By developing a strategic approach to the implementation of peace accords in civil war, the United Nations can better the odds for ending a war and fostering development in the long run. Recent attempts at implementation have suffered from recurring difficulties: incomplete, vague and expedient agreements; lack of coordination between implementing agencies; lack of sustained attention by the international community; incomplete fulfillment of agreements by warring parties; and the presence of 'spoilers' who seek to destroy and incipient peace. To overcome these difficulties, the UN must encourage the parties to choose political, cultural, social and economic security-building measures during the negotiation phase and systematically apply confidence-building measures to the military components of implementation. This demands a reconsideration of peace making in a civil war to include a long-term international commitment to the development of war-torn societies.

Robert Axelrod's The Evolution of Cooperation has been widely acclaimed in the few years since its publication. Given its promise for promoting cooperation in ‘prisoner's dilemma games' (PDGs), such praise is unsurprising. The purpose of this paper is to consider whether the tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy Axelrod recommends for achieving an evolution of cooperation in PD situations has application to the negotiation of arms control treaties.

The expected degree of compliance with agreements or treaties under negotiation must be inferred from the record of the past as well as from the expectations that are raised by the willingness of the parties to dedicate increased resources to verification, to accept more-intrusive inspections, to exhibit greater openness, and to provide for cooperative verification measures.  Yet such expectations for compliance must be tempered by the recognition of fundamental factors, which are discussed.

The missile race cannot be ended with one old stroke of the negotiator's pen on a single comprehensive and lasting treaty. I foresee instead a continuing negotiation, a continuing exchange of information on weapon plans and a continuing series of agreements. This article suggests possible structures for such a dialogue, given the division of power over the conduct of foreign policy between the Executive and the Congress.