic warheads.

For a notional agreement, assume an aggregate limit of no more than 2,500 total nuclear warheads. Within that aggregate, there could be a sublimit of no more than 1,000 deployed strategic warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and any new kinds of strategic systems with deployed warheads—the weapons most readily launched. This approach would treat bomber weapons as non-deployed, since they are not maintained on board aircraft. Ideally, all nuclear weapons other than those on deployed strategic delivery systems would be kept in storage. A new agreement could also lower the New START limits on deployed delivery systems and deployed and non-deployed launchers.

This would be ambitious. That said, it would leave each nuclear superpower with eight times as many nuclear weapons as any third country. Even if the agreement did not entail such dramatic reductions, the structure would, for the first time, capture all US and Russian nuclear warheads.

Such an agreement could enable the United States and Russia to begin to deal with third-country nuclear weapons states, and here is where nuclear arms control in the 2020s might get into new territory. Washington and Moscow could ask China, Britain and France to undertake unilateral commitments not to increase their nuclear weapon numbers as long as the United States and Russia were reducing theirs and agree to limited transparency measures to provide confidence that they were abiding by those commitments.

This US-Russian agreement would require new verification measures to monitor numbers of nuclear weapons in storage. That likely will make both sides’ militaries uncomfortable. But both have adjusted to uncomfortable monitoring measures in the past.

Some arms control experts assess that an agreement limiting all nuclear weapons, particularly non-strategic nuclear arms, is too ambitious and have suggested alternative approaches. One would expand New START’s limits to capture systems such as intercontinental ground-launched boost-glide missiles and nuclear-powered torpedoes, ban other new kinds of strategic systems, and reduce the ratio of deployed strategic warheads to deployed strategic delivery systems, but would not attempt to constrain non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Another alternative would require that non-strategic nuclear weapons be relocated away from bases with associated delivery systems to a small number of storage sites, with monitoring activities designed to verify the absence of nuclear weapons at the bases housing delivery systems, not at confirming or monitoring the number of weapons in storage. While originally suggested for Europe only, it could be broadened to apply on a global basis.

A third alternative would simply seek to lower New START’s limits. Hopefully, however, the US and Russian governments will demonstrate greater ambition.

Other Possible Issues on the US-Russia Agenda

Arms control may enter new territory in the 2020s on issues and types of weapons that, while not nuclear arms, still affect strategic stability. They could be discussed in US-Russian strategic stability talks. If a mandate were agreed, they could be spun off into separate negotiations.

One set of issues concerns missile defense. The US ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) system is designed to defend against rogue states, such as North Korea, not against a Russian or Chinese ballistic missile attack. Russian officials in the past have nevertheless indicated an interest in constraining missile defenses. Whether they will insist on negotiating on missile defense in connection with a next round of nuclear arms negotiations remains to be seen.

US missile defenses now and for the foreseeable future pose no serious threat to Russian strategic ballistic missiles, a point Russian officials sometimes appear to acknowledge. (China, with a much smaller strategic force, has greater grounds for concern, though the performance of GMD system has not been particularly good.) On the other hand, it would not seem difficult to craft an agreement covering strategic missile defenses such as the GMD system and Moscow missile defense system that would apply constraints but still leave the United States room for capabilities to defend against a North Korean ICBM attack. What would prove difficult would be the Washington politics, where Republicans oppose any limits on missile defense.

Another issue is precision-guided conventional strike weapons. In some cases, these can fulfill missions that previously required nuclear weapons. Air- and sea-launched cruise missiles have been in the US inventory for decades and now in the Russian inventory. Both sides are developing hypersonic weapons. With the demise of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, there is the 9M729 ground-launched cruise missile and likely other future intermediate-range missiles. It would be difficult to devise an arrangement that constrained all such weapons, but US and Russian officials might consider whether a subset poses a particular threat to strategic stability and should be subject to negotiation.

One possibility would seek to ban nuclear-armed intermediate-range missiles. Another possibility, though it has drawbacks, would build on the Russian idea for a moratorium on the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, provided that it would mean relocation of 9M729 missile systems out of Europe.

Operations in space—used for early warning, command, control and communications and other purposes—also can affect strategic stability. A broad agreement banning the militarization of space is difficult to envisage. However, US and Russian officials might explore more limited measures, such as keep-out zones around certain declared satellites, a ban on anti-satellite tests that generate orbital debris and a ban on emplacing weapons in space designed to strike targets on the Earth.

As for the cyber domain, traditional arms control measures appear ill-suited. Washington and Moscow might pledge not to interfere in the other side’s nuclear command, control and communication systems, but neither could be certain the pledge was being observed.

In contrast to nuclear arms reductions, which will remain a US-Russia issue in the 2020s, some related issues might be considered on a broader basis. For example, China increasingly appears a peer competitor with the United States and Russia in space operations. Moreover, China has many intermediate-range missiles. It remains in the US interest to engage China in strategic stability talks. At some point, trilateral or multilateral discussions might be appropriate.

The agenda for nuclear arms control and related issues in the 2020s is a broad one. As the United States, Russia and others figure out how to maintain and enhance strategic stability in a multi-player, multi-domain world, Washington and Moscow will continue to have a central role. There is much that could be done to enhance stability and strengthen global security. Washington and Moscow will have to overcome the mistrust created by violations of earlier arms control agreements and take an innovative approach, even if certain problems prove insoluble, at least in the near term. But they have an opportunity, and an obligation, to try.

Originally for Valdai Discussion Club

The China Program at Shorenstein APARC had the privilege of hosting Jude Blanchette, the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies​ (CSIS). The program, entitled "What’s ‘Communist’ about the Communist Party of China?," explored the goals and ideology of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as well as what they might mean for the future of China in the global community. Professor Jean Oi, William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics and director of the APARC China Program, moderated the event.

After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the goals of the CCP became less clear. As the country began to adopt market reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, CCP theorists were forced into contortions providing ideological justifications for policies that appeared overtly capitalist. Deng Xiaoping’s concept of “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” came to be seen as a theoretical fig leaf rather than a description of an egalitarian economic system, and by the 2000s, a consensus emerged that the CCP had completely abandoned any pretense of pursuing the Marxist vision it purported to hold. With the rise of Xi Jinping, however, the Party talks with renewed vigor about Marxism-Leninism and the goal of achieving actual, existing socialism. Has the CCP re-discovered communism?  In his talk, Blanchette discussed the abandoned and existing legacies of Mao Zedong, Marxism-Leninism, and the CCP’s vision of socialism. Watch now: 

On February 10, 2021, the China Program at Shorenstein APARC hosted Professor Oriana Skylar Mastro, Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies​ for the virtual program "Military Competition with China: Harder to Win Than During the Cold War?" Professor Jean Oi, William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics and director of the APARC China Program, moderated the event.

As US-China competition intensifies, experts debate the degree to which the current strategic environment resembles that of the Cold War. Those that argue against the analogy often highlight how China is deeply integrated into the US-led world order. They also point out that, while tense, US-China relations have not turned overtly adversarial. But there is another, less optimistic reason the comparison is unhelpful: deterring and defeating Chinese aggression is harder now than it was against the Soviet Union. In her talk, Dr. Mastro analyzed how technology, geography, relative resources and the alliance system complicate U.S. efforts to enhance the credibility of its deterrence posture and, in a crisis, form any sort of coalition. Mastro and Oi's thought-provoking discussion ranged from the topic of why even US allies are hesitant to take a strong stance against China to whether or not Taiwan could be a catalyst for military conflict. Watch now: 

ABSTRACT

In October 1957, Poland proposed the Rapacki Plan for the denuclearisation of Central Europe. While North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members attacked the initiative, Canada viewed it as a means to ease Cold War tensions. Although Canada joined with its allies to reject the Plan, it embarked on a quest for counterproposals to restrain NATO nuclear sharing and reduce the chances of nuclear war. Canada’s efforts alarmed Western allies and helped lead to a second Rapacki Plan. Overall, this article details Canada’s struggle to assert itself as a middle power and provides a robust example of Western interest in the Rapacki Plan.

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The U.S. and Russia on Wednesday extended the only remaining treaty that limits the deployment of nuclear weapons. But did the agreement go far enough? Rose Gottemoeller, a distinguished lecturer at Stanford University who served as undersecretary of state for arms control and international security during the Obama administration, joins Nick Schifrin to discuss the New START treaty.

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A consensus has grown in Washington that the next nuclear arms negotiation with Moscow should aim to limit all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, not just deployed strategic ones. That would raise challenging issues. Moscow may insist that it would put non-strategic weapons on the table only if Washington addresses issues of concern to Russia, particularly, missile defense. 

If that is the case, the Joe Biden administration should consider whether the benefits to the United States and allied security of limiting all nuclear weapons, including non-strategic nuclear arms, would justify accepting some constraints on missile defense. There are reasons to consider such a trade-off. Refusing to discuss missile defense could mean forgoing limits on non-strategic nuclear weapons and provide an impetus to others to increase their strategic offensive forces. 

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Arms control offers a tool to enhance U.S. security. After extending the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the Biden administration should seek to engage Russia in negotiation of a follow-on agreement and use that to draw third-country forces into the arms control process. It should also weigh how to handle other issues that can affect nuclear relations.

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    For nearly five decades, nuclear arms control has been an exclusive enterprise between Washington and Moscow. The resulting agreements have provided significant constraints on the U.S.-Soviet (later, U.S.-Russian) nuclear relationship while mandating substantial reductions in their arsenals. However, since the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which reduced U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces to levels not seen since the 1960s, no further progress has been made. Instead, the nuclear arms control regime appears to have broken down, leading some to conclude that the era of negotiated arms limitations has passed.

    The U.S. government has decisions to make: is it prepared to accept a world in which nuclear weapons go unconstrained, or do the reasons that led Washington to pursue limits on nuclear arms for more than 40 years remain valid? If the latter, U.S. officials will face a broad set of issues. Formal agreements can no longer entail just constraining U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces; they invariably will have to address related issues, including non-strategic nuclear arms, the nuclear forces of other countries, and perhaps missile defense. These questions will confront the U.S. government with a range of tough choices, such as whether to accept some limits on missile defense in order to secure limits on non-strategic nuclear weapons, and how hard to press for constraints on China’s modest nuclear arsenal. This article explores those issues and choices.

Read the rest at The Brown Journal of World Affairs