Prominent conflicts such as the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir and the conflict on the Korean Peninsula highlight the need for peaceful solutions to violent territorial disputes. Although the effectiveness of negotiated legal solutions to such conflicts is often questioned, a new Stanford study suggests that treaties that resolve territorial conflicts “work”— in the sense that they are associated with a large reduction in the probability of subsequent conflict.

The study by Kenneth A. Schultz, associate professor of political science, and Jennifer Jones, research fellow at the Stanford Center on International Conflict and Negotiation (SCICN), examined 141 pairs of states (dyads) that experienced at least one militarized territorial conflict between 1816 and 2001. Two-thirds (94) of these dyads made at least one legal commitment to resolve the territorial conflict. Two-thirds of those treaties “worked”; they were never followed by militarized conflict over the territory addressed in the agreement. A multiple regression analysis revealed that a legally binding agreement on territory is associated with a roughly 70 percent reduction in the probability of a subsequent militarized conflict.

Realist accounts of international relations predict that such treaties would work in preventing violence insofar as they allocate disputed territory in accordance with the prevailing balance of power between the affected states. Schultz and Jones’s study reveals that this “distributional” factor alone does not account for the reduced likelihood of subsequent militarized conflict. Some other variables must be at play in creating the “treaty effect."

The study accordingly examined whether the existence of a territorial treaty could itself constrain states from resorting to force to revise the agreement. In this view, the treaty effect stems from the unwillingness of the states involved to incur the costs — such as external sanctions or domestic outrage — that would stem from breaking a previously agreed-upon arrangement. Although tests indirectly support this hypothesis, the more frequent violation of simple nonaggression pacts suggests that treaties are not major constraints on state behavior. More research is necessary to determine exactly what types of salient constraints treaties place on states.

A third explanation for the treaty effect considers the domestic political costs of surrendering a state’s legal claim to territory allocated to the other party under a treaty when the claim itself is valuable, e.g., the claim to ownership over a whole piece of territory, as in Kashmir, or the claim to territory based on religious rights, as in Israel. In this view, a state would be reluctant to sign a treaty when the value of the claim to the disputed territory is particularly high. Treaties, then, serve as screening mechanisms — only those states that place a relatively low value on a claim to disputed territory will sign treaties. In this view, the treaty effect arises because states enter into treaties only when they do not want to keep fighting over disputed territory, rather than because of the inherent constraints of the treaty itself.

Although the results of the study are consistent with the view that territorial treaties work because they serve as screening mechanisms, the evidence remains unclear. There is no direct evidence that states employ a claimsbased rationale when declining to sign a treaty. Schultz and Jones are, however, working on creative ways to observe the role of this rationale for the treaty effect and expect future results to be more specific.

In their column on National Review on June 24, 2008 called “10 Concerns about Barack Obama,” William Bennett and Seth Leibsohn, begin their list of attacks on Senator Obama by writing that “Barack Obama’s foreign policy is dangerous, naïve, and betrays a profound misreading of history.” In arguing against any engagement with Iran, William Bennett and Seth Leibsohn point out that “Ronald Reagan met with no Soviet leader during the entirely of his first term in office.”

This statement is factually correct. And there was most certainly a big debate within Reagan Administration about whether to talk with the leaders of the Evil Empire. However, Bennett and Leibsohn imply in their piece that this debate was only resolved after the Soviet Union met some preconditions to talks and changed internally, that is after, as they write, that Reagan “was assured Gorbachev was a different kind of leader – after Perestroika, not before.”

In fact, the debate about engaging the evil empire was resolved three years before Reagan met with Gorbachev. The debate and the resolution in favor of talking to the leaders of the evil empires is meticulously chronicled in George’s Shultz’s memoir, Turmoil and Triumph: Diplomacy , Power, and the Victory of the American Ideal (1993). Just the title of Chapter 25, "Realistic Reengagement with the Soviets," underscores how misleading the Bennett and Leibsohn rendition of history is.

When they first came to Washington, many foreign policy advisors within Reagan administration advocated the Bennett and Leibsohn position and did not want to have any contact with the Soviets, even though every American president since the recognition to the USSR in 1933 had met with their Soviet counterparts. When George Shultz became Secretary of State in 1982, he began to challenge this policy of disengagement, arguing that the United States needed to engage both the Soviet leaders but also Soviet society. As he writes in his memoirs about the start of the New Year in 1983, “I wanted to develop a strategy for a new start with the Soviet Union. I felt we had to try to turn the relationship around: away from confrontation and towards real problem solving.” (p. 159) Shultz is writing about his thinking two years before Gorbachev comes to power.

Shultz’s idea for a turn towards engagement met resistance in the Reagan administration. Again, from his memoirs: “I knew the president’s White House staff would oppose such engagement. There was lots of powerful opposition around town to any efforts to bridge the chasm separating Moscow and Washington.” After listing the opponents to direct negotiations, which included Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and CIA head Bill Casey, Shultz affirmed that “I was determined not to hang back from engaging the Soviets because of fears that the ‘Soviet wins negotiations’.” (p. 159). Sound familiar? Instead the word, Iranians, for Soviets and you capture the essence of the debate today.

Shultz, as we all know, won this debate, convincing Reagan about the need to start talking directly to the Soviets (again well before Gorbachev came on to the scene). A subtitle of Chapter 12 of Shultz’s memoir is A President Ready to Engage. (p. 163). In early February 1983, Shultz even floats the idea of meeting directly with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin for a private chat, to which Reagan responds, “Great”, and then adds “I don’t intend to engage in a detailed exchange with Dobrynin , but I do tell him that if Andropov is wiling to do business, so am I” (p. 164). (Remember Andropov died in 1983 and his successor, Chernenko, also did not serve long as the Soviet leader before dying in 1985. from 1983-1985, there was a real crisis of leadership inside the Soviet Union, a factor that contributed to the lack of direct talks at the highest levels). Speed forwarding again to today’s Iran debate, which presidential candidate sounds more like Reagan?

Shultz’s approach toward engaging the Soviets offers another profound lesson for today’s Iran debate. Shultz never let the negotiations focus just on arms control. That played o the Soviet’s strengths. Rather, he insisted on an expanded agenda that always included human rights and democracy. Again, from his memoirs, "We were determined not to allow the Soviets to focus our negotiations simply on matters of arms control. So we continuously adhered to a broad agenda: human rights, regional issues, arms control, and bilateral issues." (p.267). This same approach is needed for dealing with the Iranian regime today.

Finally, Shultz never saw negotiations or expanding contacts with Soviets and Americans as a concession to Moscow or a signal of legitimacy for the communist dictatorship. In the debate about opening consulates in both countries – a move that some hardliners at the time saw as a sign of weakness – Shultz firmly supported the idea as a change in the American national interest. As he quotes from a memorandum that he wrote in 1982, "I believe the next step on our part should be to propose the negotiation of a new U.S.-Soviet cultural agreement and the opening of U.S. and Soviet consulates in Kiev and New York...Both of these proposals will sound good to the Soviets, but are unambiguously in our interest when examined from a hard headed American viewpoint."(p. 275). Exactly the same could be said about Iran today.

Historical analogies can only go far. Many dimensions of U.S.-Iranians relations differ radically from Cold War relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. But when observers do roll them out, getting the facts right should be precondition to the substantive date about their relevance.

Discussions began, tentatively at first, as the delegates slipped into the roles they had been assigned and for which they had prepared for several months. The tension mounted as they anticipated meeting with their heads of state, to whom they would propose their country’s goals for the upcoming U.N. Security Council meeting.

Thus began the Third Annual IDL Student Conference in International Security, sponsored by the Initiative on Distance Learning (IDL). IDL offers Stanford courses in international security to nine Russian universities via distance-learning technologies. Its annual conference brings together top students and instructors from each of the participating universities with students and faculty from Stanford. This was the first year that the conference centered on an international security simulation, led by political science professor Scott D. Sagan, director of CISAC, and Coit D. Blacker, director of FSI. Sagan has been conducting such security simulations for eight years at Stanford and other U.S. universities.

This year’s simulation scenario was the referral of Iran to the U.N. Security Council by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for failure to fully disclose its nuclear activities. Council delegates convened in the Russian provincial capital of Yaroslavl, 150 miles northeast of Moscow, due to “security concerns”— as they were informed—about U.N. headquarters in New York.

Delegates’ opening statements reflected a wide range of views on Iran’s status with the IAEA. The U.S. delegation called for sanctions and showed little interest in negotiation. “We find the Iranian regime corrupt and repressive,” said Oleg Borisov, head U.S. delegate and a student at Petrozavodsk State University. He added, rather menacingly, “The United States is not intending to use military force unless Iran keeps up its nuclear capability and continues to support terrorism.”

At the other end of the spectrum, Venezuela, Pakistan, and Iraq indicated no willingness to consider sanctioning Iran. China urged delegates to “choose the only right option—diplomacy.”

By the end of the two-day session, delegates had overcome seemingly intractable differences during four intensive legal drafting sessions. The council’s resolution gave Iran three months to comply with IAEA demands and provided for Iran to obtain enriched uranium from Russia, with the production, transport, and waste disposal to occur on Russian soil under IAEA controls.

As a learning experience, the simulation is well matched to the IDL program’s goal of fostering critical analysis among a new generation of students in post- Soviet Russia. FSI director Coit Blacker wants to develop future generations of diplomats and policymakers whose worldview is shaped “by how they think, not what they’re told to think.”

After the session ended, students reflected on what they had learned. Putting themselves in others’ shoes seemed the most valuable aspect for many. Natasha Pereira-Klamath, one of the Stanford undergraduates who participated in the Yaroslavl simulation as a representative of the Russian Federation, said she was surprised at the “extent to which people reflected the views of their (assigned) countries.” This was echoed by other students, who expressed their surprise at how easy it was to begin thinking as a representative of another country, although their official position might be very different from their own.

“I’m glad to see the resolution passed today,” said Homkosol Bheraya, an exchange student from Thailand who attends Ural State University. “I hope that in the real world this can happen someday.” Perhaps she will be in a position to advance that goal. “My dream,” she said, “is to one day work for the IAEA.”

Several years ago, a high-level Israeli official asked me to tell him everything I could about how the Israelis might find their Palestinian Mandela. His question was interesting and appropriate but also troubling because the Afrikaners didn’t really “find” Mandela. It took several months before the answer came to me. Show me the Palestinian to whom you Israelis are willing to lose, and I will to show you your Palestinian Mandela.

My friend had overlooked the fact that Mandela and the African National Congress had won in South Africa. The decisive element in the so-called miracle was that white South Africans had, in one way or another, accepted this outcome and had made it, if not their victory, then certainly something other than their defeat.

Much has been written about the many factors that drove the process forward, but no one would deny that Mandela’s leadership played a decisive role. Although he was offered his freedom numerous times if he would just give up the struggle against apartheid, it was a deal that only a quisling would make. Made of sterner stuff, Mandela refused to make the fundamental concession that the Afrikaners sought.

De Klerk’s decision to release Mandela unconditionally came in response to the unrest that had rendered the country ungovernable. De Klerk had hoped to engage Mandela in a lengthy process of negotiation in which he could be coaxed into making critical compromises. Nevertheless, after many ups and downs, it was de Klerk, not Mandela, who made the fundamental compromises.

How did this unbelievable turn of events come about? I think that a fundamental shift took place in the way de Klerk saw Mandela. De Klerk came to power thinking that Mandela was the only African who could make the concessions needed to keep Afrikaner South Africa afloat. Slowly, he came to see Mandela instead as the African who could give Afrikaners a future they could live with.

Mandela let no opportunity pass to talk about the place of white South Africans in the new South Africa. He emphasized time and again that majority rule did not mean the domination of the white minority by a black majority. Seeking a “middle ground between white fears and black hopes,” Mandela laid the very foundation for peace—“We do not want to drive you into the sea”—because there would be no peace unless white South Africans heard and believed his words.

In virtually every statement, Mandela presented a vision of the future in which white South Africans would be appreciated and respected. Those who heard him felt that they, their family, and their community could have a satisfying and secure life in what he was describing. Rather than offering concessions that would prop up the old, Mandela was offering a future to many who had begun to doubt that they had one.

It is worth noting that Mandela had no particular liking or even personal respect for de Klerk. Their relationship was often rancorous, especially at crucial moments toward the end of the negotiations. Indeed, Mandela went so far as to say publicly that de Klerk was “not fit to be a head of a government,” and yet his worst nightmare was that de Klerk might not be there when he needed him. Mandela confessed, “Whether I like him or not is irrelevant. I need him.”

Israelis need to find a Palestinian Mandela, and Palestinians need to find an Israeli Mandela. However, the Mandela they need to find is not the leader who will make the concessions they seek but the one to whom they can make the concessions they say they cannot offer. Mandela was this kind of leader: His actions and unequivocal words gave witness to a future that Afrikaners could embrace without fear.

Progress toward peace between the Israelis and Palestinians is not stalled because no one can envision the final settlement. Every thoughtful observer knows that some rough approximation of the Clinton formula is the only deal possible. The question is not so much what is needed—this much is known. The real question is who will lead us there.

The International Studies Association has awarded CISAC Co-Director Scott Sagan the 2008 Deborah “Misty” Gerner Innovative Teaching in International Studies Award for his simulation exercise that he has taught to Stanford undergraduates for the last decade through PS 114S “%course1%.” The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and United Nations Security Council (UNSC) simulation, which Sagan developed, helps students understand the complexities of international negotiations as they relate to national interests. The Gerner award recognizes an instructor “who has developed new or significantly refined effective teaching in the discipline” with particular emphasis on “pedagogy that engages students with issues of war [and] peace.”

Under Sagan’s guidance, the simulation has been successfully exported to Columbia, Dartmouth, Duke, Reed College and the University of California-Berkeley. “Students tell me the simulation is the highlight of their academic experience,” said Ron Hassner, an assistant professor of political science at Berkeley who is a CISAC visiting professor.

As many as 150 students, acting as delegates to an international negotiation on a nuclear weapons issue, participate in the three-day simulation. Sagan tries to make the exercise as realistic as possible—students are required to dress formally and adopt the language and posture of diplomats during private negotiations and plenary meetings. In preparation, students research and write memoranda outlining the goals that should guide their assigned country’s behavior, and what strategies their delegation should adopt to achieve its goals. Delegates also receive briefings and guidance from heads of state who are played by faculty and visiting scholars with experience in the real world of diplomacy and arms control negotiation.

Guest participants have included Ambassador Thomas Graham, President Bill Clinton’s special representative for arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament; Ambassador James Goodby, Clinton’s special representative for the security and dismantlement of nuclear weapons, chief negotiator for nuclear threat reduction agreements, and vice chair of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty talks; and Keith Hansen, a member of the U.S. negotiating team for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Traditionally, a law student has played the role of a UNSC undersecretary for legal affairs, to guide students through the process of drafting an international agreement. “Aside from enriching the learning experience, contact with these diplomats also contributes a solemnity and realism to the simulation,” said CISAC visiting Professor Ron Hassner, a Berkeley assistant professor of political science who teaches the class.

At Berkeley, almost 500 students have participated in Sagan’s simulations. Three years ago, Hassner said, Graham was so impressed by the students’ achievements during the exercise that he invited two student “ambassadors” to join him at the May 2005 NPT review conference in New York City. “These students had never been on an airplane, let alone visited the United Nations,” Hassner said. “Students tell me the simulation was the highlight of their academic experience.”

The award is named in honor of Deborah J. “Misty” Gerner, a University of Kansas political science professor and an internationally noted expert in Middle Eastern conflict who died of cancer in 2006. She was 50 years old.

For more information about the award: Deborah Gerner Teaching Award.

STANFORD, Calif., February 14, 2008—Stanford Law School today announced that O’Melveny & Myers law firm and a number of its current and retired partners have committed $1.5 million over five years to permanently endow the Warren Christopher Professorship of the Practice of International Law and Diplomacy. The gift is one of the largest from a law firm to fund a faculty position at the law school.

The joint appointment between Stanford Law School and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) was first established as a visiting position in fall 2003 to pay tribute to Warren Christopher, a former Secretary of State of the United States and an alumnus of Stanford Law School. Christopher is considered by many to be the consummate lawyer-statesman—multifaceted and unsurpassed in his ability to bridge the gap between national interests and global affairs, and public service and private enterprise. Among his many accomplishments, his negotiations played a key role in the release of American hostages in Iran; he chaired the commission that investigated the Rodney King assault and subsequent riots in Los Angeles; and he served on the California Hate Crimes Task Force. Today he continues as a senior partner at O’Melveny & Myers, and is co-chair—along with former Secretary James A. Baker III—of the National War Powers Commission.

“This gift, in honor of one of the nation’s greatest statesmen, provides a lasting endowment to support the study and teaching of international issues that impact the world and its future,” said Stanford Law School Dean Larry Kramer. “What we teach our students about practicing law in a global context—whether it’s about easing relationships between governments, or conducting cross-border transactional work for private parties—has been profoundly shaped by all that Warren Christopher has accomplished over his lifetime.”

Because most lawyers have a multinational dimension to their practice today, the law school is expanding its international law program and shaping its entire curriculum to better prepare its graduates to practice across national borders. The Warren Christopher chair is a key part of that transformation.

“We are delighted to support the Christopher chair and thereby to recognize Warren Christopher’s many accomplishments, and his continuing example and service,” said A.B. Culvahouse, chairman of O’Melveny & Myers. “The values that Chris represents are those of our firm, and we are pleased that the Christopher chair will continue to honor Warren Christopher’s excellence, leadership and citizenship.”

Stanford Law School’s innovative curriculum immerses students in the theory and practice of international law through combined legal, business organization, and policy studies. The faculty approaches international law not just as a subject for academic inquiry but also as a force for change in the world. They fundamentally understand how law operates in relation to governments, international organizations, and the global economy because they have practiced international law in these contexts. For example, faculty who teach public international law and international human rights have served as lawyers in the U.S. Department of State and litigated terrorism cases before the Supreme Court of the United States. Faculty who teach international deal making and arbitration have completed complex international transactions and litigated disputes over international agreements. Along with teaching international human rights law, international criminal law, and international administrative law, the law school also teaches international trade, international business, comparative law, international tax, international administrative law—and the interplay between public and private law in the global arena.

The idea for the Christopher chair was driven by Stanford Law School alumnus Richard L. Morningstar, former U.S. Ambassador to the European Union, and his wife Faith Morningstar. Many other supporters joined the Morningstars in initially underwriting the professorship, including Edison International and the Carnegie Corporation of New York, of which Christopher is a former chairman. O’Melveny & Myers partner Steve Warren spearheaded the firm’s gift effort.

"We are so pleased that O’Melveny & Myers has chosen to give this magnificent gift in honor of one of the most inspirational statesmen of the 20th century," said Coit D. Blacker, director of FSI. "This gift will ensure that Warren Christopher's legacy, his commitment to public policy, and his exemplary service to our nation will live on for generations of Stanford students."

In 2003, Allen S. Weiner was appointed as the inaugural Warren Christopher Professor of the Practice of International Law and Diplomacy as a visiting chair, both to Stanford Law School and the Stanford Institute for International Studies (the precursor to FSI). Weiner is a former State Department attaché and legal counselor for the U.S. Embassy in The Hague, and is involved in the effort to stop global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. During his tenure as Warren Christopher Professor of the Practice of International Law and Diplomacy, Weiner taught and conducted research in the fields of public international law and foreign relations law of the United States. Weiner remains at Stanford Law School as a senior lecturer in international law, co-director of the Stanford Program in International Law, and co-director of the Stanford Center on International Conflict and Negotiation (SCICN).

Following Allen Weiner, William H. Taft IV was appointed to the Warren Christopher Professorship of the Practice of International Law and Diplomacy through the 2007-2008 school year, teaching Contemporary Issues in International Law and Diplomacy and Foreign Relations Law. Like Weiner, he also joined FSI at Stanford as a visiting scholar. Taft is a former Deputy Secretary of Defense and U.S. Ambassador to NATO. He served at the Federal Trade Commission, in the Office of Management and Budget, was general counsel at the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and was the U.S. Department of State's Legal Advisor, the highest legal position in the department. Taft also worked for several years in private practice, and is currently of counsel in the Washington D.C. office of Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson.

About Stanford Law School

Stanford Law School is one of the nation’s leading institutions for legal scholarship and education. Its alumni are among the most influential decision makers in law, politics, business, and high technology. Faculty members argue before the Supreme Court, testify before Congress, and write books and articles for academic audiences, as well as the popular press. Along with offering traditional law school classes, the school has embraced new subjects and new ways of teaching.

About the Freeman Spogli Institute

The Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) is Stanford University's primary center for rigorous and innovative research on the major international issues and challenges of our time. FSI builds on Stanford's impressive intellectual strengths and exacting academic standards through interdisciplinary research conducted by its university-wide faculty, researchers, and visiting scholars.