For U.S. intelligence agencies, the twenty-first century began with a shock, when 19 al Qaeda operatives hijacked four planes and perpetrated the deadliest attack ever on U.S. soil. In the wake of the attack, the intelligence community mobilized with one overriding goal: preventing another 9/11. The CIA, the National Security Agency, and the 15 other components of the U.S. intelligence community restructured, reformed, and retooled. Congress appropriated billions of dollars to support the transformation.
That effort paid off. In the nearly two decades that U.S. intelligence agencies have been focused on fighting terrorists, they have foiled numerous plots to attack the U.S. homeland, tracked down Osama bin Laden, helped eliminate the Islamic State’s caliphate, and found terrorists hiding everywhere from Afghan caves to Brussels apartment complexes. This has arguably been one of the most successful periods in the history of American intelligence.
But today, confronted with new threats that go well beyond terrorism, U.S. intelligence agencies face another moment of reckoning. From biotechnology and nanotechnology to quantum computing and artificial intelligence (AI), rapid technological change is giving U.S. adversaries new capabilities and eroding traditional U.S. intelligence advantages. The U.S. intelligence community must adapt to these shifts or risk failure as the nation’s first line of defense.
Forty years after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, the two superpowers are competing and contesting every arena, from trade to AI research and from space exploration to maritime rights. Instead of what Americans referred to as engagement and Chinese called reform and opening, many experts and analysts now characterize the relations between the two countries as dangerously brittle. Some see a new kind of Cold War in the making. Such assertions, however, argues Shorenstein APARC Fellow Thomas Fingar, “both ignore history and impute a level of fragility that has not existed for many years.”
Fingar reflects on the U.S.-China bilateral relationship in a new article, “Forty years of formal—but not yet normal—relations,” published in the China International Strategy Review. He claims that the relationship is resilient and not destined for conflict, albeit it is beset by a host of aspirational, perceptual, and structural differences.
A political scientist and China specialist who served over two decades in senior government positions, Fingar urges readers to remember that assertions of fragility of the U.S.-China relationship undervalue the strength, scope, and significance of interdependence, shared interests, and constituencies in both countries. These, he says, have a substantial stake in the maintenance of at least minimally cooperative relations.
U.S.-China relations are indeed highly asymmetrical: Chinese citizens and organizations have far greater access to the United States than Americans do to China, notes Fingar. He also recognizes that the troubles that have soured the relationship are more intricate and often more sensitive than those of the past. Decades ago, most of the issues that arose were handled at the governmental level. But now “the number and variety of players with stakes in the relationship and disputes with counterpart actors are much greater.” Furthermore, explains Fingar, the U.S. business community is expressing a stronger voice for government action to change Chinese behavior and is not as consistent an advocate of stability in U.S. policy toward China as it used to be. “This is an extremely important development,” he says, “because it reverses a key dynamic in the U.S.-China relationship.”
Ultimately, however, the two countries and our institutions and people are linked by myriad ties that bring mutual benefits as well as the constraints of interdependence. “I remain confident that we will continue to be able to manage the relationship,” concludes Fingar. He expresses disappointment, though, that normalization of U.S.-China relations remains a work in progress and cautions that merely managing the relationship to prevent it from deteriorating is an unsatisfactory goal that should be unacceptable to both sides. Not only does such a low bar limit what each counterpart can achieve, but it also inhibits the kind of cooperation required to address transnational challenges like climate change, infectious disease, and proliferation of dangerous technologies.
Thirty years ago this week, I watched the news from Beijing and started shredding my bedding. It was the night before my college graduation, I had been studying Chinese politics, and news had broken that college students just like us had been gunned down in Tiananmen Square after weeks of peaceful and exhilarating democracy protests—carried on international TV. In the iconic square where Mao Zedong had proclaimed the People’s Republic decades before, bespectacled students from China’s best universities had camped out, putting up posters with slogans of freedom in Chinese and English. A “goddess of democracy” figure modeled after the Statue of Liberty embodied their hopes—and ours—for political liberation in China.
On my campus back then were just a handful of students majoring in East Asian studies. Learning of the brutal crackdown in Beijing, we somehow found one another, gathered our friends, and stayed up making hundreds of white armbands for classmates to wear at commencement the next day. Grappling with the cold realities of the “real world” we were about to enter, we didn’t know what else to do. So we tore sheets and cried for what might have been.
The June 4, 1989, massacre was a horrifying spectacle that the Chinese government has sought to erase from national memory ever since. But, 30 years later, contemplating what might have been is more important than ever. In hindsight, Tiananmen Square serves as a continuing reminder about just how much China has defied, and continues to defy, the odds and predictions of experts. The fact is that generations of American policy makers, political scientists, and economists have gotten China wrong more often than they’ve gotten China right. In domestic politics, economic development, and foreign policy, China has charted a surprising path that flies in the face of professional prognostications, general theories about anything, and the experience of other nations.
On March 31, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that two Chinese Air Force (PLAAF) J-11 jets crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait. This violated the long-held tacit agreement between China and Taiwan that neither side should cross the median line.
Taiwan deemed this “an intentional, reckless & provocative action,” which triggered “a 10-minute standoff” in the air. As Asia security expert Bonnie S. Glaser notes that, if intentional, this would be the first PLAAF crossing of the median line in about 20 years. In this case, it’s likely that Taiwan, not the South China Sea, prompted Beijing’s actions.
An unresolved issue from the Chinese civil war, Taiwan has always been a “core interest” to party leaders in Beijing. Here are some key takeaways from my research on China-Taiwan relations…
To hear more from Ketian, don't miss her recently posted video Q&A. In addition, be sure to RSVP for her April 16 seminar "Killing the Chicken to Scare the Monkey: Explaining Coercion by China in the South China Sea."
What are the effects of international intervention on the rule of law after civil war? Rule of law requires not only that state authorities abide by legal limits on their power, but also that citizens rely on state laws and institutions to adjudicate disputes. Using an original survey and list experiment in Liberia, I show that exposure to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) increased citizens’ reliance on state over nonstate authorities to resolve the most serious incidents of crime and violence, and increased nonstate authorities’ reliance on legal over illegal mechanisms of dispute resolution. I use multiple identification strategies to support a causal interpretation of these results, including an instrumental variables strategy that leverages plausibly exogenous variation in the distribution of UNMIL personnel induced by the killing of seven peacekeepers in neighboring Côte d'Ivoire. My results are still detectable two years later, even in communities that report no further exposure to peacekeepers. I also find that exposure to UNMIL did not mitigate and may in fact have exacerbated citizens’ perceptions of state corruption and bias in the short term, but that these apparently adverse effects dissipated over time. I conclude by discussing implications of these complex but overall beneficial effects.
On the heels of the abrupt ending of the Hanoi summit between President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, with the future of the diplomacy of denuclearization in question, the Korea Program at Shorenstein APARC convened the 11th Koret Workshop, appropriately titled this year “North Korea and the World in Flux.”
The workshop, an annual gathering made possible through generous funding from the Koret Foundation, brought together international experts in Korean affairs for a full day of panel discussions. Participants assessed the U.S.-DPRK summit diplomacy, examined the challenges and opportunities in media coverage related to the negotiations between the two countries, and considered the prospects and pitfalls for summitry with North Korea in the near term. A report on the workshop proceedings is forthcoming.
At a midday public keynote, General Vincent Brooks, U.S. Army (Ret.), spoke before a packed audience about the challenges and opportunities in Korea. Brooks, who recently retired from active duty as the four-star general in command of all U.S. Forces in Korea, provided his unique and very-timely assessment of the situation on the Korean peninsula, and offered his insights on where the diplomacy of denuclearization may go next.
Abstract: How do nuclear-armed states coerce their adversaries in wars with limited aims without using nuclear weapons? I develop a theory of strategic substitution to explain why states use space, cyber and conventional missile weapons instead of nuclear weapons to maximize leverage against their adversaries. I also explain how they select space, cyber, and conventional missile force postures, defined as weapons and plans for using them. Threats to use space, cyber and conventional missile weapons are more credible sources of strategic leverage against adversaries in wars that do not threaten a state’s survival. I demonstrate the plausibility of the theory using China’s cyber force posture. China developed space, cyber and conventional missile weapons to solve a common problem: giving Beijing the leverage it could not gain from its nuclear weapons in a future war over Taiwanese independence involving the United States. Using original Chinese-language written sources and interviews conducted during extensive fieldwork, I show that Chinese leaders pursued cyber weapons to maximize their strategic leverage after the United States bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999. As China’s vulnerability to cyber attacks grew during the 2000s, its appetite for risk in using cyber weapons declined, resulting in a change to its military cyber force posture in 2014.
Speaker Bio: Fiona Cunningham is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at CISAC. Her research interests lie at the intersection of technology and conflict, with an empirical focus on China. She received her PhD in September 2018 from the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where she was a member of the Security Studies Program. Her dissertation explained China’s development of space, cyber and conventional missile force postures as substitutes for using nuclear weapons to coerce adversaries. Her research is based on extensive fieldwork, including a year-long dissertation research fellowship at the Renmin University of China, Beijing, in 2015-6. She was a Pre-Doctoral Fellow in the Cyber Security Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, in 2017-8. Fiona’s research has been supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation, China Confucius Studies Program, and the MIT Center for International Studies. Her research on China's nuclear strategy has been published in the quarterly journal, International Security. Fiona holds a Bachelor of Arts in Politics and International Relations from the University of New South Wales and a Bachelor of Laws from the University of Sydney, both with first-class honors. She was a research associate at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney from 2009 until 2012, where she focused on extended nuclear deterrence in East Asia and nuclear nonproliferation. Fiona speaks Mandarin Chinese and French.
Fiona Cunningham
Postdoctoral Fellow
CISAC, Stanford University
A group of 20 faculty and fellows participate in an orientation visit to Indo-Pacific Command headquarters, Honolulu, Hawaii, February 21–22, 2019, organized and sponsored by the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative. Photo courtesy of the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative
On February 21–22, faculty and fellows from Stanford University traveled to Oahu, Hawaii for an orientation visit at the United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), the U.S. military command responsible for the conduct of the U.S. military’s missions throughout the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and Asia.
The visit brought together scholars and researchers from Stanford, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Council on Foreign Relations, and Macquarie University, Australia. Organized by the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative (USASI) and the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), the visit included meetings with the commanders and staffs of INDOPACOM and five of its subordinate commands (U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Air Forces Pacific, U.S. Marine Forces Pacific, and U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific), and a tour of Arleigh Burke-class Aegis destroyer USS John Paul Jones (DDG-52).
The visitors also interacted with the U.S. Army’s 25th Infantry Division’s leadership and the unit’s Jungle Training Center. The busy itinerary provided the group a superb opportunity to learn about INDOPACOM’s and its subordinate units’ threat assessments, capabilities, doctrine, regional partnerships, and readiness challenges.
These trips offer great access to America’s armed forces to those whose research focuses on or relates to national security issues, says Karl Eikenberry.
Karl Eikenberry, Director of the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative (USASI), a former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan and himself a retired U.S. Army lieutenant general said: “USASI has over the past five years organized annual trips to U.S. military commands for Stanford FSI faculty and fellows. These trips offer great access to America’s armed forces to those whose research focuses on or relates to national security issues. The insights gained inform analysis, while the host organizations gain fresh perspectives different from those found within their commands.”
Photo courtesy of the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative
Discussions began on February 21st at Camp H.M. Smith, the Headquarters of INDOPACOM. Brigadier General Jonathan Braga, U.S. Army, SOCPAC Commander and his staff discussed his command’s unique capabilities and roles in both conventional and counterterrorist/counterinsurgency warfare operations. Major General Michael Minihan, U.S. Air Force, INDOPACOM Chief of Staff, then hosted a wide-ranging session on his organization’s implementation of the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy at a time of dynamic change within the region.
Photo courtesy of Timothy R. Mungie
This was followed by a working lunch at the INDOPACOM Flag Mess with key staff members of MARFORPAC who explained U.S. Marine force posture and contingency missions throughout the Pacific Region. The Stanford group then proceeded to Hickam Field and met with General Charles Brown, Commander, PACAF, and his Deputy Commander, Major General Russell Mack. General Brown detailed the critical role played by airlift and airpower in the vast Indo-Pacific region, and the development of new concepts for the employment of U.S. Air Force capabilities in joint (inter-service) and combined (inter-allied) operations.
Photo courtesy of Timothy R. Mungie
The visiting faculty and fellows then transited to Pearl Harbor for a tour of USS John Paul Jones led by Commanding Officer, Commander Jesse Mink, United States Navy, and Executive Officer, Commander Robert Watts, USN. Noteworthy was the destroyer’s sophisticated integrated air, surface, and underseas warfare systems, and the emphasis placed on resilience in high-end combat situations. Following the ship tour, the group attended a PACFLT command briefing chaired by the Commander, Admiral John Aquilino.
The dialogue made clear PACFLT’s emphasis on a holistic approach to deterrence and decisive operations, with an eye on future requirements. The first day of the trip ended with a working reception at the historic “Nimitz House” hosted by Admiral Aquilino, offering the attendees a chance to engage in conversations with the Commander and his staff.
The second day of the trip began with an introduction to the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), followed by expert presentations and breakout sessions on select topics including the Chinese One Belt One Road plan, the security of Taiwan, pandemic threats in the Indo-Pacific region, and cyber operations. The Stanford team then traveled to Fort Shafter for a meeting with Brigadier General Pete Andrysiak, U.S. Army and Chief of Staff, USARPAC. BG Andrysiak and the USARPAC staff elaborated on the evolving U.S. Army’s regional doctrine and extensive partnership activities.
A highlight of the group’s time in Oahu came with a visit to the U.S. Army’s 25th Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks, and the 25th ID Jungle Training center via UH-60 Blackhawk Helicopters. There Brigadier General J.B. Vowell, Assistant Division Commander, 25th Infantry Division and U.S. Army Hawaii (himself a former FSI Senior Military Fellow), discussed the division’s extensive missions throughout the region, including in the Korean Peninsula.
Photo courtesy of Francis Fukuyama
Faculty and fellows were also able to “get their boots (or at least tennis shoes) muddy” in the U.S. Army’s rugged training area in northern Oahu, with highly skilled soldiers demonstrating jungle warfare tactics and techniques. The trip ended with the participants hosting a reception at the Hale Koa Hotel Warriors Lounge for their many hosts over the past two days.
The trip to INDOPACOM Headquarters provided a rare opportunity for participants to talk directly with senior U.S. military leaders in the most important region of the world and to gain a better understanding of their perspectives and the many challenges that they are addressing. Faculty and fellows interacted with junior leaders at the tactical level, helping them gain an appreciation of the ethos of those serving at the cutting edge. The hosts all commented on the benefit of learning the views of scholars, many of whom have spent their academic careers writing about national security issues.
The trip provided fascinating insights into how the U.S. military views the rapidly evolving national security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region, says Larry Diamond.
“The trip provided fascinating insights into how the U.S. military views the rapidly evolving national security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region, and how it is organized to defend against the threats. You can read about much of this in the media and the journals, but there is just no substitute for being there, seeing our facilities on the ground, and engaging directly with the remarkable men and women (and one thing that struck me is that there are quite a number of women) who are responsible for our defense,” said Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and at the Center on Democracy, Development & the Rule of Law (CDDRL) at FSI.
FSI scholars particularly valued the opportunity to connect one-on-one.
“It was invaluable to meet and hear directly from the individuals and organizations who are working so hard to ensure our security,” said Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) Senior Research Scholar Megan Palmer. For CISAC Pre-doctoral Fellow Erik Lin-Greenberg, “the opportunity to interact with decision-makers from tactical to strategic levels was incredibly valuable and helped inform my own research.”
Political scientist Asfandyar Mir has studied security affairs in South Asia for years. Now a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, Mir explains the latest developments, old conflicts, and potential conflagrations in the ongoing crisis between nuclear-armed rivals India and Pakistan.
RFE/RL: Where do you see the military situation moving after India and Pakistan engaged in what appears to be retaliatory air strikes and cross-border shelling?
Asfandyar Mir: The current stand-off between India and Pakistan hasn't fully de-escalated, but it isn't as tense as it was some days ago. After Pakistan retaliated with air strikes against India on February 27, the crisis intensified -- it appeared the Indian government was considering a follow-on retaliation. In that backdrop, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan's gesture of returning the Indian Air Force pilot, captured by Pakistan after his plane was shot down, lowered the political temperature, eased the situation somewhat. That said, military forces on both sides remain mobilized in large numbers, and the Indian government still hasn’t given a clear-cut signal of wanting to de-escalate.
RFE/RL: Do you see the current leadership in India and Pakistan as capable of deescalating given the domestic pressures they currently face?
Mir: The leadership of the two countries has different political incentives. On the Indian side, Prime Minister [Narendra] Modi still has incentives to re-escalate. He is going into a national election. His government’s economic performance has been weak, so he appears to be relying more on foreign policy issues like confronting Pakistan -- an issue the Indian electorate cares about. Pakistan’s shooting down of the Indian aircraft and capturing of the air force pilot also deeply embarrassed him and his political party, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP).
On the Pakistan side, two leaders matter: Prime Minister Imran Khan and chief of the country's powerful army, General Qamar Bajwa. After the first Indian military raid, both were left embarrassed before their key domestic audiences: Khan in front of his voter base and Bajwa in front of his officer corps.
However, Pakistan's retaliatory strikes not only reversed that damage but enhanced their domestic political standing. Now both the leaders want a deescalation. Khan has made his first move to deescalate. He is also insisting with a dialogue offer to India on terrorism on India's terms. What he hasn’t done and could do to defuse the situation is a crackdown against the group behind the February 14 terror attack, Jaish-e-Muhammed.
Khan, however, would need Bajwa’s support for such a crackdown. It remains unclear whether Bajwa would agree. The Pakistani military hasn’t acted against Pakistan-based jihadis operating in Kashmir. Instead, it has seen them as valuable allies in confronting India in Kashmir.
RFE/RL: What happens to the Kashmir issue now?
Mir: We remain very far from any meaningful progress on the dispute over Kashmir. In recent years, India has intensified its crackdown in Kashmir against violent and non-violent separatist groups. India also employs a heavy-handed counterinsurgency strategy, which frequently targets the civilian population. As a result, resentment in the Kashmiri population toward the Indian state remains very high. The Indian government continues to see a coercive approach instead of a political approach involving concessions as the way forward in the disputed region.
Pakistan also remains firm in its territorial claim over Kashmir. Given India’s unwillingness to make concessions and the deep alienation in the region toward the Indian state, Pakistan is likely to continue political and military support for the insurgency in Kashmir.
RFE/RL: What dangers do jihadi groups present to Pakistan?
Mir: It is commonly assumed that jihadi groups operating against India in Kashmir pose a direct threat to Pakistan. This was true a decade ago, when factions of Kashmir-focused jihadi groups defected toward transnational jihadis like Al-Qaeda. It appears that the process has stopped. Major Kashmir-focused jihadi groups based in Pakistan do not challenge the Pakistani government. These groups have also consolidated control over their cadres, preventing fragmentation toward Al-Qaeda and [the ultra-radical] Islamic State (IS).
This is not to say there are no indirect bad effects of such groups on Pakistan. These groups spawn a large jihadi infrastructure, which is a source of radicalization in the country. Pakistan continually faces international opprobrium, even from its allies like China privately, for allowing such groups to operate from its territory.
RFE/RL: What has the international community's role been in the current crisis?
Mir: [U.S.] President [Donald] Trump made an important statement in Hanoi on February 28, suggesting that the U.S. government has been involved in mediating an end to the India-Pakistan crisis. Besides the U.S., Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, China, and Russia have sought to deescalate the tensions.
Overall, Pakistan is under pressure from the international community for not doing enough to curb anti-India jihadi groups. Still, it is striking that beyond condemnation, the U.S. and other major powers have not pledged any material support to the Indian government like sanctions against Pakistani leadership or military support for Indian operations.
RFE/RL: Did nuclear weapons play a role in the current crisis?
Mir: Nuclear weapons have played a role. Following the first Indian air strike on February 26, the Pakistani military spokesman stated that the government was activating the body which decides the deployment and use of nuclear weapons. This was a clear-cut signal by Pakistan that it would use nuclear weapons if the crisis exacerbated. I believe that deterred a sizable Indian response after Pakistan conducted its retaliatory strikes on February 27.
More than a century after citizen armies became an international norm, nearly two dozen states actively recruit foreigners into their militaries. Why do these states skirt the strong citizen-soldier norm and continue to welcome foreigners? To explain this practice, we first identify two puzzles associated with foreign recruitment. The first is practical: foreign recruits pose loyalty, logistical, and organizational challenges that domestic soldiers do not. The second is normative: noncitizen soldiers lie in a normative gray zone, permitted under the letter of international law but in tension with the spirit of international norms against mercenary armies. Next, we survey foreign military recruitment programs around the world and sort them into three broad types of programs, each with its own primary motivation: importing expertise, importing labor, and bolstering international bonds. We explain these categories and explore three exemplary cases in depth: Australia, Bahrain, and Israel. Our findings suggest that foreign recruitment can affect a state’s military operations by allowing militaries to rapidly develop advanced capabilities, by reducing the political risk associated with the use of force, and by expanding a state’s influence among former colonial and diaspora populations.
